Aphorisms: Book 1. Understanding Nature and Human Power

1h 41m

I

1

Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as his observations on the order of nature, either with regard to things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of more.

People serve and interpret nature. They can act and understand only as far as their observations of nature’s order allow. These observations may concern things or the mind. People can neither know nor do more than that.

II

2

The unassisted hand and the understanding left to itself possess but little power. Effects are produced by the means of instruments and helps, which the understanding requires no less than the hand; and as instruments either promote or regulate the motion of the hand, so those that are applied to the mind prompt or protect the understanding.

The unaided hand and the mind left to itself have little power. Both the hand and the mind need tools and help to achieve results. Tools can either guide or control the hand’s movements. In the same way, tools applied to the mind encourage or protect understanding.

III

3

Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect; for nature is only subdued by submission, and that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause in practical science becomes the rule.

Knowledge and human power are the same, because we cannot produce an effect if we do not know its cause. We can master nature only by obeying it. What is a cause in the study of nature becomes a rule in practical science.

IV

4

Man while operating can only apply or withdraw natural bodies; nature internally performs the rest.

People can only bring natural objects together or move them apart. Nature does the rest within them.

V

5

Those who become practically versed in nature are, the mechanic, the mathematician, the physician, the alchemist, and the magician, but all (as matters now stand) with faint efforts and meagre success.

Those who gain practical knowledge of nature include mechanics, mathematicians, physicians, alchemists, and magicians, but all currently make weak efforts with little success.

Bacon uses the term in its ancient sense. He means someone who knows the hidden properties of bodies and can use them to produce wonderful, unexpected changes that startle the uninformed. See the , and the 5th cap. book iii. of the De Augmentis Scientiarum, where he speaks more clearly. Ed.

VI

6

It would be madness and inconsistency to suppose that things which have never yet been performed can be performed without employing some hitherto untried means.

It would be mad and inconsistent to think we can do things never done before without trying new methods.

VII

7

The creations of the mind and hand appear very numerous, if we judge by books and manufactures; but all that variety consists of an excessive refinement, and of deductions from a few well known matters—not of a number of axioms.

Judging by books and manufactured goods, the creations of the mind and hand appear very numerous. But all that variety comes from excessive refinement and deductions from a few well-known things, not from many axioms.

By axiomata, Bacon means general principles or universal laws. In the he uses the term for any proposition drawn from facts by induction. Such a proposition can then serve as the starting point for deductive reasoning. In this last, more precise sense, Bacon held that axioms arose from experience. See Whewell’s “Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences,” vol. i. p. 74; and Mill’s “Logic,” vol. i. p. 311; and the June “Quarterly,” 1841, for the modern phase of the discussion. Ed.

VIII

8

Even the effects already discovered are due to chance and experiment rather than to the sciences; for our present sciences are nothing more than peculiar arrangements of matters already discovered, and not methods for discovery or plans for new operations.

Even the results already discovered are due to chance and experiment rather than to the sciences. For our present sciences do nothing more than arrange what has already been discovered in particular ways. They provide no methods for discovery or plans for new operations.

IX

9

The sole cause and root of almost every defect in the sciences is this, that while we falsely admire and extol the powers of the human mind, we do not search for its real helps.

There is one root cause of almost every flaw in the sciences. We wrongly admire and praise the powers of the human mind, while failing to seek the help it truly needs.

X

10

The subtilty of nature is far beyond that of sense or of the understanding: so that the specious meditations, speculations, and theories of mankind are but a kind of insanity, only there is no one to stand by and observe it.

Nature is far more subtle than our senses or understanding can grasp. So humanity's impressive-sounding reflections, speculations, and theories are a kind of madness. But there is no one standing by to notice it.

XI

11

As the present sciences are useless for the discovery of effects, so the present system of logic is useless for the discovery of the sciences.

Just as current sciences are useless for discovering effects, the current system of logic is useless for discovering sciences.

Bacon here blames Aristotelian logic for the mistaken conclusions that arose from its misuse. Its forms of demonstration, whether expressed in words or mathematics, are necessary to support, verify, and extend induction. When their propositions rest on accurate, careful observation, their conclusions may be regarded as certain. This is true even in moral science, where the conclusions may be regarded as certain as facts revealed by direct experiments on nature.

In physics, such forms are essential for generalizing experimental results and connecting intermediate axioms with more general laws. The evidence is clear. Since Bacon’s day, no science has ceased to be experimental merely by using induction. And all sciences become exact only insofar as they go beyond experience. They do this by using deductive reasoning to connect isolated phenomena with general laws.

These forms, then, are far from useless. They are essential to scientific progress. They can be harmful only when forced into the place of direct experiment, or when used to draw conclusions about nature from imaginary hypotheses and abstract concepts.

Unfortunately, the Greeks had followed this practice. Geometry developed rapidly in their hands. They therefore imagined that the same method would produce equally brilliant results in natural science. They seized on an abstract principle, carefully shielded it from experimental testing, and imagined they could reason from it to every law and outward appearance of the universe.

The scholastics followed the same path, driven not only by precedent but also by their profession. Theology was the only science they developed consistently. Its à priori foundations kept them from using any other method to study natural phenomena.

Thus, forms of demonstration that were accurate in themselves and immensely valuable in their proper sphere became mixed up with fables. They led people to think they were exploring truth when they were only accurately deducing one error from another. A principle that was even slightly wrong could infect every conclusion based on it, like a false quantity in an equation. A philosopher might then draw a thousand successive inferences with the utmost accuracy and precision. Yet he would only succeed in producing nine hundred and ninety-nine errors very methodically. Ed.

XII

12

The present system of logic rather assists in confirming and rendering inveterate the errors founded on vulgar notions than in searching after truth, and is therefore more hurtful than useful.

The current system of logic does more to reinforce errors based on common notions than to search for truth. It is therefore more harmful than useful.

XIII

13

The syllogism is not applied to the principles of the sciences, and is of no avail in intermediate axioms, as being very unequal to the subtilty of nature. It forces assent, therefore, and not things.

The syllogism is not applied to the basic principles of the sciences. It is also useless for intermediate axioms, because it cannot match the subtlety of nature. It therefore forces people to agree, but does not control things.

This aphorism and the two preceding ones suggest that Bacon made an error. He denied the usefulness of the syllogism where it is essential to inductive science. Logic, like mathematics, is a purely formal process. Like scaffolding around a building, it must be used to arrange facts into the structure of a science. It must not form any part of the foundation or supply the materials for the system.

Like most other psychological terms, “syllogism” has no fixed or original meaning. The Greeks sometimes used it to mean reasoning in general. At other times, it means the formal method of drawing a particular inference from two or more general propositions. Bacon does not define the term precisely. But he habitually associates it with the quarrels of the schools, suggesting that he meant it in the latter sense.

The scholastics did abuse the deductive syllogism. They used it in its bare, skeleton-like form and confused it with the whole of logical theory. But Aristotle should not be blamed for their errors. He never dreamed of playing with formal syllogisms. Above all, he did not confuse reasoning that descends from general principles with reasoning that ascends to them.

We agree with the Stagyrite, as far as we can interpret him. He proposes two ways of investigating truth. In one, we ascend from particular, individual facts to general laws and axioms. In the other, we descend from universal propositions to the individual cases they implicitly include. Logic must therefore uphold the formal purity of both processes. These are the synthetic inference by which it ascends to the whole and the analytic process by which it descends to the parts.

The deductive and inductive syllogisms are equally important in building any body of truth. Anyone who limits logic to either process mistakes half its domain for the whole. If they act on that error, they will paralyze their methods and make the noblest part of science barren. Ed.

XIV

14

The syllogism consists of propositions; propositions of words; words are the signs of notions. If, therefore, the notions (which form the basis of the whole) be confused and carelessly abstracted from things, there is no solidity in the superstructure. Our only hope, then, is in genuine induction.

A syllogism consists of propositions. Propositions consist of words, and words represent ideas. These ideas are the foundation of the whole structure. So if they are confused and carelessly drawn from things, the structure built on them has no solid foundation. Our only hope, then, lies in genuine induction.

XV

15

We have no sound notions either in logic or physics; substance, quality, action, passion, and existence are not clear notions; much less weight, levity, density, tenuity, moisture, dryness, generation, corruption, attraction, repulsion, element, matter, form, and the like. They are all fantastical and ill-defined.

We have no sound concepts in either logic or physics. Our concepts of substance, quality, action, being acted upon, and existence are not clear. Still less clear are our concepts of weight, lightness, density, thinness, moisture, dryness, generation, decay, attraction, repulsion, element, matter, form, and the like. They are all fanciful and poorly defined.

XVI

16

The notions of less abstract natures, as man, dog, dove, and the immediate perceptions of sense, as heat, cold, white, black, do not deceive us materially, yet even these are sometimes confused by the mutability of matter and the intermixture of things. All the rest which men have hitherto employed are errors, and improperly abstracted and deduced from things.

Ideas of less abstract things, such as humans, dogs, and doves, do not seriously mislead us. Nor do immediate sense perceptions, such as heat, cold, white, and black. Yet even these are sometimes confused because matter changes and things mingle. All the other ideas people have used so far are errors, improperly abstracted and drawn from things.

XVII

17

There is the same degree of licentiousness and error in forming axioms as in abstracting notions, and that in the first principles, which depend on common induction; still more is this the case in axioms and inferior propositions derived from syllogisms.

Forming axioms is just as careless and error-prone as deriving general notions. This is true even of first principles, which depend on ordinary induction. It is even more true of axioms and lesser propositions derived from syllogisms.

XVIII

18

The present discoveries in science are such as lie immediately beneath the surface of common notions. It is necessary, however, to penetrate the more secret and remote parts of nature, in order to abstract both notions and axioms from things by a more certain and guarded method.

Current scientific discoveries lie just beneath the surface of common ideas. But we need to explore nature’s deeper and more hidden parts. This will let us draw both ideas and principles from things using a more reliable and careful method.

XIX

19

There are and can exist but two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from them, as principles and their supposed indisputable truth, derives and discovers the intermediate axioms. This is the way now in use. The other constructs its axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending continually and gradually, till it finally arrives at the most general axioms, which is the true but unattempted way.

There are only two possible ways to investigate and discover truth. One rushes from sensory experience and particular facts to the most general principles. It then treats those principles as indisputably true and uses them to derive intermediate principles. This is the method now in use. The other builds principles from sensory experience and particular facts. It rises steadily and gradually until it reaches the most general principles. This is the true method, but it has not yet been tried.

XX

20

The understanding when left to itself proceeds by the same way as that which it would have adopted under the guidance of logic, namely, the first; for the mind is fond of starting off to generalities, that it may avoid labor, and after dwelling a little on a subject is fatigued by experiment. But those evils are augmented by logic, for the sake of the ostentation of dispute.

Left to itself, the mind follows the same path it would take under the guidance of logic, namely, the first. The mind likes to jump to general conclusions to avoid hard work. After spending a little time on a subject, it grows tired of experimenting. But logic makes these problems worse, for the sake of showing off in debate.

XXI

21

The understanding, when left to itself in a man of a steady, patient, and reflecting disposition (especially when unimpeded by received doctrines), makes some attempt in the right way, but with little effect, since the understanding, undirected and unassisted, is unequal to and unfit for the task of vanquishing the obscurity of things.

Left to itself, the mind of a steady, patient, and thoughtful person makes some attempt in the right direction. This is especially true when the mind is not held back by accepted doctrines. But the attempt has little effect. Without guidance or help, the mind is not capable of overcoming the obscurity of things.

XXII

22

Each of these two ways begins from the senses and particulars, and ends in the greatest generalities. But they are immeasurably different; for the one merely touches cursorily the limits of experiment and particulars, while the other runs duly and regularly through them—the one from the very outset lays down some abstract and useless generalities, the other gradually rises to those principles which are really the most common in nature.

Both ways begin with the senses and particular cases, and end with the broadest general principles. But they are immeasurably different. One only briefly touches on experiments and particular cases, while the other proceeds through them carefully and systematically. The first starts by establishing abstract and useless general principles. The second gradually rises to principles that truly apply most broadly in nature.

The Latin is, ad ea quæ revera sunt naturæ notiora. Bacon uses the expressions naturæ notiora and naturæ notior so often that they may point to a distinctive feature of Baconian physics. They refer properly to the most evident principles and laws of nature. They come from a system that views the material universe as endowed with intelligence. In this view, the universe acts according to rules it has either devised or clearly understands. Ed.

XXIII

23

There is no small difference between the idols of the human mind and the ideas of the Divine mind—that is to say, between certain idle dogmas and the real stamp and impression of created objects, as they are found in nature.

There is a great difference between the idols of the human mind and the ideas of the Divine mind. In other words, there is a great difference between groundless beliefs and the true marks and impressions of created things as found in nature.

XXIV

24

Axioms determined upon in argument can never assist in the discovery of new effects; for the subtilty of nature is vastly superior to that of argument. But axioms properly and regularly abstracted from particulars easily point out and define new particulars, and therefore impart activity to the sciences.

Axioms reached through argument can never help us discover new effects. This is because nature is far more subtle than argument. But axioms properly and systematically drawn from particular observations readily reveal and define new particulars. They therefore give the sciences the power to make discoveries.

XXV

25

The axioms now in use are derived from a scanty handful, as it were, of experience, and a few particulars of frequent occurrence, whence they are of much the same dimensions or extent as their origin. And if any neglected or unknown instance occurs, the axiom is saved by some frivolous distinction, when it would be more consistent with truth to amend it.

The axioms now in use come from a mere handful of experience and a few commonly observed cases. As a result, they are about as limited in scope as the evidence they come from. If a neglected or unknown case arises, the axiom is saved by some trivial distinction. It would be truer to amend the axiom instead.

XXVI

26

We are wont, for the sake of distinction, to call that human reasoning which we apply to nature the anticipation of nature (as being rash and premature), and that which is properly deduced from things the interpretation of nature.

To distinguish them, we call human reasoning applied to nature the anticipation of nature, because it is rash and premature. We call reasoning properly deduced from things the interpretation of nature.

XXVII

27

Anticipations are sufficiently powerful in producing unanimity, for if men were all to become even uniformly mad, they might agree tolerably well with each other.

Preconceived ideas are powerful enough to produce agreement. For if everyone went mad in the same way, they might agree quite well with one another.

XXVIII

28

Anticipations again, will be assented to much more readily than interpretations, because being deduced from a few instances, and these principally of familiar occurrence, they immediately hit the understanding and satisfy the imagination; while, on the contrary, interpretations, being deduced from various subjects, and these widely dispersed, cannot suddenly strike the understanding, so that in common estimation they must appear difficult and discordant, and almost like the mysteries of faith.

Again, people will accept anticipations much more readily than interpretations. Anticipations are drawn from a few examples, mostly familiar ones. They immediately appeal to the understanding and satisfy the imagination. Interpretations, by contrast, are drawn from a wide variety of subjects. They cannot immediately appeal to the understanding. So most people must find them difficult and inconsistent, almost like the mysteries of faith.

XXIX

29

In sciences founded on opinions and dogmas, it is right to make use of anticipations and logic if you wish to force assent rather than things.

In sciences based on opinions and doctrines, it is appropriate to use preconceptions and logic if you want to win agreement rather than understand things.

XXX

30

If all the capacities of all ages should unite and combine and transmit their labors, no great progress will be made in learning by anticipations, because the radical errors, and those which occur in the first process of the mind, are not cured by the excellence of subsequent means and remedies.

Even if the minds of all ages joined forces and passed on their work, anticipations would bring no great progress in learning. This is because even the best methods and remedies used later cannot correct fundamental errors made when the mind first begins to reason.

XXXI

31

It is in vain to expect any great progress in the sciences by the superinducing or ingrafting new matters upon old. An instauration must be made from the very foundations, if we do not wish to revolve forever in a circle, making only some slight and contemptible progress.

It is useless to expect great progress in science by adding new ideas to old ones. We must rebuild science from the foundations if we do not want to go around in circles forever, making only slight and contemptible progress.

XXXII

32

The ancient authors and all others are left in undisputed possession of their honors; for we enter into no comparison of capacity or talent, but of method, and assume the part of a guide rather than of a critic.

The ancient authors and all others keep their honors without dispute. For we compare methods, not abilities or talents. We act as a guide rather than a critic.

XXXIII

33

To speak plainly, no correct judgment can be formed either of our method or its discoveries by those anticipations which are now in common use; for it is not to be required of us to submit ourselves to the judgment of the very method we ourselves arraign.

To put it plainly, the preconceptions commonly used today cannot fairly judge our method or its discoveries. We should not be expected to submit to the judgment of the very method we challenge.

XXXIV

34

Nor is it an easy matter to deliver and explain our sentiments; for those things which are in themselves new can yet be only understood from some analogy to what is old.

Nor is it easy to express and explain our ideas. For things that are truly new can only be understood through some comparison with what is old.

XXXV

35

Alexander Borgia said of the expedition of the French into Italy that they came with chalk in their hands to mark up their lodgings, and not with weapons to force their passage. Even so do we wish our philosophy to make its way quietly into those minds that are fit for it, and of good capacity; for we have no need of contention where we differ in first principles, and in our very notions, and even in our forms of demonstration.

Alexander Borgia said that the French came to Italy carrying chalk, not weapons. They used the chalk to mark their lodgings rather than force their way through. In the same way, we want our philosophy to enter quietly into minds suited to it and capable of understanding it. We have no need to argue with those who differ from us in first principles, basic ideas, and even methods of demonstration.

This Borgia was Alexander VI. The expedition mentioned was the one in which Charles VIII. overran the Italian peninsula in five months. Bacon uses the same example to conclude his survey of natural philosophy in the second book of “De Augmentis.” Ed.

XXXVI

36

We have but one simple method of delivering our sentiments, namely, we must bring men to particulars and their regular series and order, and they must for a while renounce their notions, and begin to form an acquaintance with things.

We have only one simple way to convey our ideas. We must lead people to examine particulars in their regular sequence and order. They must set aside their own notions for a while and begin to become familiar with things themselves.

XXXVII

37

Our method and that of the sceptics agree in some respects at first setting out, but differ most widely, and are completely opposed to each other in their conclusion; for they roundly assert that nothing can be known; we, that but a small part of nature can be known, by the present method; their next step, however, is to destroy the authority of the senses and understanding, while we invent and supply them with assistance.

Our method and that of the skeptics agree in some respects at the start. But they differ greatly and reach completely opposite conclusions. The skeptics flatly assert that nothing can be known. We assert that only a small part of nature can be known using the present method. The skeptics then dismiss the authority of the senses and understanding, while we devise and provide ways to help them.

Ratio eorum qui acatalepsiam tenuerunt. Bacon refers to members of the later academy. They held the doctrine of ἀκατάληψια, or the impossibility of understanding anything. His translator, however, makes him refer to the sceptics. They made no definite claims about what was known or unknown. They simply held that all knowledge was relative, πρòς πάντα τι. Therefore, they believed that people could never reach absolute truth or affirm or deny anything with certainty. Ed.

XXXVIII

38

The idols and false notions which have already preoccupied the human understanding, and are deeply rooted in it, not only so beset men’s minds that they become difficult of access, but even when access is obtained will again meet and trouble us in the instauration of the sciences, unless mankind when forewarned guard themselves with all possible care against them.

Idols and false notions have already taken hold of human understanding and are deeply rooted in it. They so crowd people’s minds that truth has difficulty gaining access. But even when it does, these idols and false notions will again confront and trouble us as we rebuild the sciences. Forewarned, humanity must guard against them with all possible care.

XXXIX

39

Four species of idols beset the human mind, to which (for distinction’s sake) we have assigned names, calling the first Idols of the Tribe, the second Idols of the Den, the third Idols of the Market, the fourth Idols of the Theatre.

Four kinds of idols trouble the human mind. To distinguish them, we have given them names. The first are the Idols of the Tribe, the second the Idols of the Den, the third the Idols of the Market, and the fourth the Idols of the Theatre.

Hallam argues, with some apparent truth, that “idols” is not the correct translation of εἴδωλα. The original word, idola, clearly derives from the Greek. But Hallam argues that Bacon used it in the literal Greek sense, meaning a kind of illusion or false appearance. He did not mean a kind of deity before which the mind bows. If Hallam is right, Bacon is spared the discredit of an analogy his foreign commentators are not far wrong to call barbarous. But this defense comes at the expense of those who gave the word the opposite meaning. They include Brown, Playfair and Dugald Stewart. Ed.

XL

40

The formation of notions and axioms on the foundation of true induction is the only fitting remedy by which we can ward off and expel these idols. It is, however, of great service to point them out; for the doctrine of idols bears the same relation to the interpretation of nature as that of the confutation of sophisms does to common logic.

Forming ideas and principles through true induction is the only suitable remedy for keeping these idols at bay and driving them out. However, it is very helpful to point them out. The study of idols helps us interpret nature, just as exposing false arguments helps us with ordinary logic.

We cannot see why these idols have less to do with misleading arguments than with natural philosophy. Scientific induction uses only the most basic elements of reasoning. It is so clear and concrete that it leaves no room for prejudice to hide. By contrast, questions of politics and morals are always liable to be influenced or distorted by the prejudices Bacon lists. The deductive method, or common logic, as Bacon calls it, is especially suited to these questions. After mathematics, physical science is least subject to the illusions of feeling. Each part has already been tested by experiment and observation. It is then fitted into the system with all the rigor of the geometrical method. In matters of taste, history, or religion, feeling or prejudice can select fragments and form a system of their own. They cannot do so in physical science. The whole must be accepted, or the structure of authoritative reason must be torn down. Needless to say, the idols listed are only another interpretation of the substance of logical fallacies. Ed.

XLI

41

The idols of the tribe are inherent in human nature and the very tribe or race of man; for man’s sense is falsely asserted to be the standard of things; on the contrary, all the perceptions both of the senses and the mind bear reference to man and not to the universe, and the human mind resembles those uneven mirrors which impart their own properties to different objects, from which rays are emitted and distort and disfigure them.

The idols of the tribe are inherent in human nature and in the human race itself. For people wrongly claim that human senses are the measure of things. On the contrary, all perceptions of the senses and the mind reflect human nature, not the universe. The human mind is like an uneven mirror that adds its own features to the objects whose rays it reflects. In doing so, it distorts and disfigures them.

This tendency toward illusion can be seen in the urge to build systems or make hasty generalizations. It remains one of the main obstacles to modern science. Ed.

XLII

42

The idols of the den are those of each individual; for everybody (in addition to the errors common to the race of man) has his own individual den or cavern, which intercepts and corrupts the light of nature, either from his own peculiar and singular disposition, or from his education and intercourse with others, or from his reading, and the authority acquired by those whom he reverences and admires, or from the different impressions produced on the mind, as it happens to be preoccupied and predisposed, or equable and tranquil, and the like; so that the spirit of man (according to its several dispositions), is variable, confused, and as it were actuated by chance; and Heraclitus said well that men search for knowledge in lesser worlds, and not in the greater or common world.

The idols of the den belong to each individual. Besides the errors common to all humanity, everyone has a personal den or cave that blocks and distorts the light of nature. This happens because of a person's unique disposition, education, or contact with others. It can also result from reading and from the authority of those a person respects and admires. Or it can result from the different impressions made on the mind, depending on whether it is occupied and predisposed or calm and balanced, and so on. Thus, the human mind varies according to its different dispositions. It is confused and seems to be driven by chance. Heraclitus was right to say that people search for knowledge in their own lesser worlds, not in the greater world shared by all.

XLIII

43

There are also idols formed by the reciprocal intercourse and society of man with man, which we call idols of the market, from the commerce and association of men with each other; for men converse by means of language, but words are formed at the will of the generality, and there arises from a bad and unapt formation of words a wonderful obstruction to the mind. Nor can the definitions and explanations with which learned men are wont to guard and protect themselves in some instances afford a complete remedy—words still manifestly force the understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies.

There are also idols formed by people’s interactions and social life. We call these idols of the market, because they arise from people’s dealings and associations with one another. People communicate through language, but words are shaped by the general public. Poorly formed and unsuitable words create a remarkable obstacle to thought. Learned people sometimes try to protect themselves with definitions and explanations, but these cannot provide a complete remedy. Words still plainly force the understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead people into countless pointless controversies and fallacies.

XLIV

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Lastly, there are idols which have crept into men’s minds from the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also from the perverted rules of demonstration, and these we denominate idols of the theatre: for we regard all the systems of philosophy hitherto received or imagined, as so many plays brought out and performed, creating fictitious and theatrical worlds. Nor do we speak only of the present systems, or of the philosophy and sects of the ancients, since numerous other plays of a similar nature can be still composed and made to agree with each other, the causes of the most opposite errors being generally the same. Nor, again, do we allude merely to general systems, but also to many elements and axioms of sciences which have become inveterate by tradition, implicit credence, and neglect. We must, however, discuss each species of idols more fully and distinctly in order to guard the human understanding against them.

Finally, there are idols that have crept into people’s minds from the doctrines of particular philosophical systems. They have also come from distorted rules of proof. We call these idols of the theatre. We regard all philosophical systems accepted or imagined so far as plays staged and performed, creating fictional, theatrical worlds. We are not speaking only of present systems or of the philosophy and schools of the ancients. Many other plays of the same kind can still be written and made to agree with one another. For the causes of even the most opposite errors are generally the same. Nor are we referring only to general systems. We also mean many principles and axioms of the sciences that have become entrenched through tradition, unquestioning belief, and neglect. We must, however, discuss each kind of idol more fully and separately, so that we can guard human understanding against them.

XLV

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The human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of order and equality in things than it really finds; and although many things in nature be sui generis and most irregular, will yet invent parallels and conjugates and relatives, where no such thing is. Hence the fiction, that all celestial bodies move in perfect circles, thus rejecting entirely spiral and serpentine lines (except as explanatory terms). Hence also the element of fire is introduced with its peculiar orbit, to keep square with those other three which are objects of our senses. The relative rarity of the elements (as they are called) is arbitrarily made to vary in tenfold progression, with many other dreams of the like nature. Nor is this folly confined to theories, but it is to be met with even in simple notions.

By its very nature, the human mind easily assumes that things are more orderly and uniform than they really are. Many things in nature are sui generis and highly irregular. Yet the mind invents parallels, counterparts, and relationships where none exist. This leads to the fiction that all celestial bodies move in perfect circles. It completely rejects spiral and serpentine lines, except as explanatory terms. Likewise, the element of fire is given its own orbit, to make it fit with the other three elements we can perceive with our senses. The relative rarity of the so-called elements is arbitrarily made to vary in tenfold steps. There are many other dreams of the same kind. This folly is not limited to theories. It can be found even in simple ideas.

Although Kepler had already demonstrated his three great laws concerning the planets’ elliptical paths when Bacon wrote this, neither Bacon nor Descartes seems to have known of or accepted his discoveries. Bacon regarded the startling astronomical announcements of his time as merely theoretical explanations of heavenly phenomena. He thought them less perfect than those proposed in antiquity, but still worthy of praise for their ingenuity.

Bacon believed that a hundred such systems might exist and explain the phenomena correctly. Yet all might differ to some degree, depending on the preconceived ideas their creators brought to their study of the heavens. He even thought his own astronomical ingenuity might deserve recognition from posterity. Ptolemy had used epicycles and eccentrics, and Kepler ellipses, to explain the laws of planetary motion. Bacon thought the mystery could be explained just as philosophically through spiral labyrinths and serpentine lines. We can only guess at the details of his system. Our only clue is a very scant but naive account of one of his inventions, which he left in his Miscellany MSS. Ed.

Thus the element of fire and its sphere were introduced. Bacon saw fire as merely the result of a particular combination of actions. He therefore denied that it was an element. Ancient physicists divided the universe into four elements and assigned each one a sphere. They believed these spheres enclosed one another. Earth’s sphere was at the center, and fire’s was at the outer edge. For Bacon’s investigation into the nature of heat, and its complete failure, see the Novum Organum. Ed.

Robert Fludd is the theorist mentioned here. He believed that earth was ten times heavier than water, water ten times heavier than air, and air ten times heavier than fire. Ed.

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The human understanding, when any proposition has been once laid down (either from general admission and belief, or from the pleasure it affords), forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation; and although most cogent and abundant instances may exist to the contrary, yet either does not observe or despises them, or gets rid of and rejects them by some distinction, with violent and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice the authority of its first conclusions. It was well answered by him who was shown in a temple the votive tablets suspended by such as had escaped the peril of shipwreck, and was pressed as to whether he would then recognize the power of the gods, by an inquiry, But where are the portraits of those who have perished in spite of their vows? All superstition is much the same, whether it be that of astrology, dreams, omens, retributive judgment, or the like, in all of which the deluded believers observe events which are fulfilled, but neglect and pass over their failure, though it be much more common. But this evil insinuates itself still more craftily in philosophy and the sciences, in which a settled maxim vitiates and governs every other circumstance, though the latter be much more worthy of confidence. Besides, even in the absence of that eagerness and want of thought (which we have mentioned), it is the peculiar and perpetual error of the human understanding to be more moved and excited by affirmatives than negatives, whereas it ought duly and regularly to be impartial; nay, in establishing any true axiom the negative instance is the most powerful.

Once the human mind has accepted a proposition, whether through common belief or because it finds the proposition pleasing, it forces everything else to support and confirm it. Even when powerful and abundant evidence exists against it, the mind either overlooks or dismisses that evidence. Or it explains the evidence away and rejects it through some distinction. It does so with violent and harmful prejudice rather than give up the authority of its first conclusions. A man once gave a good answer when he was shown tablets hanging in a temple. They had been offered in gratitude by people who had survived shipwreck. He was pressed to say whether he now recognized the power of the gods. He asked, But where are the portraits of those who perished despite their vows? All superstition is much the same, whether it concerns astrology, dreams, omens, divine punishment, or the like. In every case, deluded believers notice events that fulfill their expectations. But they overlook and ignore the failures, although these are much more common. This evil makes its way even more craftily into philosophy and the sciences. There, an established principle corrupts and governs the interpretation of every other fact, even when those facts are much more trustworthy. Besides, even without the eagerness and thoughtlessness already mentioned, the human mind has a particular and constant failing. It is more affected and excited by confirming evidence than by evidence against a proposition. Yet it should be consistently and properly impartial. Indeed, when establishing any true principle, evidence against it is the most powerful.

Diagoras. The same allusion appears in the second part of the Advancement of Learning, where Bacon discusses the idols of the mind.

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The human understanding is most excited by that which strikes and enters the mind at once and suddenly, and by which the imagination is immediately filled and inflated. It then begins almost imperceptibly to conceive and suppose that everything is similar to the few objects which have taken possession of the mind, while it is very slow and unfit for the transition to the remote and heterogeneous instances by which axioms are tried as by fire, unless the office be imposed upon it by severe regulations and a powerful authority.

The human mind is most excited by things that strike it suddenly and fill and inflate the imagination at once. Then, almost without noticing, it begins to assume that everything resembles the few things that have taken hold of it. But the mind is very slow and ill-suited to consider distant and different examples that test its principles as if by fire. It will not do so unless strict rules and a powerful authority force it to.

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The human understanding is active and cannot halt or rest, but even, though without effect, still presses forward. Thus we cannot conceive of any end or external boundary of the world, and it seems necessarily to occur to us that there must be something beyond. Nor can we imagine how eternity has flowed on down to the present day, since the usually received distinction of an infinity, a parte ante and a parte post, cannot hold good; for it would thence follow that one infinity is greater than another, and also that infinity is wasting away and tending to an end. There is the same difficulty in considering the infinite divisibility of lines, arising from the weakness of our minds, which weakness interferes to still greater disadvantage with the discovery of causes; for although the greatest generalities in nature must be positive, just as they are found, and in fact not causable, yet the human understanding, incapable of resting, seeks for something more intelligible. Thus, however, while aiming at further progress, it falls back to what is actually less advanced, namely, final causes; for they are clearly more allied to man’s own nature, than the system of the universe, and from this source they have wonderfully corrupted philosophy. But he would be an unskilful and shallow philosopher who should seek for causes in the greatest generalities, and not be anxious to discover them in subordinate objects.

The human mind is active and cannot stop or rest. It keeps pressing forward, even when it gets nowhere. Thus, we cannot conceive of an end or outer boundary to the world. We cannot help thinking that something must lie beyond it. Nor can we imagine how eternity has continued up to the present day. The usual distinction between infinity a parte ante and a parte post, or infinity before and infinity after, cannot hold. It would mean that one infinity is greater than another. It would also mean that infinity is being used up and approaching an end. We face the same difficulty when we consider how lines can be divided infinitely. This difficulty arises from the weakness of our minds. That weakness is an even greater obstacle to discovering causes. The broadest facts about nature must be accepted as they are found, and have no causes. Yet the human mind cannot rest and looks for something easier to understand. In trying to advance further, it falls back on something less advanced, namely final causes. These are clearly closer to human nature than to the system of the universe. For that reason, they have corrupted philosophy to a remarkable degree. But a philosopher who sought causes for the broadest facts, while neglecting to seek them in lesser things, would be unskilled and shallow.

A scholastic term for the two eternities of past and future. They stretch out on both sides of the narrow isthmus (time) occupied by humanity. Bacon lived before the theory of limits gave rise to higher calculus. He therefore could have had no conception of different kinds of infinity. On the other hand, he would have thought someone insane for speaking of infinitely long lines enclosing infinitely small angles. He would have thought the same of someone who said that a straight line remains straight as long as it is finite, but becomes an infinite curve when its direction changes infinitely little. Or that one curve may become infinitely smaller than another. Or that there are infinite squares, infinite cubes, and infinities of infinities, each greater than the one before it. Or that the next to last is nothing compared with the last. Yet only half a century after Bacon’s time, this terminology had become not only reasonable but necessary for understanding the higher proofs of physical science. It would have seemed to Bacon the height of madness. Ed.

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The human understanding resembles not a dry light, but admits a tincture of the will and passions, which generate their own system accordingly; for man always believes more readily that which he prefers. He, therefore, rejects difficulties for want of patience in investigation; sobriety, because it limits his hope; the depths of nature, from superstition; the light of experiment, from arrogance and pride, lest his mind should appear to be occupied with common and varying objects; paradoxes, from a fear of the opinion of the vulgar; in short, his feelings imbue and corrupt his understanding in innumerable and sometimes imperceptible ways.

Human understanding is not like pure light. It is colored by the will and passions, which shape it to suit themselves. For people always believe more readily what they prefer to believe. They therefore reject difficult questions because they lack the patience to investigate them. They reject sober judgment because it limits their hopes. They reject the depths of nature because of superstition. They reject the light of experiment out of arrogance and pride. They fear that experiments make their minds seem occupied with ordinary and changeable things. They reject paradoxes for fear of what ordinary people will think. In short, feelings color and corrupt understanding in countless ways, sometimes without our noticing.

In his letter to Oldenberg (Op. Posth. p. 398), Spinoza argues that this aphorism rests on a mistaken view of how error arises. He believed the aphorism was fundamental, so he rejected Bacon’s method altogether. Spinoza denied that humans have a will. He saw all their acts of will as individual acts, determined by a chain of physical causes as inevitably as any effects in nature. Ed.

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But by far the greatest impediment and aberration of the human understanding proceeds from the dulness, incompetence, and errors of the senses; since whatever strikes the senses preponderates over everything, however superior, which does not immediately strike them. Hence contemplation mostly ceases with sight, and a very scanty, or perhaps no regard is paid to invisible objects. The entire operation, therefore, of spirits inclosed in tangible bodies is concealed, and escapes us. All that more delicate change of formation in the parts of coarser substances (vulgarly called alteration, but in fact a change of position in the smallest particles) is equally unknown; and yet, unless the two matters we have mentioned be explored and brought to light, no great effect can be produced in nature. Again, the very nature of common air, and all bodies of less density (of which there are many) is almost unknown; for the senses are weak and erring, nor can instruments be of great use in extending their sphere or acuteness—all the better interpretations of nature are worked out by instances, and fit and apt experiments, where the senses only judge of the experiment, the experiment of nature and the thing itself.

By far the greatest obstacle to human understanding, and the greatest cause of its errors, comes from the dullness, limitations, and errors of the senses. Whatever strikes the senses outweighs everything that does not, however superior it may be. So thought mostly stops at what we can see. We pay very little attention, or perhaps none at all, to things we cannot see. Thus, the entire operation of spirits enclosed in tangible bodies is hidden from us and escapes our notice. We are equally ignorant of the more subtle changes in the structure of the parts of coarser substances. These changes are commonly called alteration, but they are really changes in the position of the smallest particles. Yet, unless both these matters are explored and brought to light, no great effect can be produced in nature. Again, the very nature of ordinary air and of all less dense bodies is almost unknown. There are many such bodies. The senses are weak and prone to error, and instruments cannot greatly extend their range or sharpness. All the better interpretations of nature are worked out through instances and suitable experiments. In these, the senses judge only the experiment, and the experiment judges nature and the thing itself.

The action of spirits in tangible bodies. Like the scholastic philosophers, Bacon distinguished the coarse, tangible parts of bodies from their volatile, intangible parts. Following scholastic usage, he calls the intangible parts spirits. He frequently returns to their operations in the second book. Ed.

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The human understanding is, by its own nature, prone to abstraction, and supposes that which is fluctuating to be fixed. But it is better to dissect than abstract nature: such was the method employed by the school of Democritus, which made greater progress in penetrating nature than the rest. It is best to consider matter, its conformation, and the changes of that conformation, its own action, and the law of this action or motion; for forms are a mere fiction of the human mind, unless you will call the laws of action by that name.

The human mind is naturally inclined to form abstractions. It assumes that what is constantly changing is fixed. But it is better to examine nature piece by piece than to abstract from it. This was the method used by the school of Democritus, which made more progress than others in understanding nature. It is best to examine matter, its structure, and changes in that structure. We should also examine matter’s own action, and the law governing that action or motion. Forms are merely inventions of the human mind, unless you choose to call the laws of action forms.

Democritus of Abdera was a disciple of Leucippus. He was born B.C. 470 and died 360. All his works have been destroyed. He is said to have developed the doctrine of atoms. He denied the immortality of the soul. He was also the first to teach that the milky way was caused by the blended light of many stars. He may be considered the founder of experimental philosophy. He pursued it so passionately that he said he would rather discover one cause of natural phenomena than possess the crown of Persia. Democritus exploited the blind credulity of his contemporaries and, like Roger Bacon, astonished them with his inventions. Ed.

The Latin is actus purus, another scholastic term for the action of the substance that makes up a body's essence, apart from its accidental qualities. For an explanation of the different kinds of motion he considers, the reader may refer to the . Ed.

After Aristotle, the scholastics distinguished three modes of being in a subject: power or faculty, act, and habitude. These mean what can exist, what actually exists, and what continues to exist. Bacon means that we must focus on what actually is, not on what can or ought to be. We must focus on fact, not on right. Ed.

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Such are the idols of the tribe, which arise either from the uniformity of the constitution of man’s spirit, or its prejudices, or its limited faculties or restless agitation, or from the interference of the passions, or the incompetence of the senses, or the mode of their impressions.

These are the idols of the tribe. They arise from the common nature of the human mind, its prejudices, its limits, or its restless activity. They also arise from the influence of emotions, the shortcomings of the senses, or how the senses receive impressions.

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The idols of the den derive their origin from the peculiar nature of each individual’s mind and body, and also from education, habit, and accident; and although they be various and manifold, yet we will treat of some that require the greatest caution, and exert the greatest power in polluting the understanding.

The idols of the den arise from the unique nature of each person's mind and body. They also arise from education, habit, and chance. Although they take many forms, we will discuss some that require the greatest caution and most strongly corrupt understanding.

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Some men become attached to particular sciences and contemplations, either from supposing themselves the authors and inventors of them, or from having bestowed the greatest pains upon such subjects, and thus become most habituated to them. If men of this description apply themselves to philosophy and contemplations of a universal nature, they wrest and corrupt them by their preconceived fancies, of which Aristotle affords us a single instance, who made his natural philosophy completely subservient to his logic, and thus rendered it little more than useless and disputatious. The chemists, again, have formed a fanciful philosophy with the most confined views, from a few experiments of the furnace. Gilbert, too, having employed himself most assiduously in the consideration of the magnet, immediately established a system of philosophy to coincide with his favorite pursuit.

Some people become attached to particular sciences and fields of study. They may believe they created or invented them, or they may have worked so hard on them that they have grown especially accustomed to them. If such people turn to philosophy and the study of universal questions, they twist and distort them to fit their preconceived ideas. Aristotle provides one example. He made his natural philosophy completely dependent on his logic. As a result, he made it little more than useless and argumentative. The chemists, too, have built a fanciful philosophy with a very narrow outlook from a few experiments with furnaces. Gilbert, too, devoted himself intensely to studying the magnet. He then promptly established a system of philosophy to match his favorite pursuit.

The lesson is to be wary of evidence that best suits our inclinations. We should accept an idea as real only if we can firmly support it with proof suited to the subject, not to our impressions. Sometimes a method of proof may suit both our inclinations and the subject. For example, Pythagoras applied his beloved numbers to astronomical phenomena. Descartes reasoned geometrically about the nature of the soul. These examples cannot fairly be criticized, because the methods suited the aims of the inquiries. The remark in the text applies only to philosophers who try to build a moral or theological system through induction alone. It also applies to those who rush to investigate nature using geometric axioms and à priori syllogisms. In such cases, the means are totally inadequate to the purpose. Ed.

Gilbert lived near the end of the sixteenth century and was court physician to both Elizabeth and James. In the work mentioned in the text, he repeatedly argues for experiment over the à priori method in studying nature. He also succeeded where his critic failed, by giving a practical example of the value of his principles. His “De Magnete” contains all the fundamental parts of the science. He treated them so thoroughly that we have nothing to add to them today.

Gilbert accepted the Copernican system and even called the opposing theory utterly absurd. He based his argument on the enormous speeds that the opposing theory requires us to attribute to the heavenly bodies. Ed.

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The greatest and, perhaps, radical distinction between different men’s dispositions for philosophy and the sciences is this, that some are more vigorous and active in observing the differences of things, others in observing their resemblances; for a steady and acute disposition can fix its thoughts, and dwell upon and adhere to a point, through all the refinements of differences, but those that are sublime and discursive recognize and compare even the most delicate and general resemblances; each of them readily falls into excess, by catching either at nice distinctions or shadows of resemblance.

The greatest, and perhaps most fundamental, difference in how people approach philosophy and the sciences is this. Some are better at noticing differences between things, while others are better at noticing similarities. A steady, sharp mind can focus on one point and follow the finest distinctions. But a broad, far-ranging mind can recognize and compare even the subtlest and most general similarities. Each can easily go too far, seizing on either overly fine distinctions or mere appearances of similarity.

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Some dispositions evince an unbounded admiration of antiquity, others eagerly embrace novelty, and but few can preserve the just medium, so as neither to tear up what the ancients have correctly laid down, nor to despise the just innovations of the moderns. But this is very prejudicial to the sciences and philosophy, and instead of a correct judgment we have but the factions of the ancients and moderns. Truth is not to be sought in the good fortune of any particular conjuncture of time, which is uncertain, but in the light of nature and experience, which is eternal. Such factions, therefore, are to be abjured, and the understanding must not allow them to hurry it on to assent.

Some people admire everything ancient without limit, while others eagerly embrace anything new. Few find the proper balance. They should neither discard what the ancients got right nor scorn the valid innovations of modern thinkers. But this imbalance greatly harms science and philosophy. Instead of sound judgment, we have factions favoring either the ancients or the moderns. Truth is not to be sought in the good fortune of any particular time, which is uncertain. It is to be sought in the light of nature and experience, which is eternal. We must therefore reject such factions and not let them rush us into agreement.

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The contemplation of nature and of bodies in their individual form distracts and weakens the understanding; but the contemplation of nature and of bodies in their general composition and formation stupefies and relaxes it. We have a good instance of this in the school of Leucippus and Democritus compared with others, for they applied themselves so much to particulars as almost to neglect the general structure of things, while the others were so astounded while gazing on the structure that they did not penetrate the simplicity of nature. These two species of contemplation must, therefore, be interchanged, and each employed in its turn, in order to render the understanding at once penetrating and capacious, and to avoid the inconveniences we have mentioned, and the idols that result from them.

Studying nature and bodies in their individual forms distracts and weakens the mind. But studying their general composition and formation stuns the mind and makes it sluggish. The school of Leucippus and Democritus offers a good example when compared with other schools. They focused so much on particulars that they almost neglected the general structure of things. The others, by contrast, were so awed by that structure that they failed to understand nature's simplicity. We must therefore alternate between these two kinds of study. Each must be used in turn so that the mind can be both penetrating and broad. In this way, we can avoid the difficulties mentioned above and the idols that result from them.

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Let such, therefore, be our precautions in contemplation, that we may ward off and expel the idols of the den, which mostly owe their birth either to some predominant pursuit, or, secondly, to an excess in synthesis and analysis, or, thirdly, to a party zeal in favor of certain ages, or, fourthly, to the extent or narrowness of the subject. In general, he who contemplates nature should suspect whatever particularly takes and fixes his understanding, and should use so much the more caution to preserve it equable and unprejudiced.

We should therefore take care, when thinking, to guard against and reject the idols of the den. These usually arise from a dominant pursuit, an excess of synthesis or analysis, strong loyalty to certain ages, or the breadth or narrowness of the subject. In general, anyone who studies nature should be suspicious of whatever especially attracts and holds their attention. They should take all the more care to keep their understanding balanced and free from prejudice.

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The idols of the market are the most troublesome of all, those namely which have entwined themselves round the understanding from the associations of words and names. For men imagine that their reason governs words, while, in fact, words react upon the understanding; and this has rendered philosophy and the sciences sophistical and inactive. Words are generally formed in a popular sense, and define things by those broad lines which are most obvious to the vulgar mind; but when a more acute understanding or more diligent observation is anxious to vary those lines, and to adapt them more accurately to nature, words oppose it. Hence the great and solemn disputes of learned men often terminate in controversies about words and names, in regard to which it would be better (imitating the caution of mathematicians) to proceed more advisedly in the first instance, and to bring such disputes to a regular issue by definitions. Such definitions, however, cannot remedy the evil in natural and material objects, because they consist themselves of words, and these words produce others; so that we must necessarily have recourse to particular instances, and their regular series and arrangement, as we shall mention when we come to the mode and scheme of determining notions and axioms.

The idols of the market are the most troublesome of all. They entangle our understanding through the associations of words and names. People imagine that reason governs words. In fact, words act back on the understanding. This has made philosophy and the sciences prone to faulty reasoning and unable to make progress. Words are generally shaped by common usage. They define things along broad lines that are most obvious to ordinary people. But a sharper mind or more careful observation may seek to redraw those lines to fit nature more precisely. Words stand in the way. As a result, the great and solemn disputes of learned people often end as arguments about words and names. It would be better to follow the example of mathematicians and proceed more carefully from the start. Definitions could then help settle such disputes systematically. Yet definitions cannot remedy the problem when it comes to natural and material things. Definitions themselves consist of words, and those words lead to others. So we must turn to particular examples and arrange them in an orderly series. We will discuss this when we come to the method and plan for establishing concepts and axioms.

The Latin text adds “without end”. But Bacon is hardly right to suppose that moving from complex ideas and propositions to simple ones involves an endless series of definitions. In this gradual process of analysis, there is a limit beyond which we cannot go. There is also an upper limit, set by the limited variations of our conceptions. To meet their requirements, or indeed to be useful, logical definitions must use simpler terms than the thing being defined. But this is impossible for fundamental notions and objects of sense. We must therefore be content with merely naming our perceptions. Ed.

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The idols imposed upon the understanding by words are of two kinds. They are either the names of things which have no existence (for as some objects are from inattention left without a name, so names are formed by fanciful imaginations which are without an object), or they are the names of actual objects, but confused, badly defined, and hastily and irregularly abstracted from things. Fortune, the primum mobile, the planetary orbits, the element of fire, and the like fictions, which owe their birth to futile and false theories, are instances of the first kind. And this species of idols is removed with greater facility, because it can be exterminated by the constant refutation or the desuetude of the theories themselves. The others, which are created by vicious and unskilful abstraction, are intricate and deeply rooted. Take some word, for instance, as moist, and let us examine how far the different significations of this word are consistent. It will be found that the word moist is nothing but a confused sign of different actions admitted of no settled and defined uniformity. For it means that which easily diffuses itself over another body; that which is indeterminable and cannot be brought to a consistency; that which yields easily in every direction; that which is easily divided and dispersed; that which is easily united and collected; that which easily flows and is put in motion; that which easily adheres to, and wets another body; that which is easily reduced to a liquid state though previously solid. When, therefore, you come to predicate or impose this name, in one sense flame is moist, in another air is not moist, in another fine powder is moist, in another glass is moist; so that it is quite clear that this notion is hastily abstracted from water only, and common ordinary liquors, without any due verification of it.

The idols that words impose on the understanding are of two kinds. The first kind consists of names for things that do not exist. Just as some objects are left unnamed through inattention, fanciful imaginations create names with no objects to match them. The second kind consists of names for real objects that are confused, poorly defined, and hastily and unevenly abstracted from things. Fortune, the primum mobile, the planetary orbits, the element of fire, and similar fictions are examples of the first kind. They arise from futile and false theories. This kind of idol is easier to remove, because it can be eliminated by continually refuting the theories themselves. It can also disappear when those theories fall out of use. The other kind of idol arises from faulty and unskillful abstraction. These idols are complicated and deeply rooted. Take the word moist, for example, and let us examine how consistently it is used. We will find that moist is merely a confused label for different actions, with no fixed and definite common meaning. It can mean something that spreads easily over another body. It can also mean something that has no definite form and cannot be made to hold one. It can mean something that yields easily in every direction, or that is easily divided and scattered. It can mean something that is easily brought together and collected, or that easily flows and moves. It can mean something that easily sticks to and wets another body. It can also mean something solid that is easily turned into a liquid. When you apply the word, then, flame is moist in one sense, while air is not moist in another. In yet another sense, fine powder is moist, and in another, glass is moist. Clearly, this notion was hastily abstracted from water and other common liquids alone, without properly testing it.

The ancients believed that the planets moved in exact circles around the south. As observations increased, new facts emerged that did not fit this theory. So the earth was moved from the center to another point in the circle. The planets were then thought to move in smaller circles (epicycles) around an imaginary point. That point, in turn, moved in a circle around the earth. As further observations revealed facts that contradicted these models, more epicycles and eccentrics were added. This made the models even more confusing. In the preceding century, Kepler had swept away all these complicated theories by demonstrating his three laws. These established that the planets follow elliptical paths. Yet Bacon regarded Kepler and Copernicus in the same light as Ptolemy and Xenophanes. Ed.

There are, however, different degrees of distortion and mistake in words. One of the least faulty classes is that of the names of substances, particularly of the less abstract and more defined species (those then of chalk and mud are good, of earth bad); words signifying actions are more faulty, as to generate, to corrupt, to change; but the most faulty are those denoting qualities (except the immediate objects of sense), as heavy, light, rare, dense. Yet in all of these there must be some notions a little better than others, in proportion as a greater or less number of things come before the senses.

Words differ, however, in how much they distort or mislead. Names of substances are among the least faulty, especially names for more specific and less abstract kinds. For example, “chalk” and “mud” are good names, but “earth” is not. Words for actions are more faulty, such as “generate,” “corrupt,” and “change.” But words for qualities are the most faulty, except those for things directly perceived by the senses. Examples include “heavy,” “light,” “rare,” and “dense.” Yet in all these classes, some ideas must be a little better than others. This depends on how many things are presented to the senses.

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The idols of the theatre are not innate, nor do they introduce themselves secretly into the understanding, but they are manifestly instilled and cherished by the fictions of theories and depraved rules of demonstration. To attempt, however, or undertake their confutation would not be consistent with our declarations. For since we neither agree in our principles nor our demonstrations, all argument is out of the question. And it is fortunate that the ancients are left in possession of their honors. We detract nothing from them, seeing our whole doctrine relates only to the path to be pursued. The lame (as they say) in the path outstrip the swift who wander from it, and it is clear that the very skill and swiftness of him who runs not in the right direction must increase his aberration.

The idols of the theatre are not innate, nor do they secretly enter the mind. They are openly instilled and nurtured by the fictions of theories and faulty rules of demonstration. But attempting to refute them would not be consistent with what we have declared. Since we agree neither on principles nor on demonstrations, all argument is out of the question. And it is fortunate that the ancients retain their honors. We take nothing away from them, since our whole doctrine concerns only the path to follow. As the saying goes, the lame on the path outstrip the swift who stray from it. Clearly, the very skill and speed of someone running in the wrong direction only carry him further astray.

Our method of discovering the sciences is such as to leave little to the acuteness and strength of wit, and indeed rather to level wit and intellect. For as in the drawing of a straight line, or accurate circle by the hand, much depends on its steadiness and practice, but if a ruler or compass be employed there is little occasion for either; so it is with our method. Although, however, we enter into no individual confutations, yet a little must be said, first, of the sects and general divisions of these species of theories; secondly, something further to show that there are external signs of their weakness; and, lastly, we must consider the causes of so great a misfortune, and so long and general a unanimity in error, that we may thus render the access to truth less difficult, and that the human understanding may the more readily be purified, and brought to dismiss its idols.

Our method of discovery in the sciences leaves little to individual sharpness or intellectual strength. Indeed, it tends to put minds on a more equal footing. Drawing a straight line or an accurate circle by hand depends greatly on steadiness and practice. But if a ruler or compass is used, little of either is needed. The same is true of our method. Although we do not refute individual theories, we must say a little about their schools and general divisions. Second, we must say more to show that there are outward signs of their weakness. Finally, we must consider the causes of so great a misfortune and such long-standing, widespread agreement in error. In this way, we may make the truth less difficult to reach. We may also help purify the human understanding and make it more ready to dismiss its idols.

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The idols of the theatre, or of theories, are numerous, and may, and perhaps will, be still more so. For unless men’s minds had been now occupied for many ages in religious and theological considerations, and civil governments (especially monarchies), had been averse to novelties of that nature even in theory (so that men must apply to them with some risk and injury to their own fortunes, and not only without reward, but subject to contumely and envy), there is no doubt that many other sects of philosophers and theorists would have been introduced, like those which formerly flourished in such diversified abundance among the Greeks. For as many imaginary theories of the heavens can be deduced from the phenomena of the sky, so it is even more easy to found many dogmas upon the phenomena of philosophy—and the plot of this our theatre resembles those of the poetical, where the plots which are invented for the stage are more consistent, elegant, and pleasurable than those taken from real history.

The idols of the theatre, or of theories, are numerous. There may be still more of them, and perhaps there will be. For many ages, people’s minds have been occupied with religious and theological questions. Civil governments, especially monarchies, have also opposed new ideas of that kind, even as theories. People who pursued them risked harm to their fortunes. They received no reward, but faced contempt and envy. Without these obstacles, there is no doubt that many more schools of philosophers and theorists would have appeared. They would have resembled the many diverse schools that once flourished among the Greeks. For just as many imaginary theories of the heavens can be drawn from what we observe in the sky, many doctrines can be based even more easily on the facts of philosophy. The plots of our theatre resemble those of the theatre of poets. Plots invented for the stage are more consistent, elegant, and pleasing than those taken from real history.

In general, men take for the groundwork of their philosophy either too much from a few topics, or too little from many; in either case their philosophy is founded on too narrow a basis of experiment and natural history, and decides on too scanty grounds. For the theoretic philosopher seizes various common circumstances by experiment, without reducing them to certainty or examining and frequently considering them, and relies for the rest upon meditation and the activity of his wit.

In general, people base their philosophy either too heavily on a few topics or too lightly on many. In both cases, their philosophy rests on too narrow a range of experiments and observations of nature. They reach conclusions on too little evidence. For the theoretical philosopher picks out various common features through experiment without establishing them with certainty. Nor does the philosopher examine them or consider them repeatedly. Instead, the philosopher relies on reflection and intellectual ingenuity for the rest.

There are other philosophers who have diligently and accurately attended to a few experiments, and have thence presumed to deduce and invent systems of philosophy, forming everything to conformity with them.

Other philosophers have carefully and accurately studied a few experiments. From these, they have presumed to devise systems of philosophy and make everything fit them.

A third set, from their faith and religious veneration, introduce theology and traditions; the absurdity of some among them having proceeded so far as to seek and derive the sciences from spirits and genii. There are, therefore, three sources of error and three species of false philosophy; the sophistic, empiric, and superstitious.

A third group brings theology and traditions into philosophy out of faith and religious reverence. Some among them have gone so far as to seek and derive the sciences from spirits and genii. This is absurd. There are, therefore, three sources of error and three kinds of false philosophy: sophistic, empirical, and superstitious.

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Aristotle affords the most eminent instance of the first; for he corrupted natural philosophy by logic—thus he formed the world of categories, assigned to the human soul, the noblest of substances, a genus determined by words of secondary operation, treated of density and rarity (by which bodies occupy a greater or lesser space), by the frigid distinctions of action and power, asserted that there was a peculiar and proper motion in all bodies, and that if they shared in any other motion, it was owing to an external moving cause, and imposed innumerable arbitrary distinctions upon the nature of things; being everywhere more anxious as to definitions in teaching and the accuracy of the wording of his propositions, than the internal truth of things. And this is best shown by a comparison of his philosophy with the others of greatest repute among the Greeks. For the similar parts of Anaxagoras, the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus, the heaven and earth of Parmenides, the discord and concord of Empedocles, the resolution of bodies into the common nature of fire, and their condensation according to Heraclitus, exhibit some sprinkling of natural philosophy, the nature of things, and experiment; while Aristotle’s physics are mere logical terms, and he remodelled the same subject in his metaphysics under a more imposing title, and more as a realist than a nominalist. Nor is much stress to be laid on his frequent recourse to experiment in his books on animals, his problems, and other treatises; for he had already decided, without having properly consulted experience as the basis of his decisions and axioms, and after having so decided, he drags experiment along as a captive constrained to accommodate herself to his decisions: so that he is even more to be blamed than his modern followers (of the scholastic school) who have deserted her altogether.

Aristotle is the most notable example of the first. He corrupted natural philosophy with logic. He built the world out of categories. He assigned the human soul, the noblest of substances, to a genus defined by terms of secondary meaning. Bodies occupy more or less space depending on their density or rarity. Yet he discussed these qualities using the lifeless distinctions between action and potential. He claimed that every body had its own particular motion. If a body shared in any other motion, he said, it was because of an external force. He also imposed countless arbitrary distinctions on the nature of things. Throughout his teaching, he cared more about definitions and precise wording than about the inner truth of things. This is best shown by comparing his philosophy with the other most respected Greek philosophies. Anaxagoras’s similar parts and the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus show some trace of natural philosophy, the nature of things, and experiment. So do the heaven and earth of Parmenides and the discord and concord of Empedocles. The same is true of Heraclitus’s account of bodies dissolving into the common nature of fire and then condensing. Aristotle’s physics, by contrast, consists of mere logical terms. He reworked the same subject in his metaphysics under a more impressive title. There he did so more as a realist than as a nominalist. We should not give much weight to his frequent use of experiment in his books on animals, his problems, and other treatises. He had already reached his conclusions without properly consulting experience as the basis for his decisions and principles. Having decided, he then drags experiment along like a captive, forced to fit his conclusions. He is therefore even more blameworthy than his modern followers in the scholastic school, who have abandoned experiment altogether.

Empedocles, of Agrigentum, flourished in 444 B.C. He was a disciple of Telanges the Pythagorean and strongly embraced the doctrine of transmigration. He believed the universe consisted of the four ordinary elements. Their union produced life and happiness, or harmony and friendship. But their separation produced death and evil, or discord and hatred. Heraclitus held that matter had no particular form. As it became less or more dense, it took the appearance of fire, air, earth, and water. He believed, however, that fire was the basic element from which the others arose. Lucretius also believed this. See book i. 783, etc.

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The empiric school produces dogmas of a more deformed and monstrous nature than the sophistic or theoretic school; not being founded in the light of common notions (which, however poor and superstitious, is yet in a manner universal, and of a general tendency), but in the confined obscurity of a few experiments. Hence this species of philosophy appears probable, and almost certain to those who are daily practiced in such experiments, and have thus corrupted their imagination, but incredible and futile to others. We have a strong instance of this in the alchemists and their dogmas; it would be difficult to find another in this age, unless perhaps in the philosophy of Gilbert. We could not, however, neglect to caution others against this school, because we already foresee and augur, that if men be hereafter induced by our exhortations to apply seriously to experiments (bidding farewell to the sophistic doctrines), there will then be imminent danger from empirics, owing to the premature and forward haste of the understanding, and its jumping or flying to generalities and the principles of things. We ought, therefore, already to meet the evil.

The empirical school produces doctrines more distorted and monstrous than those of the sophistic or theoretical school. Its doctrines are not founded on common notions, which, however poor and superstitious, are still broadly universal and general in scope. Instead, they are founded on the narrow obscurity of a few experiments. This philosophy therefore seems plausible, almost certain, to those who practice such experiments daily and have thus corrupted their imagination. But to others it seems incredible and futile. The alchemists and their doctrines provide a striking example. It would be difficult to find another in this age, except perhaps in the philosophy of Gilbert. Yet we must warn others against this school. We already foresee that men may follow our advice, abandon sophistic doctrines, and apply themselves seriously to experiments. If they do, empirics will pose an imminent danger. For the understanding is prematurely and overly hasty, jumping or flying to generalizations and the principles of things. We should therefore confront this evil now.

This is how the Vulcanists and Neptunians developed their opposing theories in geology. Phrenology is a modern example of hasty generalization. Ed.

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The corruption of philosophy by the mixing of it up with superstition and theology, is of a much wider extent, and is most injurious to it both as a whole and in parts. For the human understanding is no less exposed to the impressions of fancy, than to those of vulgar notions. The disputatious and sophistic school entraps the understanding, while the fanciful, bombastic, and, as it were, poetical school, rather flatters it.

Mixing philosophy with superstition and theology corrupts it on a much wider scale. This corruption does great harm to philosophy, both as a whole and in its parts. For the human mind is just as open to the influence of imagination as to common notions. The argumentative and deceptive school traps the mind, while the fanciful, inflated, and almost poetic school flatters it instead.

There is a clear example of this among the Greeks, especially in Pythagoras, where, however, the superstition is coarse and overcharged, but it is more dangerous and refined in Plato and his school. This evil is found also in some branches of other systems of philosophy, where it introduces abstracted forms, final and first causes, omitting frequently the intermediate and the like. Against it we must use the greatest caution; for the apotheosis of error is the greatest evil of all, and when folly is worshipped, it is, as it were, a plague spot upon the understanding. Yet some of the moderns have indulged this folly with such consummate inconsiderateness, that they have endeavored to build a system of natural philosophy on the first chapter of Genesis, the book of Job, and other parts of Scripture; seeking thus the dead among the living. And this folly is the more to be prevented and restrained, because not only fantastical philosophy, but heretical religion spring from the absurd mixture of matters divine and human. It is therefore most wise soberly to render unto faith the things that are faith’s.

There is a clear example of this among the Greeks, especially in Pythagoras. But in Pythagoras, the superstition is crude and excessive. It is more dangerous and subtle in Plato and his school. This evil also appears in some branches of other philosophical systems. There it introduces abstract forms and final and first causes, while often leaving out intermediate causes and the like. We must be extremely cautious about this. For turning error into something divine is the greatest evil of all. When folly is worshipped, it is like a plague spot on the mind. Yet some modern thinkers have indulged this folly with astonishing carelessness. They have tried to build a system of natural philosophy on the first chapter of Genesis, the book of Job, and other parts of Scripture. In doing so, they seek the dead among the living. This folly is all the more important to prevent and restrain because it produces not only fanciful philosophy but also heretical religion. Both spring from the absurd mixture of divine and human matters. It is therefore wisest to give faith, soberly, what belongs to faith.

In Scripture, everything concerning the body's temporary interests is called dead. Only knowledge concerning the soul's eternal interest is living. Ed.

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Having spoken of the vicious authority of the systems founded either on vulgar notions, or on a few experiments, or on superstition, we must now consider the faulty subjects for contemplation, especially in natural philosophy. The human understanding is perverted by observing the power of mechanical arts, in which bodies are very materially changed by composition or separation, and is induced to suppose that something similar takes place in the universal nature of things. Hence the fiction of elements, and their co-operation in forming natural bodies. Again, when man reflects upon the entire liberty of nature, he meets with particular species of things, as animals, plants, minerals, and is thence easily led to imagine that there exist in nature certain primary forms which she strives to produce, and that all variation from them arises from some impediment or error which she is exposed to in completing her work, or from the collision or metamorphosis of different species. The first hypothesis has produced the doctrine of elementary properties, the second that of occult properties and specific powers; and both lead to trifling courses of reflection, in which the mind acquiesces, and is thus diverted from more important subjects. But physicians exercise a much more useful labor in the consideration of the secondary qualities of things, and the operations of attraction, repulsion, attenuation, inspissation, dilatation, astringency, separation, maturation, and the like; and would do still more if they would not corrupt these proper observations by the two systems I have alluded to, of elementary qualities and specific powers, by which they either reduce the secondary to first qualities, and their subtile and immeasurable composition, or at any rate neglect to advance by greater and more diligent observation to the third and fourth qualities, thus terminating their contemplation prematurely. Nor are these powers (or the like) to be investigated only among the medicines for the human body, but also in all changes of other natural bodies.

Having discussed the harmful authority of systems based on common notions, a few experiments, or superstition, we must now consider misguided subjects of inquiry, especially in natural philosophy. The human understanding is led astray by observing the power of mechanical arts. These arts greatly change bodies by combining or separating them. This leads people to suppose that something similar happens throughout nature. From this comes the fiction that elements work together to form natural bodies. Again, when people reflect on nature’s complete freedom, they encounter particular species, such as animals, plants, and minerals. They are then easily led to imagine that nature contains certain primary forms that it strives to produce. They suppose that any departure from these forms arises from an obstacle or error in nature’s work. Or they suppose it arises from the collision or transformation of different species. The first hypothesis gave rise to the doctrine of elemental properties. The second gave rise to the doctrine of occult properties and specific powers. Both lead to trivial lines of thought that satisfy the mind and divert it from more important subjects. Physicians, however, do much more useful work when they study the secondary qualities of things. They also study processes such as attraction, repulsion, thinning, thickening, expansion, constriction, separation, and maturation. They would do even more if they did not spoil these sound observations with the two systems I have mentioned: elemental qualities and specific powers. Through these systems, they either reduce secondary qualities to primary ones and their subtle, immeasurable combinations. Or, at any rate, they fail to use further, more careful observation to advance to third and fourth qualities. In this way, they end their inquiries too soon. Nor should these powers, or others like them, be studied only in medicines for the human body. They should also be studied in all changes in other natural bodies.

In mechanics and the general sciences, causes combine their effects. In other words, we can generally predict à priori the effect of introducing complex agencies into an experiment. We do this by accounting for the effect of each simple cause that makes them up. In chemistry and physiology, the opposite law holds. Their causes generally unite to form distinct substances, producing unforeseen laws and combinations. The deductive method therefore does not apply here, and we must rely on experiment.

Bacon is hardly consistent with himself here. In the second book, he accepts the doctrine that the elements can be transformed into one another. Modern discoveries point to this doctrine. What seemed like poetic fiction in the theories of Pythagoras and Seneca takes on the appearance of scientific fact in Baron Caynard's hands. Ed.

A greater evil arises from the contemplation and investigation rather of the stationary principles of things from which, than of the active by which things themselves are created. For the former only serve for discussion, the latter for practice. Nor is any value to be set on those common differences of motion which are observed in the received system of natural philosophy, as generation, corruption, augmentation, diminution, alteration, and translation. For this is their meaning: if a body, unchanged in other respects, is moved from its place, this is translation; if the place and species be given, but the quantity changed, it is alteration; but if, from such a change, the mass and quantity of the body do not continue the same, this is the motion of augmentation and diminution; if the change be continued so as to vary the species and substance, and transfuse them to others, this is generation and corruption. All this is merely popular, and by no means penetrates into nature; and these are but the measures and bounds of motion, and not different species of it; they merely suggest how far, and not how or whence. For they exhibit neither the affections of bodies nor the process of their parts, but merely establish a division of that motion, which coarsely exhibits to the senses matter in its varied form. Even when they wish to point out something relative to the causes of motion, and to establish a division of them, they most absurdly introduce natural and violent motion, which is also a popular notion, since every violent motion is also in fact natural, that is to say, the external efficient puts nature in action in a different manner to that which she had previously employed.

A greater problem arises when we study the fixed principles from which things are made, rather than the active principles by which they are made. The fixed principles serve only for discussion. The active principles serve for practice. Nor should we place any value on the common distinctions between kinds of motion in established natural philosophy. These are generation, corruption, augmentation, diminution, alteration, and translation. Here is what they mean. If a body moves from its place but otherwise remains unchanged, this is translation. If its place and kind remain the same but its quantity changes, this is alteration. But if the change leaves the body with a different mass and quantity, this is augmentation or diminution. If the change continues until the body's kind and substance vary and pass into others, this is generation and corruption. All this reflects only common opinion and does not penetrate nature at all. These categories are merely measures and limits of motion, not different kinds of motion. They tell us only how far motion goes, not how it happens or where it comes from. They show neither the properties of bodies nor the processes occurring among their parts. They merely divide up motion as it roughly presents matter in its varied forms to our senses. Even when philosophers try to identify and classify the causes of motion, they introduce the absurd distinction between natural and violent motion. This too is a notion drawn from common opinion. Every violent motion is also natural. That is, an external cause sets nature to work in a different way from the one it had previously used.

But if, neglecting these, any one were, for instance, to observe that there is in bodies a tendency of adhesion, so as not to suffer the unity of nature to be completely separated or broken, and a vacuum to be formed, or that they have a tendency to return to their natural dimensions or tension, so that, if compressed or extended within or beyond it, they immediately strive to recover themselves, and resume their former volume and extent; or that they have a tendency to congregate into masses with similar bodies—the dense, for instance, toward the circumference of the earth, the thin and rare toward that of the heavens. These and the like are true physical genera of motions, but the others are clearly logical and scholastic, as appears plainly from a comparison of the two.

But suppose someone sets these aside and observes, for example, that bodies tend to stick together. They do not allow the unity of nature to be completely separated or broken, forming a vacuum. Or suppose someone observes that bodies tend to return to their natural dimensions or tension. If compressed or stretched beyond that state, they immediately strive to recover and resume their former volume and extent. Or suppose someone observes that bodies tend to gather in masses with similar bodies. Dense bodies, for example, move toward the earth’s surface, and thin, rare bodies toward the surface of the heavens. These and similar motions are true physical kinds of motion. The others, however, are clearly logical and scholastic, as a comparison of the two plainly shows.

Galileo had recently accepted the idea that nature abhors a vacuum as a basic principle. His disciple Torricelli demonstrated the practical value of Bacon’s method by discovering the barometer (1643). Only then was Galileo’s error disproved. Torricelli’s discovery also disproved the error described below concerning the homœopathic tendencies of bodies, which Bacon believed. Ed.

Another considerable evil is, that men in their systems and contemplations bestow their labor upon the investigation and discussion of the principles of things and the extreme limits of nature, although all utility and means of action consist in the intermediate objects. Hence men cease not to abstract nature till they arrive at potential and shapeless matter, and still persist in their dissection, till they arrive at atoms; and yet were all this true, it would be of little use to advance man’s estate.

Another serious problem is that men devote their systems and thinking to investigating and debating the basic principles of things and the outer limits of nature. Yet all usefulness and means of action lie in the things between these extremes. So men keep reducing nature to abstractions until they reach potential and shapeless matter, and keep dissecting it until they reach atoms. Yet even if all this were true, it would do little to improve the human condition.

Until potential and formless matter is reached. Nearly all ancient philosophers accepted that a primitive, shapeless matter existed as the basis of things. They believed that creative power gave this matter fixed proportions and turned it into distinct substances. The term potential matter refers to the substance at the basis of the Peripatetic system. This substance contained in potential all the forms that an efficient cause could draw out of it. Ed.

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The understanding must also be cautioned against the intemperance of systems, so far as regards its giving or withholding its assent; for such intemperance appears to fix and perpetuate idols, so as to leave no means of removing them.

The mind must also beware of taking systems to extremes when giving or withholding agreement. For such excess seems to fix idols permanently in place, leaving no way to remove them.

These excesses are of two kinds. The first is seen in those who decide hastily, and render the sciences positive and dictatorial. The other in those who have introduced scepticism, and vague unbounded inquiry. The former subdues, the latter enervates the understanding. The Aristotelian philosophy, after destroying other systems (as the Ottomans do their brethren) by its disputatious confutations, decided upon everything, and Aristotle himself then raises up questions at will, in order to settle them; so that everything should be certain and decided, a method now in use among his successors.

These excesses are of two kinds. The first is found in those who reach conclusions hastily and make the sciences dogmatic and dictatorial. The second is found in those who promote skepticism and vague, limitless inquiry. The first suppresses understanding, while the second weakens it. Aristotelian philosophy destroyed other systems through argumentative refutations, as the Ottomans destroy their brothers. It then settled every question. Aristotle himself raised questions at will, only to settle them. In this way, he made everything seem certain and settled. His followers still use this method today.

An allusion to the humanity of the Sultans. Early histories portray them as marking their accession to the throne by destroying their families. This removed the danger of rivalry and the terrors of civil war. Ed.

The school of Plato introduced scepticism, first, as it were in joke and irony, from their dislike to Protagoras, Hippias, and others, who were ashamed of appearing not to doubt upon any subject. But the new academy dogmatized in their scepticism, and held it as their tenet. Although this method be more honest than arbitrary decision (for its followers allege that they by no means confound all inquiry, like Pyrrho and his disciples, but hold doctrines which they can follow as probable, though they cannot maintain them to be true), yet when the human mind has once despaired of discovering truth, everything begins to languish. Hence men turn aside into pleasant controversies and discussions, and into a sort of wandering over subjects rather than sustain any rigorous investigation. But as we observed at first, we are not to deny the authority of the human senses and understanding, although weak, but rather to furnish them with assistance.

Plato’s school first introduced skepticism almost as a joke, with a touch of irony. They disliked Protagoras, Hippias, and others who were ashamed to seem uncertain about any subject. But the new academy turned skepticism into a dogma and held it as a principle. This approach is more honest than making arbitrary decisions. Its followers say they do not undermine all inquiry, as Pyrrho and his disciples do. Instead, they hold doctrines they can follow as probable, though they cannot claim they are true. Yet once the human mind has given up hope of discovering truth, everything begins to languish. People then turn aside into pleasant controversies and discussions. They wander from subject to subject rather than pursue any rigorous investigation. But as we observed at first, we should not deny the authority of human senses and understanding, though they are weak. Instead, we should give them assistance.

The text is “in odium veterum sophistarum, Protagoræ, Hippiæ, et reliquorum.” Sophists were those who ostentationis aut questus causa philosophabantur. (Acad. Prior. ii. 72.) They had corrupted and degraded philosophy before Socrates. Protagoras of Abdera (Ἄβδηρα), the most celebrated sophist, taught that man is the measure of all things. He meant that all we can know is known only in relation to our faculties. He also meant that nothing can be known apart from our faculties. The sceptics likewise held that knowledge was only probable in relation to our faculties. But they stopped there and did not, like the sophist, make absolute claims about the unknown. The works of Protagoras were condemned for impiety and publicly burned by the ædiles of Athens. The ædiles seem to have served as common hangmen for the literary blasphemers of their day. Ed.

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We have now treated of each kind of idols, and their qualities, all of which must be abjured and renounced with firm and solemn resolution, and the understanding must be completely freed and cleared of them, so that the access to the kingdom of man, which is founded on the sciences, may resemble that to the kingdom of heaven, where no admission is conceded except to children.

We have now discussed each kind of idol and its qualities. We must firmly and solemnly reject and renounce them all. We must completely free and clear our understanding of them. Then entry into the kingdom of man, founded on the sciences, may resemble entry into the kingdom of heaven. There, only children are admitted.

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Vicious demonstrations are the muniments and support of idols, and those which we possess in logic, merely subject and enslave the world to human thoughts, and thoughts to words. But demonstrations are in some manner themselves systems of philosophy and science; for such as they are, and accordingly as they are regularly or improperly established, such will be the resulting systems of philosophy and contemplation. But those which we employ in the whole process leading from the senses and things to axioms and conclusions, are fallacious and incompetent. This process is fourfold, and the errors are in equal number. In the first place the impressions of the senses are erroneous, for they fail and deceive us. We must supply defects by substitutions, and fallacies by their correction. Secondly, notions are improperly abstracted from the senses, and indeterminate and confused when they ought to be the reverse. Thirdly, the induction that is employed is improper, for it determines the principles of sciences by simple enumeration, without adopting exclusions and resolutions, or just separations of nature. Lastly, the usual method of discovery and proof, by first establishing the most general propositions, then applying and proving the intermediate axioms according to them, is the parent of error and the calamity of every science. But we will treat more fully of that which we now slightly touch upon, when we come to lay down the true way of interpreting nature, after having gone through the above expiatory process and purification of the mind.

Faulty methods of proof defend and support idols. The methods we have in logic merely enslave the world to human thoughts, and thoughts to words. Yet methods of proof are themselves, in a sense, systems of philosophy and science. For the resulting systems of philosophy and contemplation reflect the methods used, depending on whether those methods are soundly or improperly established. But the methods we use to proceed from the senses and things to axioms and conclusions are faulty and inadequate. This process has four stages, and there are four corresponding errors. First, the impressions of the senses are unreliable, because the senses fail and deceive us. We must make up for their shortcomings by providing substitutes and correct their errors. Second, we draw concepts improperly from the senses. These concepts are vague and confused when they should be precise and clear. Third, the induction we use is improper. It establishes the principles of sciences by simple enumeration, without using exclusions, analysis, or proper distinctions in nature. Finally, the usual method of discovery and proof begins by establishing the most general propositions. It then applies and proves intermediate axioms according to those propositions. This method is the source of error and the ruin of every science. But we will discuss more fully what we have touched on briefly here. We will do so when we explain the true way to interpret nature, after completing the cleansing and purification of the mind described above.

Bacon is hardly correct to imply that the ancients saw enumerationem per simplicem as the only form of induction. They appear to have regarded it as just one form, and the least important. Aristotle explicitly distinguishes between perfect, or dialectical, induction and imperfect, or rhetorical, induction. Suppose a genus (G) contains four species (A, B, C, D). A syllogism would lead us to infer that what is true of G is true of any of the four. Perfect induction would reason in the opposite direction. What we can prove separately of A, B, C, and D, we may properly state as true of G, the whole genus. This is clearly a formal argument as conclusive as a syllogism.

In matters of necessity, however, valid induction may reach further. It may infer something about the whole genus from what is apparent in only some of its species. Such inferences concern the laws of nature and the immutability of forms. Bacon sought to build his new system of philosophy on them. Aristotle, the Stagyrite, however, was just as critical and cautious as Bacon about enumerationem per simplicem. He warned readers against using it without regard to the nature of the subject or whether all the species had been examined. He regarded it as a source of countless errors. Ed.

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But experience is by far the best demonstration, provided it adhere to the experiment actually made, for if that experiment be transferred to other subjects apparently similar, unless with proper and methodical caution it becomes fallacious. The present method of experiment is blind and stupid; hence men wandering and roaming without any determined course, and consulting mere chance, are hurried about to various points, and advance but little—at one time they are happy, at another their attention is distracted, and they always find that they want something further. Men generally make their experiments carelessly, and as it were in sport, making some little variation in a known experiment, and then if they fail they become disgusted and give up the attempt; nay, if they set to work more seriously, steadily, and assiduously, yet they waste all their time on probing some solitary matter, as Gilbert on the magnet, and the alchemists on gold. But such conduct shows their method to be no less unskilful than mean; for nobody can successfully investigate the nature of any object by considering that object alone; the inquiry must be more generally extended.

Experience is by far the best proof, as long as it sticks to the experiment actually performed. But applying that experiment to other, apparently similar subjects can be misleading, unless done with proper, methodical caution. The current method of experimentation is blind and stupid. People wander without a set course, relying on chance. They rush from one point to another and make little progress. At times they are fortunate, at other times their attention is distracted. They always find that they need something more. People generally experiment carelessly, almost as if playing a game. They make a small change to a known experiment, then lose heart and give up if they fail. Even when they work more seriously, steadily, and diligently, they waste all their time investigating a single subject. Gilbert did this with the magnet, and the alchemists with gold. But such conduct shows that their method is as unskilled as it is narrow. No one can successfully investigate the nature of an object by considering it alone. The inquiry must extend more broadly.

Even when men build any science and theory upon experiment, yet they almost always turn with premature and hasty zeal to practice, not merely on account of the advantage and benefit to be derived from it, but in order to seize upon some security in a new undertaking of their not employing the remainder of their labor unprofitably, and by making themselves conspicuous, to acquire a greater name for their pursuit. Hence, like Atalanta, they leave the course to pick up the golden apple, interrupting their speed, and giving up the victory. But in the true course of experiment, and in extending it to new effects, we should imitate the Divine foresight and order; for God on the first day only created light, and assigned a whole day to that work without creating any material substance thereon. In like manner we must first, by every kind of experiment, elicit the discovery of causes and true axioms, and seek for experiments which may afford light rather than profit. Axioms, when rightly investigated and established, prepare us not for a limited but abundant practice, and bring in their train whole troops of effects. But we will treat hereafter of the ways of experience, which are not less beset and interrupted than those of judgment; having spoken at present of common experience only as a bad species of demonstration, the order of our subject now requires some mention of those external signs of the weakness in practice of the received systems of philosophy and contemplation which we referred to above, and of the causes of a circumstance at first sight so wonderful and incredible. For the knowledge of these external signs prepares the way for assent, and the explanation of the causes removes the wonder; and these two circumstances are of material use in extirpating more easily and gently the idols from the understanding.

Even when people build a science or theory on experiments, they almost always rush to put it into practice. They do this not only for the benefits they hope to gain, but also for reassurance. In a new undertaking, they want some assurance that the rest of their labor will not be wasted. They also hope to draw attention to themselves and gain greater fame for their pursuit. Thus, like Atalanta, they leave the race to pick up the golden apple. They slow themselves down and give up victory. But in following the true course of experiment and extending it to produce new effects, we should imitate Divine foresight and order. On the first day, God created only light. He devoted a whole day to that work without creating any material substance on it. Likewise, we must first use every kind of experiment to discover causes and true axioms. We must seek experiments that provide light rather than profit. When axioms are properly investigated and established, they prepare us for abundant rather than limited practical use. They bring whole hosts of effects in their train. Later, we will discuss the paths of experience, which are no less obstructed and interrupted than those of judgment. For now, we have spoken of ordinary experience only as a poor kind of demonstration. The order of our subject now requires us to mention the outward signs, noted above, of the practical weakness of accepted systems of philosophy and contemplation. We must also discuss the causes of this weakness, which at first seems so astonishing and incredible. For knowing these outward signs prepares the way for acceptance, while explaining the causes removes the wonder. Both are very useful in removing idols from the understanding more easily and gently.

See near the end. This subject extends to .

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The sciences we possess have been principally derived from the Greeks; for the addition of the Roman, Arabic, or more modern writers, are but few and of small importance, and such as they are, are founded on the basis of Greek invention. But the wisdom of the Greeks was professional and disputatious, and thus most adverse to the investigation of truth. The name, therefore, of sophists, which the contemptuous spirit of those who deemed themselves philosophers, rejected and transferred to the rhetoricians—Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Polus—might well suit the whole tribe, such as Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus, Theophrastus, and their successors—Chrysippus, Carneades, and the rest. There was only this difference between them—the former were mercenary vagabonds, travelling about to different states, making a show of their wisdom, and requiring pay; the latter more dignified and noble, in possession of fixed habitations, opening schools, and teaching philosophy gratuitously. Both, however (though differing in other respects), were professorial, and reduced every subject to controversy, establishing and defending certain sects and dogmas of philosophy, so that their doctrines were nearly (what Dionysius not unaptly objected to Plato) the talk of idle old men to ignorant youths. But the more ancient Greeks, as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, Philolaus, and the rest (for I omit Pythagoras as being superstitious), did not (that we are aware) open schools, but betook themselves to the investigation of truth with greater silence and with more severity and simplicity, that is, with less affectation and ostentation. Hence in our opinion they acted more advisedly, however their works may have been eclipsed in course of time by those lighter productions which better correspond with and please the apprehensions and passions of the vulgar; for time, like a river, bears down to us that which is light and inflated, and sinks that which is heavy and solid. Nor were even these more ancient philosophers free from the national defect, but inclined too much to the ambition and vanity of forming a sect, and captivating public opinion, and we must despair of any inquiry after truth when it condescends to such trifles. Nor must we omit the opinion, or rather prophecy, of an Egyptian priest with regard to the Greeks, that they would forever remain children, without any antiquity of knowledge or knowledge of antiquity; for they certainly have this in common with children, that they are prone to talking, and incapable of generation, their wisdom being loquacious and unproductive of effects. Hence the external signs derived from the origin and birthplace of our present philosophy are not favorable.

The sciences we have today come mainly from the Greeks. Roman, Arabic, and more recent writers have added little of importance. Even those additions are based on Greek discoveries. But Greek wisdom was professional and argumentative, and therefore deeply hostile to the search for truth. Those who thought themselves philosophers scorned the name “sophists” and applied it instead to rhetoricians such as Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, and Polus. Yet the name would suit the whole tribe just as well. This includes Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus, Theophrastus, and their successors, Chrysippus, Carneades, and the rest. There was only one difference between the two groups. The former were paid wanderers who traveled from state to state, displaying their wisdom and demanding payment. The latter were more dignified and noble. They had settled homes, opened schools, and taught philosophy for free. Yet both groups, though different in other respects, were professional teachers who turned every subject into a controversy. They established and defended particular philosophical schools and doctrines. As a result, their teachings were almost what Dionysius, not unfairly, accused Plato’s of being: the talk of idle old men to ignorant young men. The earlier Greeks did not, as far as we know, open schools. These included Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, Philolaus, and the rest. I leave out Pythagoras because he was superstitious. They pursued truth more quietly, with greater rigor and simplicity, and with less pretension and display. In my opinion, they therefore acted more wisely. Yet over time, their works may have been overshadowed by lighter writings. These were better suited to the understanding and passions of ordinary people, and pleased them more. For time, like a river, carries down to us what is light and inflated and sinks what is heavy and solid. Even these earlier philosophers, however, were not free from their nation’s defect. They were too inclined to seek the glory of founding a school and winning public approval. When the search for truth stoops to such trifles, we must despair of it. We must also remember an Egyptian priest’s opinion, or rather prophecy, about the Greeks. He said they would remain children forever, possessing neither ancient knowledge nor knowledge of antiquity. They certainly share this trait with children: they are prone to talking and incapable of producing offspring. Their wisdom is talkative and produces no results. Thus the outward signs drawn from the origin and birthplace of our present philosophy are unfavorable.

Gorgias of Leontium went to Athens in 424 B.C. He and Polus were disciples of Empedocles, whom we have already mentioned (). There, he defended three famous propositions: nothing exists, nothing can be known, and people cannot transmit or communicate knowledge. He is among the earliest writers on the art of rhetoric. For that reason, Plato named his elegant dialogue on the subject after him.

Chrysippus was a Stoic philosopher of Soli in Cilicia, Campestris. He was born in 280 and died in the 143d Olympiad, 208 B.C. He was equally distinguished for his natural ability and his industry. He rarely let a day pass without writing 500 lines. He wrote several hundred volumes, including three hundred on logic, but borrowed heavily from others throughout. He was very fond of the sorites in argument, which Persius therefore called the heap of Chrysippus. He was called the Column of the Portico. The Stoic School took its name from the portico where its founder, Zeno, taught.

Carneades was born about 215 and died in 130. He attached himself to Chrysippus and upheld the scepticism of the academy with éclat. The Athenians sent him with Critolaus and Diogenes as an ambassador to Rome. There, he attracted the attention of his new audience through his subtle reasoning and his fluent, forceful speech. Before Galba and Cato the Censor, he spoke in praise of justice, with varied ideas and abundant eloquence. The next day, to establish his doctrine that human knowledge is uncertain, he set out to refute all his arguments. Like the New Academy, he maintained that the senses, imagination, and understanding often deceive us. They therefore cannot be infallible judges of truth. But from the impressions the senses produce in the mind, we infer apparent truths or probabilities. Nevertheless, Carneades held that probable opinions are a sufficient guide to conduct in life.

Xenophanes was a Greek philosopher of Colophon, born in 556. He founded the Eleatic school, which owes its fame chiefly to Parmenides. His astronomical opinions were wild. He supposed that the stars went out every morning and were relit at night. He also thought eclipses were caused by the sun temporarily going out. He believed there were several suns for the convenience of the earth's different climates. Yet this man held the chair of philosophy at Athens for seventy years.

Philolaus was a Pythagorean philosopher of Crotona, B.C. 374. He was the first to support the earth's daily rotation on its axis and its annual motion around the sun. Cicero (Acad. iv. 39) attributed this opinion to the Syracusan philosopher Nicetas and also to Plato. From this passage, Copernicus most likely got the idea for the system he later established. In the Advancement of Human Learning, Bacon accuses Gilbert of restoring the doctrines of Philolaus because he dared to support the Copernican theory. Ed.

Bacon is equally notable for using and misusing analogies. As Stuart Mill rightly observes, the “levity” that makes substances float on a stream has only its name in common with “levity” meaning worthlessness. The analogy has little value. We need only change the word to “buoyancy” to turn the appearance of Bacon’s argument against him. Ed.

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Nor are those much better which can be deduced from the character of the time and age, than the former from that of the country and nation; for in that age the knowledge both of time and of the world was confined and meagre, which is one of the worst evils for those who rely entirely on experience—they had not a thousand years of history worthy of that name, but mere fables and ancient traditions; they were acquainted with but a small portion of the regions and countries of the world, for they indiscriminately called all nations situated far toward the north Scythians, all those to the west Celts; they knew nothing of Africa but the nearest part of Ethiopia, or of Asia beyond the Ganges, and had not even heard any sure and clear tradition of the regions of the New World. Besides, a vast number of climates and zones, in which innumerable nations live and breathe, were pronounced by them to be uninhabitable; nay, the travels of Democritus, Plato, and Pythagoras, which were not extensive, but rather mere excursions from home, were considered as something vast. But in our times many parts of the New World, and every extremity of the Old, are well known, and the mass of experiments has been infinitely increased; wherefore, if external signs were to be taken from the time of the nativity or procreation (as in astrology), nothing extraordinary could be predicted of these early systems of philosophy.

Arguments based on the character of the time are not much better than those based on the country and nation. For in that age, knowledge of both history and the world was limited and scanty. This is one of the worst disadvantages for those who rely entirely on experience. They had less than a thousand years of history worthy of the name. What came before was mere fables and ancient traditions. They knew only a small part of the world's regions and countries. They called all nations far to the north Scythians, and all those to the west Celts, without distinction. They knew nothing of Africa except the nearest part of Ethiopia, or of Asia beyond the Ganges. They had not even heard any reliable and clear account of the regions of the New World. Besides, they declared a great many climates and zones uninhabitable, though countless nations live and breathe in them. Indeed, the travels of Democritus, Plato, and Pythagoras were considered vast. Yet they were not extensive, but little more than excursions from home. In our times, however, many parts of the New World and every extremity of the Old are well known. The body of experimental knowledge has also increased enormously. So, if we judged these early systems of philosophy by the outward signs of their birth or conception, as astrologers do, we could predict nothing extraordinary for them.

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Of all signs there is none more certain or worthy than that of the fruits produced, for the fruits and effects are the sureties and vouchers, as it were, for the truth of philosophy. Now, from the systems of the Greeks, and their subordinate divisions in particular branches of the sciences during so long a period, scarcely one single experiment can be culled that has a tendency to elevate or assist mankind, and can be fairly set down to the speculations and doctrines of their philosophy. Celsus candidly and wisely confesses as much, when he observes that experiments were first discovered in medicine, and that men afterward built their philosophical systems upon them, and searched for and assigned causes, instead of the inverse method of discovering and deriving experiments from philosophy and the knowledge of causes; it is not, therefore, wonderful that the Egyptians (who bestowed divinity and sacred honors on the authors of new inventions) should have consecrated more images of brutes than of men, for the brutes by their natural instinct made many discoveries, while men derived but few from discussion and the conclusions of reason.

Of all signs, none is more certain or valuable than the results produced. The fruits and effects of a philosophy are, so to speak, the guarantees and evidence of its truth. Yet the systems of the Greeks and their subdivisions in particular sciences have existed for a very long time. In all that time, scarcely a single experiment can be found that helps or improves human life and can fairly be attributed to their philosophical speculations and doctrines. Celsus frankly and wisely admits as much. He observes that people first discovered experiments in medicine. They then built their philosophical systems on those experiments and sought and assigned causes. They did not follow the reverse method of discovering and deriving experiments from philosophy and knowledge of causes. It is therefore no wonder that the Egyptians dedicated more images to animals than to men. The Egyptians gave divine and sacred honors to the creators of new inventions. Animals made many discoveries through natural instinct, while men made few through discussion and the conclusions of reason.

The industry of the alchemists has produced some effect, by chance, however, and casualty, or from varying their experiments (as mechanics also do), and not from any regular art or theory, the theory they have imagined rather tending to disturb than to assist experiment. Those, too, who have occupied themselves with natural magic (as they term it) have made but few discoveries, and those of small import, and bordering on imposture; for which reason, in the same manner as we are cautioned by religion to show our faith by our works, we may very properly apply the principle to philosophy, and judge of it by its works, accounting that to be futile which is unproductive, and still more so if, instead of grapes and olives, it yield but the thistle and thorns of dispute and contention.

The hard work of alchemists has produced some results, but only by chance, accident, or by varying their experiments, as mechanics also do. Their results have not come from any systematic method or theory. In fact, the theories they have devised tend to hinder experiments rather than help them. Those who practice what they call natural magic have also made few discoveries. Those discoveries are of little importance and border on fraud. Religion urges us to show our faith through our works. In the same way, we may properly judge philosophy by its works. We should regard a philosophy as futile if it produces nothing. It is even more futile if, instead of grapes and olives, it produces only the thistles and thorns of dispute and contention.

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Other signs may be selected from the increase and progress of particular systems of philosophy and the sciences; for those which are founded on nature grow and increase, while those which are founded on opinion change and increase not. If, therefore, the theories we have mentioned were not like plants, torn up by the roots, but grew in the womb of nature, and were nourished by her, that which for the last two thousand years has taken place would never have happened, namely, that the sciences still continue in their beaten track, and nearly stationary, without having received any important increase, nay, having, on the contrary, rather bloomed under the hands of their first author, and then faded away. But we see that the case is reversed in the mechanical arts, which are founded on nature and the light of experience, for they (as long as they are popular) seem full of life, and uninterruptedly thrive and grow, being at first rude, then convenient, lastly polished, and perpetually improved.

Other signs may be found in the growth and progress of particular systems of philosophy and science. Those founded on nature grow and develop, while those founded on opinion change but do not grow. The theories we have mentioned are like plants torn up by the roots. If instead they grew in nature’s womb and drew nourishment from her, the last two thousand years would have been different. The sciences would not still be following the same well-worn path, almost standing still, without any important growth. Instead, they have tended to flourish under their first authors and then fade away. But the opposite is true of the mechanical arts, which are founded on nature and the light of experience. As long as they are popular, they seem full of life and continually thrive and grow. They are crude at first, then useful, and finally polished, and they continue to improve.

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There is yet another sign (if such it may be termed, being rather an evidence, and one of the strongest nature), namely, the actual confession of those very authorities whom men now follow; for even they who decide on things so daringly, yet at times, when they reflect, betake themselves to complaints about the subtilty of nature, the obscurity of things, and the weakness of man’s wit. If they would merely do this, they might perhaps deter those who are of a timid disposition from further inquiry, but would excite and stimulate those of a more active and confident turn to further advances. They are not, however, satisfied with confessing so much of themselves, but consider everything which has been either unknown or unattempted by themselves or their teachers, as beyond the limits of possibility, and thus, with most consummate pride and envy, convert the defects of their own discoveries into a calumny on nature and a source of despair to every one else. Hence arose the New Academy, which openly professed scepticism, and consigned mankind to eternal darkness; hence the notion that forms, or the true differences of things (which are in fact the laws of simple action), are beyond man’s reach, and cannot possibly be discovered; hence those notions in the active and operative branches, that the heat of the sun and of fire are totally different, so as to prevent men from supposing that they can elicit or form, by means of fire, anything similar to the operations of nature; and again, that composition only is the work of man and mixture of nature, so as to prevent men from expecting the generation or transformation of natural bodies by art. Men will, therefore, easily allow themselves to be persuaded by this sign not to engage their fortunes and labor in speculations, which are not only desperate, but actually devoted to desperation.

There is another sign, if it can be called a sign. It is really evidence, and some of the strongest evidence, from the admissions of the very authorities people now follow. Even those who make such bold judgments sometimes pause to reflect. Then they complain about the subtlety of nature, the obscurity of things, and the weakness of human intellect. If they did only this, they might discourage timid people from further inquiry. But they would also inspire more active and confident people to make further advances. They are not satisfied, however, with admitting their own limitations. They regard everything unknown or unattempted by themselves or their teachers as impossible. With supreme pride and envy, they turn the shortcomings of their own discoveries into a slander against nature. They also make everyone else despair. Thus arose the New Academy, which openly professed skepticism, and condemned mankind to eternal darkness. Thus, too, arose the belief that forms, or the true differences between things, are beyond human reach and cannot possibly be discovered. These forms are in fact the laws of simple action. In practical and technical fields, similar beliefs arose. One is that the heat of the sun and the heat of fire are completely different. This belief prevents people from thinking they can use fire to produce anything like the operations of nature. Another is that humans can only combine things, while nature can mix them. This belief prevents people from expecting to create or transform natural bodies by human skill. This sign will therefore easily persuade people not to invest their fortunes and labor in inquiries that are not only hopeless, but actually committed to despair.

We have already noted that the New Academy did not profess skepticism. Instead, it held to ἀκατάληψια, the view that the absolute essences of things cannot be understood. Some modern physicists also agree with this school. They hold that the most we can know is relative and necessarily falls short of absolute certainty. These philosophers plausibly argue that our ideas and perceptions do not express the nature of the things they represent. Instead, they express only the effects of the particular organs that convey them to our understanding. If these organs changed, we would have different ideas about the nature of things. Air that is dark to humans is luminous to bats and owls.

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Nor should we omit the sign afforded by the great dissension formerly prevalent among philosophers, and the variety of schools, which sufficiently show that the way was not well prepared that leads from the senses to the understanding, since the same groundwork of philosophy (namely, the nature of things), was torn and divided into such widely differing and multifarious errors. And although in these days the dissensions and differences of opinions with regard to first principles and entire systems are nearly extinct, yet there remain innumerable questions and controversies with regard to particular branches of philosophy. So that it is manifest that there is nothing sure or sound either in the systems themselves or in the methods of demonstration.

We should not overlook another sign: the great disagreements that once prevailed among philosophers and the variety of schools. These show clearly that the path from the senses to understanding was not well prepared. For the common foundation of philosophy, the nature of things, was torn apart into many widely differing errors. Today, disagreements over first principles and whole systems have nearly died out. Yet countless questions and controversies remain about particular branches of philosophy. It is therefore clear that nothing is sure or sound in either the systems themselves or their methods of demonstration.

Because Aristotelianism was widespread everywhere.

Remember that when Bacon wrote, algebra was still in its infancy. The doctrine of units and infinitesimals had not yet been discovered.

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With regard to the supposition that there is a general unanimity as to the philosophy of Aristotle, because the other systems of the ancients ceased and became obsolete on its promulgation, and nothing better has been since discovered; whence it appears that it is so well determined and founded, as to have united the suffrages of both ages; we will observe—1st. That the notion of other ancient systems having ceased after the publication of the works of Aristotle is false, for the works of the ancient philosophers subsisted long after that event, even to the time of Cicero, and the subsequent ages. But at a later period, when human learning had, as it were, been wrecked in the inundation of barbarians into the Roman empire, then the systems of Aristotle and Plato were preserved in the waves of ages, like planks of a lighter and less solid nature. 2d. The notion of unanimity, on a clear inspection, is found to be fallacious. For true unanimity is that which proceeds from a free judgment, arriving at the same conclusion, after an investigation of the fact. Now, by far the greater number of those who have assented to the philosophy of Aristotle, have bound themselves down to it from prejudice and the authority of others, so that it is rather obsequiousness and concurrence than unanimity. But even if it were real and extensive unanimity, so far from being esteemed a true and solid confirmation, it should even lead to a violent presumption to the contrary. For there is no worse augury in intellectual matters than that derived from unanimity, with the exception of divinity and politics, where suffrages are allowed to decide. For nothing pleases the multitude, unless it strike the imagination or bind down the understanding, as we have observed above, with the shackles of vulgar notions. Hence we may well transfer Phocion’s remark from morals to the intellect: “That men should immediately examine what error or fault they have committed, when the multitude concurs with, and applauds them.” This then is one of the most unfavorable signs. All the signs, therefore, of the truth and soundness of the received systems of philosophy and the sciences are unpropitious, whether taken from their origin, their fruits, their progress, the confessions of their authors, or from unanimity.

Some suppose that there is general agreement on Aristotle’s philosophy. They believe the other ancient systems died out after it appeared, and that nothing better has since been discovered. From this, they conclude that Aristotle’s philosophy is so well established and grounded that it won agreement in both ancient and later times. First, the claim that other ancient systems disappeared after Aristotle’s works appeared is false. The works of the ancient philosophers survived long afterward, even into Cicero’s time and the ages that followed. Later, human learning was, as it were, shipwrecked when foreign peoples flooded into the Roman empire. Then the systems of Aristotle and Plato survived on the waves of time, like planks of lighter and less solid material. Second, a close look shows that the supposed agreement is misleading. True agreement comes from people freely examining the facts and reaching the same conclusion. But most who have accepted Aristotle’s philosophy have committed themselves to it because of prejudice and the authority of others. Their agreement is therefore more a matter of submission and conformity than genuine consensus. But even if the agreement were real and widespread, it would be far from solid confirmation. It should instead give us strong reason to suspect the opposite. In intellectual matters, nothing is a worse sign than agreement. The exceptions are religion and politics, where votes are allowed to decide. Nothing pleases the multitude unless it strikes the imagination or confines the understanding. As we observed above, it confines the understanding with the shackles of common notions. We may therefore apply Phocion’s remark about morals to the intellect: “Men should immediately examine what error or fault they have committed when the multitude agrees with them and applauds them.” This agreement, then, is one of the most unfavorable signs. All the signs of the truth and soundness of the accepted systems of philosophy and the sciences are unfavorable. This is true whether we look at their origins, their results, their progress, their authors’ own admissions, or the agreement they have received.

Because ordinary people make up the overwhelming majority in such decisions, and their judgments are generally swayed by emotion or prejudice.

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We now come to the causes of errors, and of such perseverance in them for ages. These are sufficiently numerous and powerful to remove all wonder, that what we now offer should have so long been concealed from, and have escaped the notice of mankind, and to render it more worthy of astonishment, that it should even now have entered any one’s mind, or become the subject of his thoughts; and that it should have done so, we consider rather the gift of fortune than of any extraordinary talent, and as the offspring of time rather than wit. But, in the first place, the number of ages is reduced to very narrow limits, on a proper consideration of the matter. For out of twenty-five centuries, with which the memory and learning of man are conversant, scarcely six can be set apart and selected as fertile in science and favorable to its progress. For there are deserts and wastes in times as in countries, and we can only reckon up three revolutions and epochs of philosophy. 1. The Greek. 2. The Roman. 3. Our own, that is the philosophy of the western nations of Europe: and scarcely two centuries can with justice be assigned to each. The intermediate ages of the world were unfortunate both in the quantity and richness of the sciences produced. Nor need we mention the Arabs, or the scholastic philosophy, which, in those ages, ground down the sciences by their numerous treatises, more than they increased their weight. The first cause, then, of such insignificant progress in the sciences, is rightly referred to the small proportion of time which has been favorable thereto.

We now turn to the causes of errors, and of their persistence for ages. These causes are numerous and powerful enough to explain why our proposal has remained hidden and escaped human notice so long. Indeed, it is more surprising that anyone should even now have thought of it. We regard this as a gift of fortune rather than extraordinary talent, and as the product of time rather than wit. But first, on closer examination, the number of ages is much smaller than it seems. Human memory and learning cover twenty-five centuries. Yet scarcely six of these can be selected as fruitful in science and favorable to its progress. For there are deserts and wastes in time as well as in countries. We can count only three great periods and movements in philosophy: 1. The Greek. 2. The Roman. 3. Our own, that is, the philosophy of the western nations of Europe. Scarcely two centuries can fairly be assigned to each. The intervening ages were unfortunate, producing little science of any richness. Nor need we mention the Arabs or scholastic philosophy. In those ages, their numerous treatises ground down the sciences more than they added to their weight. The first cause of such slight progress in the sciences, then, is rightly attributed to the small proportion of time favorable to them.

See the end of . The subject extends to .

Herodotus places the Homeric era 400 years before his own time. If we accept his account, Homer lived about 900 years before Christ. Adding the sixteen centuries of the Christian era that had passed by Bacon’s time gives us the twenty-five centuries he mentions. The Homeric epoch is the earliest point in antiquity from which Bacon could reckon with any degree of certainty. Hesiod, if he did not live at the same time as Homer, lived just before him.

The period of Greek philosophy can be placed between Thales and Plato, from the 35th to the 88th Olympiad. The Roman period can be placed between Terence and Pliny. The modern revolution, in which Bacon is a central figure, began in the time of Dante and Petrarch. They lived at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Printing was invented, and literature spread everywhere, making a second destruction of learning impossible. For these reasons, it is difficult to foresee any end to this revolution except the extinction of the human race. Ed.

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A second cause offers itself, which is certainly of the greatest importance; namely, that in those very ages in which men’s wit and literature flourished considerably, or even moderately, but a small part of their industry was bestowed on natural philosophy, the great mother of the sciences. For every art and science torn from this root may, perhaps, be polished, and put into a serviceable shape, but can admit of little growth. It is well known, that after the Christian religion had been acknowledged, and arrived at maturity, by far the best wits were busied upon theology, where the highest rewards offered themselves, and every species of assistance was abundantly supplied, and the study of which was the principal occupation of the western European nations during the third epoch; the rather because literature flourished about the very time when controversies concerning religion first began to bud forth. 2. In the preceding ages, during the second epoch (that of the Romans), philosophical meditation and labor was chiefly occupied and wasted in moral philosophy (the theology of the heathens): besides, the greatest minds in these times applied themselves to civil affairs, on account of the magnitude of the Roman empire, which required the labor of many. 3. The age during which natural philosophy appeared principally to flourish among the Greeks, was but a short period, since in the more ancient times the seven sages (with the exception of Thales), applied themselves to moral philosophy and politics, and at a later period, after Socrates had brought down philosophy from heaven to earth, moral philosophy became more prevalent, and diverted men’s attention from natural. Nay, the very period during which physical inquiries flourished, was corrupted and rendered useless by contradictions, and the ambition of new opinions. Since, therefore, during these three epochs, natural philosophy has been materially neglected or impeded, it is not at all surprising that men should have made but little progress in it, seeing they were attending to an entirely different matter.

A second cause presents itself, and it is certainly of the greatest importance. Even in ages when learning and intellectual activity flourished considerably, or even moderately, people devoted little effort to natural philosophy, the great mother of the sciences. Any art or science separated from this root may perhaps be refined and made useful, but it can grow very little. It is well known that, after Christianity had been accepted and had matured, by far the best minds devoted themselves to theology. Theology offered the highest rewards and abundant support of every kind. Its study was the principal occupation of the nations of Western Europe during the third epoch. This was all the more so because learning flourished just as religious controversies began to emerge. 2. In the preceding ages, during the second epoch, that of the Romans, philosophical thought and effort were chiefly spent and wasted on moral philosophy, the theology of the pagans. Besides, the greatest minds of those times devoted themselves to public affairs. The vast Roman empire required the labor of many people. 3. The age when natural philosophy seemed to flourish most among the Greeks was only a short period. In earlier times, the seven sages, except Thales, devoted themselves to moral philosophy and politics. Later, after Socrates had brought philosophy down from heaven to earth, moral philosophy became more prevalent and drew attention away from natural philosophy. Even the period when inquiries into nature flourished was corrupted and made useless by disputes and the ambition to advance new opinions. Natural philosophy was therefore seriously neglected or held back during all three epochs. So it is not surprising that people made little progress in it, since they were attending to entirely different matters.

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Add to this that natural philosophy, especially of late, has seldom gained exclusive possession of an individual free from all other pursuits, even among those who have applied themselves to it, unless there may be an example or two of some monk studying in his cell, or some nobleman in his villa. She has rather been made a passage and bridge to other pursuits.

Also, especially in recent times, few people have devoted themselves exclusively to natural philosophy, even among those who studied it. There may be one or two examples of a monk studying in his cell or a nobleman in his villa. But natural philosophy has more often served as a bridge to other pursuits.

The reference is clearly to Roger Bacon and Réné Descartes. Ed.

Thus has this great mother of the sciences been degraded most unworthily to the situation of a handmaid, and made to wait upon medicine or mathematical operations, and to wash the immature minds of youth, and imbue them with a first dye, that they may afterward be more ready to receive and retain another. In the meantime, let no one expect any great progress in the sciences (especially their operative part), unless natural philosophy be applied to particular sciences, and particular sciences again referred back to natural philosophy. For want of this, astronomy, optics, music, many mechanical arts, medicine itself, and (what perhaps is more wonderful), moral and political philosophy, and the logical sciences have no depth, but only glide over the surface and variety of things; because these sciences, when they have been once partitioned out and established, are no longer nourished by natural philosophy, which would have imparted fresh vigor and growth to them from the sources and genuine contemplation of motion, rays, sounds, texture, and conformation of bodies, and the affections and capacity of the understanding. But we can little wonder that the sciences grow not when separated from their roots.

Thus, this great mother of the sciences has been unworthily reduced to a servant. She has been made to assist medicine or mathematical work and to prepare the immature minds of the young. She gives their minds a first coloring, so they can later receive and retain another more easily. Meanwhile, let no one expect great progress in the sciences, especially in their practical applications, unless natural philosophy is applied to the particular sciences and those sciences are brought back to natural philosophy. Without this connection, astronomy, optics, music, many mechanical arts, and medicine itself lack depth. The same is true of moral and political philosophy and the sciences of logic, which is perhaps more surprising. They merely glide over the surface and variety of things. Once these sciences have been separated and established, they are no longer nourished by natural philosophy. Yet natural philosophy would give them fresh vigor and growth through study of the sources and true nature of motion, rays, sounds, the texture and structure of bodies, and the workings and capacities of the understanding. But we can hardly wonder that the sciences do not grow when they are separated from their roots.

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There is another powerful and great cause of the little advancement of the sciences, which is this; it is impossible to advance properly in the course when the goal is not properly fixed. But the real and legitimate goal of the sciences is the endowment of human life with new inventions and riches. The great crowd of teachers know nothing of this, but consist of dictatorial hirelings; unless it so happen that some artisan of an acute genius, and ambitious of fame, gives up his time to a new discovery, which is generally attended with a loss of property. The majority, so far from proposing to themselves the augmentation of the mass of arts and sciences, make no other use of an inquiry into the mass already before them, than is afforded by the conversion of it to some use in their lectures, or to gain, or to the acquirement of a name, and the like. But if one out of the multitude be found, who courts science from real zeal, and on his own account, even he will be seen rather to follow contemplation, and the variety of theories, than a severe and strict investigation of truth. Again, if there even be an unusually strict investigator of truth, yet will he propose to himself, as the test of truth, the satisfaction of his mind and understanding, as to the causes of things long since known, and not such a test as to lead to some new earnest of effects, and a new light in axioms. If, therefore, no one have laid down the real end of science, we cannot wonder that there should be error in points subordinate to that end.

There is another great and powerful reason why the sciences have made so little progress. It is impossible to make proper progress when the goal is not properly set. The true and proper goal of the sciences is to enrich human life with new inventions and resources. The vast crowd of teachers know nothing of this goal. They are merely dictatorial hired hands. An exception occurs when an exceptionally gifted artisan, ambitious for fame, devotes his time to a new discovery. Such work generally costs him his property. Most people, far from setting out to expand the arts and sciences, study existing knowledge only to use it in lectures, make money, gain a name, or pursue similar ends. But even if someone among the multitude pursues science out of genuine zeal and for its own sake, he will be seen to favor contemplation and a variety of theories over a rigorous investigation of truth. Again, even if someone investigates truth with unusual rigor, he will test it by whether it satisfies his mind and understanding about the causes of things long known. He will not use a test that leads to some new evidence of what can be achieved and sheds new light on general principles. If, then, no one has set out the true goal of science, we cannot wonder that people go wrong in matters that depend on that goal.

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But, in like manner, as the end and goal of science is ill defined, so, even were the case otherwise, men have chosen an erroneous and impassable direction. For it is sufficient to astonish any reflecting mind, that nobody should have cared or wished to open and complete a way for the understanding, setting off from the senses, and regular, well-conducted experiment; but that everything has been abandoned either to the mists of tradition, the whirl and confusion of argument, or the waves and mazes of chance, and desultory, ill-combined experiment. Now, let any one but consider soberly and diligently the nature of the path men have been accustomed to pursue in the investigation and discovery of any matter, and he will doubtless first observe the rude and inartificial manner of discovery most familiar to mankind: which is no other than this. When any one prepares himself for discovery, he first inquires and obtains a full account of all that has been said on the subject by others, then adds his own reflections, and stirs up and, as it were, invokes his own spirit, after much mental labor, to disclose its oracles. All which is a method without foundation, and merely turns on opinion.

But just as the end and goal of science are poorly defined, so men have chosen a wrong and impassable path. They would have done so even if the goal had been properly defined. It is enough to astonish any thoughtful person that nobody has cared or wished to open and complete a path for understanding. Such a path would start from the senses and proceed through regular, well-conducted experiments. Instead, everything has been left to the mists of tradition, the whirl and confusion of argument, or the waves and mazes of chance and scattered, poorly combined experiments. Now let anyone consider calmly and carefully the path men have usually taken to investigate and discover anything. He will surely first notice the crude, unskilled method of discovery most familiar to mankind. It is simply this: when someone sets out to discover something, he first seeks a full account of what others have said about it. Then he adds his own reflections. After much mental labor, he stirs up his own spirit and, as it were, calls on it to reveal its oracles. This whole method has no foundation and rests entirely on opinion.

Another, perhaps, calls in logic to assist him in discovery, which bears only a nominal relation to his purpose. For the discoveries of logic are not discoveries of principles and leading axioms, but only of what appears to accord with them. And when men become curious and importunate, and give trouble, interrupting her about her proofs, and the discovery of principles or first axioms, she puts them off with her usual answer, referring them to faith, and ordering them to swear allegiance to each art in its own department.

Another person, perhaps, calls on logic to help him make discoveries. But logic has only a nominal connection to his purpose. For logic does not discover principles and leading axioms. It discovers only what seems to agree with them. When people grow curious and persistent, they trouble logic with questions about her proofs and the discovery of principles or first axioms. She puts them off with her usual answer. She refers them to faith and tells them to swear allegiance to each art in its own field.

From the misuse of logic by the scholastics, who mistook the à priori method, or deductive syllogism, for the whole of logic. Ed.

There remains but mere experience, which, when it offers itself, is called chance; when it is sought after, experiment. But this kind of experience is nothing but a loose fagot; and mere groping in the dark, as men at night try all means of discovering the right road, while it would be better and more prudent either to wait for day, or procure a light, and then proceed. On the contrary, the real order of experience begins by setting up a light, and then shows the road by it, commencing with a regulated and digested, not a misplaced and vague course of experiment, and thence deducing axioms, and from those axioms new experiments: for not even the Divine Word proceeded to operate on the general mass of things without due order.

All that remains is mere experience. When it comes to us unbidden, we call it chance. When we seek it out, we call it experiment. But this kind of experience is just a loose bundle. It is like groping in the dark, as people do at night when they try every way to find the right road. It would be better and wiser to wait for daylight or get a light before going on. By contrast, the proper method of experience begins by setting up a light. It then uses that light to show the road. It starts with a methodical, well-organized course of experiments, not a haphazard and vague one. From these experiments it draws general principles, and from those principles it devises new experiments. For even the Divine Word did not act on the whole mass of things without proper order.

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Let men, therefore, cease to wonder if the whole course of science be not run, when all have wandered from the path; quitting it entirely, and deserting experience, or involving themselves in its mazes, and wandering about, while a regularly combined system would lead them in a sure track through its wilds to the open day of axioms.

Therefore, no one should wonder that science has not completed its course when all have strayed from the path. They have either abandoned the path and left experience behind, or become entangled and lost in its mazes. Yet a properly organized system would lead them surely through the wilderness of experience into the daylight of axioms.

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The evil, however, has been wonderfully increased by an opinion, or inveterate conceit, which is both vainglorious and prejudicial, namely, that the dignity of the human mind is lowered by long and frequent intercourse with experiments and particulars, which are the objects of sense, and confined to matter; especially since such matters generally require labor in investigation, are mean subjects for meditation, harsh in discourse, unproductive in practice, infinite in number, and delicate in their subtilty. Hence we have seen the true path not only deserted, but intercepted and blocked up, experience being rejected with disgust, and not merely neglected or improperly applied.

The evil, however, has been greatly increased by a long-held opinion that is both vain and harmful. This opinion holds that the human mind is degraded by spending long periods repeatedly examining experiments and particular facts. These are things we perceive through our senses and are confined to the material world. Such matters generally require hard work to investigate. They seem lowly subjects for thought, are awkward to discuss, and yield little practical benefit. They are also countless and subtle in ways that are hard to grasp. As a result, we have seen the true path not only abandoned, but obstructed and blocked. Experience has not merely been neglected or misused. It has been rejected with disgust.

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Again, the reverence for antiquity, and the authority of men who have been esteemed great in philosophy, and general unanimity, have retarded men from advancing in science, and almost enchanted them. As to unanimity, we have spoken of it above.

Again, respect for antiquity, the authority of men regarded as great philosophers, and general agreement have held back scientific progress. They have almost cast a spell over people. We have already discussed general agreement above.

The inconsistency Bacon refers to seems to arise from confusing two distinct kinds of experience. These affect human knowledge in inverse proportion: experience that ends with a person's life, and experience passed from one century to another. Ed.

The opinion which men cherish of antiquity is altogether idle, and scarcely accords with the term. For the old age and increasing years of the world should in reality be considered as antiquity, and this is rather the character of our own times than of the less advanced age of the world in those of the ancients; for the latter, with respect to ourselves, are ancient and elder, with respect to the world modern and younger. And as we expect a greater knowledge of human affairs, and more mature judgment from an old man than from a youth, on account of his experience, and the variety and number of things he has seen, heard, and meditated upon, so we have reason to expect much greater things of our own age (if it knew but its strength and would essay and exert it) than from antiquity, since the world has grown older, and its stock has been increased and accumulated with an infinite number of experiments and observations.

The opinion people cherish about antiquity is completely mistaken and hardly fits the word itself. For the world's old age and advancing years should really be called antiquity. That description fits our own times better than the less advanced age of the world in ancient times. The ancients are old and ancient compared with us, but modern and young compared with the world. We expect greater knowledge of human affairs and more mature judgment from an old man than from a young man. That is because of his experience and the many different things he has seen, heard, and thought about. In the same way, we have reason to expect much greater things from our own age than from antiquity. That is, if our age knew its strength and would try to use it. For the world has grown older, and its store of knowledge has grown through countless experiments and observations.

We must also take into our consideration that many objects in nature fit to throw light upon philosophy have been exposed to our view, and discovered by means of long voyages and travels, in which our times have abounded. It would, indeed, be dishonorable to mankind, if the regions of the material globe, the earth, the sea, and stars, should be so prodigiously developed and illustrated in our age, and yet the boundaries of the intellectual globe should be confined to the narrow discoveries of the ancients.

We must also consider the many things in nature that can shed light on philosophy. They have been brought to our attention and discovered through the long voyages and travels common in our time. It would be a disgrace to humanity if our knowledge of the physical world expanded so greatly in our age, while our intellectual world remained confined to the narrow discoveries of the ancients. This physical world includes the earth, the sea, and the stars.

With regard to authority, it is the greatest weakness to attribute infinite credit to particular authors, and to refuse his own prerogative to time, the author of all authors, and, therefore, of all authority. For truth is rightly named the daughter of time, not of authority. It is not wonderful, therefore, if the bonds of antiquity, authority, and unanimity, have so enchained the power of man, that he is unable (as if bewitched) to become familiar with things themselves.

When it comes to authority, it is a great weakness to place unlimited trust in particular authors. It is also a weakness to deny time its own rightful authority. Time is the author of all authors and therefore the source of all authority. For truth is rightly called the daughter of time, not of authority. It is no wonder, then, that tradition, authority, and agreement have chained the power of humanity. As if bewitched, people cannot become familiar with things themselves.

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Nor is it only the admiration of antiquity, authority, and unanimity, that has forced man’s industry to rest satisfied with present discoveries, but, also, the admiration of the effects already placed within his power. For whoever passes in review the variety of subjects, and the beautiful apparatus collected and introduced by the mechanical arts for the service of mankind, will certainly be rather inclined to admire our wealth than to perceive our poverty: not considering that the observations of man and operations of nature (which are the souls and first movers of that variety) are few, and not of deep research; the rest must be attributed merely to man’s patience, and the delicate and well-regulated motion of the hand or of instruments. To take an instance, the manufacture of clocks is delicate and accurate, and appears to imitate the heavenly bodies in its wheels, and the pulse of animals in its regular oscillation, yet it only depends upon one or two axioms of nature.

It is not only admiration for antiquity, authority, and unanimous agreement that has made people content with existing discoveries. Admiration for what we can already accomplish has also held us back. Anyone who surveys the variety of things and the beautiful equipment created by the mechanical arts to serve humanity will surely be more inclined to admire our wealth than to recognize our poverty. But that overlooks how few observations and natural processes lie behind this variety. They are its essence and driving force, yet they involve no deep research. The rest is due merely to human patience and the precise, controlled movement of hands or instruments. Take clockmaking, for example. It is delicate and precise. A clock’s wheels seem to imitate the heavenly bodies, and its regular oscillation seems to imitate the pulse of animals. Yet clockmaking depends on only one or two principles of nature.

Again, if one consider the refinement of the liberal arts, or even that exhibited in the preparation of natural bodies in mechanical arts and the like, as the discovery of the heavenly motions in astronomy, of harmony in music, of the letters of the alphabet (still unadopted by the Chinese) in grammar; or, again, in mechanical operations, the productions of Bacchus and Ceres, that is, the preparation of wine and beer, the making of bread, or even the luxuries of the table, distillation, and the like; if one reflect also, and consider for how long a period of ages (for all the above, except distillation, are ancient) these things have been brought to their present state of perfection, and (as we instanced in clocks) to how few observations and axioms of nature they may be referred, and how easily, and as it were, by obvious chance or contemplation, they might be discovered, one would soon cease to admire and rather pity the human lot on account of its vast want and dearth of things and discoveries for so many ages. Yet even the discoveries we have mentioned were more ancient than philosophy and the intellectual arts; so that (to say the truth) when contemplation and doctrinal science began, the discovery of useful works ceased.

Again, consider the refinement of the liberal arts and the skill shown in preparing natural materials in the mechanical arts. In astronomy, for example, there is the discovery of the motions of the heavens. In music, there is the discovery of harmony. In grammar, there are the letters of the alphabet, which the Chinese still have not adopted. In the mechanical arts, there are the products of Bacchus and Ceres: the making of wine, beer, and bread. There are also the luxuries of the table, distillation, and similar arts. Now consider how many ages these things have taken to reach their present perfection. All of them except distillation are ancient. Consider, too, how few observations and principles of nature they depend on, as we saw with clocks. Consider how easily they might have been discovered, almost by chance or by obvious reflection. If one reflects on all this, one would soon cease to admire the human condition. Instead, one would pity it for its vast lack of things and discoveries over so many ages. Yet even the discoveries we have mentioned were older than philosophy and the intellectual arts. So, to tell the truth, the discovery of useful works ceased when contemplation and systematic learning began.

Chinese characters resemble Egyptian hieroglyphics in many ways. They represent ideas, not sounds.

But if any one turn from the manufactories to libraries, and be inclined to admire the immense variety of books offered to our view, let him but examine and diligently inspect the matter and contents of these books, and his astonishment will certainly change its object: for when he finds no end of repetitions, and how much men do and speak the same thing over again, he will pass from admiration of this variety to astonishment at the poverty and scarcity of matter, which has hitherto possessed and filled men’s minds.

But suppose someone turns from factories to libraries and marvels at the immense variety of books on display. Let him carefully examine their subject matter and contents, and his astonishment will surely turn to something else. For he will find endless repetition and see how often people do and say the same things again. Instead of admiring the variety of books, he will be astonished at the poverty and scarcity of ideas that have so far filled people’s minds.

But if any one should condescend to consider such sciences as are deemed rather curious than sound, and take a full view of the operations of the alchemists or magii, he will perhaps hesitate whether he ought rather to laugh or to weep. For the alchemist cherishes eternal hope, and when his labors succeed not, accuses his own mistakes, deeming, in his self-accusation, that he has not properly understood the words of art or of his authors; upon which he listens to tradition and vague whispers, or imagines there is some slight unsteadiness in the minute details of his practice, and then has recourse to an endless repetition of experiments: and in the meantime, when, in his casual experiments, he falls upon something in appearance new, or of some degree of utility, he consoles himself with such an earnest, and ostentatiously publishes them, keeping up his hope of the final result. Nor can it be denied that the alchemists have made several discoveries, and presented mankind with useful inventions. But we may well apply to them the fable of the old man, who bequeathed to his sons some gold buried in his garden, pretending not to know the exact spot, whereupon they worked diligently in digging the vineyard, and though they found no gold, the vintage was rendered more abundant by their labor.

But suppose someone stoops to examine sciences regarded as more curious than sound. If he takes a full look at the work of alchemists or magicians, he may hesitate between laughter and tears. The alchemist never gives up hope. When his work fails, he blames his own mistakes. He assumes that he has misunderstood the technical terms or the authors he has read. So he listens to tradition and vague rumors. Or he imagines that some small detail of his procedure was inconsistent. Then he repeats his experiments endlessly. Meanwhile, he may happen upon something that appears new or has some use. He takes comfort in this as a promise of success, and proudly publicizes his discoveries. In this way, he keeps alive his hope of achieving his final goal. Nor can it be denied that alchemists have made several discoveries and given mankind useful inventions. But we may well compare them to the old man in the fable. He left his sons some gold buried in his garden, pretending not to know exactly where it lay. So they dug diligently in the vineyard. Though they found no gold, their labor made the grape harvest more abundant.

The followers of natural magic, who explain everything by sympathy and antipathy, have assigned false powers and marvellous operations to things by gratuitous and idle conjectures: and if they have ever produced any effects, they are rather wonderful and novel than of any real benefit or utility.

Followers of natural magic explain everything through sympathy and antipathy. Based on baseless and idle guesses, they have attributed false powers and marvelous effects to things. And if they have ever produced any effects, those effects are more remarkable and novel than truly useful.

In superstitious magic (if we say anything at all about it) we must chiefly observe, that there are only some peculiar and definite objects with which the curious and superstitious arts have, in every nation and age, and even under every religion, been able to exercise and amuse themselves. Let us, therefore, pass them over. In the meantime we cannot wonder that the false notion of plenty should have occasioned want.

If we say anything at all about superstitious magic, we must chiefly note one thing. The curious and superstitious arts have been able to occupy and amuse themselves with only certain specific subjects. This has been true in every nation and age, and even under every religion. Let us therefore pass over these subjects. In the meantime, we cannot be surprised that the false idea of abundance has led to scarcity.

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The admiration of mankind with regard to the arts and sciences, which is of itself sufficiently simple and almost puerile, has been increased by the craft and artifices of those who have treated the sciences, and delivered them down to posterity. For they propose and produce them to our view so fashioned, and as it were masked, as to make them pass for perfect and complete. For if you consider their method and divisions, they appear to embrace and comprise everything which can relate to the subject. And although this frame be badly filled up and resemble an empty bladder, yet it presents to the vulgar understanding the form and appearance of a perfect science.

People’s admiration for the arts and sciences is simple and almost childish in itself. But it has been increased by the tricks of those who have written about the sciences and passed them down to later generations. They present the sciences in a form that disguises them and makes them seem perfect and complete. If you look at how they organize and divide each subject, they seem to cover everything that could relate to it. Although the framework is poorly filled out and resembles an empty bladder, it looks like a complete science to ordinary minds.

The first and most ancient investigators of truth were wont, on the contrary, with more honesty and success, to throw all the knowledge they wished to gather from contemplation, and to lay up for use, into aphorisms, or short scattered sentences unconnected by any method, and without pretending or professing to comprehend any entire art. But according to the present system, we cannot wonder that men seek nothing beyond that which is handed down to them as perfect, and already extended to its full complement.

By contrast, the earliest investigators of truth worked more honestly and successfully. They put all the knowledge they sought to gather through contemplation and save for later use into aphorisms. These were short, scattered statements, arranged without any system. They did not pretend or claim to cover an entire field of knowledge. But under the present system, we cannot wonder that people seek nothing beyond what they are handed. They are told that this knowledge is perfect and already complete.

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The ancient theories have received additional support and credit from the absurdity and levity of those who have promoted the new, especially in the active and practical part of natural philosophy. For there have been many silly and fantastical fellows who, from credulity or imposture, have loaded mankind with promises, announcing and boasting of the prolongation of life, the retarding of old age, the alleviation of pains, the remedying of natural defects, the deception of the senses, the restraint and excitement of the passions, the illumination and exaltation of the intellectual faculties, the transmutation of substances, the unlimited intensity and multiplication of motion, the impressions and changes of the air, the bringing into our power the management of celestial influences, the divination of future events, the representation of distant objects, the revelation of hidden objects, and the like. One would not be very wrong in observing with regard to such pretenders, that there is as much difference in philosophy, between their absurdity and real science, as there is in history between the exploits of Cæsar or Alexander, and those of Amadis de Gaul and Arthur of Britain. For those illustrious generals are found to have actually performed greater exploits than such fictitious heroes are even pretended to have accomplished, by the means, however, of real action, and not by any fabulous and portentous power. Yet it is not right to suffer our belief in true history to be diminished, because it is sometimes injured and violated by fables. In the meantime we cannot wonder that great prejudice has been excited against any new propositions (especially when coupled with any mention of effects to be produced), by the conduct of impostors who have made a similar attempt; for their extreme absurdity, and the disgust occasioned by it, has even to this day overpowered every spirited attempt of the kind.

Ancient theories have gained further support and credibility from the absurdity and frivolity of those promoting new ones. This is especially true in the practical side of natural philosophy. Many foolish and fanciful people, through gullibility or fraud, have burdened humanity with promises. They have claimed they could prolong life, delay old age, relieve pain, correct natural defects, and deceive the senses. They have boasted of controlling and stirring the passions, and enlightening and elevating the intellect. They have promised to transform substances, make motion infinitely powerful and multiply it without limit, and affect and change the air. They have also claimed they could give us control over celestial influences, predict future events, show distant objects, reveal hidden ones, and more. It would not be far wrong to compare these pretenders with practitioners of real science. The difference between them is like the difference in history between the exploits of Cæsar or Alexander and those of Amadis de Gaul and Arthur of Britain. Those famous generals actually performed greater exploits than the fictional heroes are even said to have performed. Yet they did so through real action, not through any fabulous or supernatural power. Still, we should not let our belief in true history diminish because fables sometimes distort and violate it. Meanwhile, impostors have made similar claims, so we cannot wonder that they have stirred up great prejudice against new proposals. This is especially true when those proposals mention effects they might produce. Even today, the extreme absurdity of the impostors and the disgust it causes have stifled every bold attempt of this kind.

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Want of energy, and the littleness and futility of the tasks that human industry has undertaken, have produced much greater injury to the sciences: and yet (to make it still worse) that very want of energy manifests itself in conjunction with arrogance and disdain.

Lack of energy and the small, pointless tasks people have undertaken have done much greater harm to the sciences. To make matters worse, this lack of energy goes hand in hand with arrogance and disdain.

For, in the first place, one excuse, now from its repetition become familiar, is to be observed in every art, namely, that its promoters convert the weakness of the art itself into a calumny upon nature: and whatever it in their hands fails to effect, they pronounce to be physically impossible. But how can the art ever be condemned while it acts as judge in its own cause? Even the present system of philosophy cherishes in its bosom certain positions or dogmas, which (it will be found on diligent inquiry) are calculated to produce a full conviction that no difficult, commanding, and powerful operation upon nature ought to be anticipated through the means of art; we instanced above the alleged different quality of heat in the sun and fire, and composition and mixture. Upon an accurate observation the whole tendency of such positions is wilfully to circumscribe man’s power, and to produce a despair of the means of invention and contrivance, which would not only confound the promises of hope, but cut the very springs and sinews of industry, and throw aside even the chances of experience. The only object of such philosophers is to acquire the reputation of perfection for their own art, and they are anxious to obtain the most silly and abandoned renown, by causing a belief that whatever has not yet been invented and understood can never be so hereafter. But if any one attempt to give himself up to things, and to discover something new; yet he will only propose and destine for his object the investigation and discovery of some one invention, and nothing more; as the nature of the magnet, the tides, the heavenly system, and the like, which appear enveloped in some degree of mystery, and have hitherto been treated with but little success. Now it is the greatest proof of want of skill, to investigate the nature of any object in itself alone; for that same nature, which seems concealed and hidden in some instances, is manifest and almost palpable in others, and excites wonder in the former, while it hardly attracts attention in the latter. Thus the nature of consistency is scarcely observed in wood or stone, but passed over by the term solid without any further inquiry about the repulsion of separation or the solution of continuity. But in water-bubbles the same circumstance appears matter of delicate and ingenious research, for they form themselves into thin pellicles, curiously shaped into hemispheres, so as for an instant to avoid the solution of continuity.

First, an excuse has become familiar through repetition in every art. Its advocates turn the weakness of the art itself into an accusation against nature. Whatever they fail to achieve through their art, they declare physically impossible. But how can an art ever be judged at fault when it acts as judge in its own case? The present system of philosophy even embraces certain doctrines that have the same effect. Careful inquiry will show that they encourage the belief that no difficult, impressive, or powerful effect on nature can be expected from art. We gave examples above: the alleged difference between heat in the sun and in fire, and the doctrines of composition and mixture. Careful observation shows that such doctrines are designed to restrict human power. They discourage the search for means of invention and ingenuity. They not only dash our hopes, but cut the very roots and sinews of effort, and even dismiss the possibilities offered by experience. The sole aim of such philosophers is to make their own art appear perfect. They seek the most foolish and discreditable kind of fame. They do this by making people believe that whatever has not yet been invented or understood never can be. But suppose someone tries to devote themselves to things and discover something new. Even then, they will set out to investigate and discover only one thing. They might study the nature of the magnet, the tides, the heavenly system, or something similar. These subjects seem surrounded by some mystery and have so far been studied with little success. Now, nothing shows a greater lack of skill than investigating the nature of a thing in isolation. The same nature that seems concealed and hidden in some cases is clear and almost tangible in others. It inspires wonder in the first cases, while it hardly attracts attention in the others. For example, the nature of consistency is scarcely noticed in wood or stone. We simply call them solid, without investigating further what resists their separation or the breaking of their continuity. But in water bubbles, the same phenomenon seems to call for delicate and ingenious research. Bubbles form thin films, curiously shaped into hemispheres, which keep from breaking apart for an instant.

See .

Newton used geometry to reach the boundaries of creation. His methods are sufficient evidence of the wisdom of the text. The same cause that makes a bubble round has made the earth round. The same law that draws a stone to the earth’s surface keeps the moon in its orbit. This great philosopher calculated and established these principles using materials entirely at his disposal. In this way, he was able to give us a key to unlock the mysteries of the universe. Ed.

In general those very things which are considered as secret are manifest and common in other objects, but will never be clearly seen if the experiments and contemplation of man be directed to themselves only. Yet it commonly happens, that if, in the mechanical arts, any one bring old discoveries to a finer polish, or more elegant height of ornament, or unite and compound them, or apply them more readily to practice, or exhibit them on a less heavy and voluminous scale, and the like, they will pass off as new.

In general, things thought to be hidden are plainly visible and common in other objects. But people will never see them clearly if they experiment and reflect only on those things themselves. Yet in the mechanical arts, old discoveries are often passed off as new. This happens when someone polishes them, makes them more decorative, or combines them. It also happens when someone makes them easier to use, or smaller and lighter, and so on.

We cannot, therefore, wonder that no magnificent discoveries, worthy of mankind, have been brought to light, while men are satisfied and delighted with such scanty and puerile tasks, nay, even think that they have pursued or attained some great object in their accomplishment.

It is no wonder, then, that no magnificent discoveries worthy of humanity have come to light. People are satisfied and delighted with such trivial, childish tasks. They even think that, by completing them, they have pursued or achieved some great goal.

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Nor should we neglect to observe that natural philosophy has, in every age, met with a troublesome and difficult opponent: I mean superstition, and a blind and immoderate zeal for religion. For we see that, among the Greeks, those who first disclosed the natural causes of thunder and storms to the yet untrained ears of man were condemned as guilty of impiety toward the gods. Nor did some of the old fathers of Christianity treat those much better who showed by the most positive proofs (such as no one now disputes) that the earth is spherical, and thence asserted that there were antipodes.

We should also note that natural philosophy has faced a troublesome and difficult opponent in every age: superstition and blind, excessive religious zeal. Among the Greeks, the first people to explain the natural causes of thunder and storms faced an audience unfamiliar with such ideas. They were condemned for impiety toward the gods. Some early Christian fathers treated others little better. These people proved beyond doubt that the earth is spherical and therefore claimed that there were people living on its opposite side. No one now disputes their proof that the earth is spherical.

See the “Clouds” of Aristophanes. Socrates is portrayed as chasing Jupiter out of the sky by explaining thunderstorms as collisions of air and whirlwinds. Ed.

Robespierre was the latest victim of this bigotry. In his youth, he tried to introduce Franklin’s lightning conductor into France. But the people whose lives he sought to protect persecuted him. They accused him of boldly trying to thwart the designs of Providence. Ed.

Even in the present state of things the condition of discussions on natural philosophy is rendered more difficult and dangerous by the summaries and methods of divines, who, after reducing divinity into such order as they could, and brought it into a scientific form, have proceeded to mingle an undue proportion of the contentious and thorny philosophy of Aristotle with the substance of religion.

Even now, discussions of natural philosophy are made more difficult and dangerous by theologians’ summaries and methods. The theologians organized theology as best they could and gave it a scientific form. Then they mixed too much of Aristotle’s contentious and thorny philosophy into the substance of religion.

We can hardly agree with the text. The scholastics certainly used the deductive syllogism to build a system of theology. They did so because the inductive syllogism was completely inapplicable, except as a way to verify conclusions. Our author criticizes the technical form in which they organized their arguments. But for that form, they owed nothing at all to Aristotle. Conducting a dispute in a purely syllogistic fashion originated entirely with the scholastics. Ed.

The fictions of those who have not feared to deduce and confirm the truth of the Christian religion by the principles and authority of philosophers, tend to the same end, though in a different manner. They celebrate the union of faith and the senses as though it were legitimate, with great pomp and solemnity, and gratify men’s pleasing minds with a variety, but in the meantime confound most improperly things divine and human. Moreover, in these mixtures of divinity and philosophy the received doctrines of the latter are alone included, and any novelty, even though it be an improvement, scarcely escapes banishment and extermination.

Those who claim to derive and prove the truth of the Christian religion from philosophers’ principles and authority invent fictions that lead to the same end, though by a different path. They celebrate the union of faith and the senses with great pomp and ceremony, as though it were legitimate. They delight people’s minds with variety, but meanwhile they improperly confuse divine and human things. Moreover, these mixtures of theology and philosophy include only the accepted doctrines of philosophy. Any new idea, even an improvement, scarcely escapes being banished and destroyed.

Bacon cannot be referring to theologians who have argued that advances in physical science confirm revelation. Rather, he refers only to those who built systems of faith from their own refinements of nature and revelation, such as Patricius and Emanuel Swedenborg. Ed.

In short, you may find all access to any species of philosophy, however pure, intercepted by the ignorance of divines. Some in their simplicity are apprehensive that a too deep inquiry into nature may penetrate beyond the proper bounds of decorum, transferring and absurdly applying what is said of sacred mysteries in Holy Writ against those who pry into divine secrets, to the mysteries of nature, which are not forbidden by any prohibition. Others with more cunning imagine and consider, that if secondary causes be unknown, everything may more easily be referred to the Divine hand and wand, a matter, as they think, of the greatest consequence to religion, but which can only really mean that God wishes to be gratified by means of falsehood. Others fear, from past example, lest motion and change in philosophy should terminate in an attack upon religion. Lastly, there are others who appear anxious lest there should be something discovered in the investigation of nature to overthrow, or at least shake, religion, particularly among the unlearned. The last two apprehensions appear to resemble animal instinct, as if men were diffident, in the bottom of their minds and secret meditations, of the strength of religion and the empire of faith over the senses, and therefore feared that some danger awaited them from an inquiry into nature. But any one who properly considers the subject will find natural philosophy to be, after the Word of God, the surest remedy against superstition, and the most approved support of faith. She is, therefore, rightly bestowed upon religion as a most faithful attendant, for the one exhibits the will and the other the power of God. Nor was he wrong who observed, “Ye err, not knowing the Scriptures and the power of God,” thus uniting in one bond the revelation of his will and the contemplation of his power. In the meanwhile, it is not wonderful that the progress of natural philosophy has been restrained, since religion, which has so much influence on men’s minds, has been led and hurried to oppose her through the ignorance of some and the imprudent zeal of others.

In short, the ignorance of theologians can block all access to any kind of philosophy, however pure. Some simply fear that too deep an inquiry into nature may go beyond the proper bounds of propriety. They absurdly apply warnings from Scripture about prying into divine secrets to the mysteries of nature. Yet no such prohibition applies to nature. Others, more cunningly, reason that if secondary causes remain unknown, everything can more easily be attributed to God’s hand and wand. They think this is of the greatest importance to religion. But it can really mean only that God wishes to be pleased by falsehood. Others fear, based on past experience, that movement and change in philosophy will end in an attack on religion. Finally, others seem anxious that inquiry into nature may uncover something that could overthrow or at least shake religion, especially among the unlearned. These last two fears seem like animal instinct. It is as if, deep in their minds and private thoughts, these people doubt religion’s strength and faith’s power over the senses. They therefore fear that some danger awaits them in the inquiry into nature. But anyone who considers the matter properly will find that natural philosophy is, after the Word of God, the surest remedy against superstition and the most proven support of faith. Natural philosophy is therefore rightly given to religion as a most faithful attendant. Religion reveals God’s will, while natural philosophy reveals his power. Nor was the person wrong who said, “You are mistaken, because you do not know the Scriptures or the power of God.” The speaker thus joined the revelation of God’s will with the contemplation of his power. Meanwhile, it is no wonder that the progress of natural philosophy has been held back. Religion has so much influence on people’s minds. Yet the ignorance of some and the reckless zeal of others have led and driven religion to oppose natural philosophy.

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Again, in the habits and regulations of schools, universities, and the like assemblies, destined for the abode of learned men and the improvement of learning, everything is found to be opposed to the progress of the sciences; for the lectures and exercises are so ordered, that anything out of the common track can scarcely enter the thoughts and contemplations of the mind. If, however, one or two have perhaps dared to use their liberty, they can only impose the labor on themselves, without deriving any advantage from the association of others; and if they put up with this, they will find their industry and spirit of no slight disadvantage to them in making their fortune; for the pursuits of men in such situations are, as it were, chained down to the writings of particular authors, and if any one dare to dissent from them he is immediately attacked as a turbulent and revolutionary spirit. Yet how great is the difference between civil matters and the arts, for there is not the same danger from new activity and new light. In civil matters even a change for the better is suspected on account of the commotion it occasions, for civil government is supported by authority, unanimity, fame, and public opinion, and not by demonstration. In the arts and sciences, on the contrary, every department should resound, as in mines, with new works and advances. And this is the rational, though not the actual view of the case, for that administration and government of science we have spoken of is wont too rigorously to repress its growth.

Again, schools, universities, and similar institutions are meant to house scholars and advance learning. Yet their habits and rules are opposed to scientific progress in every way. Lectures and exercises are arranged so that ideas outside the usual course can hardly enter anyone's thoughts. If one or two people perhaps dare to think freely, they must do the work alone. They gain no benefit from the company of others. And if they accept this, they will find that their hard work and courage are a considerable obstacle to their advancement. For scholars in such places are, as it were, chained to the writings of particular authors. If anyone dares to disagree with those authors, they are immediately attacked as a disruptive and revolutionary spirit. Yet civil affairs differ greatly from the arts. New activity and new understanding do not pose the same danger in both. In civil affairs, even a change for the better is viewed with suspicion because of the disturbance it causes. For government rests on authority, unanimity, reputation, and public opinion, not on proof. In the arts and sciences, by contrast, every field should resound with new work and progress, like a mine. This is the rational view, though it does not reflect the actual state of affairs. For the administration and government of science I have described tend to suppress its growth too severely.

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And even should the odium I have alluded to be avoided, yet it is sufficient to repress the increase of science that such attempts and industry pass unrewarded; for the cultivation of science and its reward belong not to the same individual. The advancement of science is the work of a powerful genius, the prize and reward belong to the vulgar or to princes, who (with a few exceptions) are scarcely moderately well informed. Nay, such progress is not only deprived of the rewards and beneficence of individuals, but even of popular praise; for it is above the reach of the generality, and easily overwhelmed and extinguished by the winds of common opinions. It is not wonderful, therefore, that little success has attended that which has been little honored.

Even if the hostility I mentioned could be avoided, unrewarded effort is enough to hold back the growth of science. For the person who advances science is not the person who rewards it. Advancing science takes a powerful genius, but the rewards come from ordinary people or princes. With a few exceptions, they are scarcely even moderately well informed. What is more, advances in science receive not only no rewards or generosity from individuals, but no public praise either. For they are beyond most people's understanding, and common opinions easily sweep them aside and extinguish them. It is no wonder, then, that something so little honored has met with so little success.

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But by far the greatest obstacle to the advancement of the sciences, and the undertaking of any new attempt or department, is to be found in men’s despair and the idea of impossibility; for men of a prudent and exact turn of thought are altogether diffident in matters of this nature, considering the obscurity of nature, the shortness of life, the deception of the senses, and weakness of the judgment. They think, therefore, that in the revolutions of ages and of the world there are certain floods and ebbs of the sciences, and that they grow and flourish at one time, and wither and fall off at another, that when they have attained a certain degree and condition they can proceed no further.

But by far the greatest obstacle to the progress of science and to any new attempt or field is despair and the belief that progress is impossible. Prudent and careful thinkers have no confidence in such matters. They reflect on nature's obscurity, the shortness of life, the deception of the senses, and the weakness of judgment. They therefore believe that science has its tides as ages pass and the world changes. At one time it grows and flourishes, and at another it withers and declines. They believe that once science has reached a certain stage and condition, it can go no further.

If, therefore, any one believe or promise greater things, they impute it to an uncurbed and immature mind, and imagine that such efforts begin pleasantly, then become laborious, and end in confusion. And since such thoughts easily enter the minds of men of dignity and excellent judgment, we must really take heed lest we should be captivated by our affection for an excellent and most beautiful object, and relax or diminish the severity of our judgment; and we must diligently examine what gleam of hope shines upon us, and in what direction it manifests itself, so that, banishing her lighter dreams, we may discuss and weigh whatever appears of more sound importance. We must consult the prudence of ordinary life, too, which is diffident upon principle, and in all human matters augurs the worst. Let us, then, speak of hope, especially as we are not vain promisers, nor are willing to enforce or insnare men’s judgment, but would rather lead them willingly forward. And although we shall employ the most cogent means of enforcing hope when we bring them to particulars, and especially those which are digested and arranged in our Tables of Invention (the subject partly of the second, but principally of the fourth part of the Instauration), which are, indeed, rather the very object of our hopes than hope itself; yet to proceed more leniently we must treat of the preparation of men’s minds, of which the manifestation of hope forms no slight part; for without it all that we have said tends rather to produce a gloom than to encourage activity or quicken the industry of experiment, by causing them to have a worse and more contemptuous opinion of things as they are than they now entertain, and to perceive and feel more thoroughly their unfortunate condition. We must, therefore, disclose and prefix our reasons for not thinking the hope of success improbable, as Columbus, before his wonderful voyage over the Atlantic, gave the reasons of his conviction that new lands and continents might be discovered besides those already known; and these reasons, though at first rejected, were yet proved by subsequent experience, and were the causes and beginnings of the greatest events.

If anyone believes or promises greater things, they therefore attribute it to an unrestrained and immature mind. They imagine that such efforts begin pleasantly, become laborious, and end in confusion. Since such thoughts easily occur to people of dignity and excellent judgment, we must take care. We must not let our love for an excellent and beautiful goal captivate us or weaken our critical judgment. We must carefully examine what glimmer of hope shines for us and where it appears. We can then put aside hope’s lighter dreams and discuss and weigh whatever seems more substantial. We must also consult the prudence of ordinary life, which is cautious on principle and expects the worst in all human affairs. Let us speak of hope, then. We do not make empty promises, and we do not wish to force or trap anyone’s judgment. We would rather lead people forward willingly. We will make the strongest case for hope when we come to particulars, especially those organized in our Tables of Invention. These are discussed partly in the second part of the Instauration, but principally in the fourth. They are, in fact, the very object of our hopes rather than hope itself. Yet, to proceed more gently, we must consider how to prepare people’s minds. Showing them grounds for hope is an important part of that preparation. Without hope, all we have said is more likely to cause gloom than to encourage activity or spur diligent experiment. It would leave people with a worse and more contemptuous opinion of things as they are than they now hold. It would also make them see and feel their unfortunate condition more deeply. We must therefore begin by explaining why we do not think hope of success is unreasonable. Columbus did the same before his wonderful voyage across the Atlantic. He gave his reasons for believing that new lands and continents could be discovered beyond those already known. Though his reasons were rejected at first, later experience proved them true. They were the causes and beginnings of the greatest events.

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Let us begin from God, and show that our pursuit from its exceeding goodness clearly proceeds from him, the author of good and father of light. Now, in all divine works the smallest beginnings lead assuredly to some result, and the remark in spiritual matters that “the kingdom of God cometh without observation,” is also found to be true in every great work of Divine Providence, so that everything glides quietly on without confusion or noise, and the matter is achieved before men either think or perceive that it is commenced. Nor should we neglect to mention the prophecy of Daniel, of the last days of the world, “Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased,” thus plainly hinting and suggesting that fate (which is Providence) would cause the complete circuit of the globe (now accomplished, or at least going forward by means of so many distant voyages), and the increase of learning to happen at the same epoch.

Let us begin with God. The great goodness of our pursuit clearly shows that it comes from him, the source of good and father of light. In all divine works, the smallest beginnings surely lead to some result. In spiritual matters, we are told that “the kingdom of God comes without being noticed.” The same is true of every great work of Divine Providence. Everything moves quietly, without confusion or noise. The work is accomplished before people even think or notice that it has begun. We should also mention Daniel’s prophecy about the last days of the world: “Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased.” This plainly suggests that fate, which is Providence, would bring two things about at the same time. One is the complete navigation of the globe, which has now been accomplished, or is at least underway through many distant voyages. The other is the increase of learning.

Daniel xii. 4.

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We will next give a most potent reason for hope deduced from the errors of the past, and the ways still unattempted; for well was an ill-governed state thus reproved, “That which is worst with regard to the past should appear most consolatory for the future; for if you had done all that your duty commanded, and your affairs proceeded no better, you could not even hope for their improvement; but since their present unhappy situation is not owing to the force of circumstances, but to your own errors, you have reason to hope that by banishing or correcting the latter you can produce a great change for the better in the former.” So if men had, during the many years that have elapsed, adhered to the right way of discovering and cultivating the sciences without being able to advance, it would be assuredly bold and presumptuous to imagine it possible to improve; but if they have mistaken the way and wasted their labor on improper objects, it follows that the difficulty does not arise from things themselves, which are not in our power, but from the human understanding, its practice and application, which is susceptible of remedy and correction. Our best plan, therefore, is to expose these errors; for in proportion as they impeded the past, so do they afford reason to hope for the future. And although we have touched upon them above, yet we think it right to give a brief, bare, and simple enumeration of them in this place.

We will next offer a powerful reason for hope, drawn from past errors and paths not yet tried. A badly governed state was rightly rebuked in these words: “What is worst about the past should be most encouraging for the future. If you had done everything your duty required and your affairs had gone no better, you could not even hope for improvement. But your present troubles are due not to circumstances beyond your control, but to your own errors. So you have reason to hope that, by eliminating or correcting those errors, you can greatly improve your situation.” The same is true of the sciences. If people had spent many years following the right way to discover and develop them without making progress, it would surely be bold and presumptuous to imagine that improvement was possible. But if they took the wrong path and wasted their efforts on the wrong objects, the difficulty lies elsewhere. It does not lie in things themselves, which are beyond our control. It lies in human understanding, and in how we use and apply it. That can be remedied and corrected. Our best course, then, is to expose these errors. For the more they held us back in the past, the more reason they give us to hope for the future. Although we have already touched on them, we think it right to list them here briefly and simply.

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Those who have treated of the sciences have been either empirics or dogmatical. The former like ants only heap up and use their store, the latter like spiders spin out their own webs. The bee, a mean between both, extracts matter from the flowers of the garden and the field, but works and fashions it by its own efforts. The true labor of philosophy resembles hers, for it neither relies entirely or principally on the powers of the mind, nor yet lays up in the memory the matter afforded by the experiments of natural history and mechanics in its raw state, but changes and works it in the understanding. We have good reason, therefore, to derive hope from a closer and purer alliance of these faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted.

Those who have studied the sciences have been either empiricists or dogmatists. The empiricists, like ants, only gather and use their stores. The dogmatists, like spiders, spin webs out of themselves. The bee takes a middle course. It gathers material from garden and field flowers, but transforms and shapes it through its own efforts. The true work of philosophy is like the bee’s. It does not rely entirely or mainly on the powers of the mind. Nor does it simply store in memory the raw results of experiments in natural history and mechanics. Instead, it transforms and works on that material in the mind. We therefore have good reason for hope. The experimental and rational faculties could be brought into a closer and purer alliance than has yet been attempted.

In this Aphorism, Bacon seems to have had a fair understanding of inductive and deductive methods in scientific inquiry. But his lack of knowledge of geometry must have hindered him from determining their precise roles. It certainly led him elsewhere in the Organon (V. ) to undervalue the deductive, or, as he calls it, dogmatic method. It also led him to rely too much on empiricism. Ed.

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Natural philosophy is not yet to be found unadulterated, but is impure and corrupted—by logic in the school of Aristotle, by natural theology in that of Plato, by mathematics in the second school of Plato (that of Proclus and others) which ought rather to terminate natural philosophy than to generate or create it. We may, therefore, hope for better results from pure and unmixed natural philosophy.

Natural philosophy has not yet been found in a pure form. It has been corrupted by logic in Aristotle's school, and by natural theology in Plato's school. In Plato's second school, that of Proclus and others, it has been corrupted by mathematics. Mathematics should be the culmination of natural philosophy, not its source or creator. We may therefore hope for better results from pure natural philosophy, free from these other influences.

The reader may consult the note of the for the fault Bacon criticizes. Anyone wishing to explore the subject further may read Plato’s Timæus, where Plato explains his system in detail. However, Bacon is hardly consistent in one part of his criticism. He also talks about the spirit and appetites of inanimate substances. He does so too often for us to assume he is speaking metaphorically. Ed.

Proclus flourished around the beginning of the fifth century. He was the successor of Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblicus. In the two preceding centuries, they had revived Plato’s doctrines and attacked the Christian religion. The allusion in the text must refer to Iamblicus. In the fourth century, he republished the Pythagorean theology of numbers and tried to construct the world out of arithmetic. He thought everything could be solved with the aid of proportions and geometry. Bacon should not be understood as criticizing the use of mathematics in physical investigations, but its abuse. In the “De Augmentis” (lib. iv. c. 6), he lists the many ways mathematics can demonstrate scientific facts. Ed.

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No one has yet been found possessed of sufficient firmness and severity to resolve upon and undertake the task of entirely abolishing common theories and notions, and applying the mind afresh, when thus cleared and levelled, to particular researches; hence our human reasoning is a mere farrago and crude mass made up of a great deal of credulity and accident, and the puerile notions it originally contracted.

No one has yet had the firmness and rigor to resolve to cast aside common theories and ideas entirely. Nor has anyone undertaken to clear and level the mind in this way and apply it afresh to specific investigations. As a result, human reasoning is a confused, crude mixture of credulity, chance, and the childish ideas it first acquired.

But if a man of mature age, unprejudiced senses, and clear mind, would betake himself anew to experience and particulars, we might hope much more from such a one; in which respect we promise ourselves the fortune of Alexander the Great, and let none accuse us of vanity till they have heard the tale, which is intended to check vanity.

But suppose a mature man with unbiased senses and a clear mind turned afresh to experience and particular facts. We might hope for much more from him. In this respect, we promise ourselves the good fortune of Alexander the Great. Let no one accuse us of vanity until they have heard the story, which is meant to curb vanity.

For Æschines spoke thus of Alexander and his exploits: “We live not the life of mortals, but are born at such a period that posterity will relate and declare our prodigies”; as if he considered the exploits of Alexander to be miraculous.

For Æschines said this about Alexander and his exploits: “We do not live ordinary mortal lives. We were born in an age when future generations will tell of our wonders.” It was as if he thought Alexander’s exploits were miraculous.

But in succeeding ages Livy took a better view of the fact, and has made some such observation as this upon Alexander: “That he did no more than dare to despise insignificance.” So in our opinion posterity will judge of us, that we have achieved no great matters, but only set less account upon what is considered important; for the meantime (as we have before observed) our only hope is in the regeneration of the sciences, by regularly raising them on the foundation of experience and building them anew, which I think none can venture to affirm to have been already done or even thought of.

But in later ages Livy saw the matter more clearly. He made an observation about Alexander roughly like this: “He did no more than dare to despise what was insignificant.” Similarly, we believe future generations will judge us. They will say that we accomplished nothing great, but merely valued less what people consider important. For now, as we have said before, our only hope is to renew the sciences. We must systematically rebuild them from the ground up on a foundation of experience. I do not think anyone can dare claim that this has already been done or even thought of.

See Livy, lib. ix. c. 17. In a digression on the likely outcome of a contest between Rome and Alexander the Great, he says: “Non cum Dario rem esse dixisset: quem mulierum ac spadonum agmen trahentem inter purpuram atque aurum, oneratum fortunæ apparatibus, prædam veriùs quam hostem, nihil aliud quam ausus vana contemnere, incruentus devicit.”

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The foundations of experience (our sole resource) have hitherto failed completely or have been very weak; nor has a store and collection of particular facts, capable of informing the mind or in any way satisfactory, been either sought after or amassed. On the contrary, learned, but idle and indolent, men have received some mere reports of experience, traditions as it were of dreams, as establishing or confirming their philosophy, and have not hesitated to allow them the weight of legitimate evidence. So that a system has been pursued in philosophy with regard to experience resembling that of a kingdom or state which would direct its councils and affairs according to the gossip of city and street politicians, instead of the letters and reports of ambassadors and messengers worthy of credit. Nothing is rightly inquired into, or verified, noted, weighed, or measured, in natural history; indefinite and vague observation produces fallacious and uncertain information. If this appear strange, or our complaint somewhat too unjust (because Aristotle himself, so distinguished a man and supported by the wealth of so great a king, has completed an accurate history of animals, to which others with greater diligence but less noise have made considerable additions, and others again have composed copious histories and notices of plants, metals, and fossils), it will arise from a want of sufficiently attending to and comprehending our present observations; for a natural history compiled on its own account, and one collected for the mind’s information as a foundation for philosophy, are two different things. They differ in several respects, but principally in this—the former contains only the varieties of natural species without the experiments of mechanical arts; for as in ordinary life every person’s disposition, and the concealed feelings of the mind and passions are most drawn out when they are disturbed—so the secrets of nature betray themselves more readily when tormented by art than when left to their own course. We must begin, therefore, to entertain hopes of natural philosophy then only, when we have a better compilation of natural history, its real basis and support.

Experience is our only resource. Yet until now, its foundations have been either completely lacking or very weak. No one has sought or assembled a satisfactory collection of particular facts that could inform the mind. Instead, learned but idle and lazy men have accepted mere reports of experience, like accounts of dreams, as establishing or confirming their philosophy. They have not hesitated to treat these reports as legitimate evidence. Philosophy has therefore treated experience as a kingdom or state might conduct its affairs. Imagine a government guided by the gossip of city and street politicians instead of letters and reports from trustworthy ambassadors and messengers. In natural history, nothing is properly investigated, verified, recorded, weighed, or measured. Loose and vague observation produces misleading and uncertain information. This may seem strange, or our complaint may seem somewhat unfair. After all, Aristotle himself, a distinguished man supported by the wealth of so great a king, completed an accurate history of animals. Others have made considerable additions with greater diligence but less publicity. Still others have compiled extensive histories and accounts of plants, metals, and fossils. But anyone who objects on these grounds has not paid enough attention to what we are saying or fully understood it. A natural history compiled for its own sake is different from one collected to inform the mind and provide a foundation for philosophy. The two differ in several respects, but chiefly in this: the first contains only the varieties of natural species, without experiments drawn from the mechanical arts. In ordinary life, a person's disposition and hidden thoughts and passions are most clearly revealed when that person is disturbed. In the same way, nature reveals its secrets more readily when tormented by human art than when left to its own course. We can begin to hope for progress in natural philosophy only when we have a better compilation of natural history. Natural history is the true foundation and support of natural philosophy.

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Again, even in the abundance of mechanical experiments, there is a very great scarcity of those which best inform and assist the understanding. For the mechanic, little solicitous about the investigation of truth, neither directs his attention, nor applies his hand to anything that is not of service to his business. But our hope of further progress in the sciences will then only be well founded, when numerous experiments shall be received and collected into natural history, which, though of no use in themselves, assist materially in the discovery of causes and axioms; which experiments we have termed enlightening, to distinguish them from those which are profitable. They possess this wonderful property and nature, that they never deceive or fail you; for being used only to discover the natural cause of some object, whatever be the result, they equally satisfy your aim by deciding the question.

Again, even among the many practical experiments, very few help us understand nature. For the craftsman cares little about investigating truth. He gives his attention and effort only to what serves his trade. But we can have a sound hope of further progress in the sciences only when we collect many experiments into natural history. Though these experiments have no use in themselves, they greatly help us discover causes and general principles. We have called them enlightening experiments, to distinguish them from profitable ones. They have the remarkable quality of never deceiving or failing us. They are used only to discover the natural cause of something. Whatever the result, they satisfy our aim equally by settling the question.

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We must not only search for, and procure a greater number of experiments, but also introduce a completely different method, order, and progress of continuing and promoting experience. For vague and arbitrary experience is (as we have observed), mere groping in the dark, and rather astonishes than instructs. But when experience shall proceed regularly and uninterruptedly by a determined rule, we may entertain better hopes of the sciences.

We must not only seek and conduct more experiments. We must also use a completely different method, order, and process for continuing and advancing experimentation. As we have observed, vague and random experimentation is merely groping in the dark. It astonishes more than it teaches. But when experimentation proceeds steadily and continuously according to a set rule, we may have greater hopes for the sciences.

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But after having collected and prepared an abundance and store of natural history, and of the experience required for the operations of the understanding or philosophy, still the understanding is as incapable of acting on such materials of itself, with the aid of memory alone, as any person would be of retaining and achieving, by memory, the computation of an almanac. Yet meditation has hitherto done more for discovery than writing, and no experiments have been committed to paper. We cannot, however, approve of any mode of discovery without writing, and when that comes into more general use, we may have further hopes.

Even after gathering and preparing a wealth of natural history and experience for the work of understanding or philosophy, the mind cannot work with these materials by memory alone. That would be like someone calculating an almanac entirely from memory. Yet so far, reflection has done more for discovery than writing, and no experiments have been put on paper. We cannot, however, approve of any method of discovery that does not involve writing. When writing becomes more widely used, we may have greater hopes.

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Besides this, there is such a multitude and host, as it were, of particular objects, and lying so widely dispersed, as to distract and confuse the understanding; and we can, therefore, hope for no advantage from its skirmishing, and quick movements and incursions, unless we put its forces in due order and array, by means of proper and well arranged, and, as it were, living tables of discovery of these matters, which are the subject of investigation, and the mind then apply itself to the ready prepared and digested aid which such tables afford.

Besides this, individual objects are so numerous and widely scattered that they distract and confuse the mind. We can therefore hope to gain nothing from its skirmishes, quick movements, and raids unless we put its forces in order. To do this, we need properly arranged, living tables, so to speak, for discovering the matters under investigation. The mind must then use the ready and organized help these tables provide.

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When we have thus properly and regularly placed before the eyes a collection of particulars, we must not immediately proceed to the investigation and discovery of new particulars or effects, or, at least, if we do so, must not rest satisfied therewith. For, though we do not deny that by transferring the experiments from one art to another (when all the experiments of each have been collected and arranged, and have been acquired by the knowledge, and subjected to the judgment of a single individual), many new experiments may be discovered tending to benefit society and mankind, by what we term literate experience; yet comparatively insignificant results are to be expected thence, while the more important are to be derived from the new light of axioms, deduced by certain method and rule from the above particulars, and pointing out and defining new particulars in their turn. Our road is not a long plain, but rises and falls, ascending to axioms, and descending to effects.

Once we have properly and systematically laid out a collection of particulars, we must not immediately seek new particulars or effects. Or, at least, if we do, we must not be satisfied with that alone. We do not deny that many new experiments may be discovered by transferring experiments from one art to another. This is possible when all the experiments in each art have been collected and arranged. A single person must also have learned of them and judged them. What we call literate experience can discover many new experiments that benefit society and humankind. Yet its results are likely to be comparatively insignificant. The more important results will come from the new light of axioms. These axioms are derived from the particulars above by a definite method and set of rules. In turn, they point out and define new particulars. Our path is not a long, level road. It rises and falls, ascending to axioms and descending to effects.

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Nor can we suffer the understanding to jump and fly from particulars to remote and most general axioms (such as are termed the principles of arts and things), and thus prove and make out their intermediate axioms according to the supposed unshaken truth of the former. This, however, has always been done to the present time from the natural bent of the understanding, educated too, and accustomed to this very method, by the syllogistic mode of demonstration. But we can then only augur well for the sciences, when the assent shall proceed by a true scale and successive steps, without interruption or breach, from particulars to the lesser axioms, thence to the intermediate (rising one above the other), and lastly, to the most general. For the lowest axioms differ but little from bare experiment; the highest and most general (as they are esteemed at present), are notional, abstract, and of no real weight. The intermediate are true, solid, full of life, and upon them depend the business and fortune of mankind; beyond these are the really general, but not abstract, axioms, which are truly limited by the intermediate.

Nor can we allow the mind to leap from particulars to remote and highly general axioms. These are called the principles of arts and things. It then uses their supposedly unshakable truth to prove intermediate axioms. Yet this has always been done up to the present day. It follows the mind’s natural tendency, reinforced by education and practice in reasoning by syllogism. But we can have hope for the sciences only when we arrive at conclusions by a true scale of successive steps, without gaps or breaks. We must move from particulars to the lesser axioms, then to intermediate axioms, rising one above another, and finally to the most general axioms. For the lowest axioms differ little from experiment alone. The highest and most general axioms, as they are regarded today, are speculative, abstract, and of no real value. The intermediate axioms are true, solid, and full of life. The affairs and fortunes of mankind depend on them. Beyond these lie the truly general axioms. These are not abstract, but are properly limited by the intermediate axioms.

The lowest axioms arise from simple experience. In chemistry, for example, animal substances yield no fixed salt when burned to ash. In music, consonant notes mixed with dissonant ones create harmony. Intermediate axioms go a step further. They result from reflecting on experimental knowledge and drawing laws from it. One example is the optical law that the angle of incidence equals the angle of reflection. This is a law of the first degree of generality. Another example is Kepler’s three laws of motion in mechanics. His general law may be taken as one of the highest axioms. It states that all bodies attract each other with forces proportional to their masses and inversely proportional to the squares of their distances.

Yet this principle is far from merely notional or abstract. It has given us a key to the intricate workings of the heavens and revealed the principal mechanism of the universe. But in Bacon’s day, natural philosophy had not advanced beyond intermediate axioms. The term notional or abstract applies to the general axioms then in use. These were not founded on the solid principles of inductive inquiry, but on à priori reasoning and airy metaphysics. Ed.

We must not then add wings, but rather lead and ballast to the understanding, to prevent its jumping or flying, which has not yet been done; but whenever this takes place, we may entertain greater hopes of the sciences.

We must not give the mind wings. Instead, we must weigh it down with lead and ballast to keep it from jumping or flying. This has not yet been done. But when it is done, we may have greater hopes for the sciences.

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In forming axioms, we must invent a different form of induction from that hitherto in use; not only for the proof and discovery of principles (as they are called), but also of minor, intermediate, and, in short, every kind of axioms. The induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is puerile, leads to uncertain conclusions, and is exposed to danger from one contradictory instance, deciding generally from too small a number of facts, and those only the most obvious. But a really useful induction for the discovery and demonstration of the arts and sciences, should separate nature by proper rejections and exclusions, and then conclude for the affirmative, after collecting a sufficient number of negatives. Now this has not been done, nor even attempted, except perhaps by Plato, who certainly uses this form of induction in some measure, to sift definitions and ideas. But much of what has never yet entered the thoughts of man must necessarily be employed, in order to exhibit a good and legitimate mode of induction or demonstration, so as even to render it essential for us to bestow more pains upon it than have hitherto been bestowed on syllogisms. The assistance of induction is to serve us not only in the discovery of axioms, but also in defining our notions. Much indeed is to be hoped from such an induction as has been described.

To form axioms, we must devise a different kind of induction from the one used until now. We need it not only to prove and discover what are called principles, but also for lesser and intermediate axioms. In short, we need it for every kind of axiom. Induction based on simple enumeration is childish and leads to uncertain conclusions. A single contradictory instance can overturn them. It generally draws conclusions from too few facts, and only from the most obvious ones. But an induction truly useful for discovering and demonstrating truths in the arts and sciences must distinguish features of nature through proper rejection and exclusion. Only after collecting enough negative instances should it reach an affirmative conclusion. This has not been done, or even attempted, except perhaps by Plato. He certainly uses this kind of induction to some extent to examine definitions and ideas. But a sound and legitimate method of induction or demonstration will require much that has never entered anyone's thoughts. We must therefore devote even more effort to it than has been devoted to syllogisms until now. Induction should help us not only discover axioms, but also define our notions. Indeed, we can hope for much from an induction like the one described here.

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In forming our axioms from induction, we must examine and try whether the axiom we derive be only fitted and calculated for the particular instances from which it is deduced, or whether it be more extensive and general. If it be the latter, we must observe, whether it confirm its own extent and generality by giving surety, as it were, in pointing out new particulars, so that we may neither stop at actual discoveries, nor with a careless grasp catch at shadows and abstract forms, instead of substances of a determinate nature: and as soon as we act thus, well authorized hope may with reason be said to beam upon us.

When we form axioms through induction, we must test whether they fit only the particular instances from which we derive them. Or are they broader and more general? If an axiom is broader, we must see whether it confirms its breadth and generality by pointing to new instances. In this way, it offers a kind of guarantee. This keeps us from stopping at discoveries already made. It also keeps us from carelessly grasping at shadows and abstract forms instead of things with a definite nature. As soon as we do this, we can reasonably say that well-founded hope shines upon us.

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Here, too, we may again repeat what we have said above, concerning the extending of natural philosophy and reducing particular sciences to that one, so as to prevent any schism or dismembering of the sciences; without which we cannot hope to advance.

Here, too, we may repeat what we said earlier. We must broaden natural philosophy and bring the individual sciences under it, so that the sciences do not split apart. Without this, we cannot hope to advance.

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Such are the observations we would make in order to remove despair and excite hope, by bidding farewell to the errors of past ages, or by their correction. Let us examine whether there be other grounds for hope. And, first, if many useful discoveries have occurred to mankind by chance or opportunity, without investigation or attention on their part, it must necessarily be acknowledged that much more may be brought to light by investigation and attention, if it be regular and orderly, not hasty and interrupted. For although it may now and then happen that one falls by chance upon something that had before escaped considerable efforts and laborious inquiries, yet undoubtedly the reverse is generally the case. We may, therefore, hope for further, better, and more frequent results from man’s reason, industry, method, and application, than from chance and mere animal instinct, and the like, which have hitherto been the sources of invention.

These observations are meant to dispel despair and inspire hope by abandoning or correcting the errors of past ages. Let us consider whether there are other grounds for hope. First, many useful discoveries have come about by chance or opportunity, without any investigation or attention. If so, we must acknowledge that investigation and attention can bring much more to light. They must be systematic and orderly, not hurried and interrupted. Now and then, someone may stumble on something that has escaped considerable effort and painstaking inquiry. But the opposite is undoubtedly true in most cases. We may therefore hope for more, better, and more frequent results from human reason, effort, method, and application. These should yield more than chance, mere animal instinct, and similar things, which have so far been the sources of invention.

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We may also derive some reason for hope from the circumstance of several actual inventions being of such a nature, that scarcely any one could have formed a conjecture about them previously to their discovery, but would rather have ridiculed them as impossible. For men are wont to guess about new subjects from those they are already acquainted with, and the hasty and vitiated fancies they have thence formed: than which there cannot be a more fallacious mode of reasoning, because much of that which is derived from the sources of things does not flow in their usual channel.

We may also find reason for hope in the nature of several inventions. Before their discovery, hardly anyone could have imagined them. Instead, people would have ridiculed them as impossible. People tend to guess about new subjects based on what they already know and the hasty, flawed ideas they have formed from it. No method of reasoning could be more misleading. Much of what comes from the sources of things does not follow the usual course.

If, for instance, before the discovery of cannon, one had described its effects in the following manner: There is a new invention by which walls and the greatest bulwarks can be shaken and overthrown from a considerable distance; men would have begun to contrive various means of multiplying the force of projectiles and machines by means of weights and wheels, and other modes of battering and projecting. But it is improbable that any imagination or fancy would have hit upon a fiery blast, expanding and developing itself so suddenly and violently, because none would have seen an instance at all resembling it, except perhaps in earthquakes or thunder, which they would have immediately rejected as the great operations of nature, not to be imitated by man.

Suppose, for instance, that someone had described the effects of cannon before they were invented. They might have said: There is a new invention that can shake and destroy walls and the strongest fortifications from a great distance. People would have begun to devise ways to increase the force of projectiles and machines. They might have used weights, wheels, and other methods of striking and launching objects. But it is unlikely that anyone would have imagined a fiery blast expanding so suddenly and violently. That is because no one would have seen anything like it, except perhaps in earthquakes or thunder. They would have immediately dismissed these as great forces of nature that humans could not imitate.

So, if before the discovery of silk thread, any one had observed, that a species of thread had been discovered, fit for dresses and furniture, far surpassing the thread of worsted or flax in fineness, and at the same time in tenacity, beauty, and softness; men would have begun to imagine something about Chinese plants, or the fine hair of some animals, or the feathers or down of birds, but certainly would never have had an idea of its being spun by a small worm, in so copious a manner, and renewed annually. But if any one had ventured to suggest the silkworm, he would have been laughed at as if dreaming of some new manufacture from spiders.

Suppose someone had spoken before silk thread was discovered. Suppose they had said that a new thread had been found for clothing and furnishings. It was far finer than worsted or flax thread, and also far stronger, more beautiful, and softer. People would have begun to imagine Chinese plants, the fine hair of certain animals, or birds' feathers or down. But they would never have imagined that a small worm spun it so abundantly, producing a fresh supply every year. If anyone had dared to suggest the silkworm, people would have laughed. They would have thought the person was dreaming of some new product made by spiders.

So again, if before the discovery of the compass, any one had said, that an instrument had been invented, by which the quarters and points of the heavens could be exactly taken and distinguished, men would have entered into disquisitions on the refinement of astronomical instruments, and the like, from the excitement of their imaginations; but the thought of anything being discovered, which, not being a celestial body, but a mere mineral or metallic substance, should yet in its motion agree with that of such bodies, would have appeared absolutely incredible. Yet were these facts, and the like (unknown for so many ages) not discovered at last either by philosophy or reasoning, but by chance and opportunity; and (as we have observed), they are of a nature most heterogeneous, and remote from what was hitherto known, so that no previous knowledge could lead to them.

Again, imagine that someone had spoken before the compass was discovered. Suppose they had said that an instrument could precisely identify and distinguish directions and points in the sky. People’s imaginations would have led them to speculate about improved astronomical instruments and the like. But they would have found another possibility absolutely unbelievable. They would not have believed that something other than a heavenly body, a mere mineral or metal, could move in agreement with such bodies. Yet these facts and others like them remained unknown for many ages. They were finally discovered not through philosophy or reasoning, but through chance and opportunity. As we have observed, they are of a kind entirely different from, and far removed from, what was previously known. No previous knowledge could have led to them.

We may, therefore, well hope that many excellent and useful matters are yet treasured up in the bosom of nature, bearing no relation or analogy to our actual discoveries, but out of the common track of our imagination, and still undiscovered, and which will doubtless be brought to light in the course and lapse of years, as the others have been before them; but in the way we now point out, they may rapidly and at once be both represented and anticipated.

We may therefore reasonably hope that nature still holds many excellent and useful things. They bear no relation or resemblance to what we have discovered, and lie beyond the usual reach of our imagination. In time, they will doubtless come to light, just as earlier discoveries did. But the method we now propose can reveal and anticipate them quickly and at once.

This hope has been amply fulfilled by the discovery of gravity and the decomposition of light, mainly through the inductive method. We may also credit a better philosophy with the discovery of electricity, galvanism, and their connections with each other and with magnetism. It may also account for the invention of the air pump, steam engine, and chronometer.

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There are, moreover, some inventions which render it probable that men may pass and hurry over the most noble discoveries which lie immediately before them. For however the discovery of gunpowder, silk, the compass, sugar, paper, or the like, may appear to depend on peculiar properties of things and nature, printing at least involves no contrivance which is not clear and almost obvious. But from want of observing that although the arrangement of the types of letters required more trouble than writing with the hand, yet these types once arranged serve for innumerable impressions, while manuscript only affords one copy; and again, from want of observing that ink might be thickened so as to stain without running (which was necessary, seeing the letters face upward, and the impression is made from above), this most beautiful invention (which assists so materially the propagation of learning) remained unknown for so many ages.

Moreover, some inventions suggest that people may pass over the greatest discoveries even when they lie right before them. The discovery of gunpowder, silk, the compass, sugar, paper, or similar things may seem to depend on particular properties of nature. But printing, at least, involves no technique that is not clear and almost obvious. Arranging the letter types took more work than writing by hand. Yet once arranged, the types could be used to make countless copies, while writing by hand produced only one. People also failed to notice that ink could be thickened so it would leave a mark without running. This was necessary because the letters faced upward and the impression was made from above. Because people failed to notice these things, this beautiful invention remained unknown for many ages. Yet printing does so much to spread learning.

The human mind is often so awkward and ill-regulated in the career of invention that it is at first diffident, and then despises itself. For it appears at first incredible that any such discovery should be made, and when it has been made, it appears incredible that it should so long have escaped men’s research. All which affords good reason for the hope that a vast mass of inventions yet remains, which may be deduced not only from the investigation of new modes of operation, but also from transferring, comparing, and applying these already known, by the method of what we have termed literate experience.

The human mind is often so clumsy and poorly disciplined in pursuing inventions that it first doubts itself, then looks down on itself. At first, a discovery seems impossible. Once it has been made, it seems unbelievable that people’s research missed it for so long. All this gives us good reason to hope that many inventions remain to be discovered. These may come not only from investigating new ways of doing things, but also from transferring, comparing, and applying those already known. This is the method we have called literate experience.

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Nor should we omit another ground of hope. Let men only consider (if they will) their infinite expenditure of talent, time, and fortune, in matters and studies of far inferior importance and value; a small portion of which applied to sound and solid learning would be sufficient to overcome every difficulty. And we have thought right to add this observation, because we candidly own that such a collection of natural and experimental history as we have traced in our own mind, and as is really necessary, is a great and as it were royal work, requiring much labor and expense.

We should not overlook another reason for hope. Let people consider, if they will, how much talent, time, and money they spend on matters and studies of far less importance and value. A small portion of those resources, devoted to sound and solid learning, would be enough to overcome every difficulty. We have thought it right to add this observation because we freely admit that the collection of natural and experimental history we have envisioned is a great work, fit for a king. Such a collection is truly necessary, and it requires much labor and expense.

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In the meantime let no one be alarmed at the multitude of particulars, but rather inclined to hope on that very account. For the particular phenomena of the arts and nature are in reality but as a handful, when compared with the fictions of the imagination removed and separated from the evidence of facts. The termination of our method is clear, and I had almost said near at hand; the other admits of no termination, but only of infinite confusion. For men have hitherto dwelt but little, or rather only slightly touched upon experience, while they have wasted much time on theories and the fictions of the imagination. If we had but any one who could actually answer our interrogations of nature, the invention of all causes and sciences would be the labor of but a few years.

Meanwhile, no one should be alarmed by the sheer number of individual facts. Instead, that very number should give us hope. The individual phenomena of nature and the arts are really just a handful. They are few compared with the fictions of the imagination, divorced from the evidence of facts. Our method has a clear end, and I almost dare say it is near. The other approach has no end, only endless confusion. Until now, people have spent little time on experience, or rather have only touched on it lightly. But they have wasted much time on theories and the fictions of the imagination. If only someone could actually answer the questions we put to nature, discovering all causes and sciences would take just a few years.

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We think some ground of hope is afforded by our own example, which is not mentioned for the sake of boasting, but as a useful remark. Let those who distrust their own powers observe myself, one who have among my contemporaries been the most engaged in public business, who am not very strong in health (which causes a great loss of time), and am the first explorer of this course, following the guidance of none, nor even communicating my thoughts to a single individual; yet having once firmly entered in the right way, and submitting the powers of my mind to things, I have somewhat advanced (as I make bold to think) the matter I now treat of. Then let others consider what may be hoped from men who enjoy abundant leisure, from united labors, and the succession of ages, after these suggestions on our part, especially in a course which is not confined, like theories, to individuals, but admits of the best distribution and union of labor and effect, particularly in collecting experiments. For men will then only begin to know their own power, when each performs a separate part, instead of undertaking in crowds the same work.

I think my own example gives some reason for hope. I mention it not to boast, but because it may be useful. Let those who doubt their own abilities consider my case. Among my contemporaries, I have been the most occupied with public business. My health is not very strong, which costs me a great deal of time. I am also the first to explore this path. I have followed no one’s guidance or even shared my thoughts with a single person. Yet once I firmly set out on the right path, I let the evidence guide my thinking. In this way, I have made some progress, as I dare to think, in the work I am discussing. Now let others consider what may be hoped for after these suggestions of mine. Think what people with abundant leisure may achieve, working together and over successive ages. This path, unlike theories, is not confined to individuals. It allows labor and results to be distributed and combined as effectively as possible, especially when gathering experiments. For people will begin to know their own power only when each does a separate part. They will not discover it by crowding together to do the same work.

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Lastly, though a much more faint and uncertain breeze of hope were to spring up from our new continent, yet we consider it necessary to make the experiment, if we would not show a dastard spirit. For the risk attending want of success is not to be compared with that of neglecting the attempt; the former is attended with the loss of a little human labor, the latter with that of an immense benefit. For these and other reasons it appears to us that there is abundant ground to hope, and to induce not only those who are sanguine to make experiment, but even those who are cautious and sober to give their assent.

Lastly, even if our new continent offered a much fainter and more uncertain breeze of hope, we must still try. Otherwise, we would show a cowardly spirit. For the risk of failure cannot compare with the risk of not trying. Failure costs a little human labor. Not trying costs an immense benefit. For these and other reasons, we believe there is ample ground for hope. This should encourage not only the optimistic to try, but even the cautious and sober to agree.

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Such are the grounds for banishing despair, hitherto one of the most powerful causes of the delay and restraint to which the sciences have been subjected; in treating of which we have at the same time discussed the signs and causes of the errors, idleness, and ignorance that have prevailed; seeing especially that the more refined causes, which are not open to popular judgment and observation, may be referred to our remarks on the idols of the human mind.

These are the reasons to cast off despair. Until now, despair has been one of the strongest causes of the delay and restraint of scientific progress. In discussing despair, we have also examined the signs and causes of the errors, idleness, and ignorance that have prevailed. In particular, the subtler causes lie beyond popular judgment and observation. These may be referred to our remarks on the idols of the human mind.

Here, too, we should close the demolishing branch of our Instauration, which is comprised in three confutations: 1, the confutation of natural human reason left to itself; 2, the confutation of demonstration; 3, the confutation of theories, or received systems of philosophy and doctrines. Our confutation has followed such a course as was open to it, namely, the exposing of the signs of error, and the producing evidence of the causes of it: for we could adopt no other, differing as we do both in first principles and demonstrations from others.

Here, too, we should conclude the critical part of our Instauration. It consists of three refutations: 1, the refutation of human reason left to itself; 2, the refutation of demonstration; 3, the refutation of theories, or accepted systems of philosophy and doctrine. Our refutation has taken the only course open to it. It has exposed the signs of error and presented evidence of its causes. We could take no other course, because we differ from others in both first principles and demonstrations.

It is time for us therefore to come to the art itself, and the rule for the interpretation of nature: there is, however, still something which must not be passed over. For the intent of this first book of aphorisms being to prepare the mind for understanding, as well as admitting, what follows, we must now, after having cleansed, polished, and levelled its surface, place it in a good position, and as it were a benevolent aspect toward our propositions; seeing that prejudice in new matters may be produced not only by the strength of preconceived notions, but also by a false anticipation or expectation of the matter proposed. We shall therefore endeavor to induce good and correct opinions of what we offer, although this be only necessary for the moment, and as it were laid out at interest, until the matter itself be well understood.

It is time, then, to turn to the art itself and the rules for interpreting nature. But there is still something we must not overlook. This first book of aphorisms aims to prepare the mind to understand and accept what follows. We have cleansed, polished, and leveled its surface. Now we must put it in a good position, so that it looks favorably on our propositions. For prejudice against new ideas can arise not only from strongly held preconceptions, but also from mistaken expectations about what is being proposed. We will therefore try to encourage favorable and correct opinions of what we offer. This is necessary only for the moment, as if it were an investment, until the subject itself is well understood.

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First, then, we must desire men not to suppose that we are ambitious of founding any philosophical sect, like the ancient Greeks, or some moderns, as Telesius, Patricius, and Severinus. For neither is this our intention, nor do we think that peculiar abstract opinions on nature and the principles of things are of much importance to men’s fortunes, since it were easy to revive many ancient theories, and to introduce many new ones; as, for instance, many hypotheses with regard to the heavens can be formed, differing in themselves, and yet sufficiently according with the phenomena.

First, we ask people not to suppose that we seek to found a school of philosophy. The ancient Greeks did this, as did some modern thinkers, such as Telesius, Patricius, and Severinus. That is not our intention. Nor do we think that distinctive abstract views about nature and the principles of things greatly affect people’s fortunes. After all, it would be easy to revive many ancient theories and introduce many new ones. For example, many different hypotheses about the heavens can be formed, yet all fit the observed phenomena well enough.

Bacon cites these authors so often that a brief account of their work may be useful to the reader. Bernardinus Telesius, born at Cosenza in 1508, attacked the Aristotelian system in “De Rerum Natura juxta propria principia,” i.e., according to principles of his own. In the introduction, he states his aim. He wants to show that “the construction of the world, the magnitude and nature of the bodies contained in it, are not to be investigated by reasoning, which was done by the ancients, but are to be apprehended by the senses, and collected from the things themselves.” Yet as soon as he stated this principle, he abandoned it in practice. He followed the deductive method he so strongly condemned in his predecessors. He began by assuming principles as arbitrary as any of the empirical notions of antiquity. At the outset, he quietly takes it for granted that heat is the principle of motion and cold the principle of immobility. He assumes that matter is the physical substance in which these immaterial, active agents operate. From these abstract, poorly defined ideas, Telesius builds a system as complete, symmetrical, and imaginative as any of those of antiquity.

Francis Patricius, born at Cherso, in Dalmatia, about 1529, was another physicist who challenged Aristotle and announced the dawn of a new philosophy. His “Nova de Universis Philosophia” appeared in 1593. He sets out a series of axioms that strangely mix scholastic ideas, physical discoveries, and theological dogmas. On these he builds a system that displays all the grotesque features of theological empiricism.

Severinus, born in Jutland in 1529, published an attack on Aristotle’s natural history. But he adopted fantasies that the Stagyrite had ridiculed in his own day. He was a follower of Paracelsus, a Swiss enthusiast of the fifteenth century. Paracelsus rejected the ancient doctrine of the four elements in favor of salt, sulphur and mercury. He also linked chemistry and medicine with mysticism. Ed.

We bestow not our labor on such theoretical and, at the same time, useless topics. On the contrary, our determination is that of trying, whether we can lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity. And although here and there, upon some particular points, we hold (in our own opinion) more true and certain, and I might even say, more advantageous tenets than those in general repute (which we have collected in the fifth part of our Instauration), yet we offer no universal or complete theory. The time does not yet appear to us to be arrived, and we entertain no hope of our life being prolonged to the completion of the sixth part of the Instauration (which is destined for philosophy discovered by the interpretation of nature), but are content if we proceed quietly and usefully in our intermediate pursuit, scattering, in the meantime, the seeds of less adulterated truth for posterity, and, at least, commence the great work.

We do not spend our efforts on such theoretical and useless topics. Instead, we are determined to see whether we can lay a firmer foundation and extend the boundaries of human power and dignity. On certain particular points, we believe our views are truer, more certain, and even more useful than those generally accepted. We have collected these views in the fifth part of our Instauration. Yet we offer no universal or complete theory. We do not think the time has yet come for one. Nor do we hope to live long enough to complete the sixth part of the Instauration. That part is intended to present a philosophy discovered through the interpretation of nature. We are content to continue quietly and usefully with our work in the meantime. As we do so, we will scatter the seeds of less corrupted truth for future generations and, at least, begin the great work.

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And, as we pretend not to found a sect, so do we neither offer nor promise particular effects; which may occasion some to object to us, that since we so often speak of effects, and consider everything in its relation to that end, we ought also to give some earnest of producing them. Our course and method, however (as we have often said, and again repeat), is such as not to deduce effects from effects, nor experiments from experiments (as the empirics do), but in our capacity of legitimate interpreters of nature, to deduce causes and axioms from effects and experiments; and new effects and experiments from those causes and axioms.

Just as we do not claim to be founding a sect, we do not offer or promise specific results. Some may object to this. We often speak of results and judge everything by how it relates to that goal. They may therefore say that we should give some evidence that we can produce results. However, our approach is different, as we have often said and now repeat. We do not derive results from results or experiments from experiments, as the empirics do. Instead, as legitimate interpreters of nature, we derive causes and axioms from results and experiments. From those causes and axioms, we derive new results and experiments.

And although any one of moderate intelligence and ability will observe the indications and sketches of many noble effects in our tables of inventions (which form the fourth part of the Instauration), and also in the examples of particular instances cited in the second part, as well as in our observations on history (which is the subject of the third part); yet we candidly confess that our present natural history, whether compiled from books or our own inquiries, is not sufficiently copious and well ascertained to satisfy, or even assist, a proper interpretation.

Anyone of moderate intelligence and ability will notice signs and outlines of many valuable results in our tables of inventions. These tables form the fourth part of the Instauration. Such signs and outlines also appear in the examples of particular instances in the second part. They appear, too, in our observations on history, the subject of the third part. Yet we frankly admit that our present natural history is neither extensive nor reliable enough for a proper interpretation. It cannot even help with one. This is true whether it has been compiled from books or from our own inquiries.

If, therefore, there be any one who is more disposed and prepared for mechanical art, and ingenious in discovering effects, than in the mere management of experiment, we allow him to employ his industry in gathering many of the fruits of our history and tables in this way, and applying them to effects, receiving them as interest till he can obtain the principal. For our own part, having a greater object in view, we condemn all hasty and premature rest in such pursuits as we would Atalanta’s apple (to use a common allusion of ours); for we are not childishly ambitious of golden fruit, but use all our efforts to make the course of art outstrip nature, and we hasten not to reap moss or the green blade, but wait for a ripe harvest.

If someone is more inclined and better suited to practical craft than to conducting experiments, we allow them to work in this way. They may be skilled at discovering useful results and gathering many of the fruits of our history and tables to produce them. They may take these results as interest until they can obtain the principal. For our part, we have a greater goal in view. We reject all hasty and premature satisfaction with such pursuits, as we would reject Atalanta’s apple, to use an allusion we often make. We have no childish desire for golden fruit. Instead, we make every effort to make art outstrip nature. We do not hurry to reap moss or green shoots, but wait for a ripe harvest.

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There will be some, without doubt, who, on a perusal of our history and tables of invention, will meet with some uncertainty, or perhaps fallacy, in the experiments themselves, and will thence perhaps imagine that our discoveries are built on false foundations and principles. There is, however, really nothing in this, since it must needs happen in beginnings. For it is the same as if in writing or printing one or two letters were wrongly turned or misplaced, which is no great inconvenience to the reader, who can easily by his own eye correct the error; let men in the same way conclude, that many experiments in natural history may be erroneously believed and admitted, which are easily expunged and rejected afterward, by the discovery of causes and axioms. It is, however, true, that if these errors in natural history and experiments become great, frequent, and continued, they cannot be corrected and amended by any dexterity of wit or art. If then, even in our natural history, well examined and compiled with such diligence, strictness, and (I might say) reverential scruples, there be now and then something false and erroneous in the details, what must we say of the common natural history, which is so negligent and careless when compared with ours? or of systems of philosophy and the sciences, based on such loose soil (or rather quicksand)? Let none then be alarmed by such observations.

Some people will undoubtedly find uncertainty, or perhaps error, in the experiments themselves when they read our history and tables of invention. They may therefore imagine that our discoveries rest on false foundations and principles. But there is really nothing to this objection, since such things are bound to happen at the beginning. It is like turning or misplacing one or two letters when writing or printing. This causes little trouble for the reader, who can easily correct the error by eye. In the same way, many experiments in natural history may be mistakenly believed and accepted. These can easily be removed and rejected later, when causes and axioms are discovered. It is true, however, that errors in natural history and experiments may be serious, frequent, and persistent. If they are, no skill of mind or art can correct them. We have examined and compiled our natural history with diligence, rigor, and, I might say, almost reverent care. Even so, if some details are false or mistaken, what must we say of ordinary natural history? It is negligent and careless by comparison. And what must we say of systems of philosophy and the sciences built on such loose soil, or rather, quicksand? Let no one be alarmed, then, by such observations.

Bacon’s defense is sound and fully answers the German and French critics who deny him a place in the philosophical pantheon. One German commentator, too modest to give his name, accuses Bacon of ignorance of the calculus. Yet in Bacon’s day, Wallis had not even discovered the laws of continuous fractions. Count de Maistre, in a crude attack on Bacon’s genius, expresses astonishment at his ignorance of discoveries made a century after his death. Ed.

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Again, our history and experiments will contain much that is light and common, mean and illiberal, too refined and merely speculative, and, as it were, of no use, and this perhaps may divert and alienate the attention of mankind.

Again, our history and experiments will contain much that is trivial and commonplace, lowly and beneath educated people. They will also contain much that is overly subtle, purely speculative, and seemingly useless. This may perhaps distract people and turn their attention away.

With regard to what is common; let men reflect, that they have hitherto been used to do nothing but refer and adapt the causes of things of rare occurrence to those of things which more frequently happen, without any investigation of the causes of the latter, taking them for granted and admitted.

As for common events, people should reflect on what they have done until now. They have merely explained the causes of rare events by referring to the causes of more common ones. They have taken the causes of common events for granted, without investigating them.

Hence, they do not inquire into the causes of gravity, the rotation of the heavenly bodies, heat, cold, light, hardness, softness, rarity, density, liquidity, solidity, animation, inanimation, similitude, difference, organic formation, but taking them to be self-evident, manifest, and admitted, they dispute and decide upon other matters of less frequent and familiar occurrence.

Therefore, they do not investigate the causes of gravity, the movement of heavenly bodies, heat, cold, or light. Nor do they investigate hardness, softness, rarity, density, liquidity, solidity, life, lifelessness, similarity, difference, or the formation of living organisms. Instead, they take these things as obvious, clear, and accepted. They debate and decide other matters that are less common and familiar.

But we (who know that no judgment can be formed of that which is rare or remarkable, and much less anything new brought to light, without a previous regular examination and discovery of the causes of that which is common, and the causes again of those causes) are necessarily compelled to admit the most common objects into our history. Besides, we have observed that nothing has been so injurious to philosophy as this circumstance, namely, that familiar and frequent objects do not arrest and detain men’s contemplation, but are carelessly admitted, and their causes never inquired after; so that information on unknown subjects is not more often wanted than attention to those which are known.

But we know that we cannot judge what is rare or remarkable without first studying common things systematically. Still less can we bring anything new to light. We must discover the causes of common things, and then the causes of those causes. So we are compelled to include the most common objects in our record. Besides, we have observed that nothing has harmed philosophy more than the neglect of familiar and frequent things. People do not stop to think about them. Instead, they accept them carelessly and never investigate their causes. So we need attention to what is already known as often as we need information about what is unknown.

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With regard to the meanness, or even the filthiness of particulars, for which (as Pliny observes), an apology is requisite, such subjects are no less worthy of admission into natural history than the most magnificent and costly; nor do they at all pollute natural history, for the sun enters alike the palace and the privy, and is not thereby polluted. We neither dedicate nor raise a capitol or pyramid to the pride of man, but rear a holy temple in his mind, on the model of the universe, which model therefore we imitate. For that which is deserving of existence is deserving of knowledge, the image of existence. Now the mean and splendid alike exist. Nay, as the finest odors are sometimes produced from putrid matter (such as musk and civet), so does valuable light and information emanate from mean and sordid instances. But we have already said too much, for such fastidious feelings are childish and effeminate.

Some particular things are humble or even filthy. As Pliny observes, one must apologize for discussing them. Yet they are just as worthy of inclusion in natural history as the most magnificent and costly things. They do not pollute natural history. The sun enters both the palace and the privy without being polluted. We are not dedicating or raising a capitol or pyramid to human pride. We are building a holy temple in the human mind, modeled on the universe. Therefore, we imitate the universe. For whatever deserves to exist deserves to be known, since knowledge is the image of existence. Both humble and splendid things exist. Indeed, some of the finest odors, such as musk and civet, come from putrid matter. In the same way, valuable insight and information come from humble and sordid examples. But we have already said too much, for such fastidious feelings are childish and effeminate.

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The next point requires a more accurate consideration, namely, that many parts of our history will appear to the vulgar, or even any mind accustomed to the present state of things, fantastically and uselessly refined. Hence, we have in regard to this matter said from the first, and must again repeat, that we look for experiments that shall afford light rather than profit, imitating the divine creation, which, as we have often observed, only produced light on the first day, and assigned that whole day to its creation, without adding any material work.

The next point needs closer consideration. Many parts of our history will seem absurdly and uselessly detailed to ordinary people. They will seem so even to anyone accustomed to the present state of things. For this reason, we have said from the beginning, and must repeat, that we seek experiments that provide knowledge rather than profit. In this we imitate divine creation. As we have often observed, God produced only light on the first day. He devoted the whole day to creating light, without adding any material work.

If any one, then, imagine such matters to be of no use, he might equally suppose light to be of no use, because it is neither solid nor material. For, in fact, the knowledge of simple natures, when sufficiently investigated and defined, resembles light, which, though of no great use in itself, affords access to the general mysteries of effects, and with a peculiar power comprehends and draws with it whole bands and troops of effects, and the sources of the most valuable axioms. So also the elements of letters have of themselves separately no meaning, and are of no use, yet are they, as it were, the original matter in the composition and preparation of speech. The seeds of substances, whose effect is powerful, are of no use except in their growth, and the scattered rays of light itself avail not unless collected.

If anyone thinks such matters are useless, they might as well think light is useless because it is neither solid nor material. Knowledge of simple natures, when thoroughly investigated and defined, resembles light. Though light is not very useful in itself, it gives us access to the general mysteries of effects. In a special way, such knowledge encompasses and brings with it whole groups of effects and the sources of the most valuable axioms. Similarly, individual letters have no meaning or use by themselves. Yet they are the raw material from which speech is formed. The seeds of substances have powerful effects, but they are useless unless they grow. Even scattered rays of light are useless unless they are brought together.

But if speculative subtilties give offence, what must we say of the scholastic philosophers who indulged in them to such excess? And those subtilties were wasted on words, or, at least, common notions (which is the same thing), not on things or nature, and alike unproductive of benefit in their origin and their consequences: in no way resembling ours, which are at present useless, but in their consequences of infinite benefit. Let men be assured that all subtile disputes and discursive efforts of the mind are late and preposterous, when they are introduced subsequently to the discovery of axioms, and that their true, or, at any rate, chief opportunity is, when experiment is to be weighed and axioms to be derived from it. They otherwise catch and grasp at nature, but never seize or detain her: and we may well apply to nature that which has been said of opportunity or fortune, that she wears a lock in front, but is bald behind.

But if subtle speculation offends, what must we say of the scholastic philosophers who indulged in it so excessively? They wasted their subtleties on words, or at least on common notions, which amounts to the same thing. They did not apply them to things or nature. Their subtleties produced no benefit, either at the outset or in their consequences. Ours are quite different. They are useless for now, but their consequences will be infinitely beneficial. Let everyone be assured that all subtle disputes and efforts of reasoning come too late and are wrongly placed when introduced after principles have been discovered. Their true, or at least chief, opportunity comes when experiments must be weighed and principles derived from them. Otherwise, these efforts reach and grasp at nature but never seize or hold her. We may well apply to nature what has been said of opportunity or fortune: she has a lock of hair in front, but is bald behind.

In short, we may reply decisively to those who despise any part of natural history as being vulgar, mean, or subtile, and useless in its origin, in the words of a poor woman to a haughty prince, who had rejected her petition as unworthy, and beneath the dignity of his majesty: “Then cease to reign”; for it is quite certain that the empire of nature can neither be obtained nor administered by one who refuses to pay attention to such matters as being poor and too minute.

In short, some people dismiss parts of natural history as common, trivial, too subtle, or useless from the start. We can answer them decisively with the words of a poor woman to an arrogant prince. He had rejected her petition as unworthy and beneath his royal dignity. She replied, “Then cease to reign”. For anyone who refuses to attend to such matters as too insignificant and minute cannot gain or govern the empire of nature.

Philip of Macedon.

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Again, it may be objected to us as being singular and harsh, that we should with one stroke and assault, as it were, banish all authorities and sciences, and that too by our own efforts, without requiring the assistance and support of any of the ancients.

Again, people may object that our approach is strange and harsh. We seem to dismiss all authorities and sciences in a single attack. And we do so by our own efforts, without seeking help or support from any of the ancients.

Now we are aware, that had we been ready to act otherwise than sincerely, it was not difficult to refer our present method to remote ages, prior to those of the Greeks (since the sciences in all probability flourished more in their natural state, though silently, than when they were paraded with the fifes and trumpets of the Greeks); or even (in parts, at least) to some of the Greeks themselves, and to derive authority and honor from thence; as men of no family labor to raise and form nobility for themselves in some ancient line, by the help of genealogies. Trusting, however, to the evidence of facts, we reject every kind of fiction and imposture; and think it of no more consequence to our subject, whether future discoveries were known to the ancients, and set or rose according to the vicissitudes of events and lapse of ages, than it would be of importance to mankind to know whether the new world be the island of Atlantis, and known to the ancients, or be now discovered for the first time.

We know that, had we been willing to be dishonest, we could easily have traced our present method to distant ages before the Greeks. In all probability, the sciences flourished more in their natural state, though quietly, than when the Greeks paraded them with fifes and trumpets. We could even have traced parts of our method to some of the Greeks themselves, and claimed authority and honor from them. We would have been like men of no distinguished family who use genealogies to claim noble descent from an ancient line. But we trust the evidence of facts, and reject every kind of fiction and deception. Whether future discoveries were known to the ancients is no more important to our subject than another question is to mankind. That is the question of whether the new world is the island of Atlantis, known to the ancients, or has only now been discovered for the first time. Nor does it matter to our subject whether such discoveries were lost and rediscovered as events changed and ages passed.

See Plato’s Timæus.

With regard to the universal censure we have bestowed, it is quite clear, to any one who properly considers the matter, that it is both more probable and more modest than any partial one could have been. For if the errors had not been rooted in the primary notions, some well conducted discoveries must have corrected others that were deficient. But since the errors were fundamental, and of such a nature, that men may be said rather to have neglected or passed over things, than to have formed a wrong or false judgment of them, it is little to be wondered at, that they did not obtain what they never aimed at, nor arrive at a goal which they had not determined, nor perform a course which they had neither entered upon nor adhered to.

As for my broad criticism, anyone who considers it carefully can see that it is both more plausible and more modest than a partial criticism would have been. If the errors had not been rooted in basic ideas, some well-conducted discoveries would have corrected others that fell short. But the errors were fundamental. Indeed, people may be said to have neglected or overlooked things rather than judged them wrongly. So it is hardly surprising that they did not obtain what they never sought. Nor did they reach a goal they had not set, or complete a course they had neither begun nor followed.

With regard to our presumption, we allow that if we were to assume a power of drawing a more perfect straight line or circle than any one else, by superior steadiness of hand or acuteness of eye, it would lead to a comparison of talent; but if one merely assert that he can draw a more perfect line or circle with a ruler or compasses, than another can by his unassisted hand or eye, he surely cannot be said to boast of much. Now this applies not only to our first original attempt, but also to those who shall hereafter apply themselves to the pursuit. For our method of discovering the sciences merely levels men’s wits, and leaves but little to their superiority, since it achieves everything by the most certain rules and demonstrations. Whence (as we have often observed), our attempt is to be attributed to fortune rather than talent, and is the offspring of time rather than of wit. For a certain sort of chance has no less effect upon our thoughts than on our acts and deeds.

As for the charge that we are being presumptuous, we admit one point. Suppose we claimed to draw a straighter line or a more perfect circle than anyone else. And suppose we claimed to do so through a steadier hand or a sharper eye. That would invite a comparison of talent. But suppose we merely claimed to draw a better line or circle with a ruler or compasses than someone else could draw unaided. Surely that would be no great boast. This applies not only to our own first attempt, but also to those who take up the pursuit after us. Our method of discovery in the sciences simply puts minds on a level. It leaves little room for superior talent, since it achieves everything through the most reliable rules and demonstrations. So, as we have often said, our attempt owes more to fortune than to talent. It is the product of time rather than of intelligence. For chance has no less effect on our thoughts than on our actions and deeds.

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We may, therefore, apply to ourselves the joke of him who said, that water and wine drinkers could not think alike, especially as it hits the matter so well. For others, both ancients and moderns, have in the sciences drank a crude liquor like water, either flowing of itself from the understanding, or drawn up by logic as the wheel draws up the bucket. But we drink and pledge others with a liquor made of many well-ripened grapes, collected and plucked from particular branches, squeezed in the press, and at last clarified and fermented in a vessel. It is not, therefore, wonderful that we should not agree with others.

We may therefore apply to ourselves the joke that water drinkers and wine drinkers cannot think alike, especially since it fits the case so well. For others, both ancient and modern, have drunk a crude liquor in the sciences, like water. It either flows directly from the understanding or is drawn up by logic, as a wheel draws up a bucket. But we drink and offer others a liquor made from many well-ripened grapes, gathered and picked from individual branches. The grapes are squeezed in a press, and the juice is finally clarified and fermented in a vessel. It is therefore no wonder that we disagree with others.

Philocrates' saying when he disagreed with Demosthenes. Ed.

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Another objection will without doubt be made, namely, that we have not ourselves established a correct, or the best goal or aim of the sciences (the very defect we blame in others). For they will say that the contemplation of truth is more dignified and exalted than any utility or extent of effects; but that our dwelling so long and anxiously on experience and matter, and the fluctuating state of particulars, fastens the mind to earth, or rather casts it down into an abyss of confusion and disturbance, and separates and removes it from a much more divine state, the quiet and tranquillity of abstract wisdom. We willingly assent to their reasoning, and are most anxious to effect the very point they hint at and require. For we are founding a real model of the world in the understanding, such as it is found to be, not such as man’s reason has distorted. Now this cannot be done without dissecting and anatomizing the world most diligently; but we declare it necessary to destroy completely the vain, little and, as it were, apish imitations of the world, which have been formed in various systems of philosophy by men’s fancies. Let men learn (as we have said above) the difference that exists between the idols of the human mind and the ideas of the divine mind. The former are mere arbitrary abstractions; the latter the true marks of the Creator on his creatures, as they are imprinted on, and defined in matter, by true and exquisite touches. Truth, therefore, and utility, are here perfectly identical, and the effects are of more value as pledges of truth than from the benefit they confer on men.

Another objection will no doubt be raised. People will say that we have not set the right or best goal for the sciences. This is the very fault we blame in others. They will say that contemplating truth is more dignified and exalted than any practical use or range of effects. But we spend so long and take such pains studying experience, matter, and the ever-changing world of particulars. They will say that this ties the mind to earth. Indeed, it casts the mind into an abyss of confusion and disturbance. It separates the mind from a far more divine state: the peace and tranquility of abstract wisdom. We willingly agree with their reasoning. We are most eager to accomplish the very thing they suggest and demand. For we are building a true model of the world in the understanding. It will show the world as it is found to be, not as human reason has distorted it. But this cannot be done without dissecting and examining the world with the utmost care. We therefore declare that we must completely destroy the vain, petty, and almost apish imitations of the world. These have been formed by human imagination in various systems of philosophy. As we have said before, let people learn the difference between the idols of the human mind and the ideas of the divine mind. The former are merely arbitrary abstractions. The latter are the Creator's true marks on his creatures. They are stamped on matter and given shape in it with true and exquisite touches. Truth and utility are therefore perfectly identical here. The effects are more valuable as evidence of truth than for the benefits they bring to people.

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Others may object that we are only doing that which has already been done, and that the ancients followed the same course as ourselves. They may imagine, therefore, that, after all this stir and exertion, we shall at last arrive at some of those systems that prevailed among the ancients: for that they, too, when commencing their meditations, laid up a great store of instances and particulars, and digested them under topics and titles in their commonplace books, and so worked out their systems and arts, and then decided upon what they discovered, and related now and then some examples to confirm and throw light upon their doctrine; but thought it superfluous and troublesome to publish their notes, minutes, and commonplaces, and therefore followed the example of builders who remove the scaffolding and ladders when the building is finished. Nor can we indeed believe the case to have been otherwise. But to any one, not entirely forgetful of our previous observations, it will be easy to answer this objection or rather scruple; for we allow that the ancients had a particular form of investigation and discovery, and their writings show it. But it was of such a nature, that they immediately flew from a few instances and particulars (after adding some common notions, and a few generally received opinions most in vogue) to the most general conclusions or the principles of the sciences, and then by their intermediate propositions deduced their inferior conclusions, and tried them by the test of the immovable and settled truth of the first, and so constructed their art. Lastly, if some new particulars and instances were brought forward, which contradicted their dogmas, they either with great subtilty reduced them to one system, by distinctions or explanations of their own rules, or got rid of them clumsily as exceptions, laboring most pertinaciously in the meantime to accommodate the causes of such as were not contradictory to their own principles. Their natural history and their experience were both far from being what they ought to have been, and their flying off to generalities ruined everything.

Others may object that we are only doing what has already been done, and that the ancients followed the same course. They may therefore imagine that, after all this excitement and effort, we shall end up with some ancient system. They may suppose that the ancients, too, began their inquiries by collecting many instances and particulars. They organized these under topics and headings in their notebooks, and so worked out their systems and arts. They then reached conclusions about their discoveries and occasionally gave examples to confirm and explain their teachings. But they thought it unnecessary and troublesome to publish their notes, records, and collections. They followed the example of builders who remove the scaffolding and ladders when the building is finished. Indeed, we cannot believe that it was otherwise. But anyone who has not entirely forgotten our earlier observations can easily answer this objection, or rather, this doubt. We admit that the ancients had a particular method of investigation and discovery, as their writings show. But their method was such that they leaped at once from a few instances and particulars to the most general conclusions, or the principles of the sciences. They added only some common notions and a few widely accepted opinions that were most in fashion. Then they used intermediate propositions to deduce less general conclusions. They tested these against the fixed and settled truth of their first principles, and so constructed their art. Finally, if new particulars and instances contradicted their doctrines, they dealt with them in one of two ways. They either cleverly brought them into the system through distinctions or explanations of their own rules, or clumsily dismissed them as exceptions. Meanwhile, they worked most stubbornly to make the causes of any particulars and instances that did not contradict their doctrines fit their principles. Their natural history and their experience were both far from what they should have been. Their leap to generalities ruined everything.

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Another objection will be made against us, that we prohibit decisions and the laying down of certain principles, till we arrive regularly at generalities by the intermediate steps, and thus keep the judgment in suspense and lead to uncertainty. But our object is not uncertainty but fitting certainty, for we derogate not from the senses but assist them, and despise not the understanding but direct it. It is better to know what is necessary, and not to imagine we are fully in possession of it, than to imagine that we are fully in possession of it, and yet in reality to know nothing which we ought.

Another objection will be raised against us. We prohibit decisions and the establishment of certain principles until we reach general conclusions through a proper series of intermediate steps. Critics will say that we thus leave judgment suspended and lead people into uncertainty. But our aim is not uncertainty. It is certainty of the right kind. We do not diminish the senses but help them, and we do not despise the understanding but guide it. It is better to know what we need to know without imagining we possess complete knowledge. That is better than imagining we possess complete knowledge while knowing nothing we ought to know.

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Again, some may raise this question rather than objection, whether we talk of perfecting natural philosophy alone according to our method, or the other sciences also, such as logic, ethics, politics. We certainly intend to comprehend them all. And as common logic, which regulates matters by syllogisms, is applied not only to natural, but also to every other science, so our inductive method likewise comprehends them all. For we form a history and tables of invention for anger, fear, shame, and the like, and also for examples in civil life, and the mental operations of memory, composition, division, judgment, and the rest, as well as for heat and cold, light, vegetation, and the like. But since our method of interpretation, after preparing and arranging a history, does not content itself with examining the operations and disquisitions of the mind like common logic, but also inspects the nature of things, we so regulate the mind that it may be enabled to apply itself in every respect correctly to that nature. On that account we deliver numerous and various precepts in our doctrine of interpretation, so that they may apply in some measure to the method of discovering the quality and condition of the subject matter of investigation.

Again, some may ask a question rather than raise an objection. Does our method aim to perfect natural philosophy alone, or other sciences too, such as logic, ethics, and politics? We certainly intend it to cover them all. Common logic, which governs matters through syllogisms, applies to every science, not just natural philosophy. In the same way, our inductive method covers them all. We compile a record and tables of discovery for anger, fear, shame, and similar emotions. We do the same for examples from civic life and for mental operations such as memory, composition, division, and judgment. We also do this for heat and cold, light, vegetation, and similar subjects. But our method of interpretation goes beyond common logic. After compiling and arranging a record, it does not stop at examining the mind’s operations and reasoning. It also examines the nature of things. We therefore guide the mind so that it can apply itself correctly to that nature in every respect. For that reason, our doctrine of interpretation offers many different rules. These rules can apply, to some extent, to the method of discovering the qualities and condition of the subject under investigation.

There is an old error in setting deductive syllogism against inductive reasoning, as if they were not parts of one system or could not fit together. Far from being fundamentally opposed, Bacon’s method could readily be shown to be syllogistic in his sense of the term. Every Baconian enthymeme, or argument with an unstated premise, assumes that the laws of nature are uniform. This premise is expressed in the axiom that whatever has once occurred will occur again. It must be assumed as the basis of every conclusion Bacon draws before we can accept it as valid.

Bacon’s method, therefore, could not have been directed against the old logic, since it assumed and demonstrated its principles. Rather, it opposed the way the ancients misused that science. They applied its powers to developing abstract principles, which they imagined held the solutions to the universe’s hidden mysteries. Bacon rightly overturned these ideal notions and accepted no principle as a basis unless actual experiment and observation supported it. In doing so, he laid the foundations of a sound philosophy, putting inductive logic to its proper use in interpreting nature.

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Let none even doubt whether we are anxious to destroy and demolish the philosophy, arts, and sciences, which are now in use. On the contrary, we readily cherish their practice, cultivation, and honor; for we by no means interfere to prevent the prevalent system from encouraging discussion, adorning discourses, or being employed serviceably in the chair of the professor or the practice of common life, and being taken, in short, by general consent as current coin. Nay, we plainly declare, that the system we offer will not be very suitable for such purposes, not being easily adapted to vulgar apprehensions, except by effects and works. To show our sincerity in professing our regard and friendly disposition toward the received sciences, we can refer to the evidence of our published writings (especially our books on the Advancement of Learning). We will not, therefore, endeavor to evince it any further by words; but content ourselves with steadily and professedly premising, that no great progress can be made by the present methods in the theory or contemplation of science, and that they cannot be made to produce any very abundant effects.

Let no one doubt whether we wish to destroy the philosophy, arts, and sciences now in use. On the contrary, we gladly support their practice, cultivation, and honor. We do not seek to prevent the prevailing system from encouraging discussion or enriching speeches. Nor do we object to its useful place in teaching or everyday life. In short, we do not object to its being generally accepted as common currency. Indeed, we openly declare that the system we offer will not be very suitable for such purposes. Ordinary people will find it hard to grasp, except through its results and practical achievements. Our published writings show the sincerity of our respect and goodwill toward the established sciences. We refer especially to our books on the Advancement of Learning. We will not, therefore, try to prove our regard further in words. Instead, we will be content to state firmly and openly that present methods can make no great progress in scientific theory or contemplation. Nor can they produce very abundant practical results.

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It remains for us to say a few words on the excellence of our proposed end. If we had done so before, we might have appeared merely to express our wishes, but now that we have excited hope and removed prejudices, it will perhaps have greater weight. Had we performed and completely accomplished the whole, without frequently calling in others to assist in our labors, we should then have refrained from saying any more, lest we should be thought to extol our own deserts. Since, however, the industry of others must be quickened, and their courage roused and inflamed, it is right to recall some points to their memory.

It remains for us to say a few words about the excellence of our proposed goal. If we had done so earlier, we might have seemed merely to express our wishes. But now that we have inspired hope and removed prejudices, our words may carry more weight. If we had completed the whole work ourselves, without frequently calling on others for help, we would have said no more. We would not have wanted to seem to be praising our own merits. But others must be encouraged to work and their courage must be stirred and aroused. So it is right to remind them of a few points.

First, then, the introduction of great inventions appears one of the most distinguished of human actions, and the ancients so considered it; for they assigned divine honors to the authors of inventions, but only heroic honors to those who displayed civil merit (such as the founders of cities and empire legislators, the deliverers of their country from lasting misfortunes, the quellers of tyrants, and the like). And if any one rightly compare them, he will find the judgment of antiquity to be correct; for the benefits derived from inventions may extend to mankind in general, but civil benefits to particular spots alone; the latter, moreover, last but for a time, the former forever. Civil reformation seldom is carried on without violence and confusion, while inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any.

First, introducing great inventions appears to be one of the most distinguished human achievements. The ancients thought so too. They gave divine honors to inventors, but only heroic honors to those who served society. These included founders of cities and empires, lawmakers, those who freed their countries from lasting misfortunes, and those who overthrew tyrants. If anyone compares the two fairly, they will find that the ancients were right. The benefits of inventions may extend to all humanity, but public achievements benefit only particular places. Moreover, public benefits last only for a time, while the benefits of inventions last forever. Social reform seldom takes place without violence and confusion. Inventions, by contrast, bring blessings and benefits without hurting or troubling anyone.

Inventions are also, as it were, new creations and imitations of divine works, as was expressed by the poet:

Inventions are also, in a sense, new creations and imitations of divine works, as the poet put it:

This is the opening of the Sixth Book of Lucretius. Bacon probably quoted from memory. The lines are:

> “Primæ frugiferos fœtus mortalibus ægris > Dididerunt quondam præclaro nomine Athenæ > Et recreaverunt,” etc.

> The teeming corn, that feeble mortals crave, > First, and long since, renowned Athens gave, > And cheered their life—then taught to frame their laws.

“Primum frugiferos fœtus mortalibus ægris Dididerant quondam præstanti nomine Athenæ Et recreaverunt vitam legesque rogarunt.”

“Long ago, Athens, a city of great renown, first gave suffering people crops that bore fruit. It renewed their lives and gave them laws.”

And it is worthy of remark in Solomon, that while he flourished in the possession of his empire, in wealth, in the magnificence of his works, in his court, his household, his fleet, the splendor of his name, and the most unbounded admiration of mankind, he still placed his glory in none of these, but declared that it is the glory of God to conceal a thing, but the glory of a king to search it out.

It is worth noting that Solomon flourished as ruler of his empire. He enjoyed wealth, magnificent works, a splendid court and household, a fleet, a glorious name, and the boundless admiration of mankind. Yet he took pride in none of these. Instead, he declared that it is God's glory to conceal a thing, but a king's glory to search it out.

Prov. xxv. 2.

Again, let any one but consider the immense difference between men’s lives in the most polished countries of Europe, and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies, he will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man, not only on account of mutual aid and benefits, but from their comparative states—the result of the arts, and not of the soil or climate.

Again, consider the immense difference between people’s lives in the most advanced countries of Europe and in any wild, uncivilized region of the new Indies. You will find the difference so great that one person may be called a god to another. This is not only because of the help and benefits people give one another, but also because of their different ways of life. These differences result from the arts, not from the soil or climate.

Again, we should notice the force, effect, and consequences of inventions, which are nowhere more conspicuous than in those three which were unknown to the ancients; namely, printing, gunpowder, and the compass. For these three have changed the appearance and state of the whole world: first in literature, then in warfare, and lastly in navigation; and innumerable changes have been thence derived, so that no empire, sect, or star, appears to have exercised a greater power and influence on human affairs than these mechanical discoveries.

We should also notice the power, effects, and consequences of inventions. Nowhere are these clearer than in three inventions unknown to the ancients: printing, gunpowder, and the compass. These three have changed the face and state of the whole world. They have changed literature, warfare, and navigation, respectively. Countless other changes have followed from them. No empire, sect, or star seems to have had more power and influence over human affairs than these mechanical discoveries.

It will, perhaps, be as well to distinguish three species and degrees of ambition. First, that of men who are anxious to enlarge their own power in their country, which is a vulgar and degenerate kind; next, that of men who strive to enlarge the power and empire of their country over mankind, which is more dignified but not less covetous; but if one were to endeavor to renew and enlarge the power and empire of mankind in general over the universe, such ambition (if it may be so termed) is both more sound and more noble than the other two. Now the empire of man over things is founded on the arts and sciences alone, for nature is only to be commanded by obeying her.

It may be useful to distinguish three kinds and degrees of ambition. The first is the desire to increase one's own power within one's country. This is a common and base kind of ambition. The second is the desire to extend one's country's power and rule over other people. This is more dignified, but no less driven by greed. But suppose someone tried to restore and expand humanity's power and rule over the universe as a whole. That ambition, if it can be called ambition, is both sounder and nobler than the other two. Human dominion over things rests on the arts and sciences alone, because nature can be commanded only by obeying her.

Besides this, if the benefit of any particular invention has had such an effect as to induce men to consider him greater than a man, who has thus obliged the whole race, how much more exalted will that discovery be, which leads to the easy discovery of everything else! Yet (to speak the truth) in the same manner as we are very thankful for light which enables us to enter on our way, to practice arts, to read, to distinguish each other, and yet sight is more excellent and beautiful than the various uses of light; so is the contemplation of things as they are, free from superstition or imposture, error or confusion, much more dignified in itself than all the advantage to be derived from discoveries.

Besides, a particular invention may benefit the whole human race so much that people regard its inventor as more than human. If so, how much more exalted will a discovery be that makes everything else easy to discover! Yet, to tell the truth, consider our gratitude for light. It lets us find our way, practice arts, read, and recognize one another. Still, sight is more excellent and beautiful than the many uses of light. In the same way, contemplating things as they are is more dignified in itself than all the benefits of discoveries. Such contemplation is free from superstition, deception, error, and confusion.

Lastly, let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself, and the rest. Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.

Lastly, let no one be alarmed by the objection that the arts and sciences can be misused for harmful or luxurious purposes. The same can be said of every worldly good: talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself, and the rest. Let humanity regain its rights over nature, which God gave it, and obtain that power. Its use will be governed by sound reason and true religion.

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But it is time for us to lay down the art of interpreting nature, to which we attribute no absolute necessity (as if nothing could be done without it) nor perfection, although we think that our precepts are most useful and correct. For we are of opinion, that if men had at their command a proper history of nature and experience, and would apply themselves steadily to it, and could bind themselves to two things: 1, to lay aside received opinions and notions; 2, to restrain themselves, till the proper season, from generalization, they might, by the proper and genuine exertion of their minds, fall into our way of interpretation without the aid of any art. For interpretation is the true and natural act of the mind, when all obstacles are removed: certainly, however, everything will be more ready and better fixed by our precepts.

But it is time to set out the art of interpreting nature. We do not claim that it is absolutely necessary, as if nothing could be done without it. Nor do we claim that it is perfect, although we think our rules are most useful and correct. Suppose people had a proper record of nature and experience and applied themselves steadily to it. Suppose, too, that they could commit themselves to two things: 1, setting aside accepted opinions and ideas; 2, holding back from generalizing until the right time. We believe that, by the proper and genuine exercise of their minds, they could arrive at our method of interpretation without the aid of any art. For interpretation is the mind's true and natural activity when all obstacles are removed. Certainly, however, our rules will make everything easier and more firmly established.

Yet do we not affirm that no addition can be made to them; on the contrary, considering the mind in its connection with things, and not merely relatively to its own powers, we ought to be persuaded that the art of invention can be made to grow with the inventions themselves.

Yet we do not claim that nothing can be added to them. On the contrary, we should consider the mind in relation to things, not merely in relation to its own powers. Then we should be convinced that the art of invention can grow alongside inventions themselves.