The Second Dialogue
HYL. I beg your pardon, Philonous, for not meeting you sooner. All this morning my head was so filled with our late conversation that I had not leisure to think of the time of the day, or indeed of anything else.
HYL. I'm sorry I didn't meet you sooner, Philonous. All morning, I was so absorbed in our recent conversation that I didn't think about the time or anything else.
PHILONOUS. I am glad you were so intent upon it, in hopes if there were any mistakes in your concessions, or fallacies in my reasonings from them, you will now discover them to me.
PHILONOUS. I am glad you paid such close attention. I hope you will now point out any mistakes in your concessions or flaws in my reasoning from them.
HYL. I assure you I have done nothing ever since I saw you but search after mistakes and fallacies, and, with that view, have minutely examined the whole series of yesterday's discourse: but all in vain, for the notions it led me into, upon review, appear still more clear and evident; and, the more I consider them, the more irresistibly do they force my assent.
HYL. I assure you, since I last saw you, I have done nothing but search for mistakes and faulty reasoning. To do this, I examined every part of yesterday's conversation in detail. But it was all in vain. On reviewing the ideas our conversation led me to, I find them even clearer and more obvious. And the more I consider them, the more irresistible I find them.
PHIL. And is not this, think you, a sign that they are genuine, that they proceed from nature, and are conformable to right reason? Truth and beauty are in this alike, that the strictest survey sets them both off to advantage; while the false lustre of error and disguise cannot endure being reviewed, or too nearly inspected.
PHIL. And don't you think this is a sign that they are genuine, that they come from nature and agree with sound reason? Truth and beauty are alike in this: the closer you examine them, the better they look. But the false shine of error and disguise cannot withstand a second look or close examination.
HYL. I own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor can any one be more entirely satisfied of the truth of those odd consequences, so long as I have in view the reasonings that lead to them. But, when these are out of my thoughts, there seems, on the other hand, something so satisfactory, so natural and intelligible, in the modern way of explaining things that, I profess, I know not how to reject it.
HYL. I admit there is a great deal in what you say. No one could be more fully convinced that those strange conclusions are true, as long as I have the arguments leading to them in mind. But when I am no longer thinking about those arguments, the modern way of explaining things seems so satisfactory, natural, and clear that I honestly don't know how to reject it.
PHIL. I know not what way you mean.
PHIL. I don't know what way you mean.
HYL. I mean the way of accounting for our sensations or ideas.
HYL. I mean the way we explain our sensations or ideas.
PHIL. How is that?
PHIL. How is that?
HYL. It is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the brain, from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to all parts of the body; and that outward objects, by the different impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain vibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which, according to the various impressions or traces thereby made in the brain, is variously affected with ideas.
HYL. The soul is thought to reside in a part of the brain where the nerves originate. From there, the nerves extend to all parts of the body. External objects make different impressions on the sense organs, causing different vibrations in the nerves. The nerves are filled with spirits and carry these vibrations to the brain, the seat of the soul. The vibrations leave different impressions or traces in the brain. Depending on these impressions, the soul is affected by different ideas.
PHIL. And call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are affected with ideas?
PHIL. And do you call this an explanation of how ideas affect us?
HYL. Why not, Philonous? Have you anything to object against it?
HYL. Why not, Philonous? Do you have any objections to it?
PHIL. I would first know whether I rightly understand your hypothesis. You make certain traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of our ideas. Pray tell me whether by the BRAIN you mean any sensible thing.
PHIL. First, I want to know whether I understand your theory correctly. You say that certain traces in the brain cause or give rise to our ideas. Tell me, do you mean by the BRAIN something that can be perceived by the senses?
HYL. What else think you I could mean?
HYL. What else do you think I could mean?
PHIL. Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those things which are immediately perceivable are ideas; and these exist only in the mind. Thus much you have, if I mistake not, long since agreed to.
PHIL. All sensible things can be perceived directly. Things perceived directly are ideas, and ideas exist only in the mind. If I am not mistaken, you agreed to all this long ago.
HYL. I do not deny it.
HYL. I don't deny it.
PHIL. The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing, exists only in the mind. Now, I would fain know whether you think it reasonable to suppose that one idea or thing existing in the mind occasions all other ideas. And, if you think so, pray how do you account for the origin of that primary idea or brain itself?
PHIL. The brain you speak of is therefore something perceived by the senses, and it exists only in the mind. Now, I would like to know whether you think it reasonable to suppose that one idea or thing in the mind causes all other ideas. And if you do, how do you explain the origin of that first idea, the brain itself?
HYL. I do not explain the origin of our ideas by that brain which is perceivable to sense—this being itself only a combination of sensible ideas—but by another which I imagine.
HYL. I do not explain the origin of our ideas by the brain we can perceive through our senses. That brain is itself only a combination of ideas we perceive through our senses. Instead, I explain their origin by another brain that I imagine.
PHIL. But are not things imagined as truly IN THE MIND as things perceived?
PHIL. But aren't imagined things just as truly IN THE MIND as perceived things?
HYL. I must confess they are.
HYL. I have to admit they are.
PHIL. It comes, therefore, to the same thing; and you have been all this while accounting for ideas by certain motions or impressions of the brain; that is, by some alterations in an idea, whether sensible or imaginable it matters not.
PHIL. So it comes to the same thing. All this time, you have been explaining ideas by certain motions or impressions in the brain. In other words, you have been explaining ideas by some changes in an idea. It does not matter whether that idea is sensed or imagined.
HYL. I begin to suspect my hypothesis.
HYL. I am beginning to doubt my theory.
PHIL. Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own ideas. When, therefore, you say all ideas are occasioned by impressions in the brain, do you conceive this brain or no? If you do, then you talk of ideas imprinted in an idea causing that same idea, which is absurd. If you do not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, instead of forming a reasonable hypothesis.
PHIL. Apart from spirits, all we know or can conceive are our own ideas. So, when you say that impressions in the brain cause all ideas, can you conceive of this brain or not? If you can, then you are saying that ideas imprinted in an idea cause that same idea. That is absurd. If you cannot conceive of the brain, you are speaking unintelligibly instead of forming a reasonable hypothesis.
HYL. I now clearly see it was a mere dream. There is nothing in it.
HYL. I can now clearly see that it was just a dream. There is nothing to it.
PHIL. You need not be much concerned at it; for after all, this way of explaining things, as you called it, could never have satisfied any reasonable man. What connexion is there between a motion in the nerves, and the sensations of sound or colour in the mind? Or how is it possible these should be the effect of that?
PHIL. You need not worry much about it. After all, what you called this way of explaining things could never have satisfied any reasonable person. What connection is there between movement in the nerves and sensations of sound or color in the mind? How could nerve movements possibly cause those sensations?
HYL. But I could never think it had so little in it as now it seems to have.
HYL. But I never thought there was so little to it as there now seems to be.
PHIL. Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible things have a real existence; and that you are in truth an arrant sceptic?
PHIL. Well then, are you finally convinced that nothing perceived by the senses really exists? And are you convinced that you are, in fact, a complete skeptic?
HYL. It is too plain to be denied.
HYL. It is too obvious to deny.
PHIL. Look! are not the fields covered with a delightful verdure? Is there not something in the woods and groves, in the rivers and clear springs, that soothes, that delights, that transports the soul? At the prospect of the wide and deep ocean, or some huge mountain whose top is lost in the clouds, or of an old gloomy forest, are not our minds filled with a pleasing horror? Even in rocks and deserts is there not an agreeable wildness? How sincere a pleasure is it to behold the natural beauties of the earth! To preserve and renew our relish for them, is not the veil of night alternately drawn over her face, and doth she not change her dress with the seasons? How aptly are the elements disposed! What variety and use in the meanest productions of nature! What delicacy, what beauty, what contrivance, in animal and vegetable bodies I How exquisitely are all things suited, as well to their particular ends, as to constitute opposite parts of the whole I And, while they mutually aid and support, do they not also set off and illustrate each other? Raise now your thoughts from this ball of earth to all those glorious luminaries that adorn the high arch of heaven. The motion and situation of the planets, are they not admirable for use and order? Were those (miscalled ERRATIC) globes once known to stray, in their repeated journeys through the pathless void? Do they not measure areas round the sun ever proportioned to the times? So fixed, so immutable are the laws by which the unseen Author of nature actuates the universe. How vivid and radiant is the lustre of the fixed stars! How magnificent and rich that negligent profusion with which they appear to be scattered throughout the whole azure vault! Yet, if you take the telescope, it brings into your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked eye. Here they seem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer view immense orbs of fight at various distances, far sunk in the abyss of space. Now you must call imagination to your aid. The feeble narrow sense cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving round the central fires; and in those worlds the energy of an all-perfect Mind displayed in endless forms. But, neither sense nor imagination are big enough to comprehend the boundless extent, with all its glittering furniture. Though the labouring mind exert and strain each power to its utmost reach, there still stands out ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable. Yet all the vast bodies that compose this mighty frame, how distant and remote soever, are by some secret mechanism, some Divine art and force, linked in a mutual dependence and intercourse with each other; even with this earth, which was almost slipt from my thoughts and lost in the crowd of worlds. Is not the whole system immense, beautiful, glorious beyond expression and beyond thought! What treatment, then, do those philosophers deserve, who would deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all REALITY? How should those Principles be entertained that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare? To be plain, can you expect this Scepticism of yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by all men of sense?
PHIL. Look! Aren't the fields covered in delightful greenery? Isn't there something in the woods and groves, the rivers and clear springs, that soothes, delights, and lifts the soul? When we see the wide, deep ocean, or a huge mountain whose peak disappears into the clouds, or an old, gloomy forest, aren't our minds filled with a pleasing sense of awe? Even rocks and deserts have a pleasing wildness, don't they? What pure pleasure it is to see the earth's natural beauty! To preserve and renew our enjoyment of it, isn't the veil of night regularly drawn over its face? Doesn't the earth change its dress with the seasons? How well the elements are arranged! What variety and usefulness there is in even the humblest products of nature! What delicacy, beauty, and ingenious design there is in animal and plant bodies! How perfectly everything is suited both to its particular purpose and to its role as a distinct part of the whole! And while things help and support one another, don't they also bring out one another's qualities? Now lift your thoughts from this ball of earth to all those glorious lights that adorn the high arch of heaven. Aren't the movements and positions of the planets admirable for their usefulness and order? Were those globes, wrongly called ERRATIC, ever known to stray on their repeated journeys through the pathless void? Don't they sweep out areas around the sun that are always proportional to the time taken? The laws by which the unseen Author of nature moves the universe are so fixed and unchanging. How vivid and radiant is the light of the fixed stars! How magnificent and rich is the seemingly careless abundance with which they appear scattered across the whole blue vault of heaven! Yet if you use a telescope, it brings a new host of stars into view that the naked eye cannot see. From here they seem tiny and close together. But seen from nearer, they are immense spheres of light at various distances, deep in the abyss of space. Now you must call on your imagination. Our weak, limited senses cannot make out the countless worlds revolving around those central fires. Nor can they see the power of an all-perfect Mind displayed in endless forms on those worlds. But neither our senses nor our imagination can comprehend that boundless expanse and all the glittering things it contains. Even when the struggling mind strains every power to its limit, an immeasurable surplus still remains beyond its grasp. Yet all the vast bodies that make up this mighty structure are linked in mutual dependence and interaction. They are linked by some hidden mechanism, some Divine skill and force, however far apart they may be. They are linked even to this earth, which had almost slipped from my thoughts and been lost among the crowd of worlds. Isn't the whole system immense, beautiful, and glorious beyond words and beyond thought? How, then, should we treat those philosophers who would deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all REALITY? How should we regard those principles that lead us to think all the visible beauty of creation is a false, imaginary glare? To be plain, can you expect that all sensible people will not think your Scepticism wildly absurd?
HYL. Other men may think as they please; but for your part you have nothing to reproach me with. My comfort is, you are as much a sceptic as I am.
HYL. Other men may think as they please, but you have nothing to blame me for. My comfort is that you are as much a skeptic as I am.
PHIL. There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you.
PHIL. On that point, Hylas, I must disagree with you.
HYL. What! Have you all along agreed to the premises, and do you now deny the conclusion, and leave me to maintain those paradoxes by myself which you led me into? This surely is not fair.
HYL. What! You agreed to the premises all along, and now you deny the conclusion? Are you leaving me to defend the paradoxes you led me into by myself? That is surely not fair.
PHIL. I deny that I agreed with you in those notions that led to Scepticism. You indeed said the REALITY of sensible things consisted in AN ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OUT OF THE MINDS OF SPIRITS, or distinct from their being perceived. And pursuant to this notion of reality, YOU are obliged to deny sensible things any real existence: that is, according to your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic. But I neither said nor thought the reality of sensible things was to be defined after that manner. To me it is evident for the reasons you allow of, that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not on my thought, and have all existence distinct from being perceived by me, THERE MUST BE SOME OTHER MIND WHEREIN THEY EXIST. As sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.
PHIL. I deny that I agreed with you about the ideas that led to skepticism. You said that the REALITY of sensible things consisted in AN ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OUTSIDE THE MINDS OF SPIRITS, or apart from their being perceived. Given this idea of reality, YOU must deny that sensible things have any real existence. That is, by your own definition, you call yourself a skeptic. But I neither said nor thought that the reality of sensible things should be defined that way. For reasons you accept, it is clear to me that sensible things can exist only in a mind or spirit. I do not conclude that sensible things have no real existence. Rather, they do not depend on my thought, and they all exist apart from being perceived by me. So I conclude that THERE MUST BE SOME OTHER MIND IN WHICH THEY EXIST. Therefore, as surely as the sensible world really exists, an infinite, omnipresent Spirit contains and sustains it.
HYL. What! This is no more than I and all Christians hold; nay, and all others too who believe there is a God, and that He knows and comprehends all things.
HYL. What! This is just what I and all Christians believe. In fact, so does everyone else who believes that there is a God and that he knows and understands all things.
PHIL. Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by God, because they believe the being of a God; whereas I, on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by Him.
PHIL. Yes, but here is the difference. People commonly believe that God knows or perceives all things because they believe God exists. I, on the other hand, immediately and necessarily conclude that God exists because he must perceive all things that can be sensed.
HYL. But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it how we come by that belief?
HYL. But as long as we all believe the same thing, why does it matter how we came to believe it?
PHIL. But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatever; which I do not. Besides, is there no difference between saying, THERE IS A GOD, THEREFORE HE PERCEIVES ALL THINGS; and saying, SENSIBLE THINGS DO REALLY EXIST; AND, IF THEY REALLY EXIST, THEY ARE NECESSARILY PERCEIVED BY AN INFINITE MIND: THEREFORE THERE IS AN INFINITE MIND OR GOD? This furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the BEING OF A GOD. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond all controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of the creation, that it was the workmanship of God. But that—setting aside all help of astronomy and natural philosophy, all contemplation of the contrivance, order, and adjustment of things—an infinite Mind should be necessarily inferred from the bare EXISTENCE OF THE SENSIBLE WORLD, is an advantage to them only who have made this easy reflexion: that the sensible world is that which we perceive by our several senses; and that nothing is perceived by the senses beside ideas; and that no idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind. You may now, without any laborious search into the sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious length of discourse, oppose and baffle the most strenuous advocate for Atheism. Those miserable refuges, whether in an eternal succession of unthinking causes and effects, or in a fortuitous concourse of atoms; those wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes, and Spinoza: in a word, the whole system of Atheism, is it not entirely overthrown, by this single reflexion on the repugnancy included in supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude and shapeless, of the visible world, to exist without a mind? Let any one of those abettors of impiety but look into his own thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so much as a rock, a desert, a chaos, or confused jumble of atoms; how anything at all, either sensible or imaginable, can exist independent of a Mind, and he need go no farther to be convinced of his folly. Can anything be fairer than to put a dispute on such an issue, and leave it to a man himself to see if he can conceive, even in thought, what he holds to be true in fact, and from a notional to allow it a real existence?
PHIL. But we do not agree on the same view either. Philosophers acknowledge that God perceives all physical things. Yet they also claim that these things exist independently of being perceived by any mind. I do not. Besides, is there no difference between saying, “There is a God, therefore he perceives all things,” and saying, “Things we perceive through our senses really exist. If they really exist, an infinite mind must perceive them. Therefore, there is an infinite mind, or God”? The second argument gives you a direct and immediate demonstration that God exists, starting from a completely evident principle. Theologians and philosophers had proved beyond all dispute that creation was God’s work. They proved this from the beauty and usefulness of its various parts. But an infinite mind can also be inferred necessarily from the mere existence of the sensible world. This requires no help from astronomy or natural philosophy, and no consideration of how things are designed, ordered, and arranged. This advantage belongs only to those who have made one simple observation. The sensible world is what we perceive through our various senses. Our senses perceive nothing but ideas. And no idea, or original model of an idea, can exist anywhere except in a mind. You can now confront and defeat the most determined advocate of atheism. You need no painstaking study of the sciences, subtle reasoning, or lengthy argument. Atheism has its miserable refuges, whether in an eternal succession of unthinking causes and effects or in a chance gathering of atoms. It also has the wild imaginings of Vanini, Hobbes, and Spinoza. In short, is not the whole system of atheism completely overthrown by a single observation? It is contradictory to suppose that the visible world, or any part of it, even the roughest and most shapeless part, exists without a mind. Let any one of these supporters of impiety look into his own thoughts. Let him try to conceive how even a rock, a desert, chaos, or a confused jumble of atoms could exist independently of a mind. Indeed, let him try to conceive how anything at all that can be sensed or imagined could do so. He need go no further to be convinced of his folly. Could anything be fairer than to settle a dispute on these terms? We leave a man to see for himself whether he can even imagine what he holds to be true in fact. Only then may he claim that it exists in reality, rather than merely as a notion.
HYL. It cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable to religion in what you advance. But do you not think it looks very like a notion entertained by some eminent moderns, of SEEING ALL THINGS IN GOD?
HYL. What you say is undeniably very helpful to religion. But don’t you think it closely resembles an idea held by some prominent modern thinkers, that of SEEING ALL THINGS IN GOD?
PHIL. I would gladly know that opinion: pray explain it to me.
PHIL. I would like to know that opinion. Please explain it to me.
HYL. They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, is incapable of being united with material things, so as to perceive them in themselves; but that she perceives them by her union with the substance of God, which, being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible, or capable of being the immediate object of a spirit's thought. Besides the Divine essence contains in it perfections correspondent to each created being; and which are, for that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to the mind.
HYL. They believe that the soul is immaterial and cannot unite with material things to perceive them directly. Instead, the soul perceives them through its union with the substance of God. God’s substance is spiritual and therefore purely intelligible. That is, it can be the immediate object of a spirit’s thought. Moreover, the divine essence contains perfections corresponding to each created being. For that reason, these perfections can display or represent those beings to the mind.
PHIL. I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether passive and inert, can be the essence, or any part (or like any part) of the essence or substance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible, pure, active being. Many more difficulties and objections there are which occur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only add that it is liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis, in making a created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit. Besides all which it hath this peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world serve to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argument against other hypotheses in the sciences, that they suppose Nature, or the Divine wisdom, to make something in vain, or do that by tedious roundabout methods which might have been performed in a much more easy and compendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes the whole world made in vain?
PHIL. I do not understand how our ideas can be the essence or substance of God. Nor do I understand how they can be part of it or resemble any part of it. Our ideas are entirely passive and inactive. God, by contrast, is a being who cannot be affected, cannot be divided, and is purely active. Many more difficulties and objections to this hypothesis are obvious at first sight. But I shall add only that it has all the absurdities of the common hypothesis. Like that hypothesis, it holds that a created world exists somewhere other than in the mind of a Spirit. Besides all this, it has a problem of its own: it makes the material world serve no purpose. In the sciences, we consider it a good argument against a hypothesis if it assumes that Nature or Divine wisdom makes something for no purpose. We also object if a hypothesis assumes that Nature or Divine wisdom uses a long, roundabout method when a much easier, shorter one would do. If these are good arguments, what should we think of a hypothesis that assumes the whole world was made for no purpose?
HYL. But what say you? Are not you too of opinion that we see all things in God? If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it.
HYL. But what do you say? Don't you also believe that we see all things in God? If I'm not mistaken, what you're saying comes close to that.
PHIL. Few men think; yet all have opinions. Hence men's opinions are superficial and confused. It is nothing strange that tenets which in themselves are ever so different, should nevertheless be confounded with each other, by those who do not consider them attentively. I shall not therefore be surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche; though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived by our senses, and, know not the real natures or the true forms and figures of extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon the whole there are no Principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine. It must be owned that I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture saith, "That in God we live and move and have our being." But that we see things in His essence, after the manner above set forth, I am far from believing. Take here in brief my meaning:—It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind: nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes, exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears: they must therefore exist in some other Mind, whose Will it is they should be exhibited to me. The things, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, call them which you will. But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, anything but a mind or spirit? This indeed is inconceivable. And to assert that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense: is it not?
PHIL. Few people think, yet everyone has opinions. As a result, people's opinions are superficial and confused. It is not surprising that people who do not consider doctrines carefully confuse them, however different the doctrines may be. So I will not be surprised if some people think I have fallen into Malebranche's enthusiasm. In truth, though, my views are very different from his. He builds his philosophy on the most abstract general ideas, which I reject entirely. He asserts that an absolute external world exists, which I deny. He maintains that our senses deceive us. He also maintains that we do not know the real natures or true shapes and figures of extended beings. I hold the exact opposite of all these views. So, taken as a whole, no principles are more fundamentally opposed than his and mine. I must admit that I agree entirely with what holy Scripture says: "That in God we live and move and have our being." But I am far from believing that we see things in his essence, as described above. Here, briefly, is what I mean: Clearly, the things I perceive are my own ideas, and no idea can exist except in a mind. It is equally clear that these ideas or perceived things, or their originals, exist independently of my mind. I know that I am not their author. When I open my eyes or ears, I cannot choose which particular ideas I experience. They must therefore exist in some other Mind, whose will causes them to be presented to me. The things I perceive directly are ideas or sensations, whichever you choose to call them. But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, anything other than a mind or spirit? That is inconceivable. And to assert something inconceivable is to talk nonsense, is it not?
HYL. Without doubt.
HYL. Certainly.
PHIL. But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should exist in and be produced by a spirit; since this is no more than I daily experience in myself, inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and, by an act of my will, can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my imagination: though, it must be confessed, these creatures of the fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as those perceived by my senses—which latter are called RED THINGS. From all which I conclude, THERE IS A MIND WHICH AFFECTS ME EVERY MOMENT WITH ALL THE SENSIBLE IMPRESSIONS I PERCEIVE. AND, from the variety, order, and manner of these, I conclude THE AUTHOR OF THEM TO BE WISE, POWERFUL, AND GOOD, BEYOND COMPREHENSION. MARK it well; I do not say, I see things by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible Substance of God. This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, and produced by the will of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this most plain and evident? Is there any more in it than what a little observation in our own minds, and that which passeth in them, not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us to acknowledge.
PHIL. But, on the other hand, it is easy to conceive that these things exist in and are produced by a spirit. After all, I experience no more than this in myself every day. I perceive countless ideas. By an act of will, I can also form a great variety of ideas and bring them into my imagination. Though I must admit, these products of the imagination are not quite as distinct, strong, vivid, or lasting as those I perceive through my senses. The latter are called RED THINGS. From all this I conclude that THERE IS A MIND WHICH AFFECTS ME EVERY MOMENT WITH ALL THE SENSORY IMPRESSIONS I PERCEIVE. AND, from their variety, order, and manner, I conclude that THEIR AUTHOR IS WISE, POWERFUL, AND GOOD BEYOND COMPREHENSION. MARK this well. I do not say that I see things by perceiving what represents them in the intelligible Substance of God. I do not understand that. Rather, I say that the things I perceive are known by the understanding and produced by the will of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this perfectly plain and evident? Does it involve anything more than what a little observation of our own minds and what happens in them not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us to acknowledge?
HYL. I think I understand you very clearly; and own the proof you give of a Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising. But, allowing that God is the supreme and universal Cause of an things, yet, may there not be still a Third Nature besides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be MATTER?
HYL. I think I understand you very clearly. I admit that your proof of God’s existence seems as clear as it is surprising. But even if God is the supreme and universal cause of all things, could there still be a third nature besides spirits and ideas? Could there be a lesser, limited cause of our ideas? In short, could MATTER still exist?
PHIL. How often must I inculcate the same thing? You allow the things immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind; but there is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately: therefore there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind. The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose; something that may be discovered by reason, and not by sense.
PHIL. How often must I repeat the same point? You agree that things directly perceived by the senses cannot exist outside the mind. But everything perceived by the senses is perceived directly. Therefore, nothing perceived by the senses exists outside the mind. So I suppose the Matter you still insist on is something understood by reason. It is something that may be discovered by reason, not by the senses.
HYL. You are in the right.
HYL. You are right.
PHIL. Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is grounded on; and what this Matter is, in your present sense of it.
PHIL. Please tell me what reasoning supports your belief in Matter. And what do you now mean by Matter?
HYL. I find myself affected with various ideas, whereof I know I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another, or capable of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent beings. They have therefore SOME cause distinct from me and them: of which I pretend to know no more than that it is THE CAUSE OF MY IDEAS. And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter.
HYL. I experience various ideas that I know I do not cause. Nor do the ideas cause themselves or one another, or exist on their own. They are entirely inactive, fleeting, and dependent. Therefore, they have SOME cause distinct from both me and the ideas. I claim to know nothing more about that cause than that it is THE CAUSE OF MY IDEAS. Whatever it is, I call it Matter.
PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the current proper signification attached to a common name in any language? For example, suppose a traveller should tell you that in a certain country men pass unhurt through the fire; and, upon explaining himself, you found he meant by the word fire that which others call WATER. Or, if he should assert that there are trees that walk upon two legs, meaning men by the term TREES. Would you think this reasonable?
PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, is everyone free to change the accepted meaning of a common word in any language? Suppose a traveler told you that, in a certain country, people pass through fire unharmed. Then, when he explained himself, you found that by fire he meant what others call WATER. Or suppose he claimed that there are trees that walk on two legs, meaning people by the word TREES. Would you think this reasonable?
HYL. No; I should think it very absurd. Common custom is the standard of propriety in language. And for any man to affect speaking improperly is to pervert the use of speech, and can never serve to a better purpose than to protract and multiply disputes, where there is no difference in opinion.
HYL. No, I would think it very absurd. Common usage sets the standard for proper language. Anyone who deliberately speaks improperly misuses language. This can only prolong and multiply disputes where there is no difference of opinion.
PHIL. And doth not MATTER, in the common current acceptation of the word, signify an extended, solid, moveable, unthinking, inactive Substance?
PHIL. And doesn't MATTER, in the ordinary sense of the word, mean an extended, solid, movable, unthinking, inactive substance?
HYL. It doth.
HYL. It does.
PHIL. And, hath it not been made evident that no SUCH substance can possibly exist? And, though it should be allowed to exist, yet how can that which is INACTIVE be a CAUSE; or that which is UNTHINKING be a CAUSE OF THOUGHT? You may, indeed, if you please, annex to the word MATTER a contrary meaning to what is vulgarly received; and tell me you understand by it, an unextended, thinking, active being, which is the cause of our ideas. But what else is this than to play with words, and run into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason? I do by no means find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect a cause from the PHENOMENA: BUT I deny that THE cause deducible by reason can properly be termed Matter.
PHIL. And hasn't it been shown that no SUCH substance can possibly exist? Even if we allow that it exists, how can something INACTIVE be a CAUSE? Or how can something UNTHINKING be a CAUSE OF THOUGHT? You may, if you wish, give the word MATTER a meaning opposite to its usual one. You may say that by it you mean an unextended, thinking, active being that causes our ideas. But isn't that just playing with words? Isn't it the very fault you just condemned so reasonably? I do not object at all to your reasoning from the PHENOMENA to a cause. BUT I deny that THE cause reason leads us to can properly be called Matter.
HYL. There is indeed something in what you say. But I am afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning. I would by no means be thought to deny that God, or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Cause of all things. All I contend for is, that, subordinate to the Supreme Agent, there is a cause of a limited and inferior nature, which CONCURS in the production of our ideas, not by any act of will, or spiritual efficiency, but by that kind of action which belongs to Matter, viz. MOTION.
HYL. There is something in what you say. But I am afraid you do not fully understand what I mean. I would not want anyone to think I deny that God, or an infinite Spirit, is the Supreme Cause of all things. All I argue is that there is a limited, lesser cause subordinate to the Supreme Agent. This lesser cause helps produce our ideas, not through any act of will or spiritual power, but through the kind of action that belongs to Matter, namely MOTION.
PHIL. I find you are at every turn relapsing into your old exploded conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an extended, substance, existing without the mind. What! Have you already forgotten you were convinced; or are you willing I should repeat what has been said on that head? In truth this is not fair dealing in you, still to suppose the being of that which you have so often acknowledged to have no being. But, not to insist farther on what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your ideas are not perfectly passive and inert, including nothing of action in them.
PHIL. I find that you keep falling back on your old, discredited idea of a substance that exists outside the mind. You think it can move and therefore takes up space. What! Have you already forgotten that you were convinced otherwise? Or do you want me to repeat what has been said on that subject? Really, it is unfair of you to keep assuming that this substance exists. You have so often admitted that it does not exist. But let us not dwell further on a subject we have discussed so fully. I ask whether all your ideas are not perfectly passive and inert, with no action in them.
HYL. They are.
HYL. They are.
PHIL. And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?
PHIL. And are qualities we perceive through our senses anything other than ideas?
HYL. How often have I acknowledged that they are not.
HYL. How many times have I admitted that they are not?
PHIL. But is not MOTION a sensible quality?
PHIL. But isn't MOTION a quality we can perceive through the senses?
HYL. It is.
HYL. It is.
PHIL. Consequently it is no action?
PHIL. So it is not an action?
HYL. I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that when I stir my finger, it remains passive; but my will which produced the motion is active.
HYL. I agree with you. It is indeed very clear that when I move my finger, the finger remains passive. But my will, which caused the movement, is active.
PHIL. Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, motion being allowed to be no action, you can conceive any action besides volition: and, in the second place, whether to say something and conceive nothing be not to talk nonsense: and, lastly, whether, having considered the premises, you do not perceive that to suppose any efficient or active Cause of our ideas, other than SPIRIT, is highly absurd and unreasonable?
PHIL. First, if we agree that motion is not an action, can you conceive of any action besides willing? Second, isn't it nonsense to say something without conceiving anything? Finally, having considered these points, don't you see that it is highly absurd and unreasonable to suppose that anything other than SPIRIT is an efficient or active cause of our ideas?
HYL. I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter may not be a cause, yet what hinders its being an INSTRUMENT, subservient to the supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?
HYL. I give up that point entirely. But though Matter may not be a cause, why can it not be an INSTRUMENT? It could serve the supreme Agent in producing our ideas.
PHIL. An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs, wheels, and motions, of that instrument?
PHIL. An instrument, you say? What might its shape, springs, wheels, and movements be?
HYL. Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me.
HYL. I make no claims about those, since both the substance and its qualities are entirely unknown to me.
PHIL. What? You are then of opinion it is made up of unknown parts, that it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape?
PHIL. What? So you think it is made up of unknown parts, has unknown motions, and has an unknown shape?
HYL. I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, being already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an unperceiving substance.
HYL. I do not believe it has any shape or motion at all. I am already convinced that no perceptible qualities can exist in a substance that does not perceive.
PHIL. But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of all sensible qualities, even extension itself?
PHIL. But how can you form any idea of an instrument with no sensory qualities, not even extension?
HYL. I do not pretend to have any notion of it.
HYL. I don't claim to have any idea of it.
PHIL. And what reason have you to think this unknown, this inconceivable Somewhat doth exist? Is it that you imagine God cannot act as well without it; or that you find by experience the use of some such thing, when you form ideas in your own mind?
PHIL. What reason do you have to think this unknown, inconceivable something exists? Do you imagine that God cannot act as well without it? Or do you find from experience that you use something like it when you form ideas in your own mind?
HYL. You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Pray what reasons have you not to believe it?
HYL. You are always pressing me for reasons for my belief. What reasons do you have for not believing it?
PHIL. It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist on reasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know WHAT IT IS you would have me believe; since you say you have no manner of notion of it. After all, let me entreat you to consider whether it be like a philosopher, or even like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe you know not what and you know not why.
PHIL. If I see no reason to believe something exists, that is reason enough for me not to believe it. But let us set aside reasons for believing. You will not even tell me WHAT you want me to believe in. You say you have no idea of what it is. After all, please consider whether a philosopher, or even a person with common sense, would claim to believe something without knowing what or why.
HYL. Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an INSTRUMENT, I do not mean altogether nothing. It is true I know not the particular kind of instrument; but, however, I have some notion of INSTRUMENT IN GENERAL, which I apply to it.
HYL. Wait, Philonous. When I say Matter is an INSTRUMENT, I do not mean it is nothing at all. It is true that I do not know what particular kind of instrument it is. But I do have some idea of an INSTRUMENT IN GENERAL, which I apply to Matter.
PHIL. But what if it should prove that there is something, even in the most general notion of INSTRUMENT, as taken in a distinct sense from CAUSE, which makes the use of it inconsistent with the Divine attributes?
PHIL. But what if even the most general idea of an INSTRUMENT, understood as distinct from a CAUSE, contains something that makes its use inconsistent with God's attributes?
HYL. Make that appear and I shall give up the point.
HYL. Show me that, and I will concede the point.
PHIL. What mean you by the general nature or notion of INSTRUMENT?
PHIL. What do you mean by the general nature or idea of an instrument?
HYL. That which is common to all particular instruments composeth the general notion.
HYL. What all particular instruments have in common makes up the general idea.
PHIL. Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the doing those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act of our wills? Thus, for instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger, because it is done by a volition. But I should use one if I were to remove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots. Are you of the same mind? Or, can you shew any example where an instrument is made use of in producing an effect IMMEDIATELY depending on the will of the agent?
PHIL. Isn't it true that all instruments are used only to do things we cannot do by will alone? For example, I never use an instrument to move my finger, because I can move it by willing it. But I would use one if I had to remove part of a rock or pull a tree up by its roots. Do you agree? Or can you give an example of an instrument used to produce an effect that depends IMMEDIATELY on the will of the person acting?
HYL. I own I cannot.
HYL. I admit I cannot.
PHIL. How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect Spirit, on whose Will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should need an instrument in his operations, or, not needing it, make use of it? Thus it seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless inactive instrument to be incompatible with the infinite perfection of God; that is, by your own confession, to give up the point.
PHIL. How, then, can you suppose that an all-perfect Spirit needs an instrument to act? All things depend absolutely and directly on his will. Or how can you suppose he would use an instrument without needing one? So it seems to me that you must admit that using a lifeless, inactive instrument is incompatible with God’s infinite perfection. By your own admission, you must therefore give up your argument.
HYL. It doth not readily occur what I can answer you.
HYL. I can't readily think of an answer to give you.
PHIL. But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth, when it has been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings of finite powers, are forced to make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument sheweth the agent to be limited by rules of another's prescription, and that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way, and by such conditions. Whence it seems a clear consequence, that the supreme unlimited agent useth no tool or instrument at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner exerted than executed, without the application of means; which, if they are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of any real efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce any effect, but merely in compliance with the laws of nature, or those conditions prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself above all limitation or prescription whatsoever.
PHIL. But I think you should be ready to admit the truth when it has been fairly proved to you. We have limited powers, so we are forced to use instruments. Using an instrument shows that the user is limited by rules prescribed by another. It also shows that the user can achieve his goal only in a particular way and under particular conditions. So it seems clear that the supreme, unlimited agent uses no tool or instrument at all. An Omnipotent Spirit has only to will something, and it is done, without the use of any means. If lesser agents use means, it is not because those means have any real power or necessary ability to produce an effect. They use them merely to comply with the laws of nature, the conditions prescribed for them by the First Cause. The First Cause is himself above all limitation or prescription whatsoever.
HYL. I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument. However, I would not be understood to give up its existence neither; since, notwithstanding what hath been said, it may still be an OCCASION.
HYL. I will no longer argue that Matter is an instrument. However, I do not mean to give up the claim that Matter exists. Despite what has been said, it may still be an OCCASION.
PHIL. How many shapes is your Matter to take? Or, how often must it be proved not to exist, before you are content to part with it? But, to say no more of this (though by all the laws of disputation I may justly blame you for so frequently changing the signification of the principal term)—I would fain know what you mean by affirming that matter is an occasion, having already denied it to be a cause. And, when you have shewn in what sense you understand OCCASION, pray, in the next place, be pleased to shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is such an occasion of our ideas?
PHIL. How many forms will your Matter take? How often must it be proved not to exist before you are willing to give it up? But I will say no more about that. Though, by all the rules of debate, I could rightly blame you for so often changing the meaning of the main term. I would like to know what you mean when you say matter is an occasion, having already denied that it is a cause. And once you have explained what you mean by OCCASION, please explain why you believe there is such an occasion for our ideas.
HYL. As to the first point: by OCCASION I mean an inactive unthinking being, at the presence whereof God excites ideas in our minds.
HYL. As for the first point, by OCCASION I mean an inactive being that does not think. When it is present, God creates ideas in our minds.
PHIL. And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking being?
PHIL. And what might that inactive, unthinking being be like?
HYL. I know nothing of its nature.
HYL. I know nothing about its nature.
PHIL. Proceed then to the second point, and assign some reason why we should allow an existence to this inactive, unthinking, unknown thing.
PHIL. Then move on to the second point. Give some reason why we should accept that this inactive, unthinking, unknown thing exists.
HYL. When we see ideas produced in our minds, after an orderly and constant manner, it is natural to think they have some fixed and regular occasions, at the presence of which they are excited.
HYL. When ideas arise in our minds in an orderly and consistent way, we naturally think they have certain fixed and regular occasions. We think these ideas arise whenever those occasions are present.
PHIL. You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause of our ideas, and that He causes them at the presence of those occasions.
PHIL. So you acknowledge that God alone causes our ideas, and that he causes them when those occasions arise.
HYL. That is my opinion.
HYL. That is my opinion.
PHIL. Those things which you say are present to God, without doubt He perceives.
PHIL. God undoubtedly perceives the things you say are present to him.
HYL. Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an occasion of acting.
HYL. Certainly. Otherwise, they could not give him a reason to act.
PHIL. Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis, or answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable to: I only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our ideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and power of God; and whether it doth not derogate from those attributes, to suppose He is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether, in case I granted all you contend for, it would make anything to your purpose; it not being easy to conceive how the external or absolute existence of an unthinking substance, distinct from its being perceived, can be inferred from my allowing that there are certain things perceived by the mind of God, which are to Him the occasion of producing ideas in us?
PHIL. For now, I will not press you to make sense of this hypothesis. Nor will I ask you to answer all the puzzling questions and difficulties it raises. I only ask whether God's wisdom and power sufficiently explain the order and regularity we observe in our ideas, or in the course of nature. And does it not diminish those attributes to suppose that an unthinking substance influences or directs God, or reminds him when and what to do? Finally, suppose I granted everything you argue for. Would that help your case? It is not easy to see how it would. I would be allowing that God perceives certain things that prompt him to produce ideas in us. But how could one infer from this that an unthinking substance has an external or absolute existence, distinct from its being perceived?
HYL. I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of OCCASION seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest.
HYL. I have no idea what to think, since this notion of OCCASION now seems just as groundless as the rest.
PHIL. Do you not at length perceive that in all these different acceptations of MATTER, you have been only supposing you know not what, for no manner of reason, and to no kind of use?
PHIL. Do you now see that, in all these different meanings of MATTER, you have been assuming something you know nothing about? You have done so for no reason and to no useful purpose.
HYL. I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been so accurately examined. But still, methinks, I have some confused perception that there is such a thing as MATTER.
HYL. I freely admit that I am less attached to my ideas now that they have been examined so carefully. But I still feel, though only vaguely, that there is such a thing as MATTER.
PHIL. Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately or mediately. If immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it. If mediately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things which you perceive immediately. So much for the perception. Then for the Matter itself, I ask whether it is object, SUBSTRATUM, cause, instrument, or occasion? You have already pleaded for each of these, shifting your notions, and making Matter to appear sometimes in one shape, then in another. And what you have offered hath been disapproved and rejected by yourself. If you have anything new to advance I would gladly bear it.
PHIL. You perceive the existence of Matter either directly or indirectly. If directly, please tell me which sense you perceive it with. If indirectly, tell me how you infer its existence from the things you perceive directly. That covers perception. As for Matter itself, I ask whether it is an object, SUBSTRATUM, cause, instrument, or occasion. You have already argued for each of these, changing your ideas and presenting Matter in one form and then another. And you yourself have rejected the arguments you offered. If you have anything new to put forward, I would gladly hear it.
HYL. I think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads. I am at a loss what more to urge.
HYL. I think I have already said all I have to say on those topics. I don't know what else to argue.
PHIL. And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. But, to make you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what has been hitherto suggested, you will farther consider whether, upon supposition that Matter exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be affected by it. Or, supposing it did not exist, whether it be not evident you might for all that be affected with the same ideas you now are, and consequently have the very same reasons to believe its existence that you now can have.
PHIL. And yet you are reluctant to give up your old prejudice. To help you give it up, I ask you to consider something more, besides what has already been suggested. Suppose Matter exists. Can you possibly imagine how it could affect you? Or suppose Matter did not exist. Is it not clear that you could still experience the same ideas you now have? And would you not, therefore, have the very same reasons to believe in Matter’s existence that you now have?
HYL. I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as we do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce' any idea in our minds. And, I do farther grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is impossible there should be such a thing as matter in any of the foregoing acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that there is MATTER in some sense or other. WHAT THAT IS I do not indeed pretend to determine.
HYL. I admit that we might perceive everything just as we do now, even if there were no Matter in the world. And if Matter does exist, I cannot imagine how it could produce any idea in our minds. I also admit that you have completely convinced me that Matter cannot exist in any of the senses discussed so far. But I still cannot help supposing that there is MATTER in some sense or other. I do not claim to know WHAT THAT IS.
PHIL. I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a Substance; and if so, whether you can suppose a Substance without accidents; or, in case you suppose it to have accidents or qualities, I desire you will let me know what those qualities are, at least what is meant by Matter's supporting them?
PHIL. I do not expect you to define the exact nature of that unknown being. Just tell me whether it is a Substance. If so, can you imagine a Substance without accidents? Or, if you suppose it has accidents or qualities, please tell me what those qualities are. At least tell me what it means for Matter to support them.
HYL. We have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to them. But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present understand by MATTER neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but Something entirely unknown, distinct from all these.
HYL. We have already argued about those points. I have nothing more to say about them. But to prevent any further questions, let me explain what I now mean by MATTER. I mean neither substance nor accident, neither a thinking nor an extended being, and neither cause, instrument, nor occasion. I mean something entirely unknown, distinct from all of these.
PHIL. It seems then you include in your present notion of Matter nothing but the general abstract idea of ENTITY.
PHIL. So it seems that your current idea of Matter includes nothing but the general abstract idea of ENTITY.
HYL. Nothing else; save only that I super-add to this general idea the negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I perceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend.
HYL. Nothing else, except that I add the denial of all particular things, qualities, or ideas I perceive, imagine, or grasp in any way to this general idea.
PHIL. Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist?
PHIL. Where do you suppose this unknown Matter exists?
HYL. Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for, if I say it exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since it is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind. But I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it exists; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is a negative answer for you. And you must expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about Matter.
HYL. Oh, Philonous! You think you have trapped me now. If I say it exists in a place, you will conclude that it exists in the mind. That is because we agree that place or extension exists only in the mind. But I am not ashamed to admit my ignorance. I do not know where it exists. I am only sure that it does not exist in a place. There is a negative answer for you. And you must expect no other answer to any future questions you ask about Matter.
PHIL. Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its EXISTENCE?
PHIL. Since you won't tell me where it exists, please tell me how you think it exists. What do you mean by its EXISTENCE?
HYL. It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.
HYL. It does not think or act. It does not perceive anything, and nothing perceives it.
PHIL. But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its existence?
PHIL. But what positive content is there in your abstract idea of its existence?
HYL. Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not what is meant by its EXISTENCE, or how it exists.
HYL. On careful examination, I find that I have no clear idea or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to admit my ignorance. I do not know what is meant by its EXISTENCE or how it exists.
PHIL. Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Entity in general, prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings, all particular things whatsoever.
PHIL. Keep being open and honest, good Hylas, and tell me sincerely: Can you form a distinct idea of being in general, separate from and excluding all thinking and physical beings, and all particular things whatsoever?
HYL. Hold, let me think a little—I profess, Philonous, I do not find that I can. At first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy notion of Pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite vanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not pretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of Matter, its WHERE, its HOW, its ENTITY, or anything belonging to it.
HYL. Wait, let me think for a moment. I confess, Philonous, I find that I cannot. At first, I thought I had a vague, insubstantial idea of Pure Entity in the abstract. But when I looked more closely, that idea vanished completely. The more I think about it, the more certain I am that my cautious decision was wise. I will give only negative answers. I will not pretend to have even the slightest positive knowledge or idea of Matter, its WHERE, its HOW, its ENTITY, or anything connected with it.
PHIL. When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have not any notion in your mind?
PHIL. So, when you speak of the existence of Matter, you have no idea of it in your mind?
HYL. None at all.
HYL. None at all.
PHIL. Pray tell me if the case stands not thus—At first, from a belief of material substance, you would have it that the immediate objects existed without the mind; then that they are archetypes; then causes; next instruments; then occasions: lastly SOMETHING IN GENERAL, which being interpreted proves NOTHING. So Matter comes to nothing. What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?
PHIL. Tell me, is this not how things stand? At first, because you believed in material substance, you claimed that immediate objects existed outside the mind. Then you said they were archetypes, then causes, then instruments, then occasions. Finally, you called Matter SOMETHING IN GENERAL, which turns out to mean NOTHING. So Matter comes to nothing. What do you think, Hylas? Is that not a fair summary of your whole argument?
HYL. Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our not being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence.
HYL. Whatever the case, I still insist that being unable to imagine something is no argument against its existence.
PHIL. That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other circumstance, there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing not immediately perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue against the existence of that thing, from his having no direct and positive notion of it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all this; where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing; where we have not even a relative notion of it; where an abstraction is made from perceiving and being perceived, from Spirit and idea: lastly, where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint idea pretended to—I will not indeed thence conclude against the reality of any notion, or existence of anything; but my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you employ words to no manner of purpose, without any design or signification whatsoever. And I leave it to you to consider how mere jargon should be treated.
PHIL. I freely admit that we may reasonably infer the existence of something we do not directly perceive. We may infer it from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other circumstance. I also admit that it would be absurd to argue that the thing does not exist simply because we have no direct and positive notion of it. But suppose none of this applies. Neither reason nor revelation leads us to believe that a thing exists. We do not even have a relative notion of it. We leave out perceiving and being perceived, Spirit and idea. Finally, we do not even claim to have the faintest or most inadequate idea of it. I would not conclude from this that any notion is unreal or that anything does not exist. Rather, I would conclude that you mean nothing at all. You are using words to no purpose, without any intention or meaning whatsoever. I leave you to consider how mere jargon should be treated.
HYL. To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in themselves unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends demonstration. I find myself relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know not what, MATTER.
HYL. To be frank, Philonous, your arguments seem impossible to answer. But they do not produce the complete conviction and wholehearted acceptance that a demonstration brings. I find myself slipping back into a vague suspicion of I know not what, MATTER.
PHIL. But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind? Let a visible object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is any imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it will not be distinctly seen. And though a demonstration be never so well grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding, can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly, and adhere firmly to the truth? No; there is need of time and pains: the attention must be awakened and detained by a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same, oft in different lights. I have said it already, and find I must still repeat and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you take, in pretending to maintain you know not what, for you know not what reason, to you know not what purpose. Can this be paralleled in any art or science, any sect or profession of men? Or is there anything so barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of common conversation? But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist; though at the same time you neither know WHAT IS MEANT by MATTER, or by its EXISTENCE. This indeed is surprising, and the more so because it is altogether voluntary and of your own head, you not being led to it by any one reason; for I challenge you to shew me that thing in nature which needs Matter to explain or account for it.
PHIL. But don’t you realize, Hylas, that two things must come together to remove all doubt and win the mind’s full assent? A visible object may be placed in the clearest light. Yet if there is any defect in your sight, or your eye is not turned toward the object, you will not see it clearly. Likewise, a demonstration may be perfectly sound and clearly presented. Yet if prejudice or a mistaken bias clouds your understanding, can you be expected to see the truth clearly and accept it firmly at once? No. It takes time and effort. Your attention must be awakened and held by frequent repetition of the same point, presented sometimes in the same light and sometimes in different lights. I have said this already, and I find I must keep repeating and pressing the point. You take an extraordinary liberty in claiming to defend you know not what, for you know not what reason, and for you know not what purpose. Can anything like this be found in any art or science, or among any sect or profession? Is anything so openly groundless and unreasonable found even in the lowest everyday conversation? But perhaps you will still say that Matter may exist, even though you know neither WHAT IS MEANT by MATTER nor what is meant by its EXISTENCE. This is indeed surprising. It is all the more surprising because you have chosen this position entirely on your own, without a single reason to lead you to it. I challenge you to show me anything in nature that requires Matter to explain or account for it.
HYL. THE REALITY of things cannot be maintained without supposing the existence of Matter. And is not this, think you, a good reason why I should be earnest in its defence?
HYL. Things cannot be real unless Matter exists. Don't you think that is a good reason for me to defend Matter so earnestly?
PHIL. The reality of things! What things? sensible or intelligible?
PHIL. The reality of things! What things? Things we perceive through the senses or things we understand with the mind?
HYL. Sensible things.
HYL. Things we can perceive through the senses.
PHIL. My glove for example?
PHIL. My glove, for example?
HYL. That, or any other thing perceived by the senses.
HYL. That, or anything else we perceive through our senses.
PHIL. But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not a sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this GLOVE, that I see it, and feel it, and wear it? Or, if this will not do, how is it possible I should be assured of the reality of this thing, which I actually see in this place, by supposing that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see, exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all? How can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really exists? Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or, in general of anything which is imperceptible, that a perceptible exists? Do but explain this and I shall think nothing too hard for you.
PHIL. But let us focus on one particular thing. Isn't it enough evidence that this GLOVE exists that I see it, feel it, and wear it? But if that is not enough, how could I be sure that this thing I actually see here is real? How could I be sure by supposing that some unknown thing exists? I have never seen that unknown thing and never can. It supposedly exists in an unknown way, in an unknown place, or in no place at all. How can the supposed reality of something intangible prove that anything tangible really exists? How can the supposed reality of something invisible prove that anything visible exists? Or, in general, how can the supposed reality of something imperceptible prove that anything perceptible exists? Just explain that, and I will think nothing is too hard for you.
HYL. Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of matter is highly improbable; but the direct and absolute impossibility of it does not appear to me.
HYL. Overall, I am willing to admit that matter is highly unlikely to exist. But it does not seem to me that matter is absolutely impossible.
PHIL. But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that account merely, it can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain, or a centaur.
PHIL. But even if we grant that Matter is possible, that alone gives it no more claim to existence than a golden mountain or a centaur.
HYL. I acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is possible; and that which is possible, for aught you know, may actually exist.
HYL. I admit it. But you still do not deny that it is possible. And for all you know, what is possible may actually exist.
PHIL. I deny it to be possible; and have, if I mistake not, evidently proved, from your own concessions, that it is not. In the common sense of the word MATTER, is there any more implied than an extended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind? And have not you acknowledged, over and over, that you have seen evident reason for denying the possibility of such a substance?
PHIL. I deny that it is possible. And, if I am not mistaken, I have clearly proved from your own admissions that it is not. In the ordinary sense of the word MATTER, does it mean anything more than a substance that has size and shape, is solid and movable, and exists outside the mind? And have you not acknowledged, over and over, that you have seen clear reason to deny that such a substance is possible?
HYL. True, but that is only one sense of the term MATTER.
HYL. True, but that is only one meaning of the word MATTER.
PHIL. But is it not the only proper genuine received sense? And, if Matter, in such a sense, be proved impossible, may it not be thought with good grounds absolutely impossible? Else how could anything be proved impossible? Or, indeed, how could there be any proof at all one way or other, to a man who takes the liberty to unsettle and change the common signification of words?
PHIL. But isn't that the only proper and generally accepted meaning? And if Matter in that sense is proved impossible, isn't there good reason to think it absolutely impossible? Otherwise, how could anything be proved impossible? Indeed, how could there be any proof either way for someone who takes the liberty of changing the common meanings of words?
HYL. I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more accurately than the vulgar, and were not always confined to the common acceptation of a term.
HYL. I thought philosophers were allowed to speak more precisely than ordinary people. I also thought they were not always limited to the common meaning of a term.
PHIL. But this now mentioned is the common received sense among philosophers themselves. But, not to insist on that, have you not been allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased? And have you not used this privilege in the utmost extent; sometimes entirely changing, at others leaving out, or putting into the definition of it whatever, for the present, best served your design, contrary to all the known rules of reason and logic? And hath not this shifting, unfair method of yours spun out our dispute to an unnecessary length; Matter having been particularly examined, and by your own confession refuted in each of those senses? And can any more be required to prove the absolute impossibility of a thing, than the proving it impossible in every particular sense that either you or any one else understands it in?
PHIL. But the meaning I just mentioned is the one commonly accepted by philosophers themselves. Still, let us not dwell on that. Have you not been allowed to define Matter however you pleased? And have you not used this freedom to the fullest? At times you have changed the definition entirely. At other times you have left out or added whatever best served your purpose at the moment. All this goes against the accepted rules of reason and logic. And has not this shifting, unfair method made our dispute unnecessarily long? We have examined Matter in each of those senses, and you have admitted that each has been refuted. What more could be required to prove that something is absolutely impossible? Is it not enough to prove it impossible in every particular sense in which you or anyone else understands it?
HYL. But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved the impossibility of Matter, in the last most obscure abstracted and indefinite sense.
HYL. But I am not entirely convinced that you have proved Matter impossible in its last, most obscure, abstract, and indefinite sense.
PHIL. . When is a thing shewn to be impossible?
PHIL. When is something shown to be impossible?
HYL. When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in its definition.
HYL. When the ideas included in its definition are shown to contradict each other.
PHIL. But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be demonstrated between ideas?
PHIL. But where there are no ideas, can any contradiction between ideas be demonstrated?
HYL. I agree with you.
HYL. I agree with you.
PHIL. Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense of the word MATTER, it is plain, by your own confession, there was included no idea at all, no sense except an unknown sense; which is the same thing as none. You are not, therefore, to expect I should prove a repugnancy between ideas, where there are no ideas; or the impossibility of Matter taken in an UNKNOWN sense, that is, no sense at all. My business was only to shew you meant NOTHING; and this you were brought to own. So that, in all your various senses, you have been shewed either to mean nothing at all, or, if anything, an absurdity. And if this be not sufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing, I desire you will let me know what is.
PHIL. Now, by your own admission, what you call the obscure, indefinite sense of the word MATTER contains no idea at all. It has no meaning except an unknown one, which is the same as no meaning. So you cannot expect me to prove a contradiction between ideas where there are no ideas. Nor can you expect me to prove that Matter is impossible when understood in an UNKNOWN sense, meaning no sense at all. My task was only to show that you meant NOTHING, and you were brought to admit this. So, in all the various senses you have given the word, you have been shown to mean either nothing at all or, if anything, something absurd. And if this is not enough to prove that a thing is impossible, please tell me what is.
HYL. I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible; nor do I see what more can be said in defence of it. But, at the same time that I give up this, I suspect all my other notions. For surely none could be more seemingly evident than this once was: and yet it now seems as false and absurd as ever it did true before. But I think we have discussed the point sufficiently for the present. The remaining part of the day I would willingly spend in running over in my thoughts the several heads of this morning's conversation, and tomorrow shall be glad to meet you here again about the same time.
HYL. I admit that you have proved Matter impossible. I do not see what more can be said in its defense. But as I give up my belief in Matter, I begin to doubt all my other ideas. Surely none of them could have seemed more obviously true than Matter once did. Yet now Matter seems as false and absurd as it once seemed true. But I think we have discussed the point enough for now. I would gladly spend the rest of the day thinking over the different topics of this morning’s conversation. Tomorrow I would be glad to meet you here again at about the same time.
PHIL. I will not fail to attend you.
PHIL. I will be sure to join you.