Why No One Can or Needs to Transfer All Rights to the Sovereign. The Hebrew Republic From Moses’s Lifetime to the Monarchy: Its Excellence, Why the Theocracy Fell, and Why It Could Hardly Have Survived Without Internal Conflict.

The theory put forward in the last chapter, of the universal rights of the sovereign power, and of the natural rights of the individual transferred thereto, though it corresponds in many respects with actual practice, and though practice may be so arranged as to conform to it more and more, must nevertheless always remain in many respects purely ideal. No one can ever so utterly transfer to another his power and, consequently, his rights, as to cease to be a man; nor can there ever be a power so sovereign that it can carry out every possible wish. It will always be vain to order a subject to hate what he believes brings him advantage, or to love what brings him loss, or not to be offended at insults, or not to wish to be free from fear, or a hundred other things of the sort, which necessarily follow from the laws of human nature. So much, I think, is abundantly shown by experience: for men have never so far ceded their power as to cease to be an object of fear to the rulers who received such power and right; and dominions have always been in as much danger from their own subjects as from external enemies. If it were really the case, that men could be deprived of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any further influence on affairs²⁹, except with the permission of the holders of sovereign right, it would then be possible to maintain with impunity the most violent tyranny, which, I suppose, no one would for an instant admit.

The last chapter presented a theory of the sovereign power’s universal rights and the individual’s natural rights transferred to it. Although this theory matches actual practice in many ways, it must always remain purely ideal in many others. This remains true even though practice may be arranged to conform more closely to the theory. No one can transfer his power, and therefore his rights, so completely to another that he stops being human. Nor can any sovereign power be so absolute that it can carry out every possible wish. Ordering a subject to hate what he believes benefits him will always be pointless. So will ordering him to love what harms him, or not to take offense at insults. The same holds for ordering him not to want freedom from fear, or a hundred other things of this kind. These responses necessarily follow from the laws of human nature. Experience, I think, shows this more than clearly enough. People have never surrendered so much power that the rulers receiving that power and those rights stopped fearing them. And states have always faced as much danger from their own subjects as from foreign enemies. Suppose people really could be stripped of their natural rights so completely that they had no further influence on affairs²⁹, except with the sovereign rulers’ permission. Then the most violent tyranny could be maintained without consequences. I suppose no one would accept that possibility for a moment.

(17:6) We must, therefore, grant that every man retains some part of his right, in dependence on his own decision, and no one else's.

(17:6) We must therefore accept that every person keeps some of their rights, depending on their own decisions alone.

However, in order correctly to understand the extent of the sovereign's right and power, we must take notice that it does not cover only those actions to which it can compel men by fear, but absolutely every action which it can induce men to perform: for it is the fact of obedience, not the motive for obedience, which makes a man a subject.

However, to understand the full extent of the sovereign's right and power, we must recognize the following. The sovereign's power covers more than actions people can be forced to perform through fear. It covers absolutely every action the sovereign can get people to perform. For obedience makes a person a subject, not the reason for obeying.

(17:8) Whatever be the cause which leads a man to obey the commands of the sovereign, whether it be fear or hope, or love of his country, or any other emotion - the fact remains that the man takes counsel with himself, and nevertheless acts as his sovereign orders. We must not, therefore, assert that all actions resulting from a man's deliberation with himself are done in obedience to the rights of the individual rather than the sovereign: as a matter of fact, all actions spring from a man's deliberation with himself, whether the determining motive be love or fear of punishment; therefore, either dominion does not exist, and has no rights over its subjects, or else it extends over every instance in which it can prevail on men to decide to obey it. Consequently, every action which a subject performs in accordance with the commands of the sovereign, whether such action springs from love, or fear, or (as is more frequently the case) from hope and fear together, or from reverence, compounded of fear and admiration, or, indeed, any motive whatever, is performed in virtue of his submission to the sovereign, and not in virtue of his own authority.

(17:8) A man may obey the sovereign’s commands out of fear, hope, love of his country, or any other emotion. Whatever his motive, he decides for himself, yet acts as the sovereign orders. So we must not claim that all actions a man decides on himself exercise his individual rights rather than the sovereign’s. In fact, all actions follow from a man’s own deliberation, whether motivated by love or fear of punishment. Therefore, either sovereign power does not exist and has no rights over its subjects, or that power reaches further. It extends to every case in which the sovereign can persuade people to decide to obey. Consequently, every action a subject performs according to the sovereign’s commands expresses his submission to the sovereign, not his own authority. This holds whether the action is motivated by love, fear, or, more often, hope and fear together. The motive may also be reverence, a mixture of fear and admiration, or indeed any motive at all.

(17:11) This point is made still more clear by the fact that obedience does not consist so much in the outward act as in the mental state of the person obeying; so that he is most under the dominion of another who with his whole heart determines to obey another's commands; and consequently the firmest dominion belongs to the sovereign who has most influence over the minds of his subjects; if those who are most feared possessed the firmest dominion, the firmest dominion would belong to the subjects of a tyrant, for they are always greatly feared by their ruler. Furthermore, though it is impossible to govern the mind as completely as the tongue, nevertheless minds are, to a certain extent, under the control of the sovereign, for he can in many ways bring about that the greatest part of his subjects should follow his wishes in their beliefs, their loves, and their hates. Though such emotions do not arise at the express command of the sovereign they often result (as experience shows) from the authority of his power, and from his direction; in other words, in virtue of his right; we may, therefore, without doing violence to our understanding, conceive men who follow the instigation of their sovereign in their beliefs, their loves, their hates, their contempt, and all other emotions whatsoever.

(17:11) This point becomes clearer when we recognize that obedience depends less on outward actions than on the obedient person's state of mind. So whoever wholeheartedly resolves to obey another person's commands is most fully under that person's control. Consequently, the sovereign with the greatest influence over his subjects' minds has the firmest control. If those who inspire the most fear had the firmest control, a tyrant's subjects would have the firmest control. Their ruler, after all, always fears them greatly. Furthermore, although minds cannot be governed as completely as speech, minds are still partly under the sovereign's control. In many ways, he can lead most of his subjects to follow his wishes in their beliefs, loves, and hates. Although these feelings do not arise at the sovereign's direct command, they often result from his authority and direction. Experience shows this. In other words, these feelings arise through the sovereign's right to rule. So we can reasonably imagine people whose beliefs, loves, hates, contempt, and all other emotions follow their sovereign's prompting.

(17:14) Though the powers of government, as thus conceived, are sufficiently ample, they can never become large enough to execute every possible wish of their possessors. This, I think, I have already shown clearly enough. The method of forming a dominion which should prove lasting I do not, as I have said, intend to discuss, but in order to arrive at the object I have in view, I will touch on the teaching of Divine revelation to Moses in this respect, and we will consider the history and the success of the Jews, gathering therefrom what should be the chief concessions made by sovereigns to their subjects with a view to the security and increase of their dominion.

(17:14) Though government powers, understood in this way, are broad enough, they can never fulfill every possible wish of their holders. I think I have already shown this limitation clearly enough. As I have said, I do not intend to discuss how to establish a lasting state. But to reach my intended goal, I will briefly discuss what Divine revelation taught Moses on this subject. We will then consider the history of the Jews and their success. From this, we will identify the chief concessions rulers should make to their subjects to secure and expand their rule.

That the preservation of a state chiefly depends on the subjects' fidelity and constancy in carrying out the orders they receive, is most clearly taught both by reason and experience; how subjects ought to be guided so as best to preserve their fidelity and virtue is not so obvious. All, both rulers and ruled, are men, and prone to follow after their lusts. The fickle disposition of the multitude almost reduces those who have experience of it to despair, for it is governed solely by emotions, not by reason: it rushes headlong into every enterprise, and is easily corrupted either by avarice or luxury: everyone thinks himself omniscient and wishes to fashion all things to his liking, judging a thing to be just or unjust, lawful or unlawful, according as he thinks it will bring him profit or loss: vanity leads him to despise his equals, and refuse their guidance: envy of superior fame or fortune (for such gifts are never equally distributed) leads him to desire and rejoice in his neighbour's downfall. I need not go through the whole list, everyone knows already how much crime results from disgust at the present - desire for change, headlong anger, and contempt for poverty - and how men's minds are engrossed and kept in turmoil thereby.

Reason and experience clearly teach that a state's survival depends chiefly on its subjects' loyalty and steady obedience to orders. How best to guide subjects so they remain loyal and virtuous is less obvious. All people, rulers and ruled alike, are prone to follow their desires. The crowd's fickleness nearly drives those familiar with it to despair. For the crowd is governed solely by emotion, not reason. It rushes headlong into every undertaking and is easily corrupted by greed or luxury. Everyone thinks he knows everything and wants to shape everything to his liking. He judges things just or unjust, lawful or unlawful, according to whether he expects profit or loss. Vanity leads him to despise his equals and reject their guidance. Envy of greater fame or wealth leads him to wish for his neighbor's downfall and rejoice in it. Such advantages are never equally distributed. I need not list everything. Everyone already knows how much crime comes from dissatisfaction with the present, desire for change, reckless anger, and contempt for poverty. Everyone also knows how these feelings consume people's minds and keep them in turmoil.

(17:21) To guard against all these evils, and form a dominion where no room is left for deceit; to frame our institutions so that every man, whatever his disposition, may prefer public right to private advantage, this is the task and this the toil. Necessity is often the mother of invention, but she has never yet succeeded in framing a dominion that was in less danger from its own citizens than from open enemies, or whose rulers did not fear the latter less than the former. Witness the state of Rome, invincible by her enemies, but many times conquered and sorely oppressed by her own citizens, especially in the war between Vespasian and Vitellius. (See Tacitus, Hist. bk. iv. for a description of the pitiable state of the city.)

(17:21) We must guard against all these evils and build a state that leaves no room for deceit. We must shape our institutions so that everyone, whatever their character, may prefer public right to personal advantage. That is the task, and that is the hard work. Necessity is often the mother of invention. But necessity has never yet produced a state less threatened by its own citizens than by open enemies. Nor has necessity produced a state whose rulers feared their citizens less than their enemies. Consider Rome, which its enemies could not defeat. Yet its own citizens repeatedly conquered and severely oppressed it, especially during the war between Vespasian and Vitellius. (See Tacitus, Hist. book iv, for a description of the city's pitiful condition.)

(17:25) Alexander thought prestige abroad more easy to acquire than prestige at home, and believed that his greatness could be destroyed by his own followers. Fearing such a disaster, he thus addressed his friends: "Keep me safe from internal treachery and domestic plots, and I will front without fear the dangers of battle and of war. Philip was more secure in the battle array than in the theatre: he often escaped from the hands of the enemy, he could not escape from his own subjects. If you think over the deaths of kings, you will count up more who have died by the assassin than by the open foe." (Q. Curtius, chap. vi.)

(17:25) Alexander thought prestige was easier to gain abroad than at home. He believed his own followers could destroy his greatness. Fearing such a disaster, he told his friends: "Keep me safe from betrayal within and plots at home. Then I will face the dangers of battle and war without fear. Philip was safer on the battlefield than in the theatre. He often escaped his enemies, but he could not escape his own subjects. If you consider how kings have died, you will count more killed by assassins than by enemies in open battle." (Q. Curtius, chap. vi.)

(17:29) For the sake of making themselves secure, kings who seized the throne in ancient times used to try to spread the idea that they were descended from the immortal gods, thinking that if their subjects and the rest of mankind did not look on them as equals, but believed them to be gods, they would willingly submit to their rule, and obey their commands. Thus Augustus persuaded the Romans that he was descended from Æneas, who was the son of Venus, and numbered among the gods. "He wished himself to be worshipped in temples, like the gods, with flamens and priests." (Tacitus, Ann. i. 10.)

(17:29) In ancient times, kings who seized the throne tried to secure their power by claiming descent from the immortal gods. They thought their subjects and everyone else would willingly accept their rule and obey their commands under one condition: people must see these kings not as equals, but as gods. Thus Augustus persuaded the Romans that he descended from Æneas, the son of Venus, who was counted among the gods. "He wanted to be worshipped in temples like the gods, with flamens and priests." (Tacitus, Ann. i. 10.)

(17:32) Alexander wished to be saluted as the son of Jupiter, not from motives of pride but of policy, as he showed by his answer to the invective of Hermolaus: "It is almost laughable," said he, "that Hermolaus asked me to contradict Jupiter, by whose oracle I am recognized. Am I responsible for the answers of the gods? It offered me the name of son; acquiescence was by no means foreign to my present designs. Would that the Indians also would believe me to be a god! Wars are carried through by prestige, falsehoods that are believed often gain the force of truth." (Curtius, viii,. Para. 8.) In these few words he cleverly contrives to palm off a fiction on the ignorant, and at the same time hints at the motive for the deception.

(17:32) Alexander wanted to be greeted as the son of Jupiter, not out of pride but for political reasons. His reply to Hermolaus’s attack showed his motive: "It is almost laughable," he said, "that Hermolaus asked me to contradict Jupiter, whose oracle recognizes me as his son. Am I responsible for the gods’ answers? The oracle offered me the title of son. Accepting that title certainly suited my current plans. If only the Indians would also believe I am a god! Wars are won through prestige. Lies that people believe often gain the force of truth." (Curtius, viii, para. 8.) In these few words, he cleverly passes off a fiction on the ignorant. At the same time, he hints at his reason for deceiving them.

(17:38) Cleon, in his speech persuading the Macedonians to obey their king, adopted a similar device: for after going through the praises of Alexander with admiration, and recalling his merits, he proceeds, "the Persians are not only pious, but prudent in worshipping their kings as gods: for kingship is the shield of public safety," and he ends thus, "I, myself, when the king enters a banquet hall, should prostrate my body on the ground; other men should do the like, especially those who are wise" (Curtius, viii. Para. 66). However, the Macedonians were more prudent - indeed, it is only complete barbarians who can be so openly cajoled, and can suffer themselves to be turned from subjects into slaves without interests of their own. Others, notwithstanding, have been able more easily to spread the belief that kingship is sacred, and plays the part of God on the earth, that it has been instituted by God, not by the suffrage and consent of men; and that it is preserved and guarded by Divine special providence and aid. Similar fictions have been promulgated by monarchs, with the object of strengthening their dominion, but these I will pass over, and in order to arrive at my main purpose, will merely recall and discuss the teaching on the subject of Divine revelation to Moses in ancient times.

(17:38) Cleon used a similar tactic in his speech urging the Macedonians to obey their king. After praising Alexander with admiration and recalling his achievements, Cleon continues, "the Persians are not only devout but wise to worship their kings as gods. For kingship is the shield of public safety." He ends with these words, "I myself should lie face down on the ground when the king enters a banquet hall. Other men should do the same, especially those who are wise" (Curtius, viii. Para. 66). But the Macedonians were wiser. Indeed, only complete barbarians can be so openly manipulated. Only they can let themselves be turned from subjects into slaves with no interests of their own. Others, however, have more easily spread the belief that kingship is sacred and represents God on earth. They claim that God established kingship, not human votes and consent, and that God's special providence and help preserve and protect it. Monarchs have spread similar fictions to strengthen their rule, but I will pass over those fictions. To reach my main point, I will simply recall and discuss the teaching about God's revelation to Moses in ancient times.

We have said in Chap. V. that after the Hebrews came up out of Egypt they were not bound by the law and right of any other nation, but were at liberty to institute any new rites at their pleasure, and to occupy whatever territory they chose. After their liberation from the intolerable bondage of the Egyptians, they were bound by no covenant to any man; and, therefore, every man entered into his natural right, and was free to retain it or to give it up, and transfer it to another. Being, then, in the state of nature, they followed the advice of Moses, in whom they chiefly trusted, and decided to transfer their right to no human being, but only to God; without further delay they all, with one voice, promised to obey all the commands of the Deity, and to acknowledge no right that He did not proclaim as such by prophetic revelation. This promise, or transference of right to God, was effected in the same manner as we have conceived it to have been in ordinary societies, when men agree to divest themselves of their natural rights. It is, in fact, in virtue of a set covenant, and an oath (see Exod. xxxiv:10), that the Jews freely, and not under compulsion or threats, surrendered their rights and transferred them to God. Moreover, in order that this covenant might be ratified and settled, and might be free from all suspicion of deceit, God did not enter into it till the Jews had had experience of His wonderful power by which alone they had been, or could be, preserved in a state of prosperity (Exod. xix:4, 5). It is because they believed that nothing but God's power could preserve them that they surrendered to God the natural power of self-preservation, which they formerly, perhaps, thought they possessed, and consequently they surrendered at the same time all their natural right.

We said in Chapter V that after the Hebrews left Egypt, no other nation’s laws or authority bound them. They were free to establish whatever new rites they pleased and to occupy whatever territory they chose. After their release from the Egyptians’ unbearable slavery, no covenant bound them to anyone. Each person therefore regained his natural right and was free to keep it or transfer it to someone else. Since they were in the state of nature, they followed the advice of Moses, whom they trusted above all others. They decided to transfer their right to no human being, but only to God. Without delay, they all promised with one voice to obey all God’s commands. They also promised to recognize no right unless God declared it through prophetic revelation. This promise, or transfer of right to God, took place just as we have described it in ordinary societies. In those societies, people agree to give up their natural rights. In fact, the Jews surrendered their rights and transferred them to God through an explicit covenant and an oath (see Exodus 34:10). They did so freely, not under pressure or threats. Moreover, God waited to enter this covenant until the Jews had experienced his extraordinary power. This delay ensured that the covenant would be confirmed and firmly established, without any suspicion of deception. Only God’s power had kept them prosperous, and only that power could continue to do so (Exodus 19:4, 5). Because they believed that only God’s power could preserve them, they surrendered to God their natural power to preserve themselves. Perhaps they had previously thought they possessed this power. Consequently, they also surrendered all their natural right at the same time.

God alone, therefore, held dominion over the Hebrews, whose state was in virtue of the covenant called God's kingdom, and God was said to be their king; consequently the enemies of the Jews were said to be the enemies of God, and the citizens who tried to seize the dominion were guilty of treason against God; and, lastly, the laws of the state were called the laws and commandments of God. Thus in the Hebrew state the civil and religious authority, each consisting solely of obedience to God, were one and the same. The dogmas of religion were not precepts, but laws and ordinances; piety was regarded as the same as loyalty, impiety as the same as disaffection. Everyone who fell away from religion ceased to be a citizen, and was, on that ground alone, accounted an enemy: those who died for the sake of religion, were held to have died for their country; in fact, between civil and religious law and right there was no distinction whatever. For this reason the government could be called a Theocracy, inasmuch as the citizens were not bound by anything save the revelations of God.

God alone, therefore, ruled over the Hebrews. Under the covenant, their state was called God's kingdom, and God was said to be their king. Consequently, the enemies of the Jews were said to be God's enemies. Citizens who tried to seize power were guilty of treason against God. Finally, the state's laws were called God's laws and commandments. Thus, in the Hebrew state, civil and religious authority were one and the same. Both consisted solely of obedience to God. Religious doctrines were not merely teachings, but laws and regulations. Piety was considered the same as loyalty, and impiety the same as disloyalty. Everyone who abandoned religion ceased to be a citizen and, for that reason alone, was considered an enemy. Those who died for religion were considered to have died for their country. In fact, there was no distinction at all between civil and religious law or rights. For this reason, the government could be called a Theocracy, since citizens were bound only by God's revelations.

(17:54) However, this state of things existed rather in theory than in practice, for it will appear from what we are about to say, that the Hebrews, as a matter of fact, retained absolutely in their own hands the right of sovereignty: this is shown by the method and plan by which the government was carried on, as I will now explain.

(17:54) However, this situation existed more in theory than in practice. As the following account will show, the Hebrews in fact kept the right of sovereignty entirely in their own hands. The structure of their government and the way it operated demonstrate this, as I will now explain.

(17:55) Inasmuch as the Hebrews did not transfer their rights to any other person but, as in a democracy, all surrendered their rights equally, and cried out with one voice, "Whatsoever God shall speak (no mediator or mouthpiece being named) that will we do," it follows that all were equally bound by the covenant, and that all had an equal right to consult the Deity, to accept and to interpret His laws, so that all had an exactly equal share in the government. Thus at first they all approached God together, so that they might learn His commands, but in this first salutation, they were so thoroughly terrified and so astounded to hear God speaking, that they thought their last hour was at hand: full of fear, therefore, they went afresh to Moses, and said, "Lo, we have heard God speaking in the fire, and there is no cause why we should wish to die: surely this great fire will consume us: if we hear again the voice of God, we shall surely die. Thou, therefore, go near, and hear all the words of our God, and thou (not God) shalt speak with us: all that God shall tell us, that will we hearken to and perform."

(17:55) The Hebrews did not transfer their rights to any other person. Instead, as in a democracy, they all surrendered their rights equally and declared with one voice, "Whatever God says, we will do." They named no mediator or spokesperson. It follows that all were equally bound by the covenant. All had an equal right to consult God, to accept his laws, and to interpret them. So all had an exactly equal share in the government. At first, therefore, they all approached God together so that they could learn his commands. But at this first encounter, hearing God speak terrified and astonished them so much that they thought they were about to die. Full of fear, they therefore went back to Moses and said, "Look, we have heard God speaking in the fire, and there is no reason for us to want to die. Surely this great fire will consume us. If we hear God's voice again, we will surely die. So you must go near and hear all the words of our God. Then you (not God) must speak to us. We will listen to and do everything God tells us."

(17:58) They thus clearly abrogated their former covenant, and absolutely transferred to Moses their right to consult God and interpret His commands: for they do not here promise obedience to all that God shall tell them, but to all that God shall tell Moses (see Deut. v:20 after the Decalogue, and chap. xviii:15, 16). Moses, therefore, remained the sole promulgator and interpreter of the Divine laws, and consequently also the sovereign judge, who could not be arraigned himself, and who acted among the Hebrews the part of God; in other words, held the sovereign kingship: he alone had the right to consult God, to give the Divine answers to the people, and to see that they were carried out. I say he alone, for if anyone during the life of Moses was desirous of preaching anything in the name of the Lord, he was, even if a true prophet, considered guilty and a usurper of the sovereign right (Numb. xi:28)³⁰. We may here notice, that though the people had elected Moses, they could not rightfully elect Moses's successor; for having transferred to Moses their right of consulting God, and absolutely promised to regard him as a Divine oracle, they had plainly forfeited the whole of their right, and were bound to accept as chosen by God anyone proclaimed by Moses as his successor. If Moses had so chosen his successor, who like him should wield the sole right of government, possessing the sole right of consulting God, and consequently of making and abrogating laws, of deciding on peace or war, of sending ambassadors, appointing judges - in fact, discharging all the functions of a sovereign, the state would have become simply a monarchy, only differing from other monarchies in the fact, that the latter are, or should be, carried on in accordance with God's decree, unknown even to the monarch, whereas the Hebrew monarch would have been the only person to whom the decree was revealed. A difference which increases, rather than diminishes the monarch's authority. As far as the people in both cases are concerned, each would be equally subject, and equally ignorant of the Divine decree, for each would be dependent on the monarch's words, and would learn from him alone, what was lawful or unlawful: nor would the fact that the people believed that the monarch was only issuing commands in accordance with God's decree revealed to him, make it less in subjection, but rather more. However, Moses elected no such successor, but left the dominion to those who came after him in a condition which could not be called a popular government, nor an aristocracy, nor a monarchy, but a Theocracy. For the right of interpreting laws was vested in one man, while the right and power of administering the state according to the laws thus interpreted, was vested in another man (see Numb. xxvii:21)³¹.

(17:58) They thus clearly canceled their former covenant. They completely transferred to Moses their right to consult God and interpret his commands. For they do not promise here to obey everything God tells them, but everything God tells Moses. See Deut. v:20 after the Decalogue, and chap. xviii:15, 16. Moses therefore remained the sole person authorized to proclaim and interpret the Divine laws. Consequently, he was also the supreme judge, who could not himself be brought to trial. Among the Hebrews, he acted in God's place. In other words, he held supreme royal power. He alone had the right to consult God, relay God's answers to the people, and ensure those answers were followed. I say he alone, because during Moses's lifetime, anyone wishing to preach anything in the Lord's name was considered guilty. Even a true prophet was considered to have usurped the sovereign's authority (Numb. xi:28)³⁰. We may note here that although the people had elected Moses, they had no right to elect his successor. For they had transferred to Moses their right to consult God. They had also promised without reservation to regard him as God's spokesman. They had therefore clearly surrendered that right entirely. They were bound to accept anyone Moses named as his successor as someone chosen by God. Suppose Moses had chosen a successor who, like himself, held the sole right to govern. That successor would have had the sole right to consult God and, consequently, to make and repeal laws. He would also have decided on peace or war, sent ambassadors, and appointed judges. In short, he would have performed all the duties of a sovereign. Had Moses chosen such a successor, the state would have become simply a monarchy. It would have differed from other monarchies in only one respect. Other monarchies are, or should be, governed according to God's decree, which remains unknown even to the monarch. The Hebrew monarch, however, would have been the only person to whom that decree was revealed. This difference increases rather than diminishes the monarch's authority. In either kind of monarchy, the people would be equally subject and equally ignorant of the Divine decree. For in either case, they would depend on the monarch's words. They would learn from him alone what was lawful or unlawful. The people's belief that the monarch only issued commands according to God's revealed decree would not make them less subject. Rather, that belief would make them more subject. Moses, however, chose no such successor. Instead, he left those who came after him a form of government that could not be called popular government. Nor could it be called an aristocracy or a monarchy. It was a Theocracy. For one man held the right to interpret the laws. Another held the right and power to govern the state according to those interpretations (see Numb. xxvii:21)³¹.

(17:67) In order that the question may be thoroughly understood, I will duly set forth the administration of the whole state.

(17:67) To make the question fully clear, I will explain how the entire state is governed.

First, the people were commanded to build a tabernacle, which should be, as it were, the dwelling of God - that is, of the sovereign authority of the state. This tabernacle was to be erected at the cost of the whole people, not of one man, in order that the place where God was consulted might be public property. The Levites were chosen as courtiers and administrators of this royal abode; while Aaron, the brother of Moses, was chosen to be their chief and second, as it were, to God their King, being succeeded in the office by his legitimate sons.

First, the people were commanded to build a tabernacle to serve, so to speak, as God’s dwelling. In other words, it would house the state’s sovereign authority. The whole people, not one person, were to pay for the tabernacle. This would ensure that the place where God was consulted belonged to the public. The Levites were chosen to serve as courtiers and administrators of this royal residence. Aaron, the brother of Moses, was chosen as their chief and, so to speak, second to God their King. Aaron’s legitimate sons were to succeed him in this office.

(17:71) He, as the nearest to God, was the sovereign interpreter of the Divine laws; he communicated the answers of the Divine oracle to the people, and entreated God's favour for them. If, in addition to these privileges, he had possessed the right of ruling, he would have been neither more nor less than an absolute monarch; but, in respect to government, he was only a private citizen: the whole tribe of Levi was so completely divested of governing rights that it did not even take its share with the others in the partition of territory. Moses provided for its support by inspiring the common people with great reverence for it, as the only tribe dedicated to God.

(17:71) As the one closest to God, he had the highest authority to interpret divine laws. He conveyed the divine oracle's answers to the people and asked God to favor them. If he had also held the right to govern, he would have been nothing less than an absolute monarch. But in matters of government, he was only a private citizen. The whole tribe of Levi was so completely stripped of governing rights that it received no share of the territory. Moses provided for the tribe's support by inspiring deep respect for it among the common people. He did so because it was the only tribe dedicated to God.

(17:74) Further, the army, formed from the remaining twelve tribes, was commanded to invade the land of Canaan, to divide it into twelve portions, and to distribute it among the tribes by lot. For this task twelve captains were chosen, one from every tribe, and were, together with Joshua and Eleazar, the high priest, empowered to divide the land into twelve equal parts, and distribute it by lot. Joshua was chosen for the chief command of the army, inasmuch as none but he had the right to consult God in emergencies, not like Moses, alone in his tent, or in the tabernacle, but through the high priest, to whom only the answers of God were revealed. Furthermore, he was empowered to execute, and cause the people to obey God's commands, transmitted through the high priests; to find, and to make use of, means for carrying them out; to choose as many army captains as he liked; to make whatever choice he thought best; to send ambassadors in his own name; and, in short, to have the entire control of the war. To his office there was no rightful successor - indeed, the post was only filled by the direct order of the Deity, on occasions of public emergency. In ordinary times, all the management of peace and war was vested in the captains of the tribes, as I will shortly point out. Lastly, all men between the ages of twenty and sixty were ordered to bear arms, and form a citizen army, owing allegiance, not to its general-in-chief, nor to the high priest, but to Religion and to God. The army, or the hosts, were called the army of God, or the hosts of God. For this reason God was called by the Hebrews the God of Armies; and the ark of the covenant was borne in the midst of the army in important battles, when the safety or destruction of the whole people hung upon the issue, so that the people might, as it were, see their King among them, and put forth all their strength.

(17:74) Further, the army, drawn from the remaining twelve tribes, was ordered to invade the land of Canaan. The army was to divide the land into twelve portions and distribute them among the tribes by lot. Twelve captains were chosen for this task, one from each tribe. Together with Joshua and Eleazar, the high priest, these captains had authority to divide the land into twelve equal parts. They were then to distribute the parts by lot. Joshua was chosen as the army’s supreme commander because he alone had the right to consult God in emergencies. Unlike Moses, Joshua could not consult God alone in his tent or in the tabernacle. Instead, Joshua had to consult God through the high priest, to whom alone God’s answers were revealed. Joshua also had authority to carry out God’s commands, transmitted through the high priests, and make the people obey them. He could find and use the means to carry out those commands. He could choose as many army captains as he liked and make whatever choice he thought best. He could send ambassadors in his own name and, in short, had complete control over the war. No one had a right to succeed him in this office. Indeed, the post was filled only by God’s direct command during public emergencies. In ordinary times, the tribal captains had full authority over peace and war, as I will explain shortly. Finally, all men between twenty and sixty were ordered to bear arms and form a citizen army. These men owed allegiance not to their supreme commander or the high priest, but to Religion and God. The army, or the hosts, was called the army of God, or the hosts of God. For this reason, the Hebrews called God the God of Armies. The ark of the covenant was carried in the army’s midst during important battles. These were battles whose outcome would determine the safety or destruction of the whole people. The ark was carried among them so that the people might, as it were, see their King among them. They might then fight with all their strength.

(17:83) From these directions, left by Moses to his successors, we plainly see that he chose administrators, rather than despots, to come after him; for he invested no one with the power of consulting God, where he liked and alone, consequently, no one had the power possessed by himself of ordaining and abrogating laws, of deciding on war or peace, of choosing men to fill offices both religious and secular: all these are the prerogatives of a sovereign. The high priest, indeed, had the right of interpreting laws, and communicating the answers of God, but he could not do so when he liked, as Moses could, but only when he was asked by the general-in-chief of the army, the council, or some similar authority. The general-in-chief and the council could consult God when they liked, but could only receive His answers through the high priest; so that the utterances of God, as reported by the high priest, were not decrees, as they were when reported by Moses, but only answers; they were accepted by Joshua and the council, and only then had the force of commands and decrees.

(17:83) These instructions, left by Moses to his successors, clearly show that he chose administrators, not despots, to succeed him. For he gave no one the power to consult God alone, wherever they wished. Consequently, no one had Moses’ power to make and repeal laws, or to decide on war or peace. Nor could anyone, as Moses could, choose people to fill religious and secular offices. All these powers belong to a sovereign. The high priest did have the right to interpret laws and communicate God’s answers. But unlike Moses, the high priest could not do so whenever he wished. He could act only when asked by the army’s commander-in-chief, the council, or some similar authority. The commander-in-chief and the council could consult God whenever they wished, but could receive his answers only through the high priest. So God’s words, as reported by the high priest, were only answers, not decrees as they were when Moses reported them. Joshua and the council accepted these answers, and only then did the answers carry the force of commands and decrees.

(17:86) The high priest, both in the case of Aaron and of his son Eleazar, was chosen by Moses; nor had anyone, after Moses' death, a right to elect to the office, which became hereditary. The general-in-chief of the army was also chosen by Moses, and assumed his functions in virtue of the commands, not of the high priest, but of Moses: indeed, after the death of Joshua, the high priest did not appoint anyone in his place, and the captains did not consult God afresh about a general-in-chief, but each retained Joshua's power in respect to the contingent of his own tribe, and all retained it collectively, in respect to the whole army. There seems to have been no need of a general-in-chief, except when they were obliged to unite their forces against a common enemy. This occurred most frequently during the time of Joshua, when they had no fixed dwelling. place, and possessed all things in common. After all the tribes had gained their territories by right of conquest, and had divided their allotted gains, they, became separated, having no longer their possessions in common, so that the need for a single commander ceased, for the different tribes should be considered rather in the light of confederated states than of bodies of fellow-citizens. In respect to their God and their religion, they, were fellow-citizens; but, in respect to the rights which one possessed with regard to another, they were only confederated: they, were, in fact, in much the same position (if one excepts the Temple common to all) as the United States of the Netherlands {or United States of America}. The division of property held in common is only another phrase for the possession of his share by each of the owners singly, and the surrender by the others of their rights over such share. This is why Moses elected captains of the tribes - namely, that when the dominion was divided, each might take care of his own part; consulting God through the high priest on the affairs of his tribe, ruling over his army, building and fortifying cities, appointing judges, attacking the enemies of his own dominion, and having complete control over all civil and military affairs. He was not bound to acknowledge any superior judge save God³², or a prophet whom God should expressly send. If he departed from the worship of God, the rest of the tribes did not arraign him as a subject, but attacked him as an enemy. Of this we have examples in Scripture. When Joshua was dead, the children of Israel (not a fresh general-in-chief) consulted God; it being decided that the tribe of Judah should be the first to attack its enemies, the tribe in question contracted a single alliance with the tribe of Simeon, for uniting their forces, and attacking their common enemy, the rest of the tribes not being included in the alliance (Judges i:1, 2, 3). Each tribe separately made war against its own enemies, and, according to its pleasure, received them as subjects or allies, though it had been commanded not to spare them on any conditions, but to destroy them utterly. Such disobedience met with reproof from the rest of the tribes, but did not cause the offending tribe to be arraigned: it was not considered a sufficient reason for proclaiming a civil war, or interfering in one another's affairs. But when the tribe of Benjamin offended against the others, and so loosened the bonds of peace that none of the confederated tribes could find refuge within its borders, they attacked it as an enemy, and gaining the victory over it after three battles, put to death both guilty and innocent, according to the laws of war: an act which they subsequently bewailed with tardy repentance.

(17:86) Moses chose the high priest, both Aaron and his son Eleazar. After Moses' death, no one had the right to appoint a high priest, since the office had become hereditary. Moses also chose the army's commander-in-chief. The commander took office under Moses' orders, not the high priest's. After Joshua's death, the high priest did not appoint a successor. Nor did the captains consult God again about a commander-in-chief. Instead, each captain kept Joshua's authority over his own tribe's troops. Together, the captains held that authority over the whole army. A commander-in-chief seems to have been needed only when the tribes had to unite against a common enemy. This happened most often during Joshua's time, when the people had no fixed home and held everything in common. After all the tribes conquered their territories and divided their allotted gains, they separated and no longer shared their possessions. So they no longer needed a single commander. The different tribes should be seen as allied states rather than groups of fellow citizens. They were fellow citizens in matters concerning their God and religion. But in their rights toward one another, they were only allies. In fact, their position closely resembled that of the United States of the Netherlands {or United States of America}. The exception was the Temple, which they all shared. Dividing property held in common simply means that each owner takes sole possession of his share. The other owners then give up their rights over that share. This is why Moses chose captains for the tribes. When the territory was divided, each captain was to govern his own part. He would consult God through the high priest about his tribe's affairs, command its army, and build and fortify cities. He would appoint judges and attack his territory's enemies, with complete control over all civil and military affairs. He was not required to recognize any higher judge except God³², or a prophet whom God expressly sent. If a captain abandoned the worship of God, the other tribes did not put him on trial as a subject. Instead, they attacked him as an enemy. Scripture gives us examples of this. After Joshua's death, the children of Israel, not a new commander-in-chief, consulted God. The decision was that the tribe of Judah should attack its enemies first. So Judah formed an alliance with Simeon alone to unite their forces and attack their common enemy. The other tribes were not included in this alliance (Judges i:1, 2, 3). Each tribe separately fought its own enemies and accepted them as subjects or allies as it pleased. Yet the tribes had been commanded not to spare their enemies under any conditions, but to destroy them completely. The other tribes criticized such disobedience, but did not put the offending tribe on trial. They did not consider it sufficient reason to declare civil war or interfere in one another's affairs. But the tribe of Benjamin wronged the others and weakened the bonds of peace. The breach was so severe that none of the allied tribes could find refuge within Benjamin's borders. So the other tribes attacked Benjamin as an enemy and defeated it after three battles. Under the laws of war, they killed both the guilty and the innocent. They later mourned this act, repenting too late.

(17:100) These examples plainly confirm what we have said concerning the rights of each tribe. Perhaps we shall be asked who elected the successors to the captains of each tribe; on this point I can gather no positive information in Scripture, but I conjecture that as the tribes were divided into families, each headed by its senior member, the senior of all these heads of families succeeded by right to the office of captain, for Moses chose from among these seniors his seventy coadjutors, who formed with himself the supreme council. Those who administered the government after the death of Joshua were called elders, and elder is a very common Hebrew expression in the sense of judge, as I suppose everyone knows; however, it is not very important for us to make up our minds on this point. It is enough to have shown that after the death of Moses no one man wielded all the power of a sovereign; as affairs were not all managed by one man, nor by a single council, nor by the popular vote, but partly by one tribe, partly by the rest in equal shares, it is most evident that the government, after the death of Moses, was neither monarchic, nor aristocratic, nor popular, but, as we have said, Theocratic. The reasons for applying this name are:

(17:100) These examples clearly confirm what we have said about the rights of each tribe. Perhaps someone will ask who elected the successors to each tribe’s captains. I can find no definite information about this in Scripture, but I offer the following guess. The tribes were divided into families, each headed by its oldest member. I suspect the oldest of these family heads had the right to succeed as captain. For Moses chose his seventy assistants from among these elders, and together with Moses they formed the supreme council. Those who governed after Joshua’s death were called elders. As I suppose everyone knows, “elder” is a very common Hebrew term for a judge. However, reaching a firm conclusion on this question is not very important for our purposes. We need only have shown that after Moses’ death, no single man held all the power of a sovereign. Affairs were not all managed by one man, a single council, or popular vote. Instead, some affairs were managed by one tribe, and the rest by the other tribes in equal shares. So the government after Moses’ death was clearly neither a monarchy, an aristocracy, nor a democracy. Rather, as we have said, it was a Theocracy. The reasons for using this name are:

(17:105) I. Because the royal seat of government was the Temple, and in respect to it alone, as we have shown, all the tribes were fellow-citizens.

(17:105) I. Because the Temple was the royal seat of government, and, as we have shown, all the tribes were fellow citizens only through their connection to the Temple.

II. Because all the people owed allegiance to God, their supreme Judge, to whom only they had promised implicit obedience in all things.

II. Because all the people owed allegiance to God, their supreme Judge. They had promised complete obedience in everything to God alone.

(17:107) III. Because the general-in-chief or dictator, when there was need of such, was elected by none save God alone. This was expressly commanded by Moses in the name of God (Deut. xix:15), and witnessed by the actual choice of Gideon, of Samson, and of Samuel; wherefrom we may conclude that the other faithful leaders were chosen in the same manner, though it is not expressly told us.

(17:107) III. Because the commander-in-chief or dictator, when needed, was chosen by God alone. Moses expressly commanded this in God’s name (Deut. xix:15). The actual choices of Gideon, Samson, and Samuel confirm this practice. From these examples, we may conclude that the other faithful leaders were chosen in the same way. However, we are not expressly told so.

(17:109) These preliminaries being stated, it is now time to inquire the effects of forming a dominion on this plan, and to see whether it so effectually kept within bounds both rulers and ruled, that the former were never tyrannical and the latter never rebellious.

(17:109) With these preliminary points established, we can now examine the effects of forming a state on this plan. Did the plan keep both rulers and subjects so firmly in check that rulers were never tyrannical and subjects never rebelled?

(17:110) Those who administer or possess governing power, always try to surround their high-handed actions with a cloak of legality, and to persuade the people that they act from good motives; this they are easily able to effect when they are the sole interpreters of the law; for it is evident that they are thus able to assume a far greater freedom to carry out their wishes and desires than if the interpretation if the law is vested in someone else, or if the laws were so self-evident that no one could be in doubt as to their meaning. We thus see that the power of evil-doing was greatly curtailed for the Hebrew captains by the fact that the whole interpretation of the law was vested in the Levites (Deut. xxi:5), who, on their part, had no share in the government, and depended for all their support and consideration on a correct interpretation of the laws entrusted to them. Moreover, the whole people was commanded to come together at a certain place every seven years and be instructed in the law by the high-priest; further, each individual was bidden to read the book of the law through and through continually with scrupulous care. (Deut. xxxi:9, 10, and vi:7.)

(17:110) Those who hold or exercise governing power always try to make their abuses of power appear legal. They also try to persuade the people that they act from good motives. They can easily do so when they alone interpret the law. Clearly, this exclusive authority gives rulers far more freedom to pursue their wishes and desires. They would have less freedom if someone else interpreted the law, or if the laws were clear beyond doubt. So we see that the Hebrew captains’ power to do wrong was greatly limited. This was because the Levites alone had authority to interpret the law (Deut. xxi:5). The Levites, for their part, had no share in government. All their support and standing depended on correctly interpreting the laws entrusted to them. Moreover, the entire people were commanded to gather at a certain place every seven years. There, the high-priest was to instruct them in the law. Each individual was also commanded to read the book of the law from beginning to end, continually and with great care. (Deut. xxxi:9, 10, and vi:7.)

The captains were thus for their own sakes bound to take great care to administer everything according to the laws laid down, and well known to all, if they wished to be held in high honour by the people, who would regard them as the administrators of God's dominion, and as God's vicegerents; otherwise they could not have escaped all the virulence of theological hatred. There was another very important check on the unbridled license of the captains, in the fact, that the army was formed from the whole body, of the citizens, between the ages of twenty and sixty, without exception, and that the captains were not able to hire any foreign soldiery. This I say was very important, for it is well known that princes can oppress their peoples with the single aid of the soldiery in their pay; while there is nothing more formidable to them than the freedom of citizen soldiers, who have established the freedom and glory of their country, by their valour, their toil, and their blood. Thus Alexander, when he was about to make wax on Darius, a second time, after hearing the advice of Parmenio, did not chide him who gave the advice, but Polysperchon, who was standing by. For, as Curtius says (iv. Para. 13), he did not venture to reproach Parmenio again after having shortly before reproved him too sharply. This freedom of the Macedonians, which he so dreaded, he was not able to subdue till after the number of captives enlisted in the army surpassed that of his own people: then, but not till then, he gave rein to his anger so long checked by the independence of his chief fellow-countrymen.

The captains therefore had to take great care, for their own sake, to govern according to the established laws. These laws were well known to everyone. The captains had to follow them if they wanted the people to hold them in high honor. The people would then regard the captains as administrators of God's kingdom and as God's representatives. Otherwise, the captains could not have escaped the full fury of religious hatred. Another very important restraint on the captains' unchecked power was the makeup of the army. Every citizen between twenty and sixty served, without exception, and the captains could not hire foreign soldiers. This restraint was very important, I say, because rulers can oppress their people with paid soldiers alone. Yet nothing threatens rulers more than the independence of citizen soldiers. These soldiers have secured their country's freedom and glory through their courage, their labor, and their blood. Thus, when Alexander was about to wage war on Darius a second time, he heard advice from Parmenio. Alexander did not rebuke Parmenio for the advice, but instead rebuked Polysperchon, who was standing nearby. As Curtius says (iv. Para. 13), Alexander did not dare criticize Parmenio again. He had rebuked Parmenio too harshly shortly before. Alexander greatly feared this independence among the Macedonians. He could not crush it until the captives enlisted in his army outnumbered his own people. Then, and only then, did he unleash his anger. The independence of his leading fellow countrymen had kept that anger in check for so long.

(17:119) If this independence of citizen soldiers can restrain the princes of ordinary states who are wont to usurp the whole glory of victories, it must have been still more effectual against the Hebrew captains, whose soldiers were fighting, not for the glory of a prince, but for the glory of God, and who did not go forth to battle till the Divine assent had been given.

(17:119) If citizen soldiers’ independence can restrain princes in ordinary states, it must have restrained Hebrew captains even more effectively. Those princes tend to claim all the glory of victories for themselves. But the Hebrew captains’ soldiers fought not for a prince’s glory, but for the glory of God. And those soldiers did not go into battle until God had given his approval.

(17:120) We must also remember that the Hebrew captains were associated only by the bonds of religion: therefore, if any one of them had transgressed, and begun to violate the Divine right, he might have been treated by the rest as an enemy and lawfully subdued.

(17:120) We must also remember that the Hebrew captains were united only by religious ties. So, if any captain had broken divine law, the others could have treated him as an enemy and lawfully subdued him.

(17:121) An additional check may be found in the fear of a new prophet arising, for if a man of unblemished life could show by certain signs that he was really a prophet, he ipso facto obtained the sovereign right to rule, which was given to him, as to Moses formerly, in the name of God, as revealed to himself alone; not merely through the high priest, as in the case of the captains. There is no doubt that such an one would easily be able to enlist an oppressed people in his cause, and by trifling signs persuade them of anything he wished: on the other hand, if affairs were well ordered, the captain would be able to make provision in time; that the prophet should be submitted to his approval, and be examined whether he were really of unblemished life, and possessed indisputable signs of his mission: also, whether the teaching he proposed to set forth in the name of the Lord agreed with received doctrines, and the general laws of the country; if his credentials were insufficient, or his doctrines new, he could lawfully be put to death, or else received on the captain's sole responsibility and authority.

(17:121) Another restraint may be found in the fear that a new prophet might arise. If a man of blameless life could prove through definite signs that he was truly a prophet, he automatically gained supreme authority to rule. This authority was given to him in God's name, as it had formerly been given to Moses. God revealed it directly to the prophet alone, not merely through the high priest, as with the captains. There is no doubt that such a man could easily rally an oppressed people to his cause. With trivial signs, he could persuade them of anything he wished. On the other hand, if affairs were well managed, the captain could take precautions in time. He could require the prophet to seek his approval and undergo examination. The examination would establish whether the prophet truly led a blameless life and had indisputable signs of his mission. It would also establish whether his proposed teaching in the Lord's name agreed with accepted doctrines and the country's general laws. If his credentials were inadequate or his doctrines new, he could lawfully be put to death. Alternatively, he could be accepted on the captain's sole responsibility and authority.

(17:123) Again, the captains were not superior to the others in nobility or birth, but only administered the government in virtue of their age and personal qualities. Lastly, neither captains nor army had any reason for preferring war to peace. The army, as we have stated, consisted entirely of citizens, so that affairs were managed by the same persons both in peace and war. The man who was a soldier in the camp was a citizen in the market-place, he who was a leader in the camp was a judge in the law courts, he who was a general in the camp was a ruler in the state. Thus no one could desire war for its own sake, but only for the sake of preserving peace and liberty; possibly the captains avoided change as far as possible, so as not to be obliged to consult the high priest and submit to the indignity of standing in his presence.

(17:123) Again, the captains were no higher than the others in noble rank or birth. They governed only because of their age and personal qualities. Finally, neither the captains nor the army had any reason to prefer war to peace. As we have stated, the army consisted entirely of citizens. So the same people managed affairs in both peace and war. A soldier in the camp was a citizen in the marketplace. A leader in the camp was a judge in the courts. A general in the camp was a ruler in the state. Thus no one could want war for its own sake, but only to preserve peace and liberty. Perhaps the captains avoided change as much as possible so they would not have to consult the high priest. By avoiding such consultations, they would also avoid the indignity of standing in his presence.

(17:128) So much for the precautions for keeping the captains within bounds. We must now look for the restraints upon the people: these, however, are very clearly indicated in the very groundwork of the social fabric.

(17:128) So much for the precautions to keep the captains in check. We must now examine the restraints on the people. These restraints, however, are very clearly laid out in the foundations of society itself.

(17:130) Anyone who gives the subject the slightest attention, will see that the state was so ordered as to inspire the most ardent patriotism in the hearts of the citizens, so that the latter would be very hard to persuade to betray their country, and be ready to endure anything rather than submit to a foreign yoke. After they had transferred their right to God, they thought that their kingdom belonged to God, and that they themselves were God's children. Other nations they looked upon as God's enemies, and regarded with intense hatred (which they took to be piety, see Psalm cxxxix:21, 22): nothing would have been more abhorrent to them than swearing allegiance to a foreigner, and promising him obedience: nor could they conceive any greater or more execrable crime than the betrayal of their country, the kingdom of the God whom they adored.

(17:130) Anyone who gives the subject even a little attention will see how the state was organized. Its structure was designed to inspire the strongest patriotism in its citizens. As a result, they would be very hard to persuade to betray their country. They would be ready to endure anything rather than submit to foreign rule. After transferring their rights to God, they believed their kingdom belonged to God and that they were God's children. They saw other nations as God's enemies and hated them intensely. They considered this hatred a sign of devotion to God (see Psalm cxxxix:21, 22). Nothing would have horrified them more than swearing loyalty to a foreigner and promising to obey him. Nor could they imagine any greater or more hateful crime than betraying their country. Their country was the kingdom of the God they worshipped.

(17:133) It was considered wicked for anyone to settle outside of the country, inasmuch as the worship of God by which they were bound could not be carried on elsewhere: their own land alone was considered holy, the rest of the earth unclean and profane.

(17:133) Settling outside the country was considered wicked because the required worship of God could not be practiced elsewhere. Only their own land was considered holy. The rest of the earth was considered unclean and profane.

(17:134) David, who was forced to live in exile, complained before Saul as follows: "But if they be the children of men who have stirred thee up against me, cursed be they before the Lord; for they have driven me out this day from abiding in the inheritance of the Lord, saying, Go, serve other gods." (I Sam. xxvi:19.) For the same reason no citizen, as we should especially remark, was ever sent into exile: he who sinned was liable to punishment, but not to disgrace.

(17:134) David, who was forced to live in exile, complained to Saul: "But if people have turned you against me, may they be cursed before the Lord. For they have driven me away today from living in the Lord’s inheritance, saying, Go, serve other gods." (1 Samuel 26:19.) For the same reason, no citizen was ever sent into exile, a point we should especially note. Anyone who sinned faced punishment, but not disgrace.

(17:136) Thus the love of the Hebrews for their country was not only patriotism, but also piety, and was cherished and nurtured by daily rites till, like their hatred of other nations, it must have passed into their nature. Their daily worship was not only different from that of other nations (as it might well be, considering that they were a peculiar people and entirely apart from the rest), it was absolutely contrary. Such daily reprobation naturally gave rise to a lasting hatred, deeply implanted in the heart: for of all hatreds none is more deep and tenacious than that which springs from extreme devoutness or piety, and is itself cherished as pious. Nor was a general cause lacking for inflaming such hatred more and more, inasmuch as it was reciprocated; the surrounding nations regarding the Jews with a hatred just as intense.

(17:136) Thus the Hebrews’ love for their country was not only patriotism but also religious devotion. Daily rituals cherished and nurtured this love until, like their hatred of other nations, it must have become second nature. Their daily worship was not merely different from that of other nations. Such differences were understandable, since the Hebrews were a distinct people, entirely separate from the rest. Their worship was completely opposed to that of other nations. This daily condemnation naturally produced a lasting hatred, deeply rooted in their hearts. For no hatred is deeper or more persistent than hatred born of extreme religious devotion and itself cherished as holy. Nor was there any lack of a general cause to fuel this hatred further, since the hatred was mutual. The surrounding nations hated the Jews just as intensely.

(17:140) How great was the effect of all these causes, namely, freedom from man's dominion; devotion to their country; absolute rights over all other men; a hatred not only permitted but pious; a contempt for their fellow-men; the singularity of their customs and religious rites; the effect, I repeat, of all these causes in strengthening the hearts of the Jews to bear all things for their country, with extraordinary constancy and valour, will at once be discerned by reason and attested by experience. Never, so long as the city was standing, could they endure to remain under foreign dominion; and therefore they called Jerusalem "a rebellious city" (Ezra iv:12). Their state after its reestablishment (which was a mere shadow of the first, for the high priests had usurped the rights of the tribal captains) was, with great difficulty, destroyed by the Romans, as Tacitus bears witness (Hist. ii:4):- "Vespasian had closed the war against the Jews, abandoning the siege of Jerusalem as an enterprise difficult and arduous rather from the character of the people and the obstinacy of their superstition, than from the strength left to the besieged for meeting their necessities." But besides these characteristics, which are merely ascribed by an individual opinion, there was one feature peculiar to this state and of great importance in retaining the affections of the citizens, and checking all thoughts of desertion, or abandonment of the country: namely, self-interest, the strength and life of all human action. This was peculiarly engaged in the Hebrew state, for nowhere else did citizens possess their goods so securely, as did the subjects of this community, for the latter possessed as large a share in the land and the fields as did their chiefs, and were owners of their plots of ground in perpetuity; for if any man was compelled by poverty to sell his farm or his pasture, he received it back again intact at the year of jubilee: there were other similar enactments against the possibility of alienating real property.

(17:140) Consider the powerful effect of all these causes: freedom from human rule, devotion to their country, and absolute rights over all other men. Add to these a hatred considered not only permissible but pious, contempt for their fellow human beings, and distinctive customs and religious rites. Together, these causes strengthened the Jews to endure everything for their country with extraordinary resolve and courage. Reason makes this clear at once, and experience confirms it. As long as the city stood, they could never bear to remain under foreign rule. For this reason, Jerusalem was called "a rebellious city" (Ezra iv:12). After its restoration, their state was only a shadow of the original. The high priests had seized the rights of the tribal captains. Yet the Romans destroyed this restored state only with great difficulty, as Tacitus testifies (Hist. ii:4): "Vespasian had ended the war against the Jews, abandoning the siege of Jerusalem as a difficult and demanding undertaking. The difficulty lay less in the resources the besieged still had to meet their needs. It lay more in the people's character and their stubborn devotion to their superstition." But these characteristics rest only on one individual's judgment. Beyond them, this state had one distinctive feature of great importance. It kept the citizens loyal and discouraged all thoughts of deserting or abandoning their country. That feature was self-interest, the driving force and life of all human action. The Hebrew state gave self-interest an especially strong hold. Nowhere else did citizens hold their property as securely as the subjects of this community. They held as large a share of the land and fields as their leaders did, and owned their plots forever. For if poverty forced anyone to sell his farm or pasture, he received it back intact in the jubilee year. Other similar laws also prevented permanent transfers of land ownership.

(17:145) Again, poverty was nowhere more endurable than in a country where duty towards one's neighbour, that is, one's fellow-citizen, was practised with the utmost piety, as a means of gaining the favour of God the King. Thus the Hebrew citizens would nowhere be so well off as in their own country; outside its limits they met with nothing but loss and disgrace.

(17:145) Again, nowhere was poverty easier to bear than in a country where people fulfilled their duties to their neighbours with the deepest devotion. Their neighbours were their fellow citizens, and people fulfilled these duties to gain the favour of God the King. Thus Hebrew citizens would be better off in their own country than anywhere else. Outside its borders, they faced nothing but loss and disgrace.

(17:147) The following considerations were of weight, not only in keeping them at home, but also in preventing civil war and removing causes of strife; no one was bound to serve his equal, but only to serve God, while charity and love towards fellow-citizens was accounted the highest piety; this last feeling was not a little fostered by the general hatred with which they regarded foreign nations and were regarded by them. Furthermore, the strict discipline of obedience in which they were brought up, was a very important factor; for they were bound to carry on all their actions according to the set rules of the law: a man might not plough when he liked, but only at certain times, in certain years, and with one sort of beast at a time; so, too, he might only sow and reap in a certain method and season - in fact, his whole life was one long school of obedience (see Chap. V. on the use of ceremonies); such a habit was thus engendered, that conformity seemed freedom instead of servitude, and men desired what was commanded rather than what was forbidden. This result was not a little aided by the fact that the people were bound, at certain seasons of the year, to give themselves up to rest and rejoicing, not for their own pleasure, but in order that they might worship God cheerfully.

(17:147) The following factors helped keep them at home, prevent civil war, and remove causes of conflict. No one was required to serve an equal, but only God. Kindness and love toward fellow citizens were considered the highest form of piety. This love was greatly strengthened by their general hatred of foreign nations and those nations’ hatred of them. Furthermore, the strict obedience they learned from childhood was a very important factor. They had to follow the law’s fixed rules in everything they did. A man could not plow whenever he liked, but only at certain times and in certain years. He could use only one kind of animal at a time. Likewise, he could sow and reap only in a particular way and season. In fact, his whole life was one long lesson in obedience (see Chap. V. on the use of ceremonies). Obedience thus became such a habit that following the rules seemed like freedom rather than servitude. People wanted what was commanded rather than what was forbidden. This result was greatly helped by the requirement to devote certain seasons of the year to rest and celebration. They did so not for their own pleasure, but so that they might worship God cheerfully.

(17:150) Three times in the year they feasted before the Lord; on the seventh day of every week they were bidden to abstain from all work and to rest; besides these, there were other occasions when innocent rejoicing and feasting were not only allowed but enjoined. I do not think any better means of influencing men's minds could be devised; for there is no more powerful attraction than joy springing from devotion, a mixture of admiration and love. It was not easy to be wearied by constant repetition, for the rites on the various festivals were varied and recurred seldom. We may add the deep reverence for the Temple which all most religiously fostered, on account of the peculiar rites and duties that they were obliged to perform before approaching thither. Even now, Jews cannot read without horror of the crime of Manasseh, who dared to place an idol in the Temple. The laws, scrupulously preserved in the inmost sanctuary, were objects of equal reverence to the people. Popular reports and misconceptions were, therefore, very little to be feared in this quarter, for no one dared decide on sacred matters, but all felt bound to obey, without consulting their reason, all the commands given by the answers of God received in the Temple, and all the laws which God had ordained.

(17:150) Three times a year they feasted before the Lord. On the seventh day of every week, they were commanded to stop all work and rest. There were also other occasions when innocent celebration and feasting were not only allowed but required. I do not think any better way of influencing people’s minds could be devised. For nothing draws people more powerfully than joy arising from devotion, a mixture of admiration and love. Constant repetition did not easily become tiresome, because the different festivals had different rites and came around infrequently. We may add the deep reverence for the Temple, which everyone cultivated with great religious care. This reverence arose from the special rites and duties people had to perform before approaching the Temple. Even now, Jews cannot read without horror about the crime of Manasseh, who dared to put an idol in the Temple. The laws, carefully preserved in the innermost sanctuary, were equally revered by the people. Rumors and misunderstandings among the people therefore posed very little danger in sacred matters. For no one dared to pass judgment on sacred matters. Instead, everyone felt bound to obey without consulting their reason. This obedience covered every command conveyed through God’s answers received in the Temple, and every law God had established.

(17:157) I think I have now explained clearly, though briefly, the main features of the Hebrew commonwealth. I must now inquire into the causes which led the people so often to fall away from the law, which brought about their frequent subjection, and, finally, the complete destruction of their dominion. Perhaps I shall be told that it sprang from their hardness of heart; but this is childish, for why should this people be more hard of heart than others; was it by nature?

(17:157) I think I have now explained the main features of the Hebrew commonwealth clearly, though briefly. I must now examine why the people so often abandoned the law and were so often conquered. Finally, I must examine what caused the complete destruction of their state. Perhaps someone will tell me these troubles came from their stubbornness. But this is childish. Why should this people be more stubborn than others? Were they naturally more stubborn?

[17:A] But nature forms individuals, not peoples; the latter are only distinguishable by the difference of their language, their customs, and their laws; while from the two last - i.e., customs and laws, - it may arise that they have a peculiar disposition, a peculiar manner of life, and peculiar prejudices. If, then, the Hebrews were harder of heart than other nations, the fault lay with their laws or customs.

[17:A] But nature forms individuals, not peoples. Peoples differ only in their language, customs, and laws. Customs and laws may give a people a distinctive character, way of life, and set of prejudices. If, then, the Hebrews were more hard-hearted than other nations, the fault lay with their laws or customs.

(17:162) This is certainly true, in the sense that, if God had wished their dominion to be more lasting, He would have given them other rites and laws, and would have instituted a different form of government. We can, therefore, only say that their God was angry with them, not only, as Jeremiah says, from the building of the city, but even from the founding of their laws.

(17:162) This is certainly true in the following sense. If God had wanted their rule to last longer, he would have given them different rites and laws. He would also have established a different form of government. So we can only say that their God was angry with them. His anger began not only when the city was built, as Jeremiah says, but even when their laws were established.

(17:164) This is borne witness to by Ezekiel xx:25: "Wherefore I gave them also statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live; and I polluted them in their own gifts, in that they caused to pass through the fire all that openeth the womb; that I might make them desolate, to the end that they might know that I am the Lord."

(17:164) Ezekiel xx:25 confirms this: "So I also gave them laws that were not good and rules by which they could not live. I made them impure through their own offerings, as they made all their firstborn pass through the fire. I did this to devastate them, so that they might know that I am the Lord."

(17:165) In order that we may understand these words, and the destruction of the Hebrew commonwealth, we must bear in mind that it had at first been intended to entrust the whole duties of the priesthood to the firstborn, and not to the Levites (see Numb. viii:17). It was only when all the tribes, except the Levites, worshipped the golden calf, that the firstborn were rejected and defiled, and the Levites chosen in their stead (Deut. x:8). When I reflect on this change, I feel disposed to break forth with the words of Tacitus. God's object at that time was not the safety of the Jews, but vengeance. I am greatly astonished that the celestial mind was so inflamed with anger that it ordained laws, which always are supposed to promote the honour, well-being, and security of a people, with the purpose of vengeance, for the sake of punishment; so that the laws do not seem so much laws - that is, the safeguard of the people - as pains and penalties.

(17:165) To understand these words and the destruction of the Hebrew commonwealth, we must remember the original plan for the priesthood. All priestly duties were to be entrusted to the firstborn, not the Levites (see Numb. viii:17). Only after all the tribes except the Levites worshipped the golden calf were the firstborn rejected and declared defiled. The Levites were then chosen in their place (Deut. x:8). When I reflect on this change, I feel moved to burst out with the words of Tacitus. God's purpose at that time was not to protect the Jews, but to take vengeance. I am deeply astonished that the divine mind was so inflamed with anger that it established laws to exact vengeance. Laws are always supposed to promote a people's honour, well-being, and security. Yet these laws were intended to punish, so they seem less like laws, meaning safeguards for the people, than punishments and penalties.

(17:170) The gifts which the people were obliged to bestow on the Levites and priests - the redemption of the firstborn, the poll-tax due to the Levites, the privilege possessed by the latter of the sole performance of sacred rites - all these, I say, were a continual reproach to the people, a continual reminder of their defilement and rejection. Moreover, we may be sure that the Levites were for ever heaping reproaches upon them: for among so many thousands there must have been many importunate dabblers in theology. Hence the people got into the way of watching the acts of the Levites, who were but human; of accusing the whole body of the faults of one member, and continually murmuring.

(17:170) The people were required to give gifts to the Levites and priests, including payments to redeem their firstborn. They also owed a tax per person to the Levites, who alone had the right to perform sacred rites. All these, I say, were a constant reproach to the people, constantly reminding them of their impurity and rejection. Moreover, we can be sure that the Levites constantly heaped criticism on the people. For among so many thousands, there must have been many tiresome dabblers in theology. So the people developed a habit of watching the conduct of the Levites, who were only human. They blamed the whole group for the faults of one member and complained constantly.

(17:173) Besides this, there was the obligation to keep in idleness men hateful to them, and connected by no ties of blood. Especially would this seem grievous when provisions were dear. What wonder, then, if in times of peace, when striking miracles had ceased, and no men of paramount authority were forthcoming, the irritable and greedy temper of the people began to wax cold, and at length to fall away from a worship, which, though Divine, was also humiliating, and even hostile, and to seek after something fresh; or can we be surprised that the captains, who always adopt the popular course, in order to gain the sovereign power for themselves by enlisting the sympathies of the people, and alienating the high priest, should have yielded to their demands, and introduced a new worship? If the state had been formed according to the original intention, the rights and honour of all the tribes would have been equal, and everything would have rested on a firm basis. Who is there who would willingly violate the religious rights of his kindred? What could a man desire more than to support his own brothers and parents, thus fulfilling the duties of religion? Who would not rejoice in being taught by them the interpretation of the laws, and receiving through them the answers of God?

(17:173) Besides this, the people had to support men who did no work, whom they hated, and who were not their relatives. This burden would seem especially harsh when food was expensive. Is it any wonder, then, that the irritable and greedy people began losing enthusiasm for their worship in peacetime? Striking miracles had ceased, and no leaders of commanding authority had emerged. Though divine, this worship was also humiliating and even hostile to them. Is it any wonder that they eventually abandoned it and sought something new? Or can we be surprised that the captains gave in to the people's demands and introduced a new worship? These captains always took the popular side to win supreme power for themselves. They sought to gain the people's sympathy and distance themselves from the high priest. If the state had been organized as originally intended, all the tribes would have had equal rights and honor. Everything would have rested on a firm foundation. Who would willingly violate the religious rights of their own relatives? What more could anyone want than to support their own brothers and parents, thereby fulfilling their religious duties? Who would not rejoice to have their relatives teach them the meaning of the laws and convey God's answers?

(17:179) The tribes would thus have been united by a far closer bond, if all alike had possessed the right to the priesthood. All danger would have been obviated, if the choice of the Levites had not been dictated by anger and revenge. But, as we have said, the Hebrews had offended their God, Who, as Ezekiel says, polluted them in their own gifts by rejecting all that openeth the womb, so that He might destroy them.

(17:179) The tribes would thus have been far more closely united if all had shared the right to the priesthood. All danger would have been avoided if anger and revenge had not driven the choice of the Levites. But, as we have said, the Hebrews had offended their God. As Ezekiel says, God made them impure through their own gifts by rejecting all the firstborn, so he could destroy them.

(17:182) This passage is also confirmed by their history. As soon as the people in the wilderness began to live in ease and plenty, certain men of no mean birth began to rebel against the choice of the Levites, and to make it a cause for believing that Moses had not acted by the commands of God, but for his own good pleasure, inasmuch as he had chosen his own tribe before all the rest, and had bestowed the high priesthood in perpetuity on his own brother. They, therefore, stirred up a tumult, and came to him, crying out that all men were equally sacred, and that he had exalted himself above his fellows wrongfully. Moses was not able to pacify them with reasons; but by the intervention of a miracle in proof of the faith, they all perished. A fresh sedition then arose among the whole people, who believed that their champions had not been put to death by the judgment of God, but by the device of Moses. After a great slaughter, or pestilence, the rising subsided from inanition, but in such a manner that all preferred death to life under such conditions.

(17:182) Their history also confirms this passage. As soon as the people in the wilderness began living in comfort and plenty, some men of high birth rebelled. They opposed the choice of the Levites and saw it as grounds for questioning Moses’ motives. They believed Moses had acted not on God’s commands, but according to his own wishes. He had favored his own tribe over all the others and granted his own brother the high priesthood forever. So these men stirred up an uproar and confronted Moses. They shouted that all men were equally sacred and that Moses had wrongfully raised himself above his equals. Moses could not calm them with arguments. But a miracle intervened as proof of the faith, and all the rebels died. Then the whole people rose up in a new rebellion. They believed their champions had died not by God’s judgment, but through a scheme of Moses. After a great slaughter, or plague, the rebellion died down from exhaustion. Yet all preferred death to living under such conditions.

(17:187) We should rather say that sedition ceased than that harmony was re-established. This is witnessed by Scripture (Deut. xxxi:21), where God, after predicting to Moses that the people after his death will fall away from the Divine worship, speaks thus: "For I know their imagination which they go about, even now before I have brought them into the land which I sware;" and, a little while after (xxxi:27), Moses says: "For I know thy rebellion and thy stiff neck: behold while I am yet alive with you this day, ye have been rebellious against the Lord; and how much more after my death!"

(17:187) We should say that rebellion ended, rather than that harmony was restored. Scripture supports this view (Deut. xxxi:21). God predicts to Moses that after Moses dies, the people will abandon the worship of God. God then says: "For I know what they are planning, even now, before I have brought them into the land I promised." A little later (xxxi:27), Moses says: "For I know your rebelliousness and stubbornness. Look, even while I am still alive among you today, you have rebelled against the Lord. How much more will you rebel after my death!"

(17:189) Indeed, it happened according to his words, as we all know. Great changes, extreme license, luxury, and hardness of heart grew up; things went from bad to worse, till at last the people, after being frequently conquered, came to an open rupture with the Divine right, and wished for a mortal king, so that the seat of government might be the Court, instead of the Temple, and that the tribes might remain fellow-citizens in respect to their king, instead of in respect to Divine right and the high priesthood.

(17:189) Indeed, events unfolded as he had said, as we all know. Great changes followed, along with extreme lawlessness, luxury, and hardness of heart. Things went from bad to worse. Finally, after repeated conquests, the people openly broke with Divine right and wanted a mortal king. They wanted the Court, rather than the Temple, to be the seat of government. They also wanted the tribes to remain fellow citizens through their king, rather than through Divine right and the high priesthood.

(17:191) A vast material for new seditions was thus produced, eventually resulting in the ruin of the entire state. Kings are above all things jealous of a precarious rule, and can in nowise brook a dominion within their own. The first monarchs, being chosen from the ranks of private citizens, were content with the amount of dignity to which they had risen; but their sons, who obtained the throne by right of inheritance, began gradually to introduce changes, so as to get all the sovereign rights into their own hands. This they were generally unable to accomplish, so long as the right of legislation did not rest with them, but with the high priest, who kept the laws in the sanctuary, and interpreted them to the people. The kings were thus bound to obey the laws as much as were the subjects, and were unable to abrogate them, or to ordain new laws of equal authority; moreover, they were prevented by the Levites from administering the affairs of religion, king and subject being alike unclean. Lastly, the whole safety of their dominion depended on the will of one man, if that man appeared to be a prophet; and of this they had seen an example, namely, how completely Samuel had been able to command Saul, and how easily, because of a single disobedience, he had been able to transfer the right of sovereignty to David. Thus the kings found a dominion within their own, and wielded a precarious sovereignty.

(17:191) This created abundant grounds for new rebellions, eventually bringing the entire state to ruin. Above all, kings jealously guard their power when it is insecure. They cannot tolerate another authority within their own. The first kings, chosen from among private citizens, were content with the status they had gained. But their sons inherited the throne and gradually began making changes to bring all sovereign powers into their own hands. The kings generally could not achieve this as long as legislative authority belonged to the high priest rather than themselves. The high priest kept the laws in the sanctuary and interpreted them for the people. So kings were just as bound to obey the laws as their subjects were. They could neither repeal those laws nor make new laws with equal authority. Moreover, the Levites prevented kings from managing religious affairs, since kings and subjects alike were ritually unclean. Finally, the entire security of their rule depended on one man's will, if that man appeared to be a prophet. The kings had seen an example of this in Samuel's complete authority over Saul. Because of a single act of disobedience, Samuel had easily transferred the right to rule from Saul to David. Thus kings faced another authority within their own, and their sovereignty was insecure.

(17:197) In order to surmount these difficulties, they allowed other temples to be dedicated to the gods, so that there might be no further need of consulting the Levites; they also sought out many who prophesied in the name of God, so that they might have creatures of their own to oppose to the true prophets. However, in spite of all their attempts, they never attained their end. For the prophets, prepared against every emergency, waited for a favourable opportunity, such as the beginning of a new reign, which is always precarious, while the memory of the previous reign remains green. At these times they could easily pronounce by Divine authority that the king was tyrannical, and could produce a champion of distinguished virtue to vindicate the Divine right, and lawfully to claim dominion, or a share in it. Still, not even so could the prophets effect much. They could, indeed, remove a tyrant; but there were reasons which prevented them from doing more than setting up, at great cost of civil bloodshed, another tyrant in his stead. Of discords and civil wars there was no end, for the causes for the violation of Divine right remained always the same, and could only be removed by a complete remodelling of the state.

(17:197) To overcome these difficulties, they allowed other temples to be dedicated to the gods. This would remove the need to consult the Levites. They also sought out many people who prophesied in the name of God. They wanted followers under their control who could oppose the true prophets. But despite all their efforts, they never achieved their goal. The prophets were prepared for every emergency and waited for a favorable opportunity, such as the start of a new reign. A new reign is always unstable while memories of the previous reign remain fresh. At such times, the prophets could easily declare, on God's authority, that the king was a tyrant. They could also put forward a champion of outstanding virtue to defend God's right. This champion could lawfully claim power, or a share of it. Yet even then, the prophets could achieve little. They could indeed remove a tyrant. But there were reasons why they could do no more than replace him with another tyrant, at great cost in civil bloodshed. Conflict and civil wars never ended, because the causes of violations of God's right always remained the same. These causes could only be removed by completely restructuring the state.

(17:204) We have now seen how religion was introduced into the Hebrew commonwealth, and how the dominion might have lasted for ever, if the just wrath of the Lawgiver had allowed it. As this was impossible, it was bound in time to perish. I am now speaking only of the first commonwealth, for the second was a mere shadow of the first, inasmuch as the people were bound by the rights of the Persians to whom they were subject. After the restoration of freedom, the high priests usurped the rights of the secular chiefs, and thus obtained absolute dominion. The priests were inflamed with an intense desire to wield the powers of the sovereignty and the high priesthood at the same time. I have, therefore, no need to speak further of the second commonwealth. Whether the first, in so far as we deem it to have been durable, is capable of imitation, and whether it would be pious to copy it as far as possible, will appear from what fellows. I wish only to draw attention, as a crowning conclusion, to the principle indicated already - namely, that it is evident, from what we have stated in this chapter, that the Divine right, or the right of religion, originates in a compact: without such compact, none but natural rights exist. The Hebrews were not bound by their religion to evince any pious care for other nations not included in the compact, but only for their own fellow-citizens.

(17:204) We have now seen how religion was introduced into the Hebrew commonwealth. We have also seen how its rule might have lasted forever, if the Lawgiver’s just anger had allowed it. Since that was impossible, the commonwealth was bound to perish in time. I am speaking only of the first commonwealth. The second was merely a shadow of the first, because the people were subject to Persian authority. After freedom was restored, the high priests seized the powers of the secular leaders and gained absolute rule. The priests burned with a desire to exercise both sovereign power and the authority of the high priesthood. I therefore have no need to discuss the second commonwealth further. What follows will show whether the first commonwealth can be imitated, insofar as we consider it capable of lasting. It will also show whether copying that commonwealth as closely as possible would be an act of piety. As a final conclusion, I wish only to emphasize a principle already mentioned. What we have said in this chapter makes clear that divine right, or religious right, originates in an agreement. Without such an agreement, only natural rights exist. The Hebrews’ religion did not require them to show religious concern for other nations outside the agreement. That duty applied only to their fellow citizens.