The First Dialogue

58 min

PHILONOUS. Good morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to find you abroad so early.

PHILONOUS. Good morning, Hylas. I didn't expect to see you out so early.

HYLAS. It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden.

HYLAS. It is unusual, I admit. But my thoughts were so occupied by a subject I discussed last night that I could not sleep. So I decided to get up and take a walk in the garden.

PHIL. It happened well, to let you see what innocent and agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a pleasanter time of the day, or a more delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those wild but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers, the gentle influence of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of nature inspire the soul with secret transports; its faculties too being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for those meditations, which the solitude of a garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally dispose us to. But I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts: for you seemed very intent on something.

PHIL. It was fortunate, since it lets you see the innocent and pleasant pleasures you miss every morning. Could there be a more pleasant time of day, or a more delightful season? The purple sky and the birds’ wild but sweet songs fill the soul with quiet delight. So do the fragrant blossoms on trees and flowers, the gentle warmth of the rising sun, and a thousand unnamed beauties of nature. At this hour, the mind is fresh and lively, ready for the thoughts that a quiet garden and a peaceful morning naturally inspire. But I’m afraid I’m interrupting your thoughts. You seemed very absorbed in something.

HYL. It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you will permit me to go on in the same vein; not that I would by any means deprive myself of your company, for my thoughts always flow more easily in conversation with a friend, than when I am alone: but my request is, that you would suffer me to impart my reflexions to you.

HYL. That's true, I was, and I would be grateful if you let me continue in the same way. I don't want to give up your company by any means. My thoughts always flow more easily when I talk with a friend than when I am alone. I only ask that you let me share my thoughts with you.

PHIL. With all my heart, it is what I should have requested myself if you had not prevented me.

PHIL. Gladly. I would have asked for it myself if you hadn't asked first.

HYL. I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages, through an affectation of being distinguished from the vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, pretended either to believe nothing at all, or to believe the most extravagant things in the world. This however might be borne, if their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after them some consequences of general disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief lieth here; that when men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge professing an entire ignorance of all things, or advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly received principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicions concerning the most important truths, which they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable.

HYL. I was thinking about the strange fate of certain men in every age. Some want to distinguish themselves from ordinary people, while others have some inexplicable way of thinking. They claim either to believe nothing at all or to believe the most outlandish things in the world. Yet this might be tolerable if their paradoxes and skepticism did not have consequences harmful to humanity in general. But the harm is this: people with less leisure see men supposedly devoted entirely to the pursuit of knowledge profess complete ignorance of everything. Or they see those men put forward ideas that conflict with plain, commonly accepted principles. As a result, they will be tempted to doubt the most important truths, which they had until then held sacred and beyond question.

PHIL. I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of the affected doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical conceits of others. I am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have quitted several of the sublime notions I had got in their schools for vulgar opinions. And I give it you on my word; since this revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common sense, I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easily comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and riddle.

PHIL. I completely agree with you about the harmful effects of some philosophers' affected doubts and others' fanciful ideas. Lately, I have come to think this way so strongly that I have given up several lofty notions I learned in their schools. I have replaced them with common opinions. And I give you my word, since turning from metaphysical notions to the plain guidance of nature and common sense, I find my understanding remarkably enlightened. I can now easily understand many things that were once all mystery and riddles to me.

HYL. I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I heard of you.

HYL. I'm glad to find there was no truth in what I heard about you.

PHIL. Pray, what were those?

PHIL. What were those?

HYL. You were represented, in last night's conversation, as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as MATERIAL SUBSTANCE in the world.

HYL. In last night's conversation, you were described as holding the most extravagant opinion ever to enter a human mind. That opinion is that there is no such thing as MATERIAL SUBSTANCE in the world.

PHIL. That there is no such thing as what PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.

PHIL. I am firmly convinced that what philosophers call material substance does not exist. But if I were shown anything absurd or skeptical in this view, I would abandon it. I would then have the same reason to abandon it that I believe I now have to reject the opposite view.

HYL. What I can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to Common Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as MATTER?

HYL. What could be more absurd, more contrary to common sense, or more obviously skeptical than believing that MATTER does not exist?

PHIL. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater sceptic, and maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to Common Sense, than I who believe no such thing?

PHIL. Hold on, Hylas. What if your belief that there is makes you more of a sceptic than I am? What if it also leads you to accept more paradoxes and contradictions of common sense than I do, since I believe no such thing?

HYL. You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I should ever be obliged to give up my opinion in this point.

HYL. You might as well try to persuade me that a part is greater than the whole. I will never believe that I must give up my opinion on this point to avoid absurdity and skepticism.

PHIL. Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, which upon examination shall appear most agreeable to Common Sense, and remote from Scepticism?

PHIL. Well then, will you accept as true the opinion that, on examination, best agrees with common sense and is furthest from skepticism?

HYL. With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear what you have to say.

HYL. Gladly. Since you want to argue about the most obvious things in nature, I’m willing to hear you out this once.

PHIL. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a SCEPTIC?

PHIL. Hylas, what do you mean by a skeptic?

HYL. I mean what all men mean—one that doubts of everything.

HYL. I mean what everyone means: someone who doubts everything.

PHIL. He then who entertains no doubts concerning some particular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a sceptic.

PHIL. So someone who has no doubts about a particular point cannot be considered a skeptic about that point.

HYL. I agree with you.

PHIL. Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or negative side of a question?

PHIL. Does doubting mean accepting either the affirmative or the negative side of a question?

HYL. In neither; for whoever understands English cannot but know that DOUBTING signifies a suspense between both.

HYL. Neither. Anyone who understands English must know that DOUBTING means being undecided between the two.

PHIL. He then that denies any point, can no more be said to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of assurance.

PHIL. So someone who denies a point is no more in doubt about it than someone who affirms it with equal certainty.

HYL. True.

PHIL. And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to be esteemed a sceptic than the other.

PHIL. And so, his denial gives us no more reason to consider him a skeptic than the other person.

HYL. I acknowledge it.

HYL. I admit it.

PHIL. How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you pronounce me A SCEPTIC, because I deny what you affirm, to wit, the existence of Matter? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as peremptory in my denial, as you in your affirmation.

PHIL. Then why, Hylas, do you call me A SCEPTIC because I deny what you affirm, namely, the existence of Matter? For all you know, I am as certain in my denial as you are in your affirmation.

HYL. Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my definition; but every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on. I said indeed that a SCEPTIC was one who doubted of everything; but I should have added, or who denies the reality and truth of things.

HYL. Wait, Philonous, my definition was a little off. But not every mistake a person makes in conversation needs to be dwelled on. I did say that a SCEPTIC was someone who doubted everything. But I should have added that a SCEPTIC is also someone who denies the reality and truth of things.

PHIL. What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences? But these you know are universal intellectual notions, and consequently independent of Matter. The denial therefore of this doth not imply the denying them.

PHIL. What things? Do you mean the principles and theorems of the sciences? But you know that these are universal concepts of the mind. So they are independent of Matter. Denying Matter, therefore, does not mean denying them.

HYL. I grant it. But are there no other things? What think you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not this sufficient to denominate a man a SCEPTIC?

HYL. I agree. But are there no other things? What about distrusting the senses, denying the real existence of things perceived by the senses, or claiming to know nothing about them? Is that not enough to call a man a SCEPTIC?

PHIL. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the greatest SCEPTIC?

PHIL. Shall we examine which of us denies the reality of things perceived by the senses, or claims to know the least about them? If I understand you correctly, that person should be considered the greatest SKEPTIC.

HYL. That is what I desire.

HYL. That is what I want.

PHIL. What mean you by Sensible Things?

PHIL. What do you mean by sensible things?

HYL. Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine that I mean anything else?

HYL. The things we perceive through our senses. Can you imagine I mean anything else?

PHIL. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. Are those things only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be said to be SENSIBLE which are perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?

PHIL. Forgive me, Hylas, for wanting to understand your ideas clearly, since this may greatly shorten our inquiry. Let me ask you one more question. Do the senses perceive only things that are perceived directly? Or can things perceived indirectly, through other things, properly be called SENSIBLE?

HYL. I do not sufficiently understand you.

HYL. I don't quite understand you.

PHIL. In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters; but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt: but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.

PHIL. When I read a book, I directly perceive the letters. Through the letters, ideas of God, virtue, truth, and so on come to mind. There is no doubt that the letters are things perceived by the senses. But I want to know whether you think the ideas they suggest are also perceived by the senses.

HYL. No, certainly: it were absurd to think GOD or VIRTUE sensible things; though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an arbitrary connexion.

HYL. No, certainly not. It would be absurd to think that God or virtue can be perceived by the senses. Though signs we can perceive may represent them and bring them to mind, those signs have an arbitrary connection to them.

PHIL. It seems then, that by SENSIBLE THINGS you mean those only which can be perceived IMMEDIATELY by sense?

PHIL. So it seems that by SENSIBLE THINGS you mean only things that can be perceived IMMEDIATELY through the senses?

HYL. Right.

PHIL. Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing?

PHIL. Does it not follow from this that the cause of the different colors cannot be seen or perceived by the senses? Even though I see one part of the sky as red and another as blue, my reason clearly tells me that there must be some cause for the difference. Yet that cause cannot be called a sensible thing or perceived by sight.

HYL. It doth.

HYL. It does.

PHIL. In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds?

PHIL. Similarly, although I hear a variety of sounds, I cannot be said to hear what causes those sounds?

HYL. You cannot.

PHIL. And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of its heat or weight?

PHIL. And when I touch something and find it hot and heavy, I cannot truly or properly say that I feel the cause of its heat or weight?

HYL. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you once for all, that by SENSIBLE THINGS I mean those only which are perceived by sense; and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive IMMEDIATELY: for they make no inferences. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.

HYL. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I will tell you once and for all what I mean by SENSIBLE THINGS. I mean only things perceived by the senses. In fact, the senses perceive nothing that they do not perceive IMMEDIATELY, because they make no inferences. The senses perceive only effects and appearances. So deducing causes or occasions from them is entirely a matter of reason.

PHIL. This point then is agreed between us—That SENSIBLE THINGS ARE THOSE ONLY WHICH ARE IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVED BY SENSE. You will farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside light, and colours, and figures; or by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate, anything beside tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by the touch, more than tangible qualities.

PHIL. So we agree on this point: SENSIBLE THINGS ARE ONLY THOSE WE PERCEIVE DIRECTLY THROUGH THE SENSES. Now tell me whether we see anything directly besides light, colors, and shapes. Do we hear anything besides sounds, taste anything besides tastes, or smell anything besides odors? Do we perceive anything by touch besides qualities we can feel?

HYL. We do not.

PHIL. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible?

PHIL. So it seems that if you take away all qualities that can be sensed, nothing remains that can be sensed?

HYL. I grant it.

HYL. I agree.

PHIL. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?

PHIL. So sensible things are nothing more than sensible qualities or combinations of sensible qualities?

HYL. Nothing else.

PHIL. HEAT then is a sensible thing?

PHIL. So heat is something we can perceive through our senses?

HYL. Certainly.

PHIL. Doth the REALITY of sensible things consist in being perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind?

PHIL. Does the REALITY of things we perceive consist in their being perceived? Or is their reality distinct from being perceived and unrelated to the mind?

HYL. To EXIST is one thing, and to be PERCEIVED is another.

PHIL. I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being perceived?

PHIL. I am speaking only of things we can perceive. I ask whether, by their real existence, you mean that they exist outside the mind, independently of being perceived.

HYL. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any relation to, their being perceived.

HYL. I mean a real, absolute existence, distinct from and unrelated to their being perceived.

PHIL. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without the mind?

PHIL. So, if heat is real, it must exist outside the mind?

HYL. It must.

PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there any reason why we should attribute it to some, and deny it to others? And if there be, pray let me know that reason.

PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, is real existence equally compatible with all the degrees of heat we perceive? Or is there a reason to attribute real existence to some degrees of heat and deny it to others? If there is, please tell me the reason.

HYL. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it.

HYL. Whatever degree of heat we feel, we can be sure that the same degree of heat exists in the object causing it.

PHIL. What! the greatest as well as the least?

PHIL. What! The greatest as well as the smallest?

HYL. I tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both. They are both perceived by sense; nay, the greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived; and consequently, if there is any difference, we are more certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a lesser degree.

HYL. I tell you, the reasoning is clearly the same for both. Both are perceived by the senses. In fact, the greater degree of heat is more clearly perceived. So, if there is any difference, we are more certain that the greater heat really exists than we can be that the lesser heat does.

PHIL. But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very great pain?

PHIL. But isn't the most intense heat a very great pain?

HYL. No one can deny it.

PHIL. And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure?

PHIL. And can anything that cannot perceive feel pain or pleasure?

HYL. No, certainly.

HYL. No, of course not.

PHIL. Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed with sense and perception?

PHIL. Is your material substance a being without sensation, or does it have sensation and perception?

HYL. It is senseless without doubt.

HYL. It cannot feel anything, without a doubt.

PHIL. It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?

PHIL. So it cannot feel pain?

HYL. By no means.

HYL. Not at all.

PHIL. Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain?

PHIL. And so, not of the greatest heat we feel, since you admit that it causes considerable pain?

HYL. I grant it.

HYL. I agree.

PHIL. What shall we say then of your external object; is it a material Substance, or no?

PHIL. So what should we say about your external object? Is it a material substance or not?

HYL. It is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it.

HYL. It is a material substance in which the qualities we perceive through our senses exist.

PHIL. How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot in a material substance? I desire you would clear this point.

PHIL. How, then, can intense heat exist in it, since you admit it cannot exist in a material substance? Please explain this point.

HYL. Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it.

HYL. Wait, Philonous. I fear I was wrong to agree that intense heat is a pain. It seems instead that pain is distinct from heat and is a result or effect of it.

PHIL. Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct sensations?

PHIL. When you put your hand near the fire, do you feel one simple, uniform sensation or two distinct sensations?

HYL. But one simple sensation.

HYL. Only one simple sensation.

PHIL. Is not the heat immediately perceived?

PHIL. Don't you perceive the heat directly?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. And the pain?

HYL. True.

PHIL. Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same time, and the fire affects you only with one simple or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain; and, consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.

PHIL. You directly perceive both at the same time, and the fire gives you only one simple, undivided idea. So this same simple idea is both the intense heat you directly perceive and the pain. Therefore, the intense heat you directly perceive is nothing distinct from a particular kind of pain.

HYL. It seems so.

PHIL. Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure.

PHIL. Again, Hylas, try to imagine an intense sensation without pain or pleasure.

HYL. I cannot.

HYL. I can't.

PHIL. Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells? &c.

PHIL. Or can you imagine sensory pain or pleasure in general, apart from any particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells, and so on?

HYL. I do not find that I can.

HYL. I don't think I can.

PHIL. Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense degree?

PHIL. So doesn't it follow that felt pain is nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas when they are intense?

HYL. It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it.

HYL. That cannot be denied. And honestly, I am beginning to suspect that extreme heat can exist only in a mind that perceives it.

PHIL. What! are you then in that sceptical state of suspense, between affirming and denying?

PHIL. What! Are you then suspended in doubt, unable either to affirm or deny it?

HYL. I think I may be positive in the point. A very violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind.

HYL. I think I can be certain about this. Very intense and painful heat cannot exist outside the mind.

PHIL. It hath not therefore according to you, any REAL being?

PHIL. So, according to you, it has no REAL existence?

HYL. I own it.

HYL. I admit it.

PHIL. Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in nature really hot?

PHIL. Is it therefore certain that no physical object in nature is really hot?

HYL. I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I only say, there is no such thing as an intense real heat.

HYL. I have not denied that there is real heat in bodies. I only say that there is no such thing as intense real heat.

PHIL. But, did you not say before that all degrees of heat were equally real; or, if there was any difference, that the greater were more undoubtedly real than the lesser?

PHIL. But didn't you say before that all degrees of heat were equally real? Or that, if there was any difference, greater degrees of heat were more undoubtedly real than lesser degrees?

HYL. True: but it was because I did not then consider the ground there is for distinguishing between them, which I now plainly see. And it is this: because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of painful sensation; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being; it follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance. But this is no reason why we should deny heat in an inferior degree to exist in such a substance.

HYL. True, but I had not considered the reason for distinguishing between them, which I now see clearly. The reason is this: intense heat is nothing more than a particular kind of painful sensation. Pain can exist only in a being that perceives. So intense heat cannot really exist in a physical substance that does not perceive. But this is no reason to deny that a lesser degree of heat can exist in such a substance.

PHIL. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which exist only in the mind from those which exist without it?

PHIL. But how can we tell which degrees of heat exist only in the mind and which exist outside it?

HYL. That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to think the same of them.

HYL. That is not difficult. You know that even the slightest pain cannot exist without being perceived. So any degree of heat that is painful exists only in the mind. But nothing forces us to think the same of all other degrees of heat.

PHIL. I think you granted before that no unperceiving being was capable of pleasure, any more than of pain.

PHIL. I think you agreed earlier that a being incapable of perception cannot experience pleasure any more than pain.

HYL. I did.

PHIL. And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than what causes uneasiness, a pleasure?

PHIL. And isn't warmth, or a milder degree of heat than what causes discomfort, a pleasure?

HYL. What then?

PHIL. Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an unperceiving substance, or body.

PHIL. So it cannot exist outside the mind in a substance or body that does not perceive.

HYL. So it seems.

HYL. It seems so.

PHIL. Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that are not painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking substance; may we not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any degree of heat whatsoever?

PHIL. So both painful and painless degrees of heat can exist only in a thinking substance. May we then conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable of having any degree of heat?

HYL. On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain.

HYL. On second thought, I don't think it's as clear that warmth is pleasant as that intense heat is painful.

PHIL. I do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small pleasure, it serves to make good my conclusion.

PHIL. I do not claim that warmth gives as much pleasure as heat causes pain. But if you agree that warmth is even a small pleasure, that is enough to support my conclusion.

HYL. I could rather call it an INDOLENCE. It seems to be nothing more than a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that such a quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking substance, I hope you will not deny.

HYL. I would rather call it INDIFFERENCE. It seems to be nothing more than the absence of both pain and pleasure. And I hope you will not deny that an unthinking substance may have such a quality or state.

PHIL. If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a gentle degree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you otherwise than by appealing to your own sense. But what think you of cold?

PHIL. If you insist that warmth, or mild heat, is not a pleasure, I can only appeal to your own senses to convince you otherwise. But what do you think about cold?

HYL. The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of cold is a pain; for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive a great uneasiness: it cannot therefore exist without the mind; but a lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser degree of heat.

HYL. The same as I think of heat. Intense cold is pain, because feeling very cold is feeling great discomfort. So intense cold cannot exist outside the mind. But a lesser degree of cold may exist outside the mind, just as a lesser degree of heat may.

PHIL. Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to our own, we perceive a moderate degree of heat, must be concluded to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them; and those, upon whose application we feel a like degree of cold, must be thought to have cold in them.

PHIL. Therefore, when an object touches our bodies and makes us feel moderate heat, we must conclude that the object has moderate heat or warmth in it. Likewise, when an object makes us feel the same degree of cold, we must think it has cold in it.

HYL. They must.

PHIL. Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an absurdity?

PHIL. Can any belief be true if it necessarily leads a person to an absurd conclusion?

HYL. Without doubt it cannot.

HYL. It certainly cannot.

PHIL. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at the same time both cold and warm?

PHIL. Isn't it absurd to think that the same thing could be both cold and warm at the same time?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other?

PHIL. Suppose one of your hands is hot and the other is cold. Now suppose you put both hands at once into the same container of lukewarm water. Wouldn't the water feel cold to one hand and warm to the other?

HYL. It will.

PHIL. Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time, that is, according to your own concession, to believe an absurdity?

PHIL. So, by your principles, shouldn't we conclude that it is really both cold and warm at the same time? And, as you admit, wouldn't that mean believing something absurd?

HYL. I confess it seems so.

HYL. I admit it seems so.

PHIL. Consequently, the principles themselves are false, since you have granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity.

PHIL. So the principles themselves are false, since you have agreed that no true principle leads to an absurd conclusion.

HYL. But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to say, THERE IS NO HEAT IN THE FIRE?

HYL. But, after all, could anything be more absurd than saying THERE IS NO HEAT IN THE FIRE?

PHIL. To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in two cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment?

PHIL. To make the point even clearer, tell me: Shouldn't we make the same judgment in two exactly similar cases?

HYL. We ought.

HYL. We should.

PHIL. When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and divide the fibres of your flesh?

PHIL. When a pin pricks your finger, doesn't it tear and separate the fibers of your flesh?

HYL. It doth.

HYL. It does.

PHIL. And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more?

PHIL. And when a coal burns your finger, does it do any more?

HYL. It doth not.

HYL. It does not.

PHIL. Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation itself occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the pin; you should not, conformably to what you have now granted, judge the sensation occasioned by the fire, or anything like it, to be in the fire.

PHIL. You do not think the sensation caused by the pin, or anything like that sensation, is in the pin. So, based on what you have just granted, you should not think the sensation caused by the fire, or anything like that sensation, is in the fire.

HYL. Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point, and acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations existing in our minds. But there still remain qualities enough to secure the reality of external things.

HYL. Well, since it must be so, I am willing to concede the point. I agree that heat and cold are only sensations in our minds. But there are still enough other qualities to establish the reality of external things.

PHIL. But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear that the case is the same with regard to all other sensible qualities, and that they can no more be supposed to exist without the mind, than heat and cold?

PHIL. But what will you say, Hylas, if the same proves true of all other qualities perceived by the senses? What if those qualities can no more be supposed to exist outside the mind than heat and cold can?

HYL. Then indeed you will have done something to the purpose; but that is what I despair of seeing proved.

HYL. Then you really will have accomplished something worthwhile. But I despair of ever seeing that proved.

PHIL. Let us examine them in order. What think you of TASTES, do they exist without the mind, or no?

PHIL. Let us examine them one by one. What do you think about TASTES? Do they exist outside the mind or not?

HYL. Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet, or wormwood bitter?

HYL. Can anyone in their right mind doubt that sugar is sweet or wormwood is bitter?

PHIL. Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not?

PHIL. Tell me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a kind of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or not?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain?

PHIL. And isn't bitterness a kind of discomfort or pain?

HYL. I grant it.

HYL. I agree.

PHIL. If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal substances existing without the mind, how can sweetness and bitterness, that is, Pleasure and pain, agree to them?

PHIL. So if sugar and wormwood are physical substances that cannot think and exist outside the mind, how can sweetness and bitterness, that is, pleasure and pain, belong to them?

HYL. Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was delude time. You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness at were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to which simply, that they were. Whereas I should have thus distinguished: those qualities, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pair existing in the external objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, as perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. What say you to this?

HYL. Wait, Philonous. I now see what misled me. You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness and the like, were particular kinds of pleasure and pain. I simply answered that they were. But I should have made this distinction: as we perceive them, those qualities are pleasures or pains, not qualities existing in external objects. So we must not conclude that there is no heat in the fire or sweetness in the sugar. We can only conclude that heat and sweetness, as we perceive them, are not in the fire or sugar. What do you say to that?

PHIL. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be, THE THINGS WE IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVE BY OUR SENSES. Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of as distinct from these, I know nothing of them, neither do they at all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive, and assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what use can be made of this to your present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning those qualities which are perceived by the senses), do not exist without the mind?

PHIL. I say that is beside the point. Our discussion has been entirely about sensible things, which you defined as THE THINGS WE IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVE BY OUR SENSES. If you speak of other qualities as distinct from these, I know nothing about them. Nor do they have any bearing on the question at issue. You may, of course, claim to have discovered certain qualities that you do not perceive. You may also assert that these imperceptible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But I cannot see how that helps your present argument. Tell me once more, then: do you admit that heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness do not exist outside the mind? I mean those qualities as perceived by the senses.

HYL. I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up the cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it sounds oddly, to say that sugar is not sweet.

HYL. I see there is no point in resisting, so I give up my position on the qualities we have mentioned. Though I admit, it sounds odd to say that sugar is not sweet.

PHIL. But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along with you: that which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a distempered palate, appear bitter. And, nothing can be plainer than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same food; since that which one man delights in, another abhors. And how could this be, if the taste was something really inherent in the food?

PHIL. But to make this clearer, consider that something normally sweet will taste bitter to someone with an unhealthy palate. And nothing is clearer than that different people perceive different tastes in the same food. One person delights in a food that another hates. How could this be if the taste were really inherent in the food?

HYL. I acknowledge I know not how.

HYL. I admit I don't know how.

PHIL. In the next place, ODOURS are to be considered. And, with regard to these, I would fain know whether what hath been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them? Are they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations?

PHIL. Next, we should consider ODOURS. Does what we have said about tastes apply equally to odours? Are they not all pleasant or unpleasant sensations?

HYL. They are.

PHIL. Can you then conceive it possible that they should exist in an unperceiving thing?

PHIL. Can you imagine that they could exist in something that does not perceive?

HYL. I cannot.

HYL. I can't.

PHIL. Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect those brute animals that feed on them out of choice, with the same smells which we perceive in them?

PHIL. Or can you imagine that filth and dung smell the same to us and to animals that choose to eat them?

HYL. By no means.

HYL. Not at all.

PHIL. May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the other forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but a perceiving substance or mind?

PHIL. May we therefore conclude that smells, like the other qualities mentioned earlier, can exist only in a perceiving substance or mind?

HYL. I think so.

PHIL. Then as to SOUNDS, what must we think of them: are they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not?

PHIL. Then what should we think about sounds? Are they really properties of external bodies, or not?

HYL. That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain from hence: because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump sends forth no sound. The air, therefore, must be thought the subject of sound.

HYL. Clearly, sounds do not exist in the bodies that produce them. A bell struck inside an air-pump chamber from which the air has been removed makes no sound. Therefore, air must be what sound exists in.

PHIL. What reason is there for that, Hylas?

PHIL. What is the reason for that, Hylas?

HYL. Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we perceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air's motion; but without some motion in the air, we never hear any sound at all.

HYL. Because when the air moves, we hear a louder or softer sound, depending on the air’s motion. But we never hear any sound without some motion in the air.

PHIL. And granting that we never hear a sound but when some motion is produced in the air, yet I do not see how you can infer from thence, that the sound itself is in the air.

PHIL. Even granting that we never hear a sound without some movement in the air, I do not see how you can conclude that the sound itself is in the air.

HYL. It is this very motion in the external air that produces in the mind the sensation of SOUND. For, striking on the drum of the ear, it causeth a vibration, which by the auditory nerves being communicated to the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called SOUND.

HYL. This very motion in the outside air produces the sensation of SOUND in the mind. It strikes the eardrum, causing a vibration. The auditory nerves carry the vibration to the brain, and the soul is then affected by the sensation called SOUND.

PHIL. What! is sound then a sensation?

PHIL. What! So sound is a sensation?

HYL. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation in the mind.

HYL. I tell you, as we perceive it, it is a particular sensation in the mind.

PHIL. And can any sensation exist without the mind?

PHIL. And can any sensation exist outside the mind?

HYL. No, certainly.

HYL. No, certainly not.

PHIL. How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the air, if by the AIR you mean a senseless substance existing without the mind?

PHIL. How, then, can sound, which is a sensation, exist in the air? By AIR, you mean a substance that cannot sense and exists outside the mind.

HYL. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it is perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive, and that which exists without us. The former, indeed, is a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory motion the air.

HYL. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as we perceive it and sound as it is in itself. In other words, you must distinguish between the sound we directly perceive and the sound that exists outside us. The sound we perceive is a particular kind of sensation. But the sound outside us is merely a vibration or wave-like motion of the air.

PHIL. I thought I had already obviated that distinction, by answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before. But, to say no more of that, are you sure then that sound is really nothing but motion?

PHIL. I thought I had already addressed that distinction when you used it in a similar case before. But, leaving that aside, are you sure that sound is really nothing but motion?

HYL. I am.

PHIL. Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth be attributed to motion?

PHIL. So can whatever is true of real sound also be truthfully said of motion?

HYL. It may.

PHIL. It is then good sense to speak of MOTION as of a thing that is LOUD, SWEET, ACUTE, or GRAVE.

PHIL. Then it makes sense to speak of MOTION as LOUD, SWEET, HIGH-PITCHED, or LOW-PITCHED.

HYL. I see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it not evident those accidents or modes belong only to sensible sound, or SOUND in the common acceptation of the word, but not to sound in the real and philosophic sense; which, as I just now told you, is nothing but a certain motion of the air?

HYL. I see that you are determined not to understand me. Isn't it clear that those qualities or properties belong only to sound as we hear it, or SOUND as commonly understood? They do not belong to sound in the true, philosophical sense. As I just told you, sound in that sense is nothing but a particular movement of the air.

PHIL. It seems then there are two sorts of sound—the one vulgar, or that which is heard, the other philosophical and real?

PHIL. So it seems there are two kinds of sound: ordinary sound, which is heard, and philosophical, real sound?

HYL. Even so.

HYL. Exactly.

PHIL. And the latter consists in motion?

PHIL. And the latter is made up of motion?

HYL. I told you so before.

HYL. I told you that before.

PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you, the idea of motion belongs? to the hearing?

PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, which sense do you think the idea of motion belongs to? Hearing?

HYL. No, certainly; but to the sight and touch.

HYL. No, certainly not, but to sight and touch.

PHIL. It should follow then, that, according to you, real sounds may possibly be SEEN OR FELT, but never HEARD.

PHIL. So, according to you, real sounds may be SEEN OR FELT, but never HEARD.

HYL. Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make a jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things. I own, indeed, the inferences you draw me into sound something oddly; but common language, you know, is framed by, and for the use of the vulgar: we must not therefore wonder if expressions adapted to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the way.

HYL. Look, Philonous, you may make fun of my opinion if you like, but that will not change the truth. I admit that the conclusions you lead me to sound rather odd. But ordinary language, as you know, is made by and for ordinary people. So we should not be surprised if expressions suited to precise philosophical ideas sound strange and unnatural.

PHIL. Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to have gained no small point, since you make so light of departing from common phrases and opinions; it being a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the common road, and most repugnant to the general sense of the world. But, can you think it no more than a philosophical paradox, to say that REAL SOUNDS ARE NEVER HEARD, and that the idea of them is obtained by some other sense? And is there nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?

PHIL. Has it come to that? I assure you, I think I have made no small gain, since you so readily abandon common expressions and opinions. A main part of our inquiry is to examine whose ideas stray furthest from common opinion and most contradict the general sense of the world. But can you think it merely a philosophical paradox to say that REAL SOUNDS ARE NEVER HEARD, and that we get the idea of them through some other sense? Is there nothing in this claim that goes against nature and the truth of things?

HYL. To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the concessions already made, I had as well grant that sounds too have no real being without the mind.

HYL. To be honest, I do not like it. And after the concessions I have already made, I might as well admit that sounds, too, have no real existence outside the mind.

PHIL. And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge the same of COLOURS.

PHIL. And I hope you will have no difficulty acknowledging the same about COLORS.

HYL. Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects?

HYL. Excuse me, but colours are very different. What could be clearer than that we see colours on objects?

PHIL. The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal Substances existing without the mind?

PHIL. I suppose the objects you mean are physical substances that exist outside the mind?

HYL. They are.

PHIL. And have true and real colours inhering in them?

PHIL. And do they have true and real colors within them?

HYL. Each visible object hath that colour which we see in it.

HYL. Each visible object has the color we see in it.

PHIL. How! is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight?

PHIL. What! Is anything visible except what we can see?

HYL. There is not.

HYL. There isn't.

PHIL. And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive immediately?

PHIL. And do we perceive anything through our senses that we do not perceive immediately?

HYL. How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? I tell you, we do not.

HYL. How many times do I have to repeat myself? I’m telling you, we don’t.

PHIL. Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more, whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses, except sensible qualities. I know you asserted there was not; but I would now be informed, whether you still persist in the same opinion.

PHIL. Be patient, my dear Hylas. Tell me once more: is anything other than sensible qualities perceived directly by the senses? I know you said there was not. But I would like to know whether you still hold that opinion.

HYL. I do.

PHIL. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality, or made up of sensible qualities?

PHIL. Is your corporeal substance a quality perceived by the senses, or is it made up of such qualities?

HYL. What a question that is! who ever thought it was?

HYL. What a question! Who ever thought it was?

PHIL. My reason for asking was, because in saying, EACH VISIBLE OBJECT HATH THAT COLOUR WHICH WE SEE IN IT, you make visible objects to be corporeal substances; which implies either that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or else that there is something besides sensible qualities perceived by sight: but, as this point was formerly agreed between us, and is still maintained by you, it is a clear consequence, that your CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE is nothing distinct from SENSIBLE QUALITIES.

PHIL. I asked because you say that EACH VISIBLE OBJECT HAS THE COLOUR WE SEE IN IT. By saying this, you make visible objects corporeal substances. That implies either that corporeal substances are sensible qualities or that sight perceives something besides sensible qualities. But we agreed on this point earlier, and you still maintain it. So it clearly follows that your CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE is nothing distinct from SENSIBLE QUALITIES.

HYL. You may draw as many absurd consequences as you please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand my own meaning.

HYL. You may draw as many absurd conclusions as you like and try to complicate the simplest things. But you will never persuade me to doubt my senses. I understand my own meaning clearly.

PHIL. I wish you would make me understand it too. But, since you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance examined, I shall urge that point no farther. Only be pleased to let me know, whether the same colours which we see exist in external bodies, or some other.

PHIL. I wish you would help me understand it too. But you are unwilling to have your idea of corporeal substance examined, so I will not press the point further. Please just tell me whether the colors we see exist in external bodies, or whether those bodies have different colors.

HYL. The very same.

HYL. Exactly the same.

PHIL. What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapour?

PHIL. What! Are the beautiful red and purple colors we see on those clouds really in the clouds? Or do you think the clouds themselves have any form other than that of a dark mist or vapor?

HYL. I must own, Philonous, those colours are not really in the clouds as they seem to be at this distance. They are only apparent colours.

HYL. I must admit, Philonous, that those colors are not really in the clouds, though they look that way from here. The colors only appear to be there.

PHIL. APPARENT call you them? how shall we distinguish these apparent colours from real?

PHIL. You call them apparent? How can we distinguish these apparent colours from real ones?

HYL. Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent which, appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach.

HYL. Very easily. Things that appear only at a distance and vanish as we approach should be considered apparent.

PHIL. And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are discovered by the most near and exact survey.

PHIL. And I suppose those discovered by the closest and most careful examination are to be considered real.

HYL. Right.

PHIL. Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a microscope, or by the naked eye?

PHIL. Can you examine something more closely and accurately with a microscope or with the naked eye?

HYL. By a microscope, doubtless.

HYL. With a microscope, of course.

PHIL. But a microscope often discovers colours in an object different from those perceived by the unassisted sight. And, in case we had microscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that no object whatsoever, viewed through them, would appear in the same colour which it exhibits to the naked eye.

PHIL. But a microscope often reveals colours in an object that differ from those seen with the naked eye. Suppose we had microscopes capable of magnifying to any degree. Then it is certain that no object viewed through them would appear the same colour as it does to the naked eye.

HYL. And what will you conclude from all this? You cannot argue that there are really and naturally no colours on objects: because by artificial managements they may be altered, or made to vanish.

HYL. And what do you conclude from all this? You cannot argue that objects do not really and naturally have colours just because artificial means can change or remove them.

PHIL. I think it may evidently be concluded from your own concessions, that all the colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish upon a more close and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a microscope. Then' as to what you say by way of prevention: I ask you whether the real and natural state of an object is better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight, or by one which is less sharp?

PHIL. I think your own concessions clearly allow us to conclude that all the colors we see with the naked eye are merely apparent, like those on clouds. They vanish when we examine them more closely and accurately through a microscope. Now, as for the objection you raise in advance, I ask you this: Is the real and natural state of an object better revealed by very sharp, penetrating vision or by less sharp vision?

HYL. By the former without doubt.

HYL. By the former, without a doubt.

PHIL. Is it not plain from DIOPTRICS that microscopes make the sight more penetrating, and represent objects as they would appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with a most exquisite sharpness?

PHIL. Doesn't the science of optics show that microscopes make vision sharper? They show objects as they would appear if the eye naturally had exceptionally sharp vision.

HYL. It is.

PHIL. Consequently the microscopical representation is to be thought that which best sets forth the real nature of the thing, or what it is in itself. The colours, therefore, by it perceived are more genuine and real than those perceived otherwise.

PHIL. So the view through a microscope must be thought to show the thing's real nature best, or what it is in itself. Therefore, the colors seen through a microscope are more genuine and real than those seen otherwise.

HYL. I confess there is something in what you say.

HYL. I admit there is some truth in what you say.

PHIL. Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that there actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to perceive those things which by reason of their minuteness escape our sight. What think you of those inconceivably small animals perceived by glasses? must we suppose they are all stark blind? Or, in case they see, can it be imagined their sight hath not the same use in preserving their bodies from injuries, which appears in that of all other animals? And if it hath, is it not evident they must see particles less than their own bodies; which will present them with a far different view in each object from that which strikes our senses? Even our own eyes do not always represent objects to us after the same manner. In the jaundice every one knows that all things seem yellow. Is it not therefore highly probable those animals in whose eyes we discern a very different texture from that of ours, and whose bodies abound with different humours, do not see the same colours in every object that we do? From all which, should it not seem to follow that all colours are equally apparent, and that none of those which we perceive are really inherent in any outward object?

PHIL. Besides, it is not just possible but obvious that some animals have eyes naturally suited to seeing things too small for us to see. What do you think of the unimaginably small animals seen through microscopes? Must we assume they are all completely blind? Or, if they can see, can we imagine that their sight does not protect their bodies from injury, as it does in all other animals? And if their sight does protect them, must they not see particles smaller than their own bodies? Those particles would give them a very different view of each object from the one we perceive. Even our own eyes do not always show us objects in the same way. Everyone knows that, when we have jaundice, everything looks yellow. So is it not highly likely that some animals do not see the same colours in every object that we do? After all, we can see that their eyes have a very different structure from ours, and their bodies contain many different bodily fluids. From all this, does it not seem to follow that all colours are equally apparent? And does it not follow that none of the colours we perceive really exist in any external object?

HYL. It should.

PHIL. The point will be past all doubt, if you consider that, in case colours were real properties or affections inherent in external bodies, they could admit of no alteration without some change wrought in the very bodies themselves: but, is it not evident from what hath been said that, upon the use of microscopes, upon a change happening in the burnouts of the eye, or a variation of distance, without any manner of real alteration in the thing itself, the colours of any object are either changed, or totally disappear? Nay, all other circumstances remaining the same, change but the situation of some objects, and they shall present different colours to the eye. The same thing happens upon viewing an object in various degrees of light. And what is more known than that the same bodies appear differently coloured by candle-light from what they do in the open day? Add to these the experiment of a prism which, separating the heterogeneous rays of light, alters the colour of any object, and will cause the whitest to appear of a deep blue or red to the naked eye. And now tell me whether you are still of opinion that every body hath its true real colour inhering in it; and, if you think it hath, I would fain know farther from you, what certain distance and position of the object, what peculiar texture and formation of the eye, what degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true colour, and distinguishing it from apparent ones.

PHIL. The point will be beyond all doubt if you consider the following. If colours were real properties inherent in external bodies, they could not change without a change in the bodies themselves. But what we have said makes it clear that colours can change or disappear without any real change in the object. This happens when we use microscopes, when the burnouts of the eye change, or when the distance changes. Indeed, even if everything else remains the same, some objects present different colours when their position changes. The same thing happens when an object is viewed in different degrees of light. And what is more familiar than the fact that the same bodies appear differently coloured by candlelight than in daylight? Add to these examples the experiment with a prism. The prism separates the different kinds of light rays and changes the colour of any object. It can make the whitest object appear deep blue or red to the naked eye. Now tell me, do you still think that every body has its own true, real colour inherent in it? If so, I would also like to know what exact distance and position of the object are needed to determine that true colour and distinguish it from apparent colours. What particular structure and formation of the eye, and what degree or kind of light, are needed?

HYL. I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all equally apparent, and that there is no such thing as colour really inhering in external bodies, but that it is altogether in the light. And what confirms me in this opinion is, that in proportion to the light colours are still more or less vivid; and if there be no light, then are there no colours perceived. Besides, allowing there are colours on external objects, yet, how is it possible for us to perceive them? For no external body affects the mind, unless it acts first on our organs of sense. But the only action of bodies is motion; and motion cannot be communicated otherwise than by impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act on the eye; nor consequently make itself or its properties perceivable to the soul. Whence it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous substance, which, operating on the eye, occasions a perception of colours: and such is light.

HYL. I admit that I am completely satisfied that they are all equally apparent. I am also satisfied that color does not really exist in external bodies, but entirely in light. What confirms this view is that colors are more or less vivid depending on the light. If there is no light, no colors are perceived. Besides, even if there are colors on external objects, how could we perceive them? No external body affects the mind unless it first acts on our sense organs. But bodies can act only through motion, and motion can be transferred only by a push. A distant object therefore cannot act on the eye. Consequently, it cannot make itself or its properties perceptible to the soul. It plainly follows that some substance in contact with the eye directly causes us to perceive colors. That substance is light.

PHIL. Howl is light then a substance?

PHIL. How, then, is light a substance?

HYL. . I tell you, Philonous, external light is nothing but a thin fluid substance, whose minute particles being agitated with a brisk motion, and in various manners reflected from the different surfaces of outward objects to the eyes, communicate different motions to the optic nerves; which, being propagated to the brain, cause therein various impressions; and these are attended with the sensations of red, blue, yellow, &c.

HYL. I tell you, Philonous, external light is nothing but a thin fluid substance. Its tiny particles move rapidly and are reflected in various ways from the surfaces of external objects to the eyes. The particles create different motions in the optic nerves. These motions travel to the brain and cause various impressions there. These impressions are accompanied by sensations of red, blue, yellow, and so on.

PHIL. It seems then the light doth no more than shake the optic nerves.

PHIL. So it seems that light does nothing more than shake the optic nerves.

HYL. Nothing else.

PHIL. And consequent to each particular motion of the nerves, the mind is affected with a sensation, which is some particular colour.

PHIL. And each particular movement of the nerves is followed by a sensation in the mind, which is a particular color.

HYL. Right.

PHIL. And these sensations have no existence without the mind.

PHIL. And these sensations cannot exist outside the mind.

HYL. They have not.

HYL. They haven't.

PHIL. How then do you affirm that colours are in the light; since by LIGHT you understand a corporeal substance external to the mind?

PHIL. How can you say that colors are in light, when you understand light to be a physical substance outside the mind?

HYL. Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, I grant cannot exist without the mind. But in themselves they are only the motions and configurations of certain insensible particles of matter.

HYL. I agree that light and colors, as we directly perceive them, cannot exist without the mind. But in themselves, they are only the movements and arrangements of certain particles of matter that cannot be perceived.

PHIL. Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the immediate objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving substance.

PHIL. So colors, in the ordinary sense, or as the immediate objects of sight, can belong only to a perceiving substance.

HYL. That is what I say.

HYL. That's what I'm saying.

PHIL. Well then, since you give up the point as to those sensible qualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind beside, you may hold what you please with regard to those invisible ones of the philosophers. It is not my business to dispute about THEM; only I would advise you to bethink yourself, whether, considering the inquiry we are upon, it be prudent for you to affirm—THE RED AND BLUE WHICH WE SEE ARE NOT REAL COLOURS, BUT CERTAIN UNKNOWN MOTIONS AND FIGURES WHICH NO MAN EVER DID OR CAN SEE ARE TRULY SO. Are not these shocking notions, and are not they subject to as many ridiculous inferences, as those you were obliged to renounce before in the case of sounds?

PHIL. Well then, you have given up your claim about the sensory qualities that everyone else considers colours. So you may believe whatever you like about the philosophers’ invisible colours. It is not my business to argue about THEM. But I advise you to consider whether, given our inquiry, it is wise to claim this: THE RED AND BLUE WE SEE ARE NOT REAL COLOURS. INSTEAD, CERTAIN UNKNOWN MOTIONS AND SHAPES THAT NO ONE HAS EVER SEEN OR CAN SEE ARE TRUE COLOURS. Aren’t these shocking ideas? And don’t they lead to just as many ridiculous conclusions as the ideas about sounds you had to abandon earlier?

HYL. I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed SECONDARY QUALITIES, have certainly no existence without the mind. But by this acknowledgment I must not be supposed to derogate, the reality of Matter, or external objects; seeing it is no more than several philosophers maintain, who nevertheless are the farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the clearer understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into PRIMARY and SECONDARY. The former are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest; and these they hold exist really in bodies. The latter are those above enumerated; or, briefly, ALL SENSIBLE QUALITIES BESIDE THE PRIMARY; which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the mind. But all this, I doubt not, you are apprised of. For my part, I have been a long time sensible there was such an opinion current among philosophers, but was never thoroughly convinced of its truth until now.

HYL. I frankly admit, Philonous, that it is useless to continue. Colors, sounds, tastes, and all other so-called SECONDARY QUALITIES certainly do not exist outside the mind. But I should not be taken to be denying the reality of Matter or external objects. Several philosophers maintain the same view, yet they are as far as imaginable from denying Matter. To make this clearer, you should know that philosophers divide sensible qualities into PRIMARY and SECONDARY qualities. The primary qualities are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest. Philosophers hold that these really exist in bodies. The secondary qualities are those I listed earlier, or, briefly, ALL SENSIBLE QUALITIES BESIDES THE PRIMARY ONES. Philosophers claim that these are merely sensations or ideas that exist nowhere but in the mind. But I have no doubt that you already know all this. For my part, I have long known that this opinion was common among philosophers. But I was never fully convinced that it was true until now.

PHIL. You are still then of opinion that EXTENSION and FIGURES are inherent in external unthinking substances?

PHIL. So you still believe that EXTENSION and SHAPES are inherent in external substances that do not think?

HYL. I am.

PHIL. But what if the same arguments which are brought against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these also?

PHIL. But what if the same arguments against secondary qualities also apply to these?

HYL. Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist only in the mind.

HYL. Well, then I must think that they, too, exist only in the mind.

PHIL. Is it your opinion the very figure and extension which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance? HYL. It is.

PHIL. Do you think the very shape and size you perceive through your senses exist in the external object or material substance? HYL. Yes.

PHIL. Have all other animals as good grounds to think the same of the figure and extension which they see and feel?

PHIL. Do all other animals have equally good reason to think the same about the shape and size they see and feel?

HYL. Without doubt, if they have any thought at all.

HYL. Certainly, if they think at all.

PHIL. Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were bestowed upon all animals for their preservation and well-being in life? or were they given to men alone for this end?

PHIL. Answer me, Hylas. Do you think all animals were given senses for their survival and well-being? Or were senses given to humans alone for this purpose?

HYL. I make no question but they have the same use in all other animals.

HYL. I have no doubt that they serve the same purpose in all other animals.

PHIL. If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them to perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are capable of harming them?

PHIL. If so, must they not be able to use them to perceive their own limbs and the bodies that could harm them?

HYL. Certainly.

PHIL. A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension; though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible, or at best as so many visible points?

PHIL. So must a mite see its own foot, and things the same size or even smaller, as objects of considerable size? Though to you, those same things are barely visible, or appear at best as mere points?

HYL. I cannot deny it.

HYL. I can't deny it.

PHIL. And to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger?

PHIL. And would they seem even larger to creatures smaller than the mite?

HYL. They will.

PHIL. Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain?

PHIL. So, what you can hardly see would appear to another extremely tiny animal to be a huge mountain?

HYL. All this I grant.

HYL. I agree with all of this.

PHIL. Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of different dimensions?

PHIL. Can the same thing have different dimensions in itself at the same time?

HYL. That were absurd to imagine.

HYL. That would be absurd to imagine.

PHIL. But, from what you have laid down it follows that both the extension by you perceived, and that perceived by the mite itself, as likewise all those perceived by lesser animals, are each of them the true extension of the mite's foot; that is to say, by your own principles you are led into an absurdity.

PHIL. But what you have said leads to this conclusion. The size you perceive, the size the mite itself perceives, and all the sizes perceived by smaller animals are each the true size of the mite's foot. In other words, your own principles lead you to an absurdity.

HYL. There seems to be some difficulty in the point.

HYL. There seems to be some difficulty with that point.

PHIL. Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property of any object can be changed without some change in the thing itself?

PHIL. Again, haven't you agreed that no real, inherent property of an object can change without changing the object itself?

HYL. I have.

PHIL. But, as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than another. Doth it not therefore follow from hence likewise that it is not really inherent in the object?

PHIL. But as we move closer to or farther from an object, its visible size changes. At one distance, it may appear ten or a hundred times larger than at another. Doesn't it also follow that its visible size is not really inherent in the object?

HYL. I own I am at a loss what to think.

HYL. I admit I don't know what to think.

PHIL. Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will venture to think as freely concerning this quality as you have done concerning the rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument, that neither heat nor cold was in the water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the other?

PHIL. You will soon make up your mind if you dare to think as freely about this quality as you have about the others. Wasn't it accepted as a sound argument that the water was neither hot nor cold because it felt warm to one hand and cold to the other?

HYL. It was.

PHIL. Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there is no extension or figure in an object, because to one eye it shall seem little, smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears to the other, great, uneven, and regular?

PHIL. Isn't it the very same reasoning to conclude that an object has no extension or shape for this reason? The object looks small, smooth, and round to one eye, while at the same time it looks large, uneven, and regular to the other.

HYL. The very same. But does this latter fact ever happen?

HYL. Exactly the same. But does the latter ever actually happen?

PHIL. You may at any time make the experiment, by looking with one eye bare, and with the other through a microscope.

PHIL. You can try the experiment at any time by looking with one naked eye and through a microscope with the other.

HYL. I know not how to maintain it; and yet I am loath to give up EXTENSION, I see so many odd consequences following upon such a concession.

HYL. I don't know how to defend it. Yet I am reluctant to give up EXTENSION, because I see so many strange consequences following from that concession.

PHIL. Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, I hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness. But, on the other hand, should it not seem very odd, if the general reasoning which includes all other sensible qualities did not also include extension? If it be allowed that no idea, nor anything like an idea, can exist in an unperceiving substance, then surely it follows that no figure, or mode of extension, which we can either perceive, or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really inherent in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty there must be in conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct from extension to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension. Be the sensible quality what it will—figure, or sound, or colour, it seems alike impossible it should subsist in that which doth not perceive it.

PHIL. Odd, you say? After what you have already conceded, I hope you will not object to anything merely because it seems odd. But, on the other hand, wouldn't it seem very odd if the general reasoning covered all other sensible qualities but not extension? Suppose we accept that no idea, or anything like an idea, can exist in a substance that cannot perceive. Then surely no shape or form of extension that we can perceive, imagine, or have any idea of can actually belong to Matter. Not to mention how hard it must be to conceive of a material substance that exists before and apart from extension, yet serves as the SUBSTRATUM of extension. Whatever the sensible quality, whether shape, sound, or color, it seems equally impossible for it to exist in something that does not perceive it.

HYL. I give up the point for the present, reserving still a right to retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter discover any false step in my progress to it.

HYL. I concede the point for now. But I reserve the right to change my mind if I later find a mistake in my reasoning.

PHIL. That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures and extension being despatched, we proceed next to MOTION. Can a real motion in any external body be at the same time very swift and very slow?

PHIL. That is a right no one can deny you. Having dealt with shapes and extension, we turn next to MOTION. Can the real motion of an external body be both very fast and very slow at the same time?

HYL. It cannot.

HYL. It can't.

PHIL. Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given space? Thus a body that describes a mile in an hour moves three times faster than it would in case it described only a mile in three hours.

PHIL. Isn't a body's speed inversely proportional to the time it takes to travel a given distance? For example, a body that travels a mile in an hour moves three times faster than it would if it traveled a mile in three hours.

HYL. I agree with you.

PHIL. And is not time measured by the succession of ideas in our minds?

PHIL. And isn't time measured by the sequence of ideas in our minds?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. And is it not possible ideas should succeed one another twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine, or in that of some spirit of another kind?

PHIL. And isn't it possible that ideas follow one another twice as fast in your mind as in mine or in the mind of some other kind of spirit?

HYL. I own it.

HYL. I admit it.

PHIL. Consequently the same body may to another seem to perform its motion over any space in half the time that it doth to you. And the same reasoning will hold as to any other proportion: that is to say, according to your principles (since the motions perceived are both really in the object) it is possible one and the same body shall be really moved the same way at once, both very swift and very slow. How is this consistent either with common sense, or with what you just now granted?

PHIL. So the same body may seem to someone else to move across any space in half the time it seems to take you. The same reasoning applies to any other proportion of time. According to your principles, both perceived motions are really in the object. So one and the same body could really move in the same direction, both very quickly and very slowly at once. How is this consistent with common sense or with what you just agreed to?

HYL. I have nothing to say to it.

HYL. I have nothing to say about it.

PHIL. Then as for SOLIDITY; either you do not mean any sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry: or if you do, it must be either hardness or resistance. But both the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses: it being evident that what seems hard to one animal may appear soft to another, who hath greater force and firmness of limbs. Nor is it less plain that the resistance I feel is not in the body.

PHIL. Now, as for SOLIDITY, either you do not mean a quality perceived by the senses, or you do. If you do not, solidity is beside the point of our inquiry. If you do, solidity must mean either hardness or resistance. But both are plainly relative to our senses. What seems hard to one animal may seem soft to another with stronger and firmer limbs. It is just as plain that the resistance I feel is not in the body.

HYL. I own the very SENSATION of resistance, which is all you immediately perceive, is not in the body; but the CAUSE of that sensation is.

HYL. I admit that the SENSATION of resistance is not in the body. That sensation is all you directly perceive. But the CAUSE of the sensation is in the body.

PHIL. But the causes of our sensations are not things immediately perceived, and therefore are not sensible. This point I thought had been already determined.

PHIL. But we do not directly perceive the causes of our sensations, so we cannot perceive them through the senses. I thought we had already settled this point.

HYL. I own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem a little embarrassed: I know not how to quit my old notions.

HYL. I admit it was. But please forgive me if I seem a little confused. I don't know how to give up my old ideas.

PHIL. To help you out, do but consider that if EXTENSION be once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind, the same must necessarily be granted of motion, solidity, and gravity; since they all evidently suppose extension. It is therefore superfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of them. In denying extension, you have denied them all to have any real existence.

PHIL. To help you, consider this: if extension has no existence outside the mind, the same must necessarily be true of motion, solidity, and gravity. All of them evidently depend on extension. So there is no need to examine each one separately. In denying that extension exists outside the mind, you have denied that any of them has any real existence.

HYL. I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real existence should yet attribute it to the Primary. If there is no difference between them, how can this be accounted for?

HYL. Philonous, if what you say is true, I wonder why some philosophers treat the qualities differently. They deny that Secondary Qualities have any real existence, yet say that Primary Qualities do. If there is no difference between them, how can this be explained?

PHIL. It is not my business to account for every opinion of the philosophers. But, among other reasons which may be assigned for this, it seems probable that pleasure and pain being rather annexed to the former than the latter may be one. Heat and cold, tastes and smells, have something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the ideas of extension, figure, and motion affect us with. And, it being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance, men are more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the Secondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied there is something in this, if you recollect the difference you made between an intense and more moderate degree of heat; allowing the one a real existence, while you denied it to the other. But, after all, there is no rational ground for that distinction; for, surely an indifferent sensation is as truly a SENSATION as one more pleasing or painful; and consequently should not any more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject.

PHIL. It is not my job to explain every opinion philosophers hold. But among other possible reasons for this, one seems likely. Pleasure and pain are more closely linked to Secondary Qualities than to Primary Qualities. Heat and cold, tastes and smells, affect us more vividly with pleasure or discomfort than ideas of extension, shape, and motion do. And it is obviously absurd to think that pleasure or pain can exist in a substance that perceives nothing. So people can more easily give up believing that Secondary Qualities exist externally than that Primary Qualities do. You will see that there is something in this if you recall the distinction you made between intense and moderate heat. You allowed one to have a real existence while denying it to the other. But in the end, there is no rational basis for that distinction. Surely a neutral sensation is just as much a SENSATION as a more pleasant or painful one. Therefore, we should no more suppose that a neutral sensation exists in an unthinking subject than a pleasant or painful one.

HYL. It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension. Now, though it be acknowledged that GREAT and SMALL, consisting merely in the relation which other extended beings have to the parts of our own bodies, do not really inhere in the substances themselves; yet nothing obliges us to hold the same with regard to ABSOLUTE EXTENSION, which is something abstracted from GREAT and SMALL, from this or that particular magnitude or figure. So likewise as to motion; SWIFT and SLOW are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of motion exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion abstracted from them doth not.

HYL. I have just remembered, Philonous, that I once heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension. GREAT and SMALL depend only on how other extended things relate to the parts of our own bodies. So, although we admit that greatness and smallness do not really exist in the substances themselves, we need not say the same of ABSOLUTE EXTENSION. Absolute extension is something abstracted from GREAT and SMALL, and from any particular size or shape. The same applies to motion. SWIFT and SLOW depend entirely on the succession of ideas in our own minds. But these features of motion do not exist outside the mind. That does not mean that absolute motion, abstracted from these features, cannot exist outside the mind.

PHIL. Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of extension, from another? Is it not something sensible, as some degree of swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each?

PHIL. What distinguishes one motion, or one part of extension, from another? Isn't it something perceivable, such as a degree of speed or slowness, or a particular size or shape?

HYL. I think so.

PHIL. These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible properties, are without all specific and numerical differences, as the schools call them.

PHIL. Therefore, without any sensory properties, these qualities have no specific or numerical differences, as scholars call them.

HYL. They are.

PHIL. That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in general.

PHIL. In other words, they are extension in general and motion in general.

HYL. Let it be so.

HYL. All right.

PHIL. But it is a universally received maxim that EVERYTHING WHICH EXISTS IS PARTICULAR. How then can motion in general, or extension in general, exist in any corporeal substance?

PHIL. But everyone accepts the principle that EVERYTHING THAT EXISTS IS PARTICULAR. So how can motion in general, or extension in general, exist in any physical substance?

HYL. I will take time to solve your difficulty.

HYL. I will take some time to work out your difficulty.

PHIL. But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct ABSTRACT IDEA of motion or extension, divested of all those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion of.

PHIL. But I think the question can be settled quickly. Surely you can tell whether you can form a particular idea. I am willing to settle our dispute on this basis. If you can form a distinct ABSTRACT IDEA of motion or extension, I will concede your point. But the idea must be free of all those qualities we perceive through the senses, such as fast and slow, large and small, round and square, and the like. These qualities are acknowledged to exist only in the mind. But if you cannot form such an idea, it would be unreasonable to keep insisting on something you have no conception of.

HYL. To confess ingenuously, I cannot.

HYL. To be honest, I cannot.

PHIL. Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term SECONDARY?

PHIL. Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the ideas of all the qualities that those who make the distinction call SECONDARY?

HYL. What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them?

HYL. What! Isn't it easy to consider extension and motion on their own, apart from all other qualities perceived by the senses? How do mathematicians study extension and motion?

PHIL. I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word MOTION by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may be made of extension and figures, without any mention of GREAT or SMALL, or any other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you will find, they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension.

PHIL. I admit, Hylas, that we can make general statements and arguments about those qualities without mentioning any others. In that sense, we can consider or discuss those qualities abstractly. But I can say the word MOTION by itself. How does it follow that I can form an idea of motion in my mind without a body? We can also make theorems about extension and figures without mentioning GREAT or SMALL or any other sensible form or quality. But how does it follow that the mind can clearly form and grasp an abstract idea of extension without any particular size, figure, or sensible quality? Mathematicians deal with quantity without considering what other sensible qualities accompany it, because those qualities make no difference to their demonstrations. But when mathematicians set words aside and consider the ideas alone, I believe you will find that the ideas are not purely abstract ideas of extension.

HYL. But what say you to PURE INTELLECT? May not abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty?

HYL. But what do you say about PURE INTELLECT? May pure intellect form abstract ideas?

PHIL. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain I cannot frame them by the help of PURE INTELLECT; whatsoever faculty you understand by those words. Besides, not to inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual objects, as VIRTUE, REASON, GOD, or the like, thus much seems manifest—that sensible things are only to be perceived by sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures, therefore, and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect: but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other sensible qualities.

PHIL. Since I cannot form abstract ideas at all, I clearly cannot form them with the help of PURE INTELLECT. That is true whatever faculty you mean by those words. Besides, I will not investigate the nature of pure intellect or its spiritual objects, such as VIRTUE, REASON, GOD, and the like. But this much seems clear: things perceived by the senses can only be perceived by sense or represented by the imagination. Figures and extension are originally perceived by sense. Therefore, they do not belong to pure intellect. But, to satisfy yourself further, try to form an idea of a figure apart from any particular size or even other sensible qualities.

HYL. Let me think a little—I do not find that I can.

HYL. Let me think for a moment. I don't think I can.

PHIL. And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception?

PHIL. And do you think something can really exist in nature if the very idea of it involves a contradiction?

HYL. By no means.

HYL. Not at all.

PHIL. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one exist there necessarily the other exist likewise?

PHIL. The mind cannot separate the ideas of extension and motion from all other qualities perceived by the senses. So, wherever extension and motion exist, must not those other qualities also exist?

HYL. It should seem so.

HYL. It seems so.

PHIL. Consequently, the very same arguments which you admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, without any farther application of force, against the Primary too. Besides, if you will trust your senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear as being in the same place? Do they ever represent a motion, or figure, as being divested of all other visible and tangible qualities?

PHIL. So the same arguments you accepted as conclusive against secondary qualities also apply to primary qualities. They need no further support. Besides, if you trust your senses, isn't it plain that all sensible qualities coexist? Don't they appear to your senses to be in the same place? Do your senses ever present motion or shape without any other visible and tangible qualities?

HYL. You need say no more on this head. I am free to own, if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto, that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied existence without the mind. But, my fear is that I have been too liberal in my former concessions, or overlooked some fallacy or other. In short, I did not take time to think.

HYL. You need say no more on this subject. I freely admit that all sensible qualities must equally be denied existence outside the mind, if our reasoning so far contains no hidden error or oversight. But I fear I conceded too much earlier, or overlooked some flaw in the reasoning. In short, I did not take time to think.

PHIL. For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at liberty to recover any slips you might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted which makes for your first opinion.

PHIL. In that case, Hylas, take as much time as you like to review the progress of our inquiry. You are free to correct any mistakes you may have made. You may also offer anything you left out that supports your original opinion.

HYL. One great oversight I take to be this—that I did not sufficiently distinguish the OBJECT from the SENSATION. Now, though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot.

HYL. I think one major oversight was that I did not clearly distinguish the OBJECT from the SENSATION. The sensation may not exist without the mind. But that does not mean the object cannot exist without the mind.

PHIL. What object do you mean? the object of the senses?

PHIL. What object do you mean? An object of the senses?

HYL. The same.

PHIL. It is then immediately perceived?

PHIL. So, is it perceived directly?

HYL. Right.

PHIL. Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately perceived and a sensation.

PHIL. Explain to me the difference between what is immediately perceived and a sensation.

HYL. The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides which, there is something perceived; and this I call the OBJECT. For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip.

HYL. I take sensation to be an act of the mind perceiving something. Besides this act, there is something perceived, which I call the OBJECT. For example, that tulip has red and yellow on it. But the act of perceiving those colors happens only in me, not in the tulip.

PHIL. What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see?

PHIL. Which tulip are you talking about? Is it the one you see?

HYL. The same.

PHIL. And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension?

PHIL. And what do you see besides color, shape, and size?

HYL. Nothing.

PHIL. What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent with the extension; is it not?

PHIL. So you mean that the red and yellow exist together with the extension, right?

HYL. That is not all; I would say they have a real existence without the mind, in some unthinking substance.

HYL. That is not all. I mean that they really exist outside the mind, in some substance that does not think.

PHIL. That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest. Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine; but, that any immediate object of the senses,—that is, any idea, or combination of ideas—should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to ALL minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor can I imagine how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the red and yellow were on the tulip you SAW, since you do not pretend to SEE that unthinking substance.

PHIL. The colors are clearly in the tulip I see. Nor can anyone deny that this tulip may exist independently of your mind or mine. But an immediate object of the senses is an idea or combination of ideas. It is plainly contradictory to say that such an object exists in an unthinking substance or outside ALL minds. Nor can I see how that follows from what you just said. You said that the red and yellow were on the tulip you SAW. But you do not claim to SEE that unthinking substance.

HYL. You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from the subject.

HYL. Philonous, you have a clever way of steering our discussion away from the subject.

PHIL. I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return then to your distinction between SENSATION and OBJECT; if I take you right, you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not.

PHIL. I see you do not want me to press you on that point. So let us return to your distinction between SENSATION and OBJECT. If I understand you correctly, you distinguish two things in every perception. One is an action of the mind, and the other is not.

HYL. True.

PHIL. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking thing; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may?

PHIL. And this action cannot exist in or belong to anything that does not think. But anything else involved in a perception can?

HYL. That is my meaning.

HYL. That's what I mean.

PHIL. So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance?

PHIL. So, if perception were possible without any act of the mind, could it exist in a substance that does not think?

HYL. I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a perception.

HYL. I agree. But such a perception is impossible.

PHIL. When is the mind said to be active?

PHIL. When do we say that the mind is active?

HYL. When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything.

HYL. When it creates, ends, or changes anything.

PHIL. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an act of the will?

PHIL. Can the mind create, stop, or change anything except by an act of will?

HYL. It cannot.

HYL. It can't.

PHIL. The mind therefore is to be accounted ACTIVE in its perceptions so far forth as VOLITION is included in them?

PHIL. So the mind is ACTIVE in its perceptions to the extent that WILL is involved in them?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in applying it to my nose. But is either of these smelling?

PHIL. When I pluck this flower, I am active. I pluck it by moving my hand, and I move my hand because I choose to. Likewise, I am active when I bring the flower to my nose. But is either action smelling?

HYL. NO.

HYL. No.

PHIL. I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition. But neither can this be called SMELLING: for, if it were, I should smell every time I breathed in that manner?

PHIL. I also act when I draw air through my nose, because I choose to breathe that way rather than another. But this cannot be called SMELLING either. If it were, I would smell every time I breathed that way.

HYL. True.

PHIL. Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?

PHIL. So smelling comes after all this?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. But I do not find my will concerned any farther. Whatever more there is—as that I perceive such a particular smell, or any smell at all—this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether passive. Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?

PHIL. But I do not find that my will has any further role. Whether I perceive a particular smell, or any smell at all, is beyond my control. In that respect, I am entirely passive. Is it different for you, Hylas?

HYL. No, the very same.

HYL. No, exactly the same.

PHIL. Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your eyes, or keep them shut; to turn them this or that way?

PHIL. Then, when it comes to seeing, can't you open or close your eyes and turn them either way?

HYL. Without doubt.

HYL. Certainly.

PHIL. But, doth it in like manner depend on YOUR will that in looking on this flower you perceive WHITE rather than any other colour? Or, directing your open eyes towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun? Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition?

PHIL. But in the same way, is it up to YOU whether you see this flower as WHITE rather than another color? Or can you avoid seeing the sun if you look toward that part of the sky with your eyes open? Are light or darkness the result of your will?

HYL. No, certainly.

HYL. No, certainly not.

PHIL. You are then in these respects altogether passive? HYL. I am.

PHIL. So, in these respects, you are completely passive? HYL. Yes, I am.

PHIL. Tell me now, whether SEEING consists in perceiving light and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes?

PHIL. Tell me, does SEEING mean perceiving light and colors, or opening and turning your eyes?

HYL. Without doubt, in the former.

HYL. Without a doubt, in the first.

PHIL. Since therefore you are in the very perception of light and colours altogether passive, what is become of that action you were speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation? And, doth it not follow from your own concessions, that the perception of light and colours, including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is not this a plain contradiction?

PHIL. Since you are entirely passive in perceiving light and colors, what happened to the action you said was part of every sensation? And do your own admissions not imply that the perception of light and colors may exist in a substance that cannot perceive? After all, that perception involves no action. And is that not a clear contradiction?

HYL. I know not what to think of it.

HYL. I don't know what to think of it.

PHIL. Besides, since you distinguish the ACTIVE and PASSIVE in every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? In short, do but consider the point, and then confess ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c. are not all equally passions or sensations in the soul. You may indeed call them EXTERNAL OBJECTS, and give them in words what subsistence you please. But, examine your own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as I say?

PHIL. Besides, since you distinguish the ACTIVE and PASSIVE in every perception, you must also distinguish them in pain. But how could pain exist in a substance that perceives nothing, however little activity you think pain involves? In short, consider the question and then admit honestly whether light, colours, tastes, sounds, and so on are not all equally passive experiences or sensations in the soul. You may call them EXTERNAL OBJECTS and say they exist however you please. But examine your own thoughts, and then tell me whether I am not right.

HYL. I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance. But then, on the other hand, when I look on sensible things in a different view, considering them as so many modes and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM, without which they cannot be conceived to exist.

HYL. I admit, Philonous, that when I carefully observe what happens in my mind, I find only that I am a thinking being experiencing a variety of sensations. Nor can I imagine how a sensation could exist in a substance that does not perceive. But when I look at sensible things differently, as modes and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM. Without it, I cannot conceive how those modes and qualities could exist.

PHIL. MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM call you it? Pray, by which of your senses came you acquainted with that being?

PHIL. You call it a material substratum? Tell me, which of your senses revealed that being to you?

HYL. It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities only being perceived by the senses.

HYL. It cannot itself be perceived by the senses. Only its modes and qualities can be perceived by the senses.

PHIL. I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you obtained the idea of it?

PHIL. Then I assume you got the idea of it through reflection and reasoning?

HYL. I do not pretend to any proper positive IDEA of it. However, I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to exist without a support.

HYL. I do not claim to have a clear, positive idea of it. However, I conclude that it exists because qualities cannot be conceived as existing without a support.

PHIL. It seems then you have only a relative NOTION of it, or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relation it bears to sensible qualities?

PHIL. So it seems you have only a relative notion of it. In other words, can you conceive of it only through its relation to sensible qualities?

HYL. Right.

PHIL. Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation consists.

PHIL. Please tell me, then, what that relation consists of.

HYL. Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term SUBSTRATUM, or SUBSTANCE?

HYL. Isn't it clearly enough expressed by the term SUBSTRATUM, or SUBSTANCE?

PHIL. If so, the word SUBSTRATUM should import that it is spread under the sensible qualities or accidents?

PHIL. If so, does the word SUBSTRATUM mean that it lies beneath the qualities or properties perceived by the senses?

HYL. True.

PHIL. And consequently under extension?

PHIL. And so, under extension?

HYL. I own it.

HYL. I admit it.

PHIL. It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct from extension?

PHIL. So it is something entirely distinct from extension by its very nature?

HYL. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that supports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is different from the thing supporting?

HYL. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that supports modes. Isn't it obvious that what is supported is different from what supports it?

PHIL. So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is supposed to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension?

PHIL. So something distinct from extension, and excluding it, is supposed to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension?

HYL. Just so.

HYL. Exactly.

PHIL. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension? or is not the idea of extension necessarily included in SPREADING?

PHIL. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing spread without having extension? Doesn't the idea of spreading necessarily include the idea of extension?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under which it is spread?

PHIL. So, must whatever you suppose is spread under something have its own extension, distinct from that of the thing above it?

HYL. It must.

PHIL. Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the SUBSTRATUM of extension, must have in itself another extension, by which it is qualified to be a SUBSTRATUM: and so on to infinity. And I ask whether this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that the SUBSTRATUM was something distinct from and exclusive of extension?

PHIL. Therefore, every bodily substance is the SUBSTRATUM of extension. So it must have another extension within itself that qualifies it to be a SUBSTRATUM, and so on to infinity. I ask whether this is not absurd in itself. Does it not also contradict what you just granted, namely, that the SUBSTRATUM was distinct from extension and excluded it?

HYL. Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is SPREAD in a gross literal sense under extension. The word SUBSTRATUM is used only to express in general the same thing with SUBSTANCE.

HYL. Yes, but Philonous, you misunderstand me. I do not mean that Matter is SPREAD beneath extension in a crude, literal sense. The word SUBSTRATUM is used only as a general way of expressing the same thing as SUBSTANCE.

PHIL. Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term SUBSTANCE. Is it not that it stands under accidents?

PHIL. Well then, let us examine the relation implied by the term SUBSTANCE. Does it not mean that substance stands under accidents?

HYL. The very same.

HYL. Exactly the same.

PHIL. But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it not be extended?

PHIL. But for one thing to stand under or support another, must it not have physical extent?

HYL. It must.

PHIL. Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with the former?

PHIL. So, doesn't this assumption have the same absurdity as the previous one?

HYL. You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not fair, Philonous.

HYL. You still take things too literally. That isn't fair, Philonous.

PHIL. I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand something by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents. How! is it as your legs support your body?

PHIL. I do not want to impose any meaning on your words. You are free to explain them as you please. I only ask that you make me understand what you mean. You tell me that Matter supports or stands under accidents. How? Does it support them as your legs support your body?

HYL. No; that is the literal sense.

HYL. No, that is the literal meaning.

PHIL. Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you understand it in.—How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?

PHIL. Please tell me what you understand it to mean, whether literally or otherwise. How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?

HYL. I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well enough what was meant by Matter's supporting accidents. But now, the more I think on it the less can I comprehend it: in short I find that I know nothing of it.

HYL. I really don't know what to say. I once thought I understood well enough what it meant for Matter to support accidents. But the more I think about it, the less I understand. In short, I find that I know nothing about it.

PHIL. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents?

PHIL. So it seems you have no idea of Matter at all, either relative or positive. You know neither what Matter is in itself nor how it relates to accidents?

HYL. I acknowledge it.

HYL. I admit it.

PHIL. And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a material support of them?

PHIL. And yet you claimed you could not conceive of qualities or accidents existing independently. You said you also had to conceive of a material substance supporting them?

HYL. I did.

PHIL. That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot conceive?

PHIL. So, when you imagine qualities really existing, you also imagine something you cannot imagine?

HYL. It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this? It is just come into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind. Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without some other sensible quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist without the mind.

HYL. I admit I was wrong. But I still fear there is some flaw in the argument. What do you think of this? It just occurred to me that the cause of all our error is your treating each quality separately. Now, I grant that no quality can exist on its own outside the mind. Color cannot exist without extension, nor can shape exist without some other quality we can perceive. But the various qualities combine or blend to form whole things we can perceive. So nothing prevents us from supposing that such things can exist outside the mind.

PHIL. Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, yet my arguments or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they were not AT ALL without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it was impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so.

PHIL. Hylas, either you are joking or you have a very bad memory. We did go through all the qualities by name, one after another. But my arguments, or rather your concessions, never suggested that each secondary quality could not exist on its own. They showed instead that secondary qualities could not exist AT ALL outside the mind. In discussing figure and motion, we did conclude that they could not exist outside the mind. That was because we could not even in thought separate them from all secondary qualities and conceive them existing on their own. But that was not the only argument we used on that occasion. Still, let us set aside everything said so far and count it as nothing, if you wish. I am content to settle the whole matter on this point. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist outside the mind, then I will grant that it actually does so.

HYL. If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.

HYL. If that is the issue, it will soon be settled. What could be easier than imagining a tree or house existing on its own, independent of any mind and unperceived by any mind? Right now, I am imagining them existing that way.

PHIL. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?

PHIL. What do you say, Hylas? Can you see something that is unseen at the same time?

HYL. No, that were a contradiction.

HYL. No, that would be a contradiction.

PHIL. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of CONCEIVING a thing which is UNCONCEIVED?

PHIL. Isn't it just as much a contradiction to speak of CONCEIVING something that is UNCONCEIVED?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you?

PHIL. So, you have an idea of the tree or house you are thinking about?

HYL. How should it be otherwise?

HYL. How could it be otherwise?

PHIL. And what is conceived is surely in the mind?

PHIL. And surely what is imagined is in the mind?

HYL. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.

HYL. Without a doubt, whatever is imagined is in the mind.

PHIL. How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?

PHIL. Then how could you say you imagined a house or tree existing independently of all minds?

HYL. That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me into it.—It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was present to see it, methought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive them EXISTING OUT OF THE MINDS OF ALL SPIRITS.

HYL. I admit that was an oversight. But wait, let me consider what led me to it. It is an amusing mistake. I was thinking of a tree in a lonely place, where no one was present to see it. I thought I was imagining a tree existing without being perceived or thought of. I did not consider that I was imagining it all the while. But now I see clearly that all I can do is form ideas in my own mind. I can imagine a tree, a house, or a mountain in my thoughts, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can imagine them EXISTING OUTSIDE THE MINDS OF ALL SPIRITS.

PHIL. You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in the mind?

PHIL. So you admit that you cannot imagine how any physical thing perceived by the senses could exist outside the mind?

HYL. I do.

PHIL. And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive?

PHIL. And yet you insist that something is true when you cannot even imagine it?

HYL. I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I SEE THINGS at a distance? Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way off? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses?

HYL. I honestly don't know what to think, but I still have some doubts. Isn't it certain that I SEE THINGS at a distance? Don't we perceive the stars and moon, for example, as being very far away? Isn't their distance, I ask, obvious to the senses?

PHIL. Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?

PHIL. Don't you also perceive those objects or similar ones in a dream?

HYL. I do.

PHIL. And have they not then the same appearance of being distant?

PHIL. And don't they seem equally distant?

HYL. They have.

PHIL. But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind?

PHIL. But you do not conclude from that that the things you see in a dream exist outside the mind?

HYL. By no means.

HYL. Not at all.

PHIL. You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are perceived.

PHIL. So you should not conclude that objects perceived by the senses exist outside the mind based on how they appear or are perceived.

HYL. I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases?

HYL. I admit it. But don't my senses deceive me in those cases?

PHIL. By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive, neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are without the mind.

PHIL. Not at all. Neither your senses nor reason tells you that the idea or thing you directly perceive exists outside the mind. Through your senses, you only know that you experience certain sensations of light, colors, and so on. And you would not say that these sensations are outside the mind.

HYL. True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests something of OUTNESS OR DISTANCE?

HYL. True. But besides all that, don't you think sight suggests something about OUTNESS OR DISTANCE?

PHIL. Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances?

PHIL. As you approach a distant object, do its visible size and shape keep changing? Or do they look the same at all distances?

HYL. They are in a continual change.

HYL. They are constantly changing.

PHIL. Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform you, that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance, or will be perceived when you advance farther onward; there being a continued series of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your approach.

PHIL. Sight therefore does not suggest or tell you in any way that the visible object you directly perceive exists at a distance. Nor does sight tell you that you will perceive that object as you move closer. Instead, a continuous series of visible objects appears, each following the last, throughout your approach.

HYL. It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object I shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: no matter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still something of distance suggested in the case.

HYL. It does not. But when I see an object, I still know what object I will perceive after traveling a certain distance. It does not matter whether it is exactly the same object or not. Something about distance is still suggested in this case.

PHIL. Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this: from the ideas you actually perceive by sight, you have by experience learned to collect what other ideas you will (according to the standing order of nature) be affected with, after such a certain succession of time and motion.

PHIL. Dear Hylas, think about this for a moment. Then tell me whether it amounts to anything more than this: From the ideas you actually perceive by sight, you have learned through experience to infer what other ideas you will perceive. You expect to perceive them after a certain passage of time and motion, according to the regular order of nature.

HYL. Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else.

HYL. All things considered, I think it is nothing else.

PHIL. Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a sudden made to see, he could at first have no experience of what may be SUGGESTED by sight?

PHIL. Now, suppose a man born blind suddenly gained sight. Isn't it clear that he would at first have no experience of what sight might SUGGEST?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. He would not then, according to you, have any notion of distance annexed to the things he saw; but would take them for a new set of sensations, existing only in his mind?

PHIL. So, according to you, he would not associate the things he saw with any idea of distance? Instead, he would take them to be a new set of sensations existing only in his mind?

HYL. It is undeniable.

HYL. It cannot be denied.

PHIL. But, to make it still more plain: is not DISTANCE a line turned endwise to the eye?

PHIL. But to make it even clearer, isn't DISTANCE a line viewed end-on?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. And can a line so situated be perceived by sight?

PHIL. And can a line positioned like that be seen?

HYL. It cannot.

HYL. It can't.

PHIL. Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and immediately perceived by sight?

PHIL. Doesn't it follow, then, that distance is not directly or strictly perceived by sight?

HYL. It should seem so.

HYL. It seems so.

PHIL. Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance?

PHIL. Again, do you think colors are at a distance?

HYL. It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind.

HYL. We must admit that they are only in the mind.

PHIL. But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same place with extension and figures?

PHIL. But don’t colors appear to the eye in the same place as size and shape?

HYL. They do.

PHIL. How can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without, when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible appearance being the very same with regard to both?

PHIL. How can you conclude from sight that shapes exist outside the mind, while admitting that colors do not? Shapes and colors appear to the senses in exactly the same way.

HYL. I know not what to answer.

HYL. I don't know what to say.

PHIL. But, allowing that distance was truly and immediately perceived by the mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed out of the mind. For, whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist out of the mind?

PHIL. But even if the mind truly and immediately perceived distance, it would not follow that distance existed outside the mind. For whatever is immediately perceived is an idea. And can any idea exist outside the mind?

HYL. To suppose that were absurd: but, inform me, Philonous, can we perceive or know nothing beside our ideas?

HYL. That would be absurd to assume. But tell me, Philonous, can we perceive or know anything besides our ideas?

PHIL. As for the rational deducing of causes from effects, that is beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best tell whether you perceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether the things immediately perceived are other than your own sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, in the course of this conversation, declared yourself on those points; but you seem, by this last question, to have departed from what you then thought.

PHIL. As for reasoning from effects to their causes, that is outside our inquiry. Your senses can best tell you whether you perceive anything that is not immediately perceived. And I ask you, are the things you immediately perceive anything other than your own sensations or ideas? You have stated your views on these points more than once during our conversation. But your last question seems to depart from what you thought then.

HYL. To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of objects:—the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called IDEAS; the other are real things or external objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their images and representations. Now, I own ideas do not exist without the mind; but the latter sort of objects do. I am sorry I did not think of this distinction sooner; it would probably have cut short your discourse.

HYL. To tell the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of objects. The first kind is perceived directly and is also called IDEAS. The second kind consists of real things, or external objects. These are perceived through ideas, which are their images and representations. Now, I admit that ideas do not exist outside the mind, but real things do. I am sorry I did not think of this distinction sooner. It would probably have cut your discussion short.

PHIL. Are those external objects perceived by sense or by some other faculty?

PHIL. Do you perceive those external objects through your senses or by some other ability?

HYL. They are perceived by sense.

HYL. They are perceived through the senses.

PHIL. Howl Is there any thing perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived?

PHIL. What? Is anything perceived by the senses not perceived immediately?

HYL. Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said after a manner to perceive him (though not immediately) by my senses.

HYL. Yes, Philonous, in a way there is. For example, when I look at a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said to perceive him through my senses, though not directly.

PHIL. It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these also are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance to our ideas?

PHIL. So it seems you believe our ideas are pictures of external things, though only our ideas are perceived directly. And you believe external things are also perceived by the senses because they match or resemble our ideas?

HYL. That is my meaning.

HYL. That's what I mean.

PHIL. And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in himself invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves imperceptible, are perceived by sense.

PHIL. And just as Julius Caesar is invisible in himself but can still be seen, real things cannot be perceived in themselves but can still be perceived through the senses.

HYL. In the very same.

HYL. In exactly the same.

PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar, do you see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a certain symmetry and composition of the whole?

PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, when you look at a picture of Julius Caesar, what do you see? Do you see anything more than some colors and shapes, arranged with a certain symmetry and composition?

HYL. Nothing else.

PHIL. And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar see as much?

PHIL. And wouldn't someone who had never heard of Julius Caesar see just as much?

HYL. He would.

PHIL. Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect a degree as you?

PHIL. So his sight and his ability to use it are just as perfect as yours?

HYL. I agree with you.

PHIL. Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have no advantage over him in that respect. It should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory: should it not?

PHIL. Why, then, are your thoughts directed toward the Roman emperor, while his are not? This cannot be because of the sensations or ideas you perceive through your senses at that moment. You admit that you have no advantage over him in that respect. So the difference would seem to come from reason and memory, wouldn't it?

HYL. It should.

PHIL. Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything is perceived by sense which is not, immediately perceived. Though I grant we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense: that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the immediate perception of ideas by one sense SUGGESTS to the mind others, perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with them. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but, from the experience I have had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing can be HEARD BUT SOUND; and the coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from experience. So likewise when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure which are properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense, which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred on us. As for other things, it is plain they are only suggested to the mind by experience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to return to your comparison of Caesar's picture, it is plain, if you keep to that, you must hold the real things, or archetypes of our ideas, are not perceived by sense, but by some internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory. I would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for the existence of what you call REAL THINGS OR MATERIAL OBJECTS. Or, whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in themselves; or, if you have heard or read of any one that did.

PHIL. So that example does not show that we perceive anything through the senses without perceiving it immediately. Though I grant that, in one sense, we may be said to perceive things indirectly through the senses. This happens when we have often perceived a connection between ideas. The immediate perception of ideas by one sense then suggests other ideas to the mind. These other ideas are usually connected with the first ones, and perhaps belong to another sense. For example, when I hear a coach driving along the street, I immediately perceive only the sound. But experience has taught me that such a sound is connected with a coach. So I am said to hear the coach. Yet clearly, in truth and strictly speaking, nothing but sound can be heard. The coach is not properly perceived by the senses at that moment. Instead, experience suggests it to the mind. Likewise, we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron. But the solidity and heat of the iron are not objects of sight. The color and shape, which are properly perceived by sight, suggest the solidity and heat to the imagination. In short, the only things actually and strictly perceived by a sense are those we would have perceived if we had just acquired that sense. Clearly, other things are only suggested to the mind by experience based on earlier perceptions. But let us return to your comparison with Caesar's picture. Clearly, if you stand by that comparison, you must hold that the real things, or archetypes of our ideas, are not perceived by the senses. Instead, they are perceived by some inner faculty of the soul, such as reason or memory. I would therefore like to know what arguments reason can give for the existence of what you call real things or material objects. Or do you remember ever seeing them as they are in themselves? Have you heard or read of anyone who did?

HYL. I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery; but that will never convince me.

HYL. I see, Philonous, that you are inclined to joke, but joking will never convince me.

PHIL. My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge of MATERIAL BEINGS. Whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or mediately: by sense, or by reason and reflexion. But, as you have excluded sense, pray shew me what reason you have to believe their existence; or what MEDIUM you can possibly make use of to prove it, either to mine or your own understanding.

PHIL. My only aim is to learn from you how to gain knowledge of MATERIAL BEINGS. We perceive everything either immediately or indirectly, through the senses or through reason and reflection. But since you have ruled out the senses, please show me what reason you have to believe material beings exist. Or what MEANS could you possibly use to prove their existence, either to me or to yourself?

HYL. To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider the point, I do not find I can give you any good reason for it. But, thus much seems pretty plain, that it is at least possible such things may really exist. And, as long as there is no absurdity in supposing them, I am resolved to believe as I did, till you bring good reasons to the contrary.

HYL. To be honest, Philonous, now that I think about it, I can't give you any good reason for believing it. But it seems fairly clear that such things could at least really exist. And as long as there is nothing absurd in supposing they exist, I will keep believing as I did until you give me good reasons not to.

PHIL. What! Is it come to this, that you only BELIEVE the existence of material objects, and that your belief is founded barely on the possibility of its being true? Then you will have me bring reasons against it: though another would think it reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds the affirmative. And, after all, this very point which you are now resolved to maintain, without any reason, is in effect what you have more than once during this discourse seen good reason to give up. But, to pass over all this; if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist without the mind, but that they are copies, images, or representations, of certain originals that do?

PHIL. What! Has it come to this? You only BELIEVE that material objects exist, and your belief rests solely on the possibility that they exist? Yet you expect me to argue against their existence. Someone else might reasonably think that the person making the claim should prove it. And after all, you have more than once during this discussion seen good reason to give up the very claim you now insist on defending without any reason. But let us set all that aside. If I understand you correctly, you say that our ideas do not exist outside the mind. Instead, you say they are copies, images, or representations of certain originals that do exist outside the mind?

HYL. You take me right.

HYL. You understand me correctly.

PHIL. They are then like external things?

PHIL. So they are like external things?

HYL. They are.

PHIL. Have those things a stable and permanent nature, independent of our senses; or are they in a perpetual change, upon our producing any motions in our bodies—suspending, exerting, or altering, our faculties or organs of sense?

PHIL. Do those things have a stable and permanent nature independent of our senses? Or do they constantly change whenever we move our bodies by suspending, using, or altering our sensory faculties or organs?

HYL. Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, which remains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses, or in the posture and motion of our bodies; which indeed may affect the ideas in our minds, but it were absurd to think they had the same effect on things existing without the mind.

HYL. Clearly, real things have a fixed, real nature. This nature stays the same despite changes in our senses or in our bodies' position and movement. Such changes may affect the ideas in our minds. But it would be absurd to think they have the same effect on things that exist outside the mind.

PHIL. How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and constant? Or, in other words, since all sensible qualities, as size, figure, colour, &c., that is, our ideas, are continually changing, upon every alteration in the distance, medium, or instruments of sensation; how can any determinate material objects be properly represented or painted forth by several distinct things, each of which is so different from and unlike the rest? Or, if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all the false ones?

PHIL. How, then, can our ideas, which are always fleeting and changing, be copies or images of anything fixed and constant? In other words, all sensible qualities, such as size, shape, and color, are our ideas. They constantly change whenever the distance, medium, or instruments of sensation change. How, then, can any definite material objects be properly represented or portrayed by several distinct ideas? Each of those ideas is so different from the others. Or, if you say a material object resembles only one of our ideas, how can we distinguish the true copy from all the false ones?

HYL. I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not what to say to this.

HYL. I must admit, Philonous, I'm at a loss. I don't know what to say to this.

PHIL. But neither is this all. Which are material objects in themselves—perceptible or imperceptible?

PHIL. But that is not all. Are material objects in themselves perceptible or imperceptible?

HYL. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible, and to be perceived only by our ideas.

HYL. Strictly speaking, we can perceive only ideas directly. Therefore, all material things are imperceptible in themselves and can be perceived only through our ideas.

PHIL. Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals insensible?

PHIL. So ideas can be perceived by the senses, but their models or originals cannot?

HYL. Right.

PHIL. But how can that which is sensible be like that which is insensible? Can a real thing, in itself INVISIBLE, be like a COLOUR; or a real thing, which is not AUDIBLE, be like a SOUND? In a word, can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea?

PHIL. But how can something that can be sensed be like something that cannot be sensed? Can a real thing that is INVISIBLE in itself be like a COLOUR? Or can a real thing that is not AUDIBLE be like a SOUND? In short, can anything be like a sensation or idea except another sensation or idea?

HYL. I must own, I think not.

HYL. I must admit, I don't think so.

PHIL. Is it possible there should be any doubt on the point? Do you not perfectly know your own ideas?

PHIL. Can there be any doubt about the point? Don't you know your own ideas perfectly?

HYL. I know them perfectly; since what I do not perceive or know can be no part of my idea.

HYL. I know them perfectly, because what I do not perceive or know cannot be part of my idea.

PHIL. Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then tell me if there be anything in them which can exist without the mind: or if you can conceive anything like them existing without the mind.

PHIL. So consider and examine them. Then tell me whether anything in them can exist outside the mind. Can you conceive of anything like them existing outside the mind?

HYL. Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to conceive or understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. And it is most evident that NO IDEA CAN EXIST WITHOUT THE MIND.

HYL. On reflection, I find that I cannot understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. And it is perfectly clear that NO IDEA CAN EXIST OUTSIDE THE MIND.

PHIL. You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the REALITY of sensible things; since you made it to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say, you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which was to shew your principles led to Scepticism.

PHIL. Your principles therefore force you to deny the REALITY of things perceived by the senses. For you said their reality consists in an absolute existence outside the mind. In other words, you are a complete skeptic. So I have made my point, which was to show that your principles lead to skepticism.

HYL. For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at least silenced.

HYL. For now, if I'm not entirely convinced, at least I have nothing to say.

PHIL. I would fain know what more you would require in order to a perfect conviction. Have you not had the liberty of explaining yourself all manner of ways? Were any little slips in discourse laid hold and insisted on? Or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce anything you had offered, as best served your purpose? Hath not everything you could say been heard and examined with all the fairness imaginable? In a word have you not in every point been convinced out of your own mouth? And, if you can at present discover any flaw in any of your former concessions, or think of any remaining subterfuge, any new distinction, colour, or comment whatsoever, why do you not produce it?

PHIL. I would like to know what more you need to be completely convinced. Have you not been free to explain yourself in every possible way? Have I seized on any small slips in what you said and pressed them against you? Or were you not allowed to withdraw or strengthen anything you said, as best suited your purpose? Has not everything you could say been heard and examined as fairly as possible? In short, have you not been convinced on every point by your own words? And if you can now find any flaw in anything you conceded earlier, why do you not point it out? Or if you can think of any remaining escape, any new distinction, pretext, or explanation at all, why do you not offer it?

HYL. A little patience, Philonous. I am at present so amazed to see myself ensnared, and as it were imprisoned in the labyrinths you have drawn me into, that on the sudden it cannot be expected I should find my way out. You must give me time to look about me and recollect myself.

HYL. Be patient, Philonous. I am amazed to find myself trapped, as if imprisoned in the labyrinths you have led me into. So you cannot expect me to find my way out at once. You must give me time to look around and collect my thoughts.

PHIL. Hark; is not this the college bell?

PHIL. Listen. Isn't that the college bell?

HYL. It rings for prayers.

HYL. It is ringing for prayers.

PHIL. We will go in then, if you please, and meet here again tomorrow morning. In the meantime, you may employ your thoughts on this morning's discourse, and try if you can find any fallacy in it, or invent any new means to extricate yourself.

PHIL. If you like, we will go inside now and meet here again tomorrow morning. In the meantime, you may think over this morning's discussion. Try to find a flaw in the argument or come up with a new way out of your difficulty.

HYL. Agreed.