Preface

7 min

They who have presumed to dogmatize on nature, as on some well investigated subject, either from self-conceit or arrogance, and in the professorial style, have inflicted the greatest injury on philosophy and learning. For they have tended to stifle and interrupt inquiry exactly in proportion as they have prevailed in bringing others to their opinion: and their own activity has not counterbalanced the mischief they have occasioned by corrupting and destroying that of others. They again who have entered upon a contrary course, and asserted that nothing whatever can be known, whether they have fallen into this opinion from their hatred of the ancient sophists, or from the hesitation of their minds, or from an exuberance of learning, have certainly adduced reasons for it which are by no means contemptible. They have not, however, derived their opinion from true sources, and, hurried on by their zeal and some affectation, have certainly exceeded due moderation. But the more ancient Greeks (whose writings have perished), held a more prudent mean, between the arrogance of dogmatism, and the despair of scepticism; and though too frequently intermingling complaints and indignation at the difficulty of inquiry, and the obscurity of things, and champing, as it were, the bit, have still persisted in pressing their point, and pursuing their intercourse with nature; thinking, as it seems, that the better method was not to dispute upon the very point of the possibility of anything being known, but to put it to the test of experience. Yet they themselves, by only employing the power of the understanding, have not adopted a fixed rule, but have laid their whole stress upon intense meditation, and a continual exercise and perpetual agitation of the mind.

Those who have claimed to speak authoritatively about nature, as if it were already well understood, have greatly harmed philosophy and learning. They have done so through self-conceit or arrogance, speaking in the manner of professors. The more they have persuaded others to accept their views, the more they have stifled and interrupted inquiry. Their own efforts have not made up for the harm they have done by corrupting and destroying the efforts of others. Others have taken the opposite course, claiming that nothing at all can be known. They may have reached this view through hatred of the ancient sophists, uncertainty of mind, or an excess of learning. Their arguments are certainly not to be dismissed. But their view does not come from true sources. Carried away by zeal and a desire to appear learned, they have certainly gone beyond reasonable limits. The more ancient Greeks, whose writings have been lost, took a wiser middle course. They stood between the arrogance of dogmatism and the despair of skepticism. They complained and protested too often about the difficulty of inquiry and the obscurity of things. They were, as it were, champing at the bit. Yet they persisted in pursuing their questions and engaging with nature. They seem to have thought it better to test knowledge through experience than to dispute whether anything could be known. Yet even they relied only on the power of the understanding and followed no fixed rule. Instead, they placed all their emphasis on intense meditation and the constant exercise and restless activity of the mind.

Our method, though difficult in its operation, is easily explained. It consists in determining the degrees of certainty, while we, as it were, restore the senses to their former rank, but generally reject that operation of the mind which follows close upon the senses, and open and establish a new and certain course for the mind from the first actual perceptions of the senses themselves. This, no doubt, was the view taken by those who have assigned so much to logic; showing clearly thereby that they sought some support for the mind, and suspected its natural and spontaneous mode of action. But this is now employed too late as a remedy, when all is clearly lost, and after the mind, by the daily habit and intercourse of life, has come prepossessed with corrupted doctrines, and filled with the vainest idols. The art of logic therefore being (as we have mentioned), too late a precaution, and in no way remedying the matter, has tended more to confirm errors, than to disclose truth. Our only remaining hope and salvation is to begin the whole labor of the mind again; not leaving it to itself, but directing it perpetually from the very first, and attaining our end as it were by mechanical aid. If men, for instance, had attempted mechanical labors with their hands alone, and without the power and aid of instruments, as they have not hesitated to carry on the labors of their understanding with the unaided efforts of their mind, they would have been able to move and overcome but little, though they had exerted their utmost and united powers. And just to pause awhile on this comparison, and look into it as a mirror; let us ask, if any obelisk of a remarkable size were perchance required to be moved, for the purpose of gracing a triumph or any similar pageant, and men were to attempt it with their bare hands, would not any sober spectator avow it to be an act of the greatest madness? And if they should increase the number of workmen, and imagine that they could thus succeed, would he not think so still more? But if they chose to make a selection, and to remove the weak, and only employ the strong and vigorous, thinking by this means, at any rate, to achieve their object, would he not say that they were more fondly deranged? Nay, if not content with this, they were to determine on consulting the athletic art, and were to give orders for all to appear with their hands, arms, and muscles regularly oiled and prepared, would he not exclaim that they were taking pains to rave by method and design? Yet men are hurried on with the same senseless energy and useless combination in intellectual matters, as long as they expect great results either from the number and agreement, or the excellence and acuteness of their wits; or even strengthen their minds with logic, which may be considered as an athletic preparation, but yet do not desist (if we rightly consider the matter) from applying their own understandings merely with all this zeal and effort. While nothing is more clear, than that in every great work executed by the hand of man without machines or implements, it is impossible for the strength of individuals to be increased, or for that of the multitude to combine.

Our method is difficult to carry out, but easy to explain. It determines degrees of certainty and restores the senses, as it were, to their former rank. But it generally rejects the mind’s immediate response to what the senses perceive. Instead, it opens and establishes a new and reliable path for the mind, beginning with actual sense perceptions. Those who have given logic so much importance were no doubt thinking along these lines. They clearly sought support for the mind and distrusted its natural, spontaneous way of working. But logic is now applied too late as a remedy, when all is clearly lost. By then, daily habits and dealings have already filled the mind with corrupt doctrines and the most worthless idols. As we have said, logic is therefore a precaution taken too late. It does nothing to remedy the problem and has done more to confirm errors than to reveal truth. Our only remaining hope and salvation is to begin the whole work of the mind again. We must not leave the mind to itself, but guide it continually from the very beginning. We must reach our goal, as it were, with mechanical aid. Suppose, for example, that people had tried to do mechanical work with their hands alone, without the power and help of tools. People have not hesitated to do the work of understanding with their minds alone. But with their hands alone, they could have moved and overcome very little, even with all their strength combined. Let us pause over this comparison and look into it as a mirror. Suppose a remarkably large obelisk had to be moved to adorn a triumph or some similar pageant. If people tried to move it with their bare hands, would any sensible observer not declare the attempt sheer madness? If they added more workers and imagined they could succeed that way, would he not think them even madder? Suppose they selected only the strong and vigorous, dismissing the weak, and thought this would surely achieve their goal. Would he not say that they were even more foolishly deranged? And suppose they went further and consulted athletic experts. They might order everyone to appear with hands, arms, and muscles properly oiled and prepared. Would he not cry out that they were taking pains to be mad with method and purpose? Yet people rush into intellectual work with the same senseless energy and useless joining of forces. They expect great results from the number and agreement of their minds, or from their excellence and sharpness. They may even strengthen their minds with logic, which can be seen as a kind of athletic preparation. But if we consider the matter rightly, all this zeal and effort still amounts to using their minds alone. Nothing is clearer than this: in any great work done by human hands, machines or tools are necessary. Without them, individuals cannot increase their strength, and a multitude cannot combine theirs.

Because drawing a logical conclusion from false principles was pointless. False premises spread error just as much as invalid reasoning does, and logic does not claim to examine premises. As Bacon says later, people easily confuse valid reasoning with truth. Thus, the very subtlety of their intellect confirmed them in their errors. Ed.

Having premised so much, we lay down two points on which we would admonish mankind, lest they should fail to see or to observe them. The first of these is, that it is our good fortune (as we consider it), for the sake of extinguishing and removing contradiction and irritation of mind, to leave the honor and reverence due to the ancients untouched and undiminished, so that we can perform our intended work, and yet enjoy the benefit of our respectful moderation. For if we should profess to offer something better than the ancients, and yet should pursue the same course as they have done, we could never, by any artifice, contrive to avoid the imputation of having engaged in a contest or rivalry as to our respective wits, excellences, or talents; which, though neither inadmissible nor new (for why should we not blame and point out anything that is imperfectly discovered or laid down by them, of our own right, a right common to all?), yet however just and allowable, would perhaps be scarcely an equal match, on account of the disproportion of our strength. But since our present plan leads up to open an entirely different course to the understanding, and one unattempted and unknown to them, the case is altered. There is an end to party zeal, and we only take upon ourselves the character of a guide, which requires a moderate share of authority and good fortune, rather than talents and excellence. The first admonition relates to persons, the next to things.

Having said this much, we offer two warnings to mankind, lest they be overlooked or ignored. The first concerns what we regard as our good fortune. We can leave the honor and respect due to the ancients untouched and undiminished. This helps us avoid disagreement and resentment, while allowing us to do our intended work and benefit from respectful moderation. If we claimed to offer something better than the ancients while following their course, the situation would be different. No skill could prevent us from being accused of competing with them in wit, excellence, or talent. Such a contest would be neither forbidden nor new. After all, why should we not exercise a right common to all? We can criticize and point out anything the ancients discovered or stated imperfectly. Yet, however fair and legitimate the contest, it might hardly be an equal match, given the difference in our strengths. But our present plan opens an entirely different path for the understanding, one the ancients neither attempted nor knew. So the case is different. There is no need for loyalty to rival parties. We take on only the role of a guide, which requires moderate authority and good fortune rather than talent and excellence. The first warning concerns persons, the next concerns things.

We make no attempt to disturb the system of philosophy that now prevails, or any other which may or will exist, either more correct or more complete. For we deny not that the received system of philosophy, and others of a similar nature, encourage discussion, embellish harangues, are employed, and are of service in the duties of the professor, and the affairs of civil life. Nay, we openly express and declare that the philosophy we offer will not be very useful in such respects. It is not obvious, nor to be understood in a cursory view, nor does it flatter the mind in its preconceived notions, nor will it descend to the level of the generality of mankind unless by its advantages and effects.

We do not seek to disturb the philosophy that now prevails or any other philosophy, present or future, that may be more correct or complete. We do not deny that the accepted philosophy and others like it encourage discussion and add polish to speeches. They are also useful in teaching and public affairs. Indeed, we openly declare that the philosophy we offer will not be very useful in these ways. It is not obvious or easy to understand at a glance. It does not flatter the mind’s preconceptions. Nor will it reach most people except through its benefits and effects.

Let there exist then (and may it be of advantage to both), two sources, and two distributions of learning, and in like manner two tribes, and as it were kindred families of contemplators or philosophers, without any hostility or alienation between them; but rather allied and united by mutual assistance. Let there be in short one method of cultivating the sciences, and another of discovering them. And as for those who prefer and more readily receive the former, on account of their haste or from motives arising from their ordinary life, or because they are unable from weakness of mind to comprehend and embrace the other (which must necessarily be the case with by far the greater number), let us wish that they may prosper as they desire in their undertaking, and attain what they pursue. But if any individual desire, and is anxious not merely to adhere to, and make use of present discoveries, but to penetrate still further, and not to overcome his adversaries in disputes, but nature by labor, not in short to give elegant and specious opinions, but to know to a certainty and demonstration, let him, as a true son of science (if such be his wish), join with us; that when he has left the antechambers of nature trodden by the multitude, an entrance may at last be discovered to her inner apartments. And in order to be better understood, and to render our meaning more familiar by assigning determinate names, we have accustomed ourselves to call the one method the anticipation of the mind, and the other the interpretation of nature.

Let there be two sources and two divisions of learning. May this benefit both. Likewise, let there be two groups, two related families of thinkers or philosophers. Let there be no hostility or estrangement between them. Instead, let them be allied and united by mutual help. In short, let there be one method of cultivating the sciences and another of discovering them. Some prefer and more readily accept the first method because they are in a hurry. Others do so because of demands arising from their ordinary lives. Still others lack the mental strength to understand and embrace the second method. This must necessarily be true of by far the greater number. Let us wish them success in their undertaking, so that they achieve what they seek. But someone may wish and strive to do more than follow and use present discoveries. He may wish to go further, and to overcome nature through hard work rather than opponents in debate. In short, he may wish to know things with certainty and proof, not merely offer elegant and plausible opinions. If he wishes, let him join us as a true son of science. Then, once he has left nature’s antechambers, which the multitude has trodden, an entrance to her inner rooms may finally be discovered. To make ourselves better understood and our meaning clearer, we have given the two methods distinct names. We call one the anticipation of the mind and the other the interpretation of nature.

We have still one request left. We have at least reflected and taken pains in order to render our propositions not only true, but of easy and familiar access to men’s minds, however wonderfully prepossessed and limited. Yet it is but just that we should obtain this favor from mankind (especially in so great a restoration of learning and the sciences), that whosoever may be desirous of forming any determination upon an opinion of this our work either from his own perceptions, or the crowd of authorities, or the forms of demonstrations, he will not expect to be able to do so in a cursory manner, and while attending to other matters; but in order to have a thorough knowledge of the subject, will himself by degrees attempt the course which we describe and maintain; will be accustomed to the subtilty of things which is manifested by experience; and will correct the depraved and deeply rooted habits of his mind by a seasonable, and, as it were, just hesitation: and then, finally (if he will), use his judgment when he has begun to be master of himself.

We have one request left. We have at least thought carefully and worked hard to make our propositions both true and easy to understand. We have done this however deeply minds may be filled with preconceptions and limited. In return, it is only fair that we ask one favor of humanity, especially in such a great renewal of learning and the sciences. Anyone who wishes to judge our work should not expect to do so hastily or while occupied with other matters. This applies whether they judge it by their own understanding, the weight of authorities, or established forms of proof. To understand the subject thoroughly, they should gradually try the course we describe and defend. They should become familiar with the subtle nature of things that experience reveals. They should also correct their distorted and deeply rooted habits of mind through timely and, as it were, proper hesitation. Finally, if they wish, they may pass judgment once they have begun to master themselves.