The Third Dialogue

PHILONOUS. Tell me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday's meditation? Has it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting? or have you since seen cause to change your opinion?

PHILONOUS. Tell me, Hylas, what came of your thinking yesterday? Did it confirm the opinion you held when we parted? Or have you since found reason to change your mind?

HYLAS. Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and uncertain. What we approve to-day, we condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir about knowledge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas I we know nothing all the while: nor do I think it possible for us ever to know anything in this life. Our faculties are too narrow and too few. Nature certainly never intended us for speculation.

HYLAS. Honestly, I think all our opinions are equally worthless and uncertain. What we approve of today, we condemn tomorrow. We make a fuss about knowledge and spend our lives pursuing it. Yet, sadly, we know nothing all the while. Nor do I think we can ever know anything in this life. Our abilities are too limited and too few. Nature surely never intended us to engage in speculation.

PHIL. What! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas?

PHIL. What! Are you saying we can know nothing, Hylas?

HYL. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know the real nature, or what it is in itself.

HYL. There is not a single thing in the world whose real nature we can know, or what it is in itself.

PHIL. Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?

PHIL. Are you saying I don't really know what fire or water is?

HYL. You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid; but this is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own mind, upon the application of fire and water to your organs of sense. Their internal constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly in the dark as to THAT.

HYL. You may indeed know that fire feels hot and water feels fluid. But you only know what sensations arise in your own mind when fire and water come into contact with your senses. You know nothing at all about their internal makeup or their true, real nature.

PHIL. Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?

PHIL. Don't I know that the stone I stand on is real, and that the tree before my eyes is real?

HYL. KNOW? No, it is impossible you or any man alive should know it. All you know is, that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your own mind. But what is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you that colour, figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real natures of those things, or in the least like them. The same may be said of all other real things, or corporeal substances, which compose the world. They have none of them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know anything of them, as they are in their own nature.

HYL. Know it? No, it is impossible for you or anyone alive to know it. All you know is that you have a certain idea or appearance in your own mind. But what does that tell you about the real tree or stone? I tell you that the color, shape, and hardness you perceive are not the real natures of those things. They are not even slightly like their real natures. The same may be said of all other real things, or physical substances, that make up the world. None of them has anything in itself like the qualities we perceive through our senses. So we should not claim to know or say anything about their own nature.

PHIL. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example, from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?

PHIL. But surely, Hylas, I can tell gold from iron, for example. How could I do that if I didn't know what each truly was?

HYL. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think you they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses, and have no absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of a different species, because their clothes were not of the same colour.

HYL. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own ideas. Do you think that yellow color, that weight, and the other qualities you perceive are really in the gold? They exist only in relation to the senses and have no independent existence in nature. And you claim to distinguish kinds of real things by how they appear in your mind. In doing so, you may perhaps be as wise as someone who concludes that two men are different species because their clothes are different colors.

PHIL. It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel.

PHIL. It seems, then, that we are given nothing but appearances, and false ones at that. Even the meat I eat and the cloth I wear have nothing in them like what I see and feel.

HYL. Even so.

HYL. Exactly.

PHIL. But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how it is, but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life, as comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they are conversant about.

PHIL. But isn't it strange that the whole world should be deceived like this and be foolish enough to believe their senses? And yet, somehow, people eat, drink, sleep, and go about all the business of life comfortably and conveniently. They do so as if they really knew the things they deal with.

HYL. They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes, and for all that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life. But philosophers know better things.

HYL. They do. But you know that everyday activities do not require a precise knowledge of theory. So ordinary people keep their mistaken beliefs, yet still manage to get through the business of life. But philosophers know better.

PHIL. You mean, they KNOW that they KNOW NOTHING.

PHIL. You mean, they KNOW that they KNOW NOTHING.

HYL. That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.

HYL. That is the highest and most perfect form of human knowledge.

PHIL. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do you not know what it is you call for?

PHIL. But are you serious, Hylas? Do you really believe that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you were going to write. Wouldn't you ask for pen, ink, and paper, like anyone else? And don't you know what you are asking for?

HYL. How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen, ink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I declare positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think on it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that it is impossible any REAL corporeal thing should exist in nature.

HYL. How often must I tell you that I do not know the real nature of anything in the universe? I may sometimes use pen, ink, and paper. But I can say with certainty that I do not know the true nature of any of them. The same is true of every other physical thing. What is more, we do not just lack knowledge of the true and real nature of things. We do not even know whether they exist. We cannot deny that we perceive certain appearances or ideas. But we cannot conclude from those appearances or ideas that physical bodies really exist. Indeed, now that I think about it, I must go further, in keeping with what I have already conceded. I must declare that no REAL physical thing can exist in nature.

PHIL. You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than the notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into all these extravagances by the belief of MATERIAL SUBSTANCE? This makes you dream of those unknown natures in everything. It is this occasions your distinguishing between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well. Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant of the true nature of everything, but you know not whether anything really exists, or whether there are any true natures at all; forasmuch as you attribute to your material beings an absolute or external existence, wherein you suppose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in the end to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct repugnancy, or nothing at all, it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own hypothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny the real existence of any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into the deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was. Tell me, Hylas, is it not as I say?

PHIL. You amaze me. Could anything be wilder or more extravagant than the ideas you now hold? Isn’t it clear that your belief in MATERIAL SUBSTANCE leads you into all these extravagant ideas? This belief makes you imagine unknown natures in everything. It leads you to distinguish between the reality of things and how they appear to the senses. Thanks to this belief, you are ignorant of what everyone else knows perfectly well. Nor is that all. You are not only ignorant of the true nature of everything. You do not even know whether anything really exists, or whether anything has a true nature at all. For you believe that material things have an absolute or external existence, and that their reality consists in this existence. In the end, you are forced to admit that such an existence means either an outright contradiction or nothing at all. It follows that you must abandon your own theory of material Substance. You must also flatly deny the real existence of any part of the universe. So you are plunged into the deepest and most deplorable skepticism anyone has ever suffered. Tell me, Hylas, isn’t it as I say?

HYL. I agree with you. MATERIAL SUBSTANCE was no more than an hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my breath in defence of it. But whatever hypothesis you advance, or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question you upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present.

HYL. I agree with you. MATERIAL SUBSTANCE was only a hypothesis, and a false and groundless one at that. I will waste no more breath defending it. But whatever hypothesis you propose, or whatever account of things you put in its place, I have no doubt it will prove just as false, if you allow me to question you about it. In other words, let me treat you as you have treated me. I guarantee it will lead you through just as many puzzles and contradictions to the very same state of skepticism I am in now.

PHIL. I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at all. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses. These I know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings. A piece of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you speak of. It is likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are on the objects. I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white, and fire hot. You indeed, who by SNOW and fire mean certain external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in THEM. But I, who understand by those words the things I see and feel, am obliged to think like other folks. And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to their existence. That a thing should be really perceived by my senses, and at the same time not really exist, is to me a plain contradiction; since I cannot prescind or abstract, even in thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being perceived. Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name and discourse of, are things that I know. And I should not have known them but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the senses are immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists in being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he hath it proved to him from the veracity of God; or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or demonstration! I might as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things I actually see and feel.

PHIL. I assure you, Hylas, I am not trying to propose any hypothesis at all. I am an ordinary sort of person, simple enough to trust my senses and leave things as I find them. To put it plainly, I believe that real things are the very things I see, feel, and perceive with my senses. I know these things, and I find that they meet all the needs and purposes of life. So I have no reason to worry about any other unknown beings. A piece of bread I can perceive, for example, would satisfy my hunger better than ten thousand times as much of that imperceptible, unintelligible, real bread you speak of. I also believe that colors and other qualities we perceive belong to the objects themselves. I simply cannot help thinking that snow is white and fire is hot. You mean certain external substances that are neither perceived nor capable of perceiving when you speak of snow and fire. So you are right to deny that whiteness or heat are qualities inherent in those substances. But by those words I mean the things I see and feel, so I must think like other people. I am not skeptical about the nature of things, and I am not skeptical about their existence either. To me, it is a clear contradiction to say that I really perceive a thing and that it does not really exist. I cannot separate the existence of a perceptible thing from its being perceived, even in thought. Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and similar things are things I know and speak about. I would not have known them unless I had perceived them with my senses. Things perceived by the senses are perceived immediately. Things perceived immediately are ideas, and ideas cannot exist without the mind. So their existence consists in being perceived. Therefore, when they are actually perceived, there can be no doubt that they exist. Away, then, with all that skepticism and all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a joke it is for a philosopher to question whether perceptible things exist until God's truthfulness proves it to him. What a joke it is, too, to claim that our knowledge of their existence falls short of intuition or demonstration! I might as well doubt my own existence as the existence of the things I actually see and feel.

HYL. Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible things should exist without the mind. Do you not?

HYL. Not so fast, Philonous. You say you cannot imagine how things we perceive through our senses could exist outside the mind. Is that right?

PHIL. I do.

PHIL. I do.

HYL. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible that things perceivable by sense may still exist?

HYL. Suppose you were destroyed. Can you imagine that things you can sense might still exist?

PHIL. I can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily follows there is an OMNIPRESENT ETERNAL MIND, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the LAWS OF NATURE.

PHIL. I can, but sensible things must then exist in another mind. When I deny that sensible things exist outside the mind, I mean all minds, not just my own. Clearly, sensible things exist outside my mind, because experience shows me that they are independent of it. Therefore, they exist in some other Mind during the intervals when I do not perceive them. They also existed in that Mind before I was born and would continue to exist if I were annihilated. The same is true of all other finite created spirits. It therefore follows necessarily that there is an OMNIPRESENT ETERNAL MIND that knows and comprehends all things. He presents them to our view in a manner and according to rules that he himself has established. We call these rules the LAWS OF NATURE.

HYL. Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings? Or have they any agency included in them?

HYL. Tell me, Philonous. Are all our ideas completely inactive? Or do they have any power to act?

PHIL. They are altogether passive and inert.

PHIL. They are entirely passive and inactive.

HYL. And is not God an agent, a being purely active?

HYL. And isn't God an agent, a being who is purely active?

PHIL. I acknowledge it.

PHIL. I acknowledge it.

HYL. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of God?

HYL. So no idea can resemble or represent the nature of God?

PHIL. It cannot.

PHIL. It can't.

HYL. Since therefore you have no IDEA of the mind of God, how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind? Or, if you can conceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no idea of it?

HYL. Since you have no idea of God's mind, how can you conceive of things existing in his mind? Or, if you can conceive of God's mind without having an idea of it, why can't I conceive of Matter existing, even though I have no idea of it?

PHIL. As to your first question: I own I have properly no IDEA, either of God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I mean by the terms I AND MYSELF; and I know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind, Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks, acts, and perceives. I say INDIVISIBLE, because unextended; and UNEXTENDED, because extended, figured, moveable things are ideas; and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them. I do not therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the word IDEA in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea, that is, an image or likeness of God—though indeed extremely inadequate. For, all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections. I have, therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in MYSELF some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by reflexion and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas. Farther, from my own being, and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do, by an act of reason, necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all created things in the mind of God. So much for your first question. For the second: I suppose by this time you can answer it yourself. For you neither perceive Matter objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea; nor know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act, neither do you mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other; nor yet collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately. All which makes the case of MATTER widely different from that of the DEITY.

PHIL. As for your first question, I admit that I have no idea, strictly speaking, of God or any other spirit. Spirits are active, and so cannot be represented by things that are completely inactive, as our ideas are. Nevertheless, I know that I exist as a spirit or thinking substance, just as surely as I know my ideas exist. I also know what I mean by the words “I” and “myself.” I know this directly or intuitively, though I do not perceive myself as I perceive a triangle, a color, or a sound. The mind, spirit, or soul is the indivisible thing without extension that thinks, acts, and perceives. I call it indivisible because it has no extension. And I say it has no extension because things with extension, shape, and motion are ideas. But what perceives ideas, thinks, and wills is plainly not itself an idea or like an idea. Ideas are inactive things that are perceived. Spirits are a kind of being altogether different from ideas. I therefore do not say that my soul is an idea or like one. However, if we use the word “idea” broadly, my soul may be said to give me an idea of God. That is, it may give me an image or likeness of God, though a very inadequate one. For all my notion of God comes from reflecting on my own soul, increasing its powers, and removing its imperfections. So, although I do not have an inactive idea of God, I have in myself a kind of active, thinking image of the Deity. And though I do not perceive him through my senses, I have a notion of him, or know him, through reflection and reasoning. I have direct knowledge of my own mind and my own ideas. With their help, I understand indirectly that other spirits and ideas may exist. Further, from my own existence, and from the dependence I find in myself and my ideas, I reason to a necessary conclusion. God exists, and all created things exist in the mind of God. That answers your first question. As for your second question, I suppose you can answer it yourself by now. You do not perceive matter as an object, as you perceive an inactive being or idea. Nor do you know matter through reflection, as you know yourself. Nor do you understand matter indirectly through any likeness to an idea or to yourself. Nor do you infer it by reasoning from what you know directly. All this makes the case of matter very different from that of the Deity.

HYL. You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea or image of God. But, at the same time, you acknowledge you have, properly speaking, no IDEA of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit nevertheless that there is spiritual Substance, although you have no idea of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What say you to this?

HYL. You say your own soul gives you some kind of idea or image of God. But you also admit that, strictly speaking, you have no IDEA of your own soul. You even say that spirits are entirely different kinds of beings from ideas. So no idea can be like a spirit. Therefore, we have no idea of any spirit. Yet you admit that spiritual Substance exists, although you have no idea of it. At the same time, you deny that material Substance can exist, because you have no notion or idea of it. Is that fair? To be consistent, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What do you say to this?

PHIL. I say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence of material substance, merely because I have no notion of it' but because the notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, because it is repugnant that there should be a notion of it. Many things, for aught I know, may exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can have any idea or notion whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that is, nothing inconsistent must be included in their definition. I say, secondly, that, although we believe things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we may not believe that any particular thing exists, without some reason for such belief: but I have no reason for believing the existence of Matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither can I immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance—either by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know by reflexion. You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer to the same objections. In the very notion or definition of MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, there is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency. But this cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist in what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repugnant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. It is granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits; but it will not thence follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances: if to suppose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to suppose the other; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and there is a probability for the other; if we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves, and see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I have a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of it. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it by reflexion.

PHIL. I say, first, that I do not deny the existence of material substance merely because I have no notion of it. I deny it because the notion is inconsistent. In other words, it is contradictory to suppose that there could be such a notion. For all I know, many things may exist of which neither I nor anyone else has or can have any idea or notion. But such things must be possible. That is, their definitions must contain no contradiction. Second, although we believe that things we do not perceive exist, we cannot believe that any particular thing exists without some reason. But I have no reason to believe that Matter exists. I have no direct awareness of it. Nor can I infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance directly from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or feelings. I can draw no such inference by probable deduction or necessary consequence. By contrast, reflection makes me clearly aware that my Self exists, meaning my own soul, mind, or thinking principle. Forgive me if I repeat the same points in answer to the same objections. The very notion or definition of MATERIAL SUBSTANCE contains an obvious contradiction and inconsistency. But the same cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. It is contradictory to say that ideas exist in something that does not perceive, or are produced by something that does not act. But there is no contradiction in saying that a perceiving thing has ideas, or that an active thing causes them. I admit that we have neither direct evidence nor demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits. But it does not follow that such spirits are on the same footing as material substances. The cases differ if supposing one to exist is inconsistent, while supposing the other to exist is not. They differ if no argument can support an inference to one, while there is a probability in favor of the other. And they differ if we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves, but no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational belief in Matter. Lastly, I say that I have a notion of Spirit, though I do not, strictly speaking, have an idea of it. I do not perceive Spirit as an idea or by means of an idea. I know Spirit through reflection.

HYL. Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it should follow that YOU are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a meaning. And, as there is no more meaning in SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE than in MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, the one is to be exploded as well as the other.

HYL. Despite all you have said, it seems to me that your own principles lead to a conclusion about YOU. According to them, you are only a system of floating ideas, with no substance to support them. Words must not be used without meaning. And SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE has no more meaning than MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, so both should be rejected.

PHIL. How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own being; and that I MYSELF am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour: that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the same reason, from aft other sensible things and inert ideas. But, I am not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of Matter. On the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an inconsistency. Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no parity of case between Spirit and Matter.

PHIL. How often must I repeat that I know, or am conscious of, my own existence? I MYSELF am not my ideas, but something else: a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and acts on ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colors and sounds. A color cannot perceive a sound, nor can a sound perceive a color. So I am one individual principle, distinct from color and sound. For the same reason, I am distinct from all other sensible things and inactive ideas. But I am not conscious of either the existence or the essence of Matter in the same way. On the contrary, I know that nothing contradictory can exist, and that the existence of Matter involves a contradiction. Moreover, I know what I mean when I say there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas. I mean that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. But I do not know what is meant by saying that ideas or their archetypes exist in, and are supported by, a substance that cannot perceive. So, taken as a whole, the cases of Spirit and Matter are not alike.

HYL. I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them? Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, TO BE PERCEIVED is one thing, and TO EXIST is another.

HYL. I admit that I am satisfied on this point. But do you really think that sensible things exist only when they are actually perceived? If so, why does everyone distinguish between being perceived and existing? Ask the first person you meet. They will tell you that TO BE PERCEIVED is one thing, and TO EXIST is another.

PHIL. I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you, because he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he terms a real, being, and saith it IS OR EXISTS; but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no being.

PHIL. I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world to establish the truth of my view. Ask the gardener why he thinks that cherry tree exists in the garden. He will tell you it is because he sees and feels it. In short, he perceives the tree through his senses. Ask him why he thinks there is no orange tree there. He will tell you it is because he does not perceive one. He calls whatever he perceives through his senses a real thing, and says that it IS OR EXISTS. But he says that whatever cannot be perceived does not exist.

HYL. Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.

HYL. Yes, Philonous, I agree that a thing exists for the senses if it can be perceived. But it does not have to be actually perceived.

PHIL. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist without being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed between us.

PHIL. And what can be perceived except an idea? Can an idea exist without actually being perceived? We agreed on these points long ago.

HYL. But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men. Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: what answer think you he would make?

HYL. But however true your opinion may be, surely you cannot deny that it is shocking and contrary to common sense. Ask that fellow whether the tree over there exists outside his mind. What answer do you think he would give?

PHIL. The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended by (that is EXISTS IN) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not at first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this; inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies a mind wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a REAL existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an ABSOLUTE existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds. This indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion.

PHIL. The same thing I would say myself, namely, that the tree exists outside his mind. But surely no Christian would be shocked to hear that God truly knows and comprehends the real tree outside that person's mind. That is, the tree EXISTS IN the infinite mind of God. At first, he may not realize there is direct and immediate proof of this. For the very existence of a tree, or any other thing we can perceive, implies a mind in which it exists. But he cannot deny the point itself. The question between the Materialists and me is not whether things have a REAL existence outside any particular person's mind. It is whether they have an ABSOLUTE existence, separate from being perceived by God and outside all minds. Some heathens and philosophers have indeed said that things have such an existence. But anyone whose ideas of God are in keeping with the Holy Scriptures will hold a different view.

HYL. But, according to your notions, what difference is there between real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream—since they are all equally in the mind?

HYL. But according to your view, what is the difference between real things, imaginary things, and dreams? After all, they are all equally in the mind.

PHIL. The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct; they have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and, being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with the visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And, though they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by their not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished from realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish THINGS FROM CHIMERAS on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.

PHIL. Ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct. They also depend entirely on our will. But ideas perceived by the senses, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear. They are impressed on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, so they do not depend on our will in the same way. There is therefore no danger of confusing real things with ideas formed by the imagination. There is just as little danger of confusing real things with dreams, which are dim, irregular, and confused. Even if dreams are extremely vivid and lifelike, they can easily be distinguished from realities. They are not connected with the events before and after them in our lives, nor do they form a whole with those events. In short, whatever method you use to distinguish THINGS FROM CHIMERAS under your view will clearly work under mine too. I presume you must make the distinction by some perceived difference. And I do not want to deprive you of anything you perceive.

HYL. But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very oddly.

HYL. But still, Philonous, you believe there is nothing in the world but spirits and ideas. And you must admit that sounds very strange.

PHIL. I own the word IDEA, not being commonly used for THING, sounds something out of the way. My reason for using it was, because a necessary relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that term; and it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the understanding. But, however oddly the proposition may sound in words, yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its sense; which in effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that there are only things perceiving, and things perceived; or that every unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature of its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom "we five, and move, and have our being." Is this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are not on the objects: or that we cannot be sure of the existence of things, or know any thing of their real natures—though we both see and feel them, and perceive them by all our senses?

PHIL. I admit that the word IDEA sounds a little unusual because it is not commonly used to mean THING. I used it because the word implies a necessary relation to the mind. Philosophers also commonly use it now to mean the immediate objects of understanding. But however odd the claim may sound, its meaning is not so strange or shocking. It amounts to no more than this: there are only things that perceive and things that are perceived. In other words, every unthinking being is necessarily perceived by some mind, simply because of the nature of its existence. If it is not perceived by a finite, created mind, it is certainly perceived by the infinite mind of God, in whom "we live, and move, and have our being." Is this as strange as saying that sensible qualities are not on objects? Or that we cannot be sure things exist or know anything about their real natures, even though we see and feel them and perceive them with all our senses?

HYL. And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such things as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is the immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature? Can there be anything more extravagant than this?

HYL. And does this mean we must believe there are no physical or material causes? Must we believe instead that a Spirit directly causes all natural phenomena? Could anything be more absurd?

PHIL. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say—a thing which is inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions, without any regard either to consistency, or the old known axiom, NOTHING CAN GIVE TO ANOTHER THAT WHICH IT HATH NOT ITSELF. Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places. In them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author of all those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. This is so much the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to confirm it by citations.

PHIL. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say that something inert acts on the mind. It is also infinitely more extravagant to say that something unable to perceive causes our perceptions. Such claims disregard consistency and the familiar old axiom: NOTHING CAN GIVE TO ANOTHER WHAT IT DOES NOT HAVE ITSELF. Besides, what seems so extravagant to you is simply what the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places. I do not know why it seems so extravagant to you. The Scriptures present God as the sole and immediate author of all those effects that some heathens and philosophers usually attribute to Nature, Matter, Fate, or some similar unthinking principle. This is so consistently the language of Scripture that there is no need to confirm it with citations.

HYL. You are not aware, Philonous, that in making God the immediate Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins.

HYL. You do not realize, Philonous, that by making God the direct cause of all motion in nature, you also make him responsible for murder, sacrilege, adultery, and other terrible sins.

PHIL. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of an instrument or occasion, called MATTER, you as truly make Him the author of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent in all those operations vulgarly ascribed to Nature. I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though the outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder. Since, therefore, sin doth not consist in the physical action, the making God an immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him the Author of sin. Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies. It is true I have denied there are any other agents besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions.

PHIL. In answer, I first observe that a person is equally guilty whether they act with or without an instrument. So suppose you believe that God acts through an instrument or means called MATTER. Then you make him the author of sin just as much as I do. I believe he acts directly in all the operations commonly attributed to Nature. I further observe that sin, or moral wrongdoing, does not consist in an outward physical action or motion. It consists in the will’s inward departure from the laws of reason and religion. This is clear because killing an enemy in battle or legally putting a criminal to death is not considered sinful. Yet the outward act is exactly the same as in a murder. So sin does not consist in the physical action. Therefore, making God the immediate cause of all such actions does not make him the author of sin. Lastly, I have never said that God is the only agent who produces all motions in bodies. I have indeed denied that any agents other than spirits exist. But this is entirely consistent with allowing thinking, rational beings limited powers to produce motion. These powers ultimately come from God, but they are directly controlled by the beings’ own wills. That is enough to make those beings fully responsible for the guilt of their actions.

HYL. But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal Substance; there is the point. You can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to the universal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most voices, I am confident you would give up the point, without gathering the votes.

HYL. But denying matter, Philonous, or corporeal substance, is the point at issue. You can never persuade me that denying it does not contradict the common sense of all mankind. If our dispute were decided by a majority vote, I am sure you would concede without even counting the votes.

PHIL. I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the judgment of men who had plain common sense, without the prejudices of a learned education. Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses, who thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains no doubts of their existence; and you fairly set forth with all your doubts, your paradoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly acquiesce in the determination of any indifferent person. That there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident. And that the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed. And that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived no one can deny. It is therefore evident there can be no SUBSTRATUM of those qualities but spirit; in which they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it. I deny therefore that there is ANY UNTHINKING-SUBSTRATUM of the objects of sense, and IN THAT ACCEPTATION that there is any material substance. But if by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE is meant only SENSIBLE BODY, THAT which is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world, I dare say, mean no more)—then I am more certain of matter's existence than you or any other philosopher pretend to be. If there be anything which makes the generality of mankind averse from the notions I espouse, it is a misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible things. But, as it is you who are guilty of that, and not I, it follows that in truth their aversion is against your notions and not mine. I do therefore assert that I am as certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal substances (meaning the things I perceive by my senses); and that, granting this, the bulk of mankind will take no thought about, nor think themselves at all concerned in the fate of those unknown natures, and philosophical quiddities, which some men are so fond of.

PHIL. I wish both our opinions could be presented fairly to people with plain common sense, free from the prejudices of a learned education. Let me be presented as someone who trusts his senses. I think I know the things I see and feel, and I have no doubt that they exist. Let you be presented fairly with all your doubts, paradoxes, and skepticism. I will willingly accept the judgment of any impartial person. It is clear to me that ideas can exist in no substance except spirit. Everyone agrees that the objects we perceive directly are ideas. And no one can deny that sensible qualities are objects we perceive directly. It is therefore clear that spirit is the only possible SUBSTRATUM, or underlying support, for those qualities. The qualities exist in spirit, not as modes or properties, but as things perceived in what perceives them. I therefore deny that the objects of sense have ANY UNTHINKING SUBSTRATUM. IN THAT SENSE, I deny that there is any material substance. But if by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE one means only SENSIBLE BODY, THAT which is seen and felt, then I am more certain that matter exists than you or any other philosopher claim to be. And I dare say that people who are not philosophers mean nothing more than that by material substance. If anything makes most people reject my views, it is the mistaken belief that I deny the reality of sensible things. But you are guilty of denying that reality, not I. So their rejection is really directed at your views, not mine. I therefore maintain that I am as certain of my own existence as I am that bodies, or corporeal substances, exist. By bodies, I mean the things I perceive through my senses. And once that is granted, most people will give no thought to those unknown natures and philosophical quiddities, or supposed essential natures, that some people are so fond of. Nor will they think the fate of such things concerns them at all.

HYL. What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water, crooked?

HYL. What do you say to this? According to you, people judge whether things are real by their senses. So how can someone be mistaken in thinking that the moon is a flat, bright surface about a foot across? Or that a square tower seen from a distance is round? Or that an oar with one end in the water is bent?

PHIL. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives, but in the inference he makes from his present perceptions. Thus, in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and at present, (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or, concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances. The case is the same with regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other planets, we should not then perceive its motion.

PHIL. He is not mistaken about the ideas he actually perceives, but about what he concludes from his present perceptions. Take the oar, for example. What he immediately sees is certainly crooked, and so far he is right. But he is mistaken if he concludes that he will see the same crookedness when he takes the oar out of the water. He is also mistaken if he concludes that it would feel crooked to the touch, as crooked things usually do. In the same way, suppose he perceives the moon or a tower from one position. He is mistaken if he concludes that he would still perceive the same ideas if he moved toward it. But his mistake does not lie in what he perceives immediately and at present. It is plainly a contradiction to suppose he could be mistaken about that. His mistake lies in his wrong judgment about the ideas he thinks are connected with those he immediately perceives. In other words, he judges wrongly about what he imagines he would perceive in other circumstances, based on what he perceives now. The same is true of the Copernican system. From here, we do not perceive any motion of the earth. But it would be wrong to conclude from this that we would not perceive its motion if we were as far from the earth as we now are from the other planets.

HYL. I understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible enough. But, give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray, Philonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you are now that it does not?

HYL. I understand you, and I must admit that what you say sounds plausible enough. But let me remind you of one thing. Philonous, weren't you once as certain that Matter existed as you are now that it does not?

PHIL. I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry, upon evidence.

PHIL. I was. But there is a difference. Before, my certainty was based on prejudice, without any examination. Now, after examining the matter, my certainty is based on evidence.

HYL. After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things. We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with ideas FROM WITHOUT is evident; and it is no less evident that there must be (I will not say archetypes, but) Powers without the mind, corresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot subsist by themselves, there is some subject of them necessarily to be admitted; which I call MATTER, and you call SPIRIT. This is all the difference.

HYL. After all, it seems our dispute is more about words than things. We agree about the thing, but call it by different names. Clearly, we receive ideas FROM OUTSIDE the mind. It is equally clear that there must be Powers outside the mind corresponding to those ideas. I will not call them archetypes. And because these Powers cannot exist on their own, we must admit that something supports them. I call this MATTER, and you call it SPIRIT. That is the only difference.

PHIL. Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers, extended?

PHIL. Hylas, does that powerful being, or bearer of powers, have spatial extent?

HYL. It hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the idea of extension.

HYL. It does not have extension, but it can give you the idea of extension.

PHIL. It is therefore itself unextended?

PHIL. So it has no physical dimensions itself?

HYL. I grant it.

HYL. I admit it.

PHIL. Is it not also active?

PHIL. Isn't it also active?

HYL. Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?

HYL. Certainly. Otherwise, how could we say it has powers?

PHIL. Now let me ask you two questions: FIRST, Whether it be agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name MATTER to an unextended active being? And, SECONDLY, Whether it be not ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of language?

PHIL. Now let me ask you two questions. FIRST, do philosophers or anyone else usually call an active being without spatial extent MATTER? SECONDLY, isn't it ridiculously absurd to use names in ways that go against common usage?

HYL. Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have it so, but some THIRD NATURE distinct from Matter and Spirit. For what reason is there why you should call it Spirit? Does not the notion of spirit imply that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended?

HYL. Well then, since you insist, let us not call it Matter, but some THIRD NATURE distinct from Matter and Spirit. Why should you call it Spirit? Doesn't the idea of spirit imply that it thinks, as well as being active and unextended?

PHIL. My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from volition, neither can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit: therefore, when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean a Spirit. Beside, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely it must be a Spirit. To make you comprehend the point still more clearly if it be possible, I assert as well as you that, since we are affected from without, we must allow Powers to be without, in a Being distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful Being. I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) Third Nature. Thus, I prove it to be Spirit. From the effects I see produced, I conclude there are actions; and, because actions, volitions; and, because there are volitions, there must be a WILL. Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of MY mind: but, being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an understanding; there is therefore an UNDERSTANDING. But will and understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a SPIRIT.

PHIL. My reason is this: I want the words I use to have some meaning. But I have no idea of any action distinct from willing, and I cannot conceive of willing anywhere except in a spirit. Therefore, when I speak of an active being, I must mean a spirit. Besides, what could be clearer than that a thing with no ideas of its own cannot give me ideas? And if it has ideas, surely it must be a spirit. To make the point even clearer, if possible, I agree with you that we are affected by something outside ourselves. So we must admit that powers exist outside us, in a being distinct from ourselves. So far, we agree. But we differ about what kind of being has these powers. I say it is spirit. You say it is matter, or some third kind of thing I know nothing about. I may add that you know nothing about it either. I prove that it is spirit in this way. From the effects I see produced, I conclude that there are actions. Because there are actions, there must be acts of willing. And because there are acts of willing, there must be a WILL. Again, the things I perceive, or their original patterns, must exist outside MY mind. But since they are ideas, neither they nor their original patterns can exist except in an understanding. Therefore, there is an UNDERSTANDING. But will and understanding together make up a mind or spirit in the strictest sense. Therefore, the powerful cause of my ideas is, strictly speaking, a SPIRIT.

HYL. And now I warrant you think you have made the point very clear, little suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a contradiction. Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in God?

HYL. And now I bet you think you have made your point very clear. You hardly suspect that what you are saying leads directly to a contradiction. Isn't it absurd to imagine that God has any imperfection?

PHIL. Without a doubt.

PHIL. Without a doubt.

HYL. To suffer pain is an imperfection?

HYL. Is feeling pain an imperfection?

PHIL. It is.

PHIL. It is.

HYL. Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some other Being?

HYL. Doesn't some other being sometimes cause us pain and discomfort?

PHIL. We are.

PHIL. We are.

HYL. And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not that Spirit God?

HYL. And haven't you said that Being is a spirit? And isn't that spirit God?

PHIL. I grant it.

PHIL. I agree.

HYL. But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive from without are in the mind which affects us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and uneasiness are in God; or, in other words, God suffers pain: that is to say, there is an imperfection in the Divine nature: which, you acknowledged, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain contradiction.

HYL. But you have claimed that every idea we perceive from outside us is in the mind that affects us. So the ideas of pain and discomfort are in God. In other words, God suffers pain. That means there is an imperfection in the divine nature, which you admitted was absurd. So you are caught in a clear contradiction.

PHIL. That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But, that God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external Agent, which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do; whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing: it is evident, such a Being as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to a body: that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities or ideas as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind. So that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions means no more than a correspondence in the order of nature, between two sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable. But God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy, or natural ties. No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind. To know everything knowable, is certainly a perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath ideas; but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are. Your not distinguishing, where there is so manifest a difference, makes you fancy you see an absurdity where there is none.

PHIL. I have no doubt that God knows or understands all things. Among other things, he knows what pain is, including every kind of painful sensation. He also knows what it is for his creatures to suffer pain. But although God knows about painful sensations and sometimes causes them in us, I firmly deny that he can suffer pain himself. We are limited and dependent spirits, subject to sensory impressions caused by an external agent. Because these impressions arise against our will, they are sometimes painful and uncomfortable. But no external being can affect God, and he perceives nothing through the senses as we do. His will is absolute and independent. It causes all things, and nothing can thwart or resist it. Clearly, such a being cannot suffer or experience any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We are bound to a body. That is, our perceptions are connected with bodily movements. Under the law of our nature, we are affected whenever the nerves of our sensible body undergo a change. Properly understood, this sensible body is only a collection of qualities or ideas. These have no existence apart from being perceived by a mind. So the connection between sensations and bodily movements is no more than a correspondence in the order of nature. It is a correspondence between two sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable. But God is a pure spirit, free from all such connections and natural ties. No bodily movements are accompanied by sensations of pain or pleasure in his mind. To know everything that can be known is certainly a perfection. But to endure, suffer, or feel anything through the senses is an imperfection. The first, I say, applies to God, but not the second. God knows, or has ideas, but his ideas are not conveyed to him through the senses as ours are. You fail to recognize this obvious difference. As a result, you imagine that you see an absurdity where there is none.

HYL. But, all this while you have not considered that the quantity of Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of bodies. And what can withstand demonstration?

HYL. But you have not yet considered that the amount of matter has been proved proportional to the weight of bodies. And what can stand against proof?

PHIL. Let me see how you demonstrate that point.

PHIL. Let me see how you prove that point.

HYL. I lay it down for a principle, that the moments or quantities of motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the velocities and quantities of Matter contained in them. Hence, where the velocities are equal, it follows the moments are directly as the quantity of Matter in each. But it is found by experience that all bodies (bating the small inequalities, arising from the resistance of the air) descend with an equal velocity; the motion therefore of descending bodies, and consequently their gravity, which is the cause or principle of that motion, is proportional to the quantity of Matter; which was to be demonstrated.

HYL. I take as a principle that a body's momentum is directly proportional to both its velocity and its quantity of matter. So, when bodies have equal velocities, their momentum is directly proportional to the quantity of matter in each. But experience shows that all bodies fall at the same velocity, apart from small differences caused by air resistance. Therefore, the motion of falling bodies is proportional to their quantity of matter. So, too, is their gravity, which causes that motion. This is what I set out to prove.

PHIL. You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quantity of motion in any body is proportional to the velocity and MATTER taken together; and this is made use of to prove a proposition from whence the existence of MATTER is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in a circle?

PHIL. You take it as self-evident that a body's quantity of motion is proportional to its velocity and MATTER combined. You then use this principle to prove a proposition from which you infer that MATTER exists. Isn't that circular reasoning?

HYL. In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional to the velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity.

HYL. By the premise, I only mean that motion is proportional to velocity, extension, and solidity together.

PHIL. But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow that gravity is proportional to MATTER, in your philosophic sense of the word; except you take it for granted that unknown SUBSTRATUM, or whatever else you call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities; which to suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is magnitude and solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant; as likewise, that gravity may be proportional to those qualities I will not dispute. But that either these qualities as perceived by us, or the powers producing them, do exist in a MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM; this is what I deny, and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your demonstration, have not yet proved.

PHIL. But even if this is true, it does not follow that gravity is proportional to MATTER in your philosophical sense. That conclusion requires you to assume that the unknown SUBSTRATUM, or whatever else you call it, is proportional to those qualities perceived by the senses. To assume this is plainly to beg the question. I readily grant that we perceive size and solidity, or resistance, through our senses. I will not dispute that gravity may be proportional to those qualities. But I deny that either those qualities as we perceive them, or the powers that produce them, exist in a MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM. You affirm that they do, but despite your demonstration, you have not yet proved it.

HYL. I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think, however, you shall persuade me that the natural philosophers have been dreaming all this while? Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter?

HYL. I won't press that point any further. But do you think you can persuade me that natural philosophers have been dreaming all this time? What, then, becomes of all their hypotheses and explanations of phenomena that assume Matter exists?

PHIL. What mean you, Hylas, by the PHENOMENA?

PHIL. What do you mean by the PHENOMENA, Hylas?

HYL. I mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses.

HYL. I mean the appearances I perceive through my senses.

PHIL. And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas?

PHIL. And aren't the appearances we perceive through our senses ideas?

HYL. I have told you so a hundred times.

HYL. I've told you that a hundred times.

PHIL. Therefore, to explain the phenomena, is, to shew how we come to be affected with ideas, in that manner and order wherein they are imprinted on our senses. Is it not?

PHIL. So, to explain phenomena is to show how ideas come to affect us in the manner and order in which they are imprinted on our senses. Isn't that right?

HYL. It is.

HYL. It is.

PHIL. Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the production of any one idea in our minds by the help of MATTER, I shall for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said against it as nothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of phenomena. That a Being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or exhibit ideas is easily understood. But that a Being which is utterly destitute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect an intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say, though we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew its qualities, and could comprehend its existence, would yet be so far from explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in the world. And yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers have been doing nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the connexion of ideas, they discover the laws and methods of nature, which is a part of knowledge both useful and entertaining.

PHIL. Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has used MATTER to explain how a single idea is produced in our minds, I will accept it forever. I will regard everything said against matter as worthless. But if you cannot, there is no point in arguing that matter explains phenomena. It is easy to understand how a being with knowledge and will could produce or present ideas. But I can never understand how a being entirely without those abilities could produce ideas or affect a mind in any way. I say this even if we had some positive conception of matter, knew its qualities, and could understand its existence. Even then, matter would be so far from explaining things that it would itself be the most inexplicable thing in the world. Yet none of this means that philosophers have been doing nothing. By observing and reasoning about the connections between ideas, they discover the laws and methods of nature. This is a kind of knowledge that is both useful and entertaining.

HYL. After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind? Do you imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of Matter, if there was no such thing?

HYL. After all, can we suppose God would deceive all humanity? Do you think he would have led the whole world to believe that Matter exists if it did not?

PHIL. That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, or passion, or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it, I believe you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it must be either because He has discovered it to us by supernatural revelation; or because it is so evident to our natural faculties, which were framed and given us by God, that it is impossible we should withhold our assent from it. But where is the revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts the belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, TAKEN FOR SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM WHAT WE PERCEIVE BY OUR SENSES, is thought to exist by all mankind; or indeed, by any except a few philosophers, who do not know what they would be at? Your question supposes these points are clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall think myself obliged to give you another answer. In the meantime, let it suffice that I tell you, I do not suppose God has deceived mankind at all.

PHIL. I do not believe you would say that God is the source of every widespread opinion arising from prejudice, passion, or thoughtlessness. We can attribute an opinion to God for one of two reasons. Either he has revealed it to us supernaturally, or it is so evident to our natural faculties that we cannot help believing it. God created those faculties and gave them to us. But where is the revelation? Or where is the evidence that compels us to believe in Matter? And how can we tell that all people believe Matter exists, MEANING SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM WHAT WE PERCEIVE THROUGH OUR SENSES? Indeed, how can we tell that anyone believes this, except a few philosophers who do not know what they are trying to say? Your question assumes these points are clear. Once you have made them clear, I shall consider myself obliged to give you another answer. Meanwhile, let it be enough for me to say that I do not believe God has deceived mankind at all.

HYL. But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger. New notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men's minds, and nobody knows where they will end.

HYL. But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! That's where the danger lies. New ideas should always be discouraged. They unsettle people's minds, and nobody knows where they will lead.

PHIL. Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to unsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of these, I cannot imagine. That innovations in government and religion are dangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But is there the like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy? The making anything known which was unknown before is an innovation in knowledge: and, if all such innovations had been forbidden, men would have made a notable progress in the arts and sciences. But it is none of my business to plead for novelties and paradoxes. That the qualities we perceive are not on the objects: that we must not believe our senses: that we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be assured even of their existence: that real colours and sounds are nothing but certain unknown figures and motions: that motions are in themselves neither swift nor slow: that there are in bodies absolute extensions, without any particular magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid, thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit: that the least particle of a body contains innumerable extended parts:—these are the novelties, these are the strange notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted judgment of all mankind; and being once admitted, embarrass the mind with endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against these and the like innovations I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense. It is true, in doing this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some AMBAGES, and ways of speech not common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly understood, that which is most singular in them will, in effect, be found to amount to no more than this.—that it is absolutely impossible, and a plain contradiction, to suppose any unthinking Being should exist without being perceived by a Mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be so, at this time of day, and in a Christian country.

PHIL. I cannot imagine why rejecting an idea with no basis in the senses, reason, or divine authority should undermine belief in opinions grounded in any or all of these. I freely admit that innovations in government and religion are dangerous and should be discouraged. But is there the same reason to discourage innovations in philosophy? Making anything known that was previously unknown is an innovation in knowledge. If all such innovations had been forbidden, people would certainly have made remarkable progress in the arts and sciences. But it is not my business to defend new and paradoxical ideas. These are the new and strange ideas that shock the genuine, uncorrupted judgment of all mankind: that the qualities we perceive are not in the objects themselves, that we must not trust our senses, that we know nothing of the real nature of things and can never be sure even that they exist, that real colors and sounds are nothing but certain unknown shapes and motions, that motions are in themselves neither fast nor slow, that bodies have absolute extension without any particular size or shape, that something without thought or activity acts on a spirit, and that the smallest particle of a body contains countless extended parts. Once accepted, these ideas entangle the mind in endless doubts and difficulties. I seek to defend common sense against these and similar innovations. It is true that, in doing so, I may perhaps have to speak indirectly and use unusual expressions. But once my ideas are fully understood, the strangest of them will in effect amount to no more than this: it is absolutely impossible and plainly contradictory to suppose that any unthinking being can exist without being perceived by a mind. And if this idea is unusual, it is a shame that it should be so at this point in time and in a Christian country.

HYL. As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those are out of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion. Can anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into ideas? You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge me WITH SCEPTICISM. This is so plain, there is no denying it.

HYL. The difficulties other opinions may face are beside the point. Your job is to defend your own opinion. Could anything be clearer than that you want to turn all things into ideas? And you are not ashamed to accuse me OF SCEPTICISM. Your position is so clear that you cannot deny it.

PHIL. You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves.

PHIL. You misunderstand me. I do not want to turn things into ideas, but rather ideas into things. For I take the immediate objects of perception to be the real things themselves. You, on the other hand, take them to be only appearances of things.

HYL. Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which strikes the senses.

HYL. Things! You can claim whatever you like. But you certainly leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the mere outward appearances that strike the senses.

PHIL. What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise than upon your supposition—that Matter is an essential part of all corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms: but herein we differ—you will have them to be empty appearances, I, real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I do.

PHIL. What you call the empty forms and outward appearances of things seem to me to be the things themselves. They are empty or incomplete only if you assume that Matter is an essential part of all physical things. So we both agree that we perceive only forms available to the senses. But we differ in this: you take them to be empty appearances, while I take them to be real things. In short, you do not trust your senses. I do.

HYL. You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that disagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities, perceived all manner of ways? and why should we use a microscope the better to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the naked eye?

HYL. You say you believe your senses. You also seem proud that you agree with ordinary people on this point. According to you, then, the senses reveal the true nature of a thing. If so, where does this disagreement come from? Why do we not perceive the same shape and other qualities in every way we observe a thing? And if the true nature of a body can be discovered with the naked eye, why use a microscope to see it better?

PHIL. Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by the naked eye. But, in case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind of individual, the endless number of confusion of names would render language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but observed, however, to have some connexion in nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession; all which they refer to one name, and consider as one thing. Hence it follows that when I examine, by my other senses, a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one sense not being perceived by the other senses. And, when I look through a microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived already with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the glass being quite different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know what ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things. What, therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all circumstances affected with the same appearances. It will not thence follow they are not to be trusted; or that they are inconsistent either with themselves or anything else: except it be with your preconceived notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real Nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems to have taken its rise from not rightly understanding the common language of men, speaking of several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed, there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the philosophers are owing to the same original: while they began to build their schemes not so much on notions as on words, which were framed by the vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of life, without any regard to speculation.

PHIL. Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel. Nor do we perceive the same object through a microscope that we perceived with the naked eye. But suppose every variation were considered enough to make a new kind of individual. The endless number and confusion of names would make language impossible to use. To avoid this and other inconveniences that a little thought makes obvious, people group several ideas together. These ideas may be perceived by different senses, or by the same sense at different times or in different circumstances. But they are observed to have some connection in nature, either because they occur together or because one follows another. People give all these ideas one name and consider them one thing. So when I use my other senses to examine something I have seen, my purpose is not to understand the same object of sight better. The object of one sense is not perceived by the other senses. And when I look through a microscope, my purpose is not to see more clearly what I already saw with my naked eyes. The object seen through the microscope is quite different from the one seen before. In both cases, my aim is only to learn which ideas are connected. The more a person knows about the connections between ideas, the more he is said to know about the nature of things. So what if our ideas vary? What if our senses do not present us with the same appearances in every circumstance? It does not follow that our senses cannot be trusted. Nor does it follow that they are inconsistent with themselves or anything else, except perhaps with your preconceived notion. You believe that each name stands for a single, unchanged, unperceivable, real Nature, though I do not know what you mean by it. This prejudice seems to have arisen from a misunderstanding of ordinary speech. People speak of several distinct ideas as one thing because the mind has joined them together. And there is good reason to suspect that several mistaken ideas of philosophers have the same source. Philosophers began to build their theories less on ideas than on words. Ordinary people coined these words simply for convenience and speed in everyday life, without regard for philosophical speculation.

HYL. Methinks I apprehend your meaning.

HYL. I think I understand what you mean.

PHIL. It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is no farther real than as our ideas are the true REPRESENTATIONS OF THOSE ORIGINALS. But, as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they resemble them at all. We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real knowledge. Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot all be true copies of them: or, if some are and others are not, it is impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty. Again, when we consider the point, we cannot conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an absolute existence out of a mind: nor consequently, according to you, how there should be any real thing in nature. The result of all which is that we are thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now, give me leave to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not the source of all this scepticism? Secondly, whether you are informed, either by sense or reason, of the existence of those unknown originals? And, in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them? Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is anything distinctly conceived or meant by the ABSOLUTE OR EXTERNAL EXISTENCE OF UNPERCEIVING SUBSTANCES? Lastly, Whether, the premises considered, it be not the wisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or substances, admit with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses?

PHIL. You believe that the ideas we perceive through our senses are not real things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge is therefore real only insofar as our ideas are true REPRESENTATIONS OF THOSE ORIGINALS. But these supposed originals are unknown in themselves. So we cannot know how closely our ideas resemble them, or whether they resemble them at all. We therefore cannot be sure that we have any real knowledge. Furthermore, our ideas constantly change, while the supposed real things do not. It necessarily follows that our ideas cannot all be true copies of those things. Or, if some are true copies and others are not, we cannot tell the difference. This leaves us even more uncertain. Again, when we consider the matter, we cannot conceive how an idea, or anything like an idea, could exist absolutely outside a mind. According to you, then, we cannot conceive how any real thing could exist in nature. All this leaves us in the most hopeless and complete scepticism. Now, allow me to ask you some questions. First, isn’t the source of all this scepticism your view that ideas are copies of certain unperceived substances that exist absolutely? Second, do either your senses or your reason tell you that these unknown originals exist? And if not, isn’t it absurd to suppose that they do? Third, when you examine the matter, do you find that you can clearly conceive or mean anything by the ABSOLUTE OR EXTERNAL EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANCES THAT DO NOT PERCEIVE? Finally, given all this, isn’t it wisest to follow nature and trust your senses? Shouldn’t you set aside all anxious thoughts about unknown natures or substances? And shouldn’t you agree with ordinary people that the things we perceive through our senses are real things?

HYL. For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I would much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are not the objects perceived by the SENSES of one, likewise perceivable to others present? If there were a hundred more here, they would all see the garden, the trees, and flowers, as I see them. But they are not in the same manner affected with the ideas I frame in my IMAGINATION. Does not this make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?

HYL. For now, I don't feel like answering questions. I would much rather see how you can deal with what follows. Aren't the objects one person perceives through the SENSES also perceivable by others present? If a hundred more people were here, they would all see the garden, the trees, and the flowers as I do. But they are not affected in the same way by the ideas I form in my IMAGINATION. Doesn't this show a difference between the two kinds of objects?

PHIL. I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the objects of sense and those of imagination. But what would you infer from thence? You cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, because they are perceived by many.

PHIL. I agree that it does. I have never denied that objects of the senses differ from objects of the imagination. But what do you conclude from that difference? You cannot say that objects of the senses exist without being perceived simply because many people perceive them.

HYL. I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me into another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our minds?

HYL. I admit I cannot make sense of that objection, but it has led me to another one. Don't you believe that our senses perceive only the ideas that exist in our minds?

PHIL. It is.

PHIL. It is.

HYL. But the SAME idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow, from your principles, that no two can see the same thing? And is not this highly, absurd?

HYL. But the SAME idea that is in my mind cannot be in yours or in any other mind. So, according to your principles, doesn't it follow that no two people can see the same thing? And isn't that highly absurd?

PHIL. If the term SAME be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that different persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since men are used to apply the word SAME where no distinction or variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before, SEVERAL SAW THE SAME THING, so they may, upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things. But, if the term SAME be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing. But whether philosophers shall think fit to CALL a thing the SAME or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and who had yet never known the use of language; they would, without question, agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to the use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived, might call it the SAME thing: others, especially regarding the diversity of persons who perceived, might choose the denomination of DIFFERENT things. But who sees not that all the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether what is perceived by different persons may yet have the term SAME applied to it? Or, suppose a house, whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones built in their place; and that you should call this the SAME, and I should say it was not the SAME house.—would we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself? And would not all the difference consist in a sound? If you should say, We differed in our notions; for that you super-added to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would tell you, I know not what you mean by THE ABSTRACTED IDEA OF IDENTITY; and should desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood yourself.—Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet satisfied men may dispute about identity and diversity, without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take this farther reflexion with you: that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the case is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the Materialists themselves acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas. Your difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes equally against the Materialists and me.

PHIL. If SAME is understood in its ordinary sense, different people can certainly perceive the same thing. The same thing or idea can exist in different minds. None of this conflicts with the principles I maintain. Words get their meanings by convention. People are used to applying the word SAME where they perceive no difference or variety. I do not claim to change their perceptions. So, just as people have said before that SEVERAL SAW THE SAME THING, they may continue to say so on similar occasions. The phrase will still be proper language and true to the facts. But philosophers claim to have an abstract notion of identity. If SAME is used in their sense, different people may or may not be able to perceive the same thing. The answer depends on their various definitions of identity, for they have not yet agreed on what philosophical identity consists in. But I think it matters little whether philosophers choose to CALL a thing the SAME or not. Suppose several people are together, all with the same faculties, and therefore affected in the same way by their senses. Suppose, too, that they have never learned to use language. They would undoubtedly agree in their perceptions. Yet perhaps, when they learned to speak, some would call what they perceived the SAME thing, because of its uniformity. Others might call what they perceived DIFFERENT things, paying particular attention to the fact that different people perceived them. But who cannot see that the whole dispute is about a word? The question is whether the word SAME may be applied to what different people perceive. Or suppose that a house's walls or outer shell remain unchanged, but all its rooms are demolished and replaced with new ones. You call it the SAME house, and I say it is not the SAME house. Would we not still agree perfectly in our thoughts about the house itself? Would the whole difference not consist in a sound? You might say that our notions differed. You might say that you added the simple abstract idea of identity to your idea of the house, while I did not. I would tell you that I do not know what you mean by THE ABSTRACT IDEA OF IDENTITY. I would ask you to examine your own thoughts and make sure you understood yourself. Why are you so silent, Hylas? Are you still not satisfied that people may dispute about identity and difference without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, apart from names? Consider this further point: whether Matter is allowed to exist or not, the case is exactly the same on the question at hand. For the Materialists themselves acknowledge that what we immediately perceive through our senses are our own ideas. Your objection that no two people see the same thing therefore tells just as much against the Materialists as against me.

HYL. Ay, Philonous, but they suppose an external archetype, to which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive the same thing.

HYL. Yes, Philonous, but they assume there is an external archetype. By referring their different ideas to it, they may truly be said to perceive the same thing.

PHIL. And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles;—EXTERNAL, I MEAN, TO YOUR OWN MIND: though indeed it must be' supposed to exist in that Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the ends of IDENTITY, as well as if it existed out of a mind. And I am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.

PHIL. And, leaving aside the fact that you have discarded those archetypes, you may also suppose an external archetype on my principles. By EXTERNAL, I MEAN outside your own mind. Though the archetype must be supposed to exist in the Mind that comprehends all things, this serves all the purposes of IDENTITY just as well as if the archetype existed outside a mind. And I am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.

HYL. You have indeed clearly satisfied me—either that there is no difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes equally against both opinions.

HYL. You have indeed convinced me that either there is no real difficulty in this matter, or that the difficulty counts equally against both views.

PHIL. But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions can be a proof against neither.

PHIL. But something that counts equally against two contradictory opinions cannot disprove either one.

HYL. I acknowledge it. But, after all, Philonous, when I consider the substance of what you advance against SCEPTICISM, it amounts to no more than this: We are sure that we really see, hear, feel; in a word, that we are affected with sensible impressions.

HYL. I admit that. But after all, Philonous, when I consider your argument against skepticism, it comes down to this: We are sure that we really see, hear, and feel. In short, we are sure that we experience sensations.

PHIL. And how are WE concerned any farther? I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure NOTHING cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted: it is therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind, because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations. But if by the word CHERRY, you mean an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its EXISTENCE something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.

PHIL. And why should we be concerned with anything beyond that? I see this cherry, I feel it, and I taste it. I am sure that nothing cannot be seen, felt, or tasted. So the cherry is real. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, and tartness, and you take away the cherry. For the cherry is not a thing separate from those sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a collection of sensory impressions, or ideas perceived by different senses. The mind combines these ideas into one thing, or gives them one name, because they are observed to occur together. Thus, when the palate experiences a certain taste, the eyes see a red color, and touch feels roundness, softness, and so on. So, when I see, feel, and taste in these various ways, I am sure the cherry exists, or is real. In my opinion, its reality is nothing separate from those sensations. But suppose that by “cherry” you mean an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensory qualities. And suppose that by its “existence” you mean something distinct from its being perceived. Then I admit that neither you nor I, nor anyone else, can be sure the cherry exists.

HYL. But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very same reasons against the existence of sensible things IN A MIND, which you have offered against their existing IN A MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM?

HYL. But what would you say, Philonous, if I used the very same arguments against sensible things existing IN A MIND? You used those arguments against their existing IN A MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM.

PHIL. When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to them.

PHIL. When I see your reasons, I'll tell you what I think of them.

HYL. Is the mind extended or unextended?

HYL. Does the mind occupy space or not?

PHIL. Unextended, without doubt.

PHIL. Unextended, certainly.

HYL. Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?

HYL. Are you saying that the things you perceive are in your mind?

PHIL. They are.

PHIL. They are.

HYL. Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?

HYL. Again, haven't I heard you speak of sensory impressions?

PHIL. I believe you may.

PHIL. I believe you may.

HYL. Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended things be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to understand those expressions? Explain me this if you can: and I shall then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my SUBSTRATUM.

HYL. Tell me, Philonous, how can there be room in your mind for all those trees and houses to exist? Can things that take up space be contained in something that takes up no space? Or are we to imagine impressions made on something that has no solidity? You cannot say that objects are in your mind as books are in your study. Nor can you say that things are imprinted on your mind as a seal leaves its figure on wax. So what do you mean by those expressions? Explain this to me if you can. Then I will be able to answer all the questions you asked me earlier about my SUBSTRATUM.

PHIL. Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself. This is my explication of your difficulty; and how it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material SUBSTRATUM intelligible, I would fain know.

PHIL. Look, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind or imprinted on the senses, I do not mean this literally. I do not mean it as when we say that bodies exist in a place or that a seal leaves an impression on wax. I mean only that the mind understands or perceives objects, and that it is affected from outside, by some being distinct from itself. This is my explanation of your difficulty. I would like to know how it can make your belief in an unperceiving material SUBSTRATUM intelligible.

HYL. Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?

HYL. Well, if that is all, I admit I do not see what use it has. But aren't you misusing language in some way here?

PHIL. None at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is the rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being more usual, than for philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind. 'Nor is there anything in this but what is conformable to the general analogy of language; most part of the mental operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in the terms COMPREHEND, reflect, DISCOURSE, &C., which, being applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, original sense.

PHIL. None at all. It goes no further than common custom allows, and as you know, custom governs language. Nothing is more usual than for philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of understanding as things existing in the mind. 'Nor is this way of speaking out of keeping with the general pattern of language. Most mental operations are described using words borrowed from things we perceive through our senses. This is clear from terms such as COMPREHEND, reflect, DISCOURSE, and so on. When applied to the mind, these words must not be taken in their literal, original sense.

HYL. You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there still remains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get over. And, indeed, it is of such importance that if you could solve all others, without being able to find a solution for this, you must never expect to make me a proselyte to your principles.

HYL. I admit you have satisfied me on this point. But one great difficulty remains, and I do not know how you will overcome it. This difficulty is so important that, even if you solved all the others, you could never expect to convert me to your principles unless you solved this one too.

PHIL. Let me know this mighty difficulty.

PHIL. Tell me about this great difficulty.

HYL. The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to me utterly irreconcilable with your notions. Moses tells us of a creation: a creation of what? of ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things, solid corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and I shall perhaps agree with you.

HYL. The Scripture account of creation seems completely impossible to reconcile with your ideas. Moses tells us about a creation. But what was created? Ideas? Certainly not. He means things, real things, solid physical substances. Make your principles agree with this account, and perhaps I shall agree with you.

PHIL. Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants and animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning created by God, I make no question. If by IDEAS you mean fictions and fancies of the mind, then these are no ideas. If by IDEAS you mean immediate objects of the understanding, or sensible things, which cannot exist unperceived, or out of a mind, then these things are ideas. But whether you do or do not call them IDEAS, it matters little. The difference is only about a name. And, whether that name be retained or rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things continues the same. In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed IDEAS, but THINGS. Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation of things, of REAL things. Neither is this in the least inconsistent with my principles, as is evident from what I have now said; and would have been evident to you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been so often said before. But as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to show where Moses makes any mention of them; and, if they should be mentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be incumbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the vulgar acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the philosophic acceptation, for Matter, or AN UNKNOWN QUIDDITY, WITH AN ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. When you have proved these points, then (and not till then) may you bring the authority of Moses into our dispute.

PHIL. Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants and animals. I have no doubt that all these really exist and were created by God in the beginning. If by IDEAS you mean inventions and fantasies of the mind, then these are not ideas. If by IDEAS you mean immediate objects of understanding, or things perceived by the senses, then these things are ideas. Such things cannot exist unperceived or outside a mind. But it matters little whether you call them IDEAS. The difference is only in the name. Whether you keep or reject that name, the meaning, truth, and reality of things remain the same. In everyday speech, the objects of our senses are called THINGS, not IDEAS. Continue to call them things. As long as you do not attribute an absolute external existence to them, I will never quarrel with you over a word. I therefore agree that the creation was a creation of things, of REAL things. This is not at all inconsistent with my principles, as should be clear from what I have just said. It would have been clear to you without this explanation if you had not forgotten what was said so often before. But as for solid bodily substances, please show me where Moses mentions them. And even if Moses or any other inspired writer mentions them, you must still prove something more. You must show that the words were not used in their ordinary sense, meaning things perceived by our senses. You must show that they were used in their philosophical sense, meaning Matter, or AN UNKNOWN ESSENCE WITH AN ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. Once you have proved these points, and not before, you may appeal to Moses's authority in our dispute.

HYL. It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your notions?

HYL. There is no point arguing about something so clear. I am content to leave the question to your own conscience. Are you not convinced that there is some particular conflict between the Mosaic account of creation and your ideas?

PHIL. If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other, then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither do you pretend they exist without the mind.

PHIL. If every possible interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis can fit my principles as well as any others, then Genesis is not especially opposed to my principles. But you can conceive of every interpretation just as well while believing as I do. For, besides spirits, all you conceive of are ideas, and I do not deny that ideas exist. Nor do you claim that ideas exist outside the mind.

HYL. Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.

HYL. Please show me any way you can make sense of it.

PHIL. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I should have seen things produced into being—that is become perceptible—in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever before believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or end their existence, we do not mean this with regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but when things, before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with respect to created minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand that the several parts of the world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties; so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth perceived by them. This is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture: in which is included no mention, or no thought, either of SUBSTRATUM, INSTRUMENT, OCCASION, or ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain honest men, who believe the creation, never think of those things any more than I. What metaphysical sense you may understand it in, you only can tell.

PHIL. Well, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I would have seen things come into being, that is, become perceptible, in the order given by the sacred historian. I have always believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and I find that my way of believing it has not changed. When we say that things begin or end their existence, we do not mean this in relation to God, but to his creatures. God knows all objects eternally. Or, what amounts to the same thing, all objects exist eternally in his mind. But when things that creatures could not perceive before become perceptible to them by God’s decree, they are said to begin a relative existence in relation to created minds. So, when I read the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand that the various parts of the world gradually became perceptible to finite spirits equipped with the proper faculties. If any such spirits were present, they truly perceived those parts of the world. This is the literal, obvious meaning that the words of Holy Scripture suggest to me. That meaning includes no mention or thought of SUBSTRATUM, INSTRUMENT, OCCASION, or ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. And, if we inquire, I have no doubt we will find that most plain, honest people who believe in the creation never think of those things any more than I do. Only you can tell what metaphysical meaning you may understand in the account.

HYL. But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical being: that is to say, upon supposition there were MEN to perceive them; without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?

HYL. But, Philonous, you do not seem to realize what your view implies. You allow created things only a relative existence in the beginning, and therefore only a hypothetical one. In other words, they existed only on the assumption that there were humans to perceive them. Without humans to perceive them, created things have no actual, independent existence for creation to bring about. So, according to you, is it not plainly impossible that any inanimate creatures were created before humans? And does this not directly contradict the account of creation given by Moses?

PHIL. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my notions, unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created spirits in being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the creation, as we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of all sorts produced, by an invisible Power, in a desert where nobody was present—that this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles, since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable; that it exactly suits with the common, natural, and undebauched notions of mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all things on God; and consequently hath all the good effect or influence, which it is possible that important article of our faith should have in making men humble, thankful, and resigned to their great Creator. I say, moreover, that, in this naked conception of things, divested of words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the ACTUALITY OF ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. You may indeed raise a dust with those terms, and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a useless and unintelligible jargon.

PHIL. In answer, I say, first, that created beings might begin to exist in the minds of created intelligences besides humans. So you cannot prove that Moses contradicts my views unless you first show that no other order of finite created spirits existed before humans. I say further, suppose we imagine creation as we would now imagine an invisible Power producing plants of all kinds in a deserted place where nobody was present. This way of explaining or imagining creation is consistent with my principles. Those principles deprive you of nothing you can sense or imagine. This explanation exactly fits the common, natural, and uncorrupted notions of mankind. It shows that all things depend on God. Consequently, it has every good effect or influence that this important article of our faith could have. It can make people humble, thankful, and resigned to their great Creator. I say, moreover, that if you consider things in this bare way, without the words, you will find no idea of what you call the ACTUALITY OF ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. You may indeed stir up confusion with those terms and so prolong our dispute to no purpose. But I ask you to examine your own thoughts calmly. Then tell me whether those terms are not useless and unintelligible jargon.

HYL. I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say you to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in their being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of God? Did they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you? And how could that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be clearer or better connected than this?

HYL. I admit that I do not have a very clear idea of what they mean. But what do you say to this? Don't you hold that sensible things exist only by being in a mind? And weren't all things eternally in the mind of God? So, according to you, didn't they exist from all eternity? And how could something eternal be created in time? Could anything be clearer or more logically connected than this?

PHIL. And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from eternity?

PHIL. And don't you also believe that God has known all things from eternity?

HYL. I am.

HYL. I am.

PHIL. Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect.

PHIL. So they have always existed in God's mind.

HYL. This I acknowledge.

HYL. I acknowledge this.

PHIL. By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in that point.

PHIL. By your own admission, then, nothing is new or begins to exist in the mind of God. So we agree on that point.

HYL. What shall we make then of the creation?

HYL. What should we make of creation, then?

PHIL. May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which He then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may call this a RELATIVE, or HYPOTHETICAL EXISTENCE if you please. But, so long as it supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and literal sense of the Mosaic history of the creation; so long as it answers all the religious ends of that great article; in a word, so long as you can assign no other sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this? Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory of God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the corporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind of God, as well as to the minds of all created spirits; yet how could this set forth either the immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the necessary and immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes?

PHIL. Could we understand the creation as taking place entirely in relation to finite spirits? In that case, things may properly be said to begin to exist, or be created, in relation to us, when God decreed that intelligent creatures should be able to perceive them. He decreed that they should be perceived in the order and manner he then established, which we now call the laws of nature. You may call this a RELATIVE or HYPOTHETICAL EXISTENCE if you please. But why should we reject this understanding? It gives us the most natural, obvious, and literal reading of the Mosaic account of creation. It serves all the religious purposes of that great article of faith. And, in short, you can offer no other sense or meaning in its place. Should we reject it to indulge a ridiculous skeptical urge to make everything nonsensical and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say we should reject it for the glory of God. Suppose the physical world could conceivably have an absolute existence outside God's mind and the minds of all created spirits. How could that display God's immensity or omniscience, or the necessary and immediate dependence of all things on him? Would it not instead seem to diminish those attributes?

HYL. Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making things perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, God did either execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to will what He had not actually willed before, but only designed to will? If the former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of existence, in finite things. If the latter, then we must acknowledge something new to befall the Deity; which implies a sort of change: and all change argues imperfection.

HYL. Well, Philonous, what do you say about God’s decree to make things perceptible? Surely God either carried out that decree from all eternity, or he began to will it at some particular time. In the latter case, he had not actually willed it before, but had only planned to will it. If he carried out the decree from all eternity, then finite things could not have been created or begun to exist. If he began to will it at some particular time, then we must admit that something new happened to God. That implies a kind of change, and all change indicates imperfection.

PHIL. Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this objection concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against every other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None of which can WE conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and having a beginning. God is a Being of transcendent and unlimited perfections: His nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether Materialist or Immaterialist, should have exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes, and ways of operation. If then you would infer anything against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is unavoidable on any scheme; but from the denial of Matter, of which there is not one word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.

PHIL. Please consider what you are doing. Surely this objection argues just as strongly against creation in any sense. Indeed, it argues against every other act of God that we can discover through reason alone. We cannot conceive of any of these acts except as taking place in time and having a beginning. God is a being of supreme and unlimited perfection. His nature is therefore beyond the understanding of finite minds. So we cannot expect anyone, whether a Materialist or an Immaterialist, to have exactly correct ideas about God, his attributes, and how he acts. If you want to draw any conclusion against my position, your difficulty must arise from the denial of Matter. It cannot arise from the inadequacy of our ideas about God’s nature, which is unavoidable under any theory. Yet your objection says nothing about the denial of Matter, either directly or indirectly.

HYL. I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are peculiar to that notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring myself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation and your opinion; though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly know.

HYL. I must admit that the difficulties you need to clear up arise only from the nonexistence of Matter. They are peculiar to that idea. You are right as far as that goes. But I cannot bring myself to think there is no peculiar conflict between creation and your view. Though I cannot say exactly where that conflict lies.

PHIL. What would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of things—the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of God. Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines? or, is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies. To take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this one point. Either you are not able to conceive the Creation on any hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or complaint against any particular opinion on that score: or you are able to conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the full scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses, or by ratiocination from your senses; whatever you could perceive, imagine, or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion you have of the creation by other Principles be intelligible, you have it still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all; and so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope it need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter doth not make the creation conceivable, the creation's being without it inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.

PHIL. What more do you want? Don’t I acknowledge two kinds of things, one ectypal, or natural, and the other archetypal and eternal? The first was created in time. The second existed forever in the mind of God. Doesn’t this agree with the common views of theologians? Is anything more needed to conceive of creation? But you suspect some particular contradiction, though you don’t know where it lies. To remove all possible doubt, consider this one point. Either you cannot conceive of creation under any theory at all, or you can. If you cannot, you have no reason to object to any particular view on that ground. If you can conceive of creation, why can’t you do so under my principles? After all, my principles take away nothing that can be conceived. You have had full use of your senses, imagination, and reason all along. So you still have whatever you could grasp before, whether directly or indirectly through your senses, or by reasoning from them. Whatever you could perceive, imagine, or understand remains with you. If your idea of creation under other principles is intelligible, you still have it under mine. If it is not intelligible, I think it is no idea at all. So you have lost nothing. Indeed, it seems very clear to me that assuming Matter exists cannot help us conceive of anything. Matter is, after all, something perfectly unknown and inconceivable. And I hope I need not prove the following point to you. If the existence of Matter does not make creation conceivable, then the fact that creation is inconceivable without Matter cannot count against its nonexistence.

HYL. I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point of the creation.

HYL. I admit, Philonous, you have almost convinced me on this point about creation.

PHIL. I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism: but you know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, to pass by all that, would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy between the received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?

PHIL. I would like to know why you are not entirely satisfied. You say there is a conflict between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism, but you do not know where the conflict lies. Is that reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect me to resolve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, leaving all that aside, would one not think you were certain that the accepted ideas of Materialists do not conflict with the inspired writings?

HYL. And so I am.

HYL. And I am.

PHIL. Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way?

PHIL. Should the historical parts of Scripture be understood in a plain, obvious sense, or in an obscure, metaphysical sense?

HYL. In the plain sense, doubtless.

HYL. In the ordinary sense, of course.

PHIL. When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been created by God; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader?

PHIL. When Moses says God created plants, earth, water, and so on, don't those words bring to mind the familiar things we perceive with our senses for every reader who is not a philosopher?

HYL. I cannot help thinking so.

HYL. I can't help thinking so.

PHIL. And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?

PHIL. And doesn’t the Materialist’s doctrine deny that all ideas, or things perceived by the senses, have a real existence?

HYL. This I have already acknowledged.

HYL. I have already acknowledged this.

PHIL. The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the creation of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of certain unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation might terminate?

PHIL. So, according to them, creation was not the creation of things we perceive, which exist only in relation to us? Rather, it was the creation of certain unknown natures that exist absolutely, and in which creation could be completed?

HYL. True.

HYL. True.

PHIL. Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy the plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not what; something equally unintelligible to themselves and me?

PHIL. Is it not clear, then, that those who assert the existence of Matter destroy the plain, obvious meaning of Moses? Their ideas are utterly inconsistent with that meaning. Instead, they force on us something I cannot identify, something equally unintelligible to them and to me.

HYL. I cannot contradict you.

HYL. I can't disagree with you.

PHIL. Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown quiddities, of occasions, or SUBSTRATUM? No, certainly; but of things obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions, if you expect I should be reconciled to them.

PHIL. Moses tells us about a creation. A creation of what? Of unknown quiddities, occasions, or SUBSTRATUM? Certainly not. He speaks of the creation of things we can perceive with our senses. You must first reconcile your ideas with this account if you expect me to accept them.

HYL. I see you can assault me with my own weapons.

HYL. I see you can attack me with my own weapons.

PHIL. Then as to ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE; was there ever known a more jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible that you have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain anything by it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to be clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the creation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a creation? That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so impossible and absurd! that not only the most celebrated among the ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity. Lay these things together, and then judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things.

PHIL. Then, as for ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE, was there ever a more empty idea? It is so abstract and unintelligible that you have frankly admitted you cannot conceive it, much less explain anything by it. But suppose Matter exists, and suppose the idea of absolute existence is perfectly clear. Has this ever made creation more believable? On the contrary, has it not given atheists and unbelievers of all ages their most plausible arguments against creation? A bodily substance exists absolutely, outside the minds of spirits. The idea that such a substance could be produced from nothing by the mere will of a Spirit has been seen as utterly unreasonable, impossible, and absurd! As a result, not only the most celebrated ancient philosophers, but even various modern and Christian philosophers, have thought Matter existed eternally alongside God. Consider all this, and then judge whether Materialism makes people more likely to believe in the creation of things.

HYL. I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the CREATION is the last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it hath been sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be overcome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself towards your notions.

HYL. I admit, Philonous, that I think it does not. Creation is the last objection I can think of. And I must admit that it has been answered sufficiently, like all the others. All that remains is to overcome a kind of resistance to your ideas that I cannot explain.

PHIL. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of the question, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And indeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very much the advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned education.

PHIL. When a man favors one side of a question without knowing why, what else could this be but prejudice? Prejudice always accompanies old, deeply rooted beliefs. And in this respect, I cannot deny that belief in Matter has a great advantage over the opposing view among educated men.

HYL. I confess it seems to be as you say.

HYL. I admit it seems to be as you say.

PHIL. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us throw into the scale the great advantages that arise from the belief of Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. The being of a God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of religion, are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate evidence? When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general Cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but God, in the strict and proper sense of the word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous as the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more reason to doubt than of our own being.—Then, with relation to human sciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into! To say nothing of the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c.—do they not pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are they able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with a cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions, have they been able to reach the MECHANICAL production of any one animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course of things? Have they accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe? But, laying aside Matter and corporeal, causes, and admitting only the efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the PHENOMENA are nothing else but IDEAS; God is a SPIRIT, but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate an unlimited power in their cause; God is active and omnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and usefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired; God is infinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute of all contrivance and design. These surely are great advantages in PHYSICS. Not to mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men to a negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on their minds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking second causes.—Then in METAPHYSICS: what difficulties concerning entity in abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures, substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent substances so widely different as SPIRIT AND MATTER, should mutually operate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and endless disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do we escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas?—Even the MATHEMATICS themselves, if we take away the absolute existence of extended things, become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those sciences depending on the infinite divisibility of finite extension; which depends on that supposition—But what need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their reality to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of colours in a pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight. But these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable;—however, not changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is real from the IRREGULAR VISIONS of the fancy.

PHIL. To balance the weight of this prejudice, let us consider the great advantages of believing in Immaterialism. These advantages concern both religion and human learning. Are not the great articles of religion, the existence of God and the soul’s incorruptibility, proved by the clearest and most immediate evidence? By the existence of God, I do not mean some obscure general cause of things that we cannot conceive. I mean God in the strict and proper sense of the word. He is a being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, infinite power, and goodness are as clear as the existence of things we perceive. Despite the misleading claims and studied doubts of Skeptics, we have no more reason to doubt the existence of those things than our own existence. Now consider the human sciences. In natural philosophy, what complexities, obscurities, and contradictions has belief in Matter led people into! I will say nothing of the countless disputes about Matter’s extent, continuity, uniformity, gravity, divisibility, and so on. Do not those who believe in Matter claim to explain everything by bodies acting on other bodies according to the laws of motion? Yet can they understand how one body could move another? Suppose there were no difficulty in reconciling the idea of an inactive being with the idea of a cause. Suppose, too, that we could conceive how a property might pass from one body to another. Even then, have all their strained reasoning and extravagant assumptions enabled them to explain how a single animal or plant body is produced mechanically? Can they explain sounds, tastes, smells, or colors by the laws of motion? Can they explain the regular course of things by those laws? Have they used physical principles to explain the fitness and design of even the least significant parts of the universe? But suppose we set aside Matter and bodily causes, and accept only the power of an All-perfect Mind. Do not all the effects of nature then become easy to understand? If the phenomena are nothing but ideas, God is a spirit, while Matter is an unintelligent being that perceives nothing. If the phenomena demonstrate unlimited power in their cause, God is active and all-powerful, while Matter is an inert mass. If we can never sufficiently admire their order, regularity, and usefulness, God is infinitely wise and provident, while Matter has no plan or design. Surely these are great advantages in physics. And when people think of God as distant, they are naturally inclined to be careless about their moral actions. They would be more careful if they thought he was immediately present and acting on their minds, without Matter or unthinking secondary causes coming between them. Then consider metaphysics. Suppose that only spirits and ideas exist. What difficulties and endless inquiries we escape! These concern abstract being, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures, substance and property, and the principle of individuation. They also concern whether Matter can think, the origin of ideas, and how two independent substances as different as spirit and Matter could act on each other. We escape difficulties and inquiries about these and countless other similar questions. Even mathematics becomes much clearer and easier if we reject the absolute existence of extended things. The most shocking paradoxes and complicated theories in mathematics depend on the infinite divisibility of finite extension. And that divisibility depends on the assumption that extended things exist absolutely. But why dwell on the individual sciences? Is not the opposition to all science, that frenzy of ancient and modern Skeptics, built on the same foundation? Can you produce even one argument against the reality of bodily things, or for the claim that we are utterly ignorant of their nature, that does not assume their reality consists in an absolute existence outside the mind? On that assumption, we must admit that the objections based on the changing colors of a pigeon’s neck, or an oar’s appearance of being broken in water, carry weight. But these and similar objections vanish if we do not claim that absolute external originals exist. Instead, we place the reality of things in ideas. These ideas are indeed fleeting and changeable, but they do not change at random. They change according to the fixed order of nature. That order gives things the constancy and truth that safeguard all the concerns of life and distinguish what is real from the irregular visions of the imagination.

HYL. I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement, what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be avoided by that single notion of IMMATERIALISM!

HYL. I agree with everything you have just said. I must admit that nothing could make me more inclined to accept your view than the advantages I see in it. I am lazy by nature, and your view would greatly shorten the work of acquiring knowledge. Think of all the doubts, hypotheses, distracting mazes, fields of debate, and oceans of false learning that may be avoided by that single idea of IMMATERIALISM!

PHIL. After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You may remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism. This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the ABSOLUTE existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same notion has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued in its consequences, and all objections against it cleared. Can there be a greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true opinion and yet be false?

PHIL. After all, is there anything else left to do? You may remember your promise to accept the opinion that proved closest to Common Sense and furthest from Scepticism. By your own admission, that opinion denies Matter, or the ABSOLUTE existence of physical things. Nor is that all. The same idea has been proved in several ways, considered from different angles, and followed through to its consequences. And all objections to it have been cleared up. Could there be greater evidence of its truth? Could an opinion have all the marks of a true opinion and still be false?

HYL. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects. But, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full assent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty will occur hereafter?

HYL. I admit that, for now, I am completely satisfied in every respect. But how can I be sure that I will continue to agree fully with your view? How can I be sure that no unforeseen objection or difficulty will arise later?

PHIL. Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once evidently proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or difficulties it may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable quantities, of the angle of contact, of the asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the Providence of God, because there may be some particular things which you know not how to reconcile with it? If there are difficulties ATTENDING IMMATERIALISM, there are at the same time direct and evident proofs of it. But for the existence of Matter there is not one proof, and far more numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are those mighty difficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what they are; something which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never yield it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly and solidly soever demonstrated.

PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, do you withhold agreement in other cases once a point has been clearly proved? Do you withhold it because there may be objections or difficulties? Consider the difficulties surrounding incommensurable quantities, the angle of contact, asymptotes to curves, and the like. Are these enough to make you resist a mathematical proof? Or will you disbelieve in the providence of God because you cannot reconcile some particular things with it? If there are difficulties with immaterialism, there are also direct and clear proofs of it. But there is not one proof for the existence of Matter. And there are far more numerous and insurmountable objections to it. But where are the great difficulties you insist on? Alas, you do not know where or what they are. They are merely something that may possibly arise later. If that is enough reason to withhold your full agreement, you should never fully agree with any proposition. You should not agree, however free from objections or however clearly and firmly proved it may be.

HYL. You have satisfied me, Philonous.

HYL. You've satisfied me, Philonous.

PHIL. But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider: That which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be proof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the MATERIALISTS. Be not deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you cannot conceive it easier by the help of MATERIALISM, it is plain it can be no objection against IMMATERIALISM. Had you proceeded all along by this rule, you would probably have spared yourself abundance of trouble in objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge you to shew one that is explained by Matter: nay, which is not more unintelligible with than without that supposition; and consequently makes rather AGAINST than FOR it. You should consider, in each particular, whether the difficulty arises from the NON-EXISTENCE OF MATTER. If it doth not, you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty against IMMATERIALISM. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will find this to have been often, if not always, the case. You should likewise take heed not to argue on a PETITIO PRINCIPII. One is apt to say—The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things, rather than the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in the productions of our ideas? But is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such external substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the question? But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism which is called IGNORATIO ELENCHI. You talked often as if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible Things. Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than I am. And it is you who doubt; I should have said, positively deny it. Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by the senses, is, on the principles I embrace, a real being; but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend for is an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed SOMEWHAT), which is quite stripped of all sensible qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the mind. Remember I say, that it is not any object which is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c. For all these things I affirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever. Think on these points; let them be attentively considered and still kept in view. Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question; without which your objections will always be wide of the mark, and, instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they have been) against your own notions.

PHIL. But consider this, so you can answer all future objections. A difficulty that applies equally to two opposing views cannot disprove either one. Whenever you encounter a difficulty, try to solve it using the materialists' theory. Do not be misled by words. Examine your own thoughts. If materialism does not make the difficulty easier to understand, then clearly it cannot be an objection to immaterialism. If you had followed this rule all along, you would probably have saved yourself much trouble in raising objections. Of all your difficulties, I challenge you to show me one that matter explains. Indeed, I challenge you to show me one that is not harder to understand with matter than without it. So each difficulty counts against matter rather than in its favor. In each case, you should consider whether the difficulty arises from the nonexistence of matter. If it does not, you might as well argue against divine foreknowledge from the infinite divisibility of extension. Yet, on reflection, I believe you will find that this has often, if not always, been the case. You should also take care not to beg the question, or commit a petitio principii. You might say: Unknown substances should be regarded as real things, rather than the ideas in our minds. Who can say that an unthinking external substance does not help produce our ideas, as a cause or instrument? But does this argument not assume that such external substances exist? And is that assumption not begging the question? Above all, beware of misleading yourself with the common fallacy called ignoratio elenchi, or missing the point. You often spoke as if you thought I denied the existence of things perceived by the senses. In truth, no one can be more completely certain of their existence than I am. You are the one who doubts their existence. I should say, you positively deny it. Under the principles I accept, everything seen, felt, heard, or otherwise perceived by the senses is real. But under your principles, it is not. Remember that the matter you defend is an unknown something, if it can indeed be called something. It has been stripped of all sensible qualities. It cannot be perceived by the senses or grasped by the mind. Remember, I say, that matter is not any object that is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, and so on. I affirm that all these things exist. But I do deny that their existence is separate from being perceived, or that they exist outside every mind. Think about these points. Consider them carefully and keep them in view. Otherwise, you will not understand what is at issue. Without that understanding, your objections will always miss the mark. They may even be directed against your own ideas rather than mine, as they have been more than once.

HYL. I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from agreeing with you more than this same MISTAKING THE QUESTION. In denying Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for it. What think you, therefore, of retaining the name MATTER, and applying it to SENSIBLE THINGS? This may be done without any change in your sentiments: and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion.

HYL. I must admit, Philonous, that nothing seems to have kept me from agreeing with you more than this MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE QUESTION. When you deny Matter, at first I am tempted to think you deny the things we see and feel. But on reflection, I find no reason to think so. What do you think, then, of keeping the name MATTER and applying it to SENSIBLE THINGS? You could do this without changing your views. And believe me, it might help some people accept your views. They may be more shocked by a change in words than by a change in opinion.

PHIL. With all my heart: retain the word MATTER, and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for an expression. MATTER, or MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the TERMS SENSIBLE, SUBSTANCE, BODY, STUFF, and the like, are retained, the word MATTER should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general confused term.

PHIL. Gladly. Keep the word MATTER and apply it to the objects of the senses, if you please. But do not claim that those objects exist apart from being perceived. I will never quarrel with you over a word. MATTER and MATERIAL SUBSTANCE are terms introduced by philosophers. As philosophers use them, the terms imply a kind of independence, or existence apart from being perceived by a mind. But ordinary people never use them, except, if they do, to mean the immediate objects of the senses. So one would think the word MATTER would never be missed in ordinary conversation. That is, as long as we keep the names of all particular things, along with terms like SENSIBLE, SUBSTANCE, BODY, and STUFF. And in philosophical discussion, it seems best to leave MATTER out altogether. For perhaps nothing has done more to encourage and strengthen the mind’s corrupt tendency toward Atheism than using that general, confused term.

HYL. Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the word MATTER as I please, and annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind. I freely own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than SPIRIT. But I have been so long accustomed to the term MATTER that I know not how to part with it: to say, there is no MATTER in the world, is still shocking to me. Whereas to say—There is no MATTER, if by that term be meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if by MATTER is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists in being perceived, then there is MATTER:—THIS distinction gives it quite another turn; and men will come into your notions with small difficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. For, after all, the controversy about MATTER in the strict acceptation of it, lies altogether between you and the philosophers: whose principles, I acknowledge, are not near so natural, or so agreeable to the common sense of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either desire or shun but as it makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of our happiness or misery. But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Existence; or with unknown entities, ABSTRACTED FROM ALL RELATION TO US? It is evident, things regard us only as they are pleasing or displeasing: and they can please or displease only so far forth as they are perceived. Farther, therefore, we are not concerned; and thus far you leave things as you found them. Yet still there is something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I do not now think with the Philosophers; nor yet altogether with the vulgar. I would know how the case stands in that respect; precisely, what you have added to, or altered in my former notions.

HYL. Well, Philonous, I am willing to give up the idea of an unthinking substance outside the mind. But I think you should let me use the word MATTER as I please. I would use it to mean a collection of sensible qualities that exist only in the mind. I freely admit that, strictly speaking, there is no substance other than SPIRIT. But I have used the word MATTER for so long that I do not know how to give it up. It still shocks me to say that there is no MATTER in the world. But consider this way of putting it: There is no MATTER if the word means an unthinking substance existing outside the mind. But if MATTER means a sensible thing whose existence consists in being perceived, then there is MATTER. This distinction puts the matter in quite a different light. People will accept your ideas with little difficulty when they are presented that way. After all, the dispute about MATTER in the strict sense is entirely between you and the philosophers. I admit that their principles are not nearly as natural as yours. Nor do their principles agree as well as yours with common sense and Holy Scripture. We desire or avoid things only because they make, or we think they make, some part of our happiness or misery. But what do happiness or misery, joy or grief, pleasure or pain have to do with Absolute Existence? What do they have to do with unknown entities, CONSIDERED APART FROM ALL RELATION TO US? Clearly, things concern us only insofar as they are pleasing or displeasing. And they can please or displease us only insofar as they are perceived. So we are concerned with things no further than that. And as far as we are concerned with them, you leave things as you found them. Yet there is still something new in this doctrine. Clearly, I no longer think as the philosophers do. But I do not think entirely as ordinary people do, either. I want to know where I stand in that respect. Exactly what have you added to or changed in my former ideas?

PHIL. I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours tend only to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers:—the former being of opinion, that THOSE THINGS THEY IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVE ARE THE REAL THINGS; and the latter, that THE THINGS IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVED ARE IDEAS, WHICH EXIST ONLY IN THE MIND. Which two notions put together, do, in effect, constitute the substance of what I advance.

PHIL. I do not claim to be putting forward new ideas. I seek only to unite and clarify a truth previously shared between ordinary people and philosophers. Ordinary people believe that THE THINGS THEY DIRECTLY PERCEIVE ARE REAL THINGS. Philosophers believe that THE THINGS DIRECTLY PERCEIVED ARE IDEAS THAT EXIST ONLY IN THE MIND. Together, these two beliefs make up the substance of what I am arguing.

HYL. I have been a long time distrusting my senses: methought I saw things by a dim light and through false glasses. Now the glasses are removed and a new light breaks in upon my understanding. I am clearly convinced that I see things in their native forms, and am no longer in pain about their UNKNOWN NATURES OR ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. This is the state I find myself in at present; though, indeed, the course that brought me to it I do not yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the same principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually do; and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their philosophical Scepticism: but, in the end, your conclusions are directly opposite to theirs.

HYL. For a long time, I have distrusted my senses. I thought I saw things in dim light and through distorting glasses. Now the glasses are gone, and a new light has dawned on my understanding. I am convinced that I see things clearly as they really are. I am no longer troubled by their UNKNOWN NATURES OR ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. That is how I feel now, though I still do not fully understand how I came to this point. You began with the same principles that Academics, Cartesians, and similar schools usually follow. For a long time, it seemed as if you were arguing for their philosophical Skepticism. But in the end, your conclusions are directly opposed to theirs.

PHIL. You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent, as well as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of GRAVITATION. just so, the same Principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense.

PHIL. Look, Hylas, at the water in that fountain. It is forced upward in a round column to a certain height. There, the column breaks apart, and the water falls back into the basin it rose from. Both its rise and its fall come from the same constant law or principle of gravity. In just the same way, the principles that at first seem to lead to skepticism bring people back to common sense when followed far enough.