The Hebrew State and History: Political Lessons

Although the commonwealth of the Hebrews, as we have conceived it, might have lasted for ever, it would be impossible to imitate it at the present day, nor would it be advisable so to do. If a people wished to transfer their rights to God it would be necessary to make an express covenant with Him, and for this would be needed not only the consent of those transferring their rights, but also the consent of God. God, however, has revealed through his Apostles that the covenant of God is no longer written in ink, or on tables of stone, but with the Spirit of God in the fleshy tables of the heart.

The Hebrew commonwealth, as we have described it, might have lasted forever. Even so, copying it today would be impossible, and attempting to do so would not be advisable. If a people wished to transfer their rights to God, they would need to make an explicit covenant with him. Such a covenant would require the consent not only of those transferring their rights, but also of God. However, God has revealed through his Apostles that his covenant is no longer written in ink or on stone tablets. Instead, it is written with the Spirit of God on the living tablets of the heart.

(18:4) Furthermore, such a form of government would only be available for those who desire to have no foreign relations, but to shut themselves up within their own frontiers, and to live apart from the rest of the world; it would be useless to men who must have dealings with other nations; so that the cases where it could be adopted are very few indeed.

(18:4) Furthermore, such a government would only suit those who want no foreign relations. They would want to stay within their own borders and live apart from the rest of the world. Such a government would be useless to people who must deal with other nations. So there are very few cases in which such a government could be adopted.

(18:5) Nevertheless, though it could not be copied in its entirety, it possessed many excellent features which might be brought to our notice, and perhaps imitated with advantage. My intention, however, is not to write a treatise on forms of government, so I will pass over most of such points in silence, and will only touch on those which bear upon my purpose.

(18:5) Still, although it could not be copied in full, it had many excellent features worth noting and perhaps usefully imitating. But I do not intend to write a study of forms of government. So I will leave most of these features unmentioned and touch only on those relevant to my purpose.

(18:7) God's kingdom is not infringed upon by the choice of an earthly ruler endowed with sovereign rights; for after the Hebrews had transferred their rights to God, they conferred the sovereign right of ruling on Moses, investing him with the sole power of instituting and abrogating laws in the name of God, of choosing priests, of judging, of teaching, of punishing - in fact, all the prerogatives of an absolute monarch.

(18:7) Choosing an earthly ruler with sovereign rights does not undermine God's kingdom. For after the Hebrews transferred their rights to God, they gave Moses the sovereign right to rule. They gave Moses sole authority to make and repeal laws in God's name, choose priests, judge, teach, and punish. In fact, they gave him all the powers of an absolute monarch.

(18:8) Again, though the priests were the interpreters of the laws, they had no power to judge the citizens, or to excommunicate anyone: this could only be done by the judges and chiefs chosen from among the people. A consideration of the successes and the histories of the Hebrews will bring to light other considerations worthy of note. To wit:

(18:8) Again, although the priests interpreted the laws, they had no power to judge citizens or excommunicate anyone. Only the judges and leaders chosen from among the people could do so. A look at the successes and history of the Hebrews will reveal other points worth noting. These are:

(18:9) I. That there were no religious sects, till after the high priests, in the second commonwealth, possessed the authority to make decrees, and transact the business of government. In order that such authority might last for ever, the high priests usurped the rights of secular rulers, and at last wished to be styled kings. The reason for this is ready to hand; in the first commonwealth no decrees could bear the name of the high priest, for he had no right to ordain laws, but only to give the answers of God to questions asked by the captains or the councils: he had, therefore, no motive for making changes in the law, but took care, on the contrary, to administer and guard what had already been received and accepted. His only means of preserving his freedom in safety against the will of the captains lay in cherishing the law intact. After the high priests had assumed the power of carrying on the government, and added the rights of secular rulers to those they already possessed, each one began both in things religious and in things secular, to seek for the glorification of his own name, settling everything by sacerdotal authority, and issuing every day, concerning ceremonies, faith, and all else, new decrees which he sought to make as sacred and authoritative as the laws of Moses. Religion thus sank into a degrading superstition, while the true meaning and interpretation of the laws became corrupted. Furthermore, while the high priests were paving their way to the secular rule just after the restoration, they attempted to gain popular favour by assenting to every demand; approving whatever the people did, however impious, and accommodating Scripture to the very depraved current morals. Malachi bears witness to this in no measured terms: he chides the priests of his time as despisers of the name of God, and then goes on with his invective as follows (Mal ii:7, 8): "For the priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek the law at his mouth: for he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts. But ye are departed out of the way; ye have caused many to stumble at the law, ye have corrupted the covenant of Levi, saith the Lord of hosts." He further accuses them of interpreting the laws according to their own pleasure, and paying no respect to God but only to persons. It is certain that the high priests were never so cautious in their conduct as to escape the remark of the more shrewd among the people, for the latter were at length emboldened to assert that no laws ought to be kept save those that were written, and that the decrees which the Pharisees (consisting, as Josephus says in his "Antiquities," chiefly of the common people), were deceived into calling the traditions of the fathers, should not be observed at all. However this may be, we can in nowise doubt that flattery of the high priest, the corruption of religion and the laws, and the enormous increase of the extent of the last-named, gave very great and frequent occasion for disputes and altercations impossible to allay. When men begin to quarrel with all the ardour of superstition, and the magistracy to back up one side or the other, they can never come to a compromise, but are bound to split into sects.

(18:9) I. Religious sects appeared only after the high priests of the second commonwealth gained authority to issue decrees and govern. To make that authority permanent, the high priests seized the rights of secular rulers. Eventually, they wanted to be called kings. The reason is clear. In the first commonwealth, no decrees could be issued in the high priest’s name. He had no right to make laws. He could only give God’s answers to questions asked by the military leaders or councils. He therefore had no reason to change the law. Instead, he took care to administer and protect what had already been received and accepted. Keeping the law intact was his only way to preserve his independence safely against the military leaders’ wishes. After the high priests took over government, they added secular rulers’ rights to the rights they already held. Each high priest then sought to glorify his own name in both religious and secular matters. Each settled everything through priestly authority and issued new decrees every day about ceremonies, faith, and everything else. Each sought to make these decrees as sacred and authoritative as the laws of Moses. Religion thus sank into degrading superstition, while the laws’ true meaning and interpretation became corrupted. Furthermore, just after the restoration, the high priests were preparing to take secular power. To win popular favor, they agreed to every demand. They approved whatever the people did, however ungodly, and adapted Scripture to the deeply corrupt morals of the time. Malachi bears witness to this in forceful terms. He rebukes the priests of his time for despising God’s name, then continues his denunciation as follows (Mal ii:7, 8): "A priest’s lips should preserve knowledge, and people should seek instruction in the law from his mouth. For he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts. But you have left the right path. You have caused many to stumble over the law. You have corrupted the covenant of Levi, says the Lord of hosts." Malachi further accuses the priests of interpreting the laws however they pleased. They showed respect only for particular people, not for God. Certainly, the high priests never acted cautiously enough to escape the notice of the more perceptive people. These people eventually grew bold enough to argue that only written laws should be obeyed. They also argued that the decrees the Pharisees mistakenly called the traditions of the fathers should not be observed at all. According to Josephus in his "Antiquities," the Pharisees consisted chiefly of ordinary people. However that may be, we cannot doubt the effects of flattery of the high priest and corruption of religion and law. These, together with the enormous expansion of the laws, created frequent and serious disputes that could not be settled. When people quarrel with all the fervor of superstition, and government officials support one side or the other, compromise becomes impossible. They are bound to split into sects.

(18:22) II. It is worthy of remark that the prophets, who were in a private station of life, rather irritated than reformed mankind by their freedom of warning, rebuke, and censure; whereas the kings, by their reproofs and punishments, could always produce an effect. The prophets were often intolerable even to pious kings, on account of the authority they assumed for judging whether an action was right or wrong, or for reproving the kings themselves if they dared to transact any business, whether public or private, without prophetic sanction. King Asa who, according to the testimony of Scripture, reigned piously, put the prophet Hanani into a prison-house because he had ventured freely to chide and reprove him for entering into a covenant with the king of Armenia.

(18:22) II. It is worth noting that the prophets were private citizens. Their outspoken warnings, rebukes, and criticism irritated people rather than reformed them. Kings, however, could always produce an effect through their rebukes and punishments. Even devout kings often found the prophets intolerable because the prophets claimed authority to judge actions as right or wrong. The prophets also rebuked kings if the kings dared conduct any public or private business without prophetic approval. According to Scripture, King Asa ruled devoutly. Yet Asa imprisoned the prophet Hanani because Hanani had dared to rebuke him openly for an alliance with Armenia’s king.

(18:25) Other examples might be cited, tending to prove that religion gained more harm than good by such freedom, not to speak of the further consequence, that if the prophets had retained their rights, great civil wars would have resulted.

(18:25) Other examples could be cited to suggest that such freedom did religion more harm than good. Furthermore, if the prophets had kept their rights, major civil wars would have resulted.

III. It is remarkable that during all the period, during which the people held the reins of power, there was only one civil war, and that one was completely extinguished, the conquerors taking such pity on the conquered, that they endeavoured in every way to reinstate them in their former dignity and power. But after that the people, little accustomed to kings, changed its first form of government into a monarchy, civil war raged almost continuously; and battles were so fierce as to exceed all others recorded; in one engagement (taxing our faith to the utmost) five hundred thousand Israelites were slaughtered by the men of Judah, and in another the Israelites slew great numbers of the men of Judah (the figures are not given in Scripture), almost razed to the ground the walls of Jerusalem, and sacked the Temple in their unbridled fury. At length, laden with the spoils of their brethren, satiated with blood, they took hostages, and leaving the king in his well-nigh devastated kingdom, laid down their arms, relying on the weakness rather than the good faith of their foes. A few years after, the men of Judah, with recruited strength, again took the field, but were a second time beaten by the Israelites, and slain to the number of a hundred and twenty thousand, two hundred thousand of their wives and children were led into captivity, and a great booty again seized. Worn out with these and similar battles set forth at length in their histories, the Jews at length fell a prey to their enemies.

III. Remarkably, throughout the entire period when the people held power, there was only one civil war. That war ended completely. The victors felt such pity for the defeated that they tried every way to restore their former standing and power. But then the people, with little experience of kings, replaced their original form of government with a monarchy. After that, civil war raged almost continuously. The battles were so fierce that they surpassed all others on record. In one battle, the men of Judah slaughtered five hundred thousand Israelites, a figure that strains belief to the limit. In another, the Israelites killed great numbers of the men of Judah (Scripture gives no figures). In their uncontrolled fury, the Israelites almost leveled Jerusalem’s walls and plundered the Temple. Finally, loaded with their fellow countrymen’s possessions and satisfied with the bloodshed, the Israelites took hostages. They left the king in his nearly devastated kingdom and laid down their arms. They relied on their enemies’ weakness rather than their good faith. A few years later, the men of Judah had regained their strength and went to war again. But the Israelites defeated them a second time, killing a hundred and twenty thousand. The Israelites took two hundred thousand of their wives and children captive and again seized vast amounts of plunder. These and similar battles, described at length in their histories, wore the Jews down. At last, the Jews fell into their enemies’ hands.

(18:31) Furthermore, if we reckon up the times during which peace prevailed under each form of government, we shall find a great discrepancy. Before the monarchy forty years and more often passed, and once eighty years (an almost unparalleled period), without any war, foreign or civil. After the kings acquired sovereign power, the fighting was no longer for peace and liberty, but for glory; accordingly we find that they all, with the exception of Solomon (whose virtue and wisdom would be better displayed in peace than in war) waged war, and finally a fatal desire for power gained ground, which, in many cases, made the path to the throne a bloody one.

(18:31) Furthermore, if we compare how long peace lasted under each form of government, we will find a great difference. Before the monarchy, forty years or more often passed without any foreign or civil war. Once, peace lasted eighty years, an almost unmatched period. After the kings gained supreme power, wars were no longer fought for peace and liberty, but for glory. Accordingly, we find that all the kings except Solomon waged war. Solomon's virtue and wisdom would be better displayed in peace than in war. Finally, a fatal desire for power grew stronger, often making the path to the throne a bloody one.

(18:34) Lastly, the laws, during the rule of the people, remained uncorrupted and were studiously observed. Before the monarchy there were very few prophets to admonish the people, but after the establishment of kings there were a great number at the same time. Obadiah saved a hundred from death and hid them away, lest they should be slain with the rest. The people, so far as we can see, were never deceived by false prophets till after the power had been vested in kings, whose creatures many of the prophets were. Again, the people, whose heart was generally proud or humble according to its circumstances, easily corrected itself under misfortune, turned again to God, restored His laws, and so freed itself from all peril; but the kings, whose hearts were always equally puffed up, and who could not be corrected without humiliation, clung pertinaciously to their vices, even till the last overthrow of the city.

(18:34) Finally, while the people ruled, the laws remained uncorrupted and were carefully observed. Before the monarchy, very few prophets warned the people. But after kings came to power, many prophets were active at the same time. Obadiah saved a hundred from death and hid them so they would not be killed with the rest. As far as we can see, false prophets never deceived the people until power was placed in kings’ hands. Many of the prophets were tools of those kings. Moreover, the people were generally proud or humble according to their circumstances. When misfortune struck, the people readily corrected their ways, returned to God, and restored his laws. In this way, the people freed themselves from all danger. But the kings remained just as arrogant, whatever their circumstances, and could not be corrected without being humiliated. They stubbornly clung to their vices, right up to the city’s final destruction.

We may now clearly see from what I have said:-

From what I have said, we can now clearly see the following:

I. How hurtful to religion and the state is the concession to ministers of religion of any power of issuing decrees or transacting the business of government: how, on the contrary, far greater stability is afforded, if the said ministers are only allowed to give answers to questions duly put to them, and are, as a rule, obliged to preach and practise the received and accepted doctrines.

I. How harmful it is to religion and the state to let religious ministers issue decrees or conduct government business. By contrast, how much greater stability there is if ministers may only answer questions properly put to them. Under this condition, ministers must also, as a rule, preach and practice established and accepted doctrines.

(18:41) II How dangerous it is to refer to Divine right matters merely speculative and subject or liable to dispute. The most tyrannical governments are those which make crimes of opinions, for everyone has an inalienable right over his thoughts - nay, such a state of things leads to the rule of popular passion.

(18:41) II How dangerous it is to treat purely speculative matters open to dispute as matters of divine right. The most tyrannical governments are those that make opinions crimes, because everyone has an inalienable right to their own thoughts. Indeed, criminalizing opinions leads to rule by popular passions.

(18:43) Pontius Pilate made concession to the passion of the Pharisees in consenting to the crucifixion of Christ, whom he knew to be innocent. Again, the Pharisees, in order to shake the position of men richer than themselves, began to set on foot questions of religion, and accused the Sadducees of impiety, and, following their example, the vilest hypocrites, stirred, as they pretended, by the same holy wrath which they called zeal for the Lord, persecuted men whose unblemished character and distinguished virtue had excited the popular hatred, publicly denounced their opinions, and inflamed the fierce passions of the people against them.

(18:43) Pontius Pilate gave in to the Pharisees’ anger by agreeing to crucify Christ, whom he knew to be innocent. Again, the Pharisees raised religious disputes to undermine men richer than themselves and accused the Sadducees of impiety. Following the Pharisees’ example, the vilest hypocrites pretended to be moved by the same holy anger. They called this anger zeal for the Lord. These hypocrites persecuted men whose spotless character and outstanding virtue had stirred up public hatred. They publicly condemned these men’s opinions and inflamed the people’s fierce passions against them.

(18:45) This wanton licence being cloaked with the specious garb of religion could not easily be repressed, especially when the sovereign authorities introduced a sect of which they were not the head; they were then regarded not as interpreters of Divine right, but as sectarians - that is, as persons recognizing the right of Divine interpretation assumed by the leaders of the sect. The authority of the magistrates thus became of little account in such matters in comparison with the authority of sectarian leaders before whose interpretations kings were obliged to bow.

(18:45) This reckless freedom was disguised as religion, making it hard to restrain. This was especially true when rulers introduced a sect without being its leaders. The rulers were then seen not as interpreters of divine law, but as members of the sect. In other words, they recognized the sect’s leaders as having the right to interpret divine law. As a result, the civil authorities carried little weight in these matters compared with the sect’s leaders. Even kings had to bow to those leaders’ interpretations.

(18:47) To avoid such evils in a state, there is no safer way, than to make piety and religion to consist in acts only - that is, in the practice of justice and charity, leaving everyone's judgment in other respects free. But I will speak of this more at length presently.

(18:47) The safest way to avoid such evils in a state is to make piety and religion consist only in actions. These actions are the practice of justice and charity, leaving everyone free to judge for themselves in all other matters. But I will discuss this approach in more detail shortly.

III. We see how necessary it is, both in the interests of the state and in the interests of religion, to confer on the sovereign power the right of deciding what is lawful or the reverse. If this right of judging actions could not be given to the very prophets of God without great injury to the state and religion, how much less should it be entrusted to those who can neither foretell the future nor work miracles! But this again I will treat of more fully hereafter.

III. We see how necessary it is to give the sovereign power the right to decide what is lawful or unlawful. Both the state and religion require this authority. If even God’s prophets could not receive this right to judge actions without seriously harming the state and religion, how much less should it be entrusted to people who can neither predict the future nor perform miracles! But I will discuss this right to judge actions more fully later.

(18:52) IV. Lastly, we see how disastrous it is for a people unaccustomed to kings, and possessing a complete code of laws, to set up a monarchy. Neither can the subjects brook such a sway, nor the royal authority submit to laws and popular rights set up by anyone inferior to itself. Still less can a king be expected to defend such laws, for they were not framed to support his dominion, but the dominion of the people, or some council which formerly ruled, so that in guarding the popular rights the king would seem to be a slave rather than a master. The representative of a new monarchy will employ all his zeal in attempting to frame new laws, so as to wrest the rights of dominion to his own use, and to reduce the people till they find it easier to increase than to curtail the royal prerogative. I must not, however, omit to state that it is no less dangerous to remove a monarch, though he is on all hands admitted to be a tyrant. For his people are accustomed to royal authority and will obey no other, despising and mocking at any less august control.

(18:52) IV. Finally, we see how disastrous establishing a monarchy is for a people unused to kings, with a complete legal code. The subjects cannot tolerate royal rule. Nor can royal authority submit to laws and popular rights established by anyone beneath it. Still less can a king be expected to defend such laws. For those laws were designed to support the people's rule, or that of some council that previously governed. They were not designed to support his rule. So, by protecting the people's rights, the king would seem to be a servant rather than a master. The ruler of a new monarchy will devote all his energy to trying to create new laws. His aim will be to take the rights of government for himself and weaken the people. He will weaken them until they find expanding royal powers easier than limiting them. I must, however, add that removing a monarch is no less dangerous, though everyone agrees he is a tyrant. For his people are used to royal authority and will obey no other. They despise and mock any authority that commands less awe.

(18:58) It is therefore necessary, as the prophets discovered of old, if one king be removed, that he should be replaced by another, who will be a tyrant from necessity rather than choice. For how will he be able to endure the sight of the hands of the citizens reeking with royal blood, and to rejoice in their regicide as a glorious exploit? Was not the deed perpetrated as an example and warning for himself?

(18:58) Therefore, as the prophets discovered long ago, if one king is removed, another must replace him. The new king will be a tyrant out of necessity rather than choice. For how could he bear to see the citizens’ hands soaked in royal blood? And how could he celebrate their killing of the king as a glorious achievement? Wasn’t the killing meant as an example and a warning to the new king himself?

(18:61) If he really wishes to be king, and not to acknowledge the people as the judge of kings and the master of himself, or to wield a precarious sway, he must avenge the death of his predecessor, making an example for his own sake, lest the people should venture to repeat a similar crime. He will not, however, be able easily to avenge the death of the tyrant by the slaughter of citizens unless he defends the cause of tyranny and approves the deeds of his predecessor, thus following in his footsteps.

(18:61) If he truly wants to be king, he must avenge his predecessor’s death. Otherwise, he must accept the people as judges of kings and as his own masters, or rule insecurely. For his own sake, he must make an example of the killers, lest the people dare commit such a crime again. But he will not easily avenge the tyrant’s death by killing citizens unless he defends tyranny and approves his predecessor’s actions. In doing so, he follows in his predecessor’s footsteps.

(18:63) Hence it comes to pass that peoples have often changed their tyrants, but never removed them or changed the monarchical form of government into any other.

(18:63) As a result, peoples have often replaced their tyrants, but have never freed themselves from tyrants. Nor have they replaced monarchy with any other form of government.

The English people furnish us with a terrible example of this fact. They sought how to depose their monarch under the forms of law, but when he had been removed, they were utterly unable to change the form of government, and after much bloodshed only brought it about, that a new monarch should be hailed under a different name (as though it had been a mere question of names); this new monarch could only consolidate his power by completely destroying the royal stock, putting to death the king's friends, real or supposed, and disturbing with war the peace which might encourage discontent, in order that the populace might be engrossed with novelties and divert its mind from brooding over the slaughter of the king. At last, however, the people reflected that it had accomplished nothing for the good of the country beyond violating the rights of the lawful king and changing everything for the worse. It therefore decided to retrace its steps as soon as possible, and never rested till it had seen a complete restoration of the original state of affairs.

The English people offer a terrible example of this fact. They looked for a legal way to remove their monarch. But once the king was removed, they were completely unable to change their form of government. After much bloodshed, they only managed to welcome a new monarch under a different name. It was as though the whole issue had been a matter of names. This new monarch could secure his power only by completely destroying the royal family. He also had to execute the king's friends, both real and supposed. And he had to wage war to disrupt a peace that might encourage discontent. The purpose was to keep the people absorbed in new events, distracting them from brooding over the king's killing. At last, however, the people realized they had done nothing to benefit the country. They had only violated the lawful king's rights and changed everything for the worse. So they decided to reverse course as soon as possible. They did not rest until the original state of affairs had been fully restored.

(18:68) It may perhaps be objected that the Roman people was easily able to remove its tyrants, but I gather from its history a strong confirmation of my contention. Though the Roman people was much more than ordinarily capable of removing their tyrants and changing their form of government, inasmuch as it held in its own hands the power of electing its king and his successor, and being composed of rebels and criminals had not long been used to the royal yoke (out of its six kings it had put to death three), nevertheless it could accomplish nothing beyond electing several tyrants in place of one, who kept it groaning under a continual state of war, both foreign and civil, till at last it changed its government again to a form differing from monarchy, as in England, only in name.

(18:68) Some may perhaps object that the Roman people could easily remove their tyrants. But I find strong support for my argument in Roman history. The Roman people were far better able than most to remove their tyrants and change their form of government. They held the power to elect their king and his successor. And, being made up of rebels and criminals, they had not lived long under royal rule. They had killed three of their six kings. Yet despite these advantages, they achieved nothing beyond electing several tyrants in place of one. These tyrants kept the people suffering through constant wars, both foreign and civil. At last, the people changed their government again. As in England, the new form differed from monarchy only in name.

As for the United States of the Netherlands, they have never, as we know, had a king, but only counts, who never attained the full rights of dominion. The States of the Netherlands evidently acted as principals in the settlement made by them at the time of the Earl of Leicester's mission: they always reserved for themselves the authority to keep the counts up to their duties, and the power to preserve this authority and the liberty of the citizens. They had ample means of vindicating their rights if their rulers should prove tyrannical, and could impose such restraints that nothing could be done without their consent and approval.

As far as we know, the United States of the Netherlands have never had a king, only counts. These counts never held full sovereign rights. The States of the Netherlands clearly acted as the ultimate authority in the settlement during the Earl of Leicester's mission. The States always reserved the right to hold the counts to their duties. They also retained the power to defend this authority and the citizens' freedom. The States had ample means to defend their rights if their rulers became tyrants. They could also impose limits so that nothing could be done without their consent and approval.

(18:73) Thus the rights of sovereign power have always been vested in the States, though the last count endeavoured to usurp them. It is therefore little likely that the States should give them up, especially as they have just restored their original dominion, lately almost lost.

(18:73) Thus sovereign rights have always belonged to the States, though the last count tried to seize those rights. So the States are unlikely to give up those rights, especially after just regaining their original authority, recently almost lost.

(18:75) These examples, then, confirm us in our belief, that every dominion should retain its original form, and, indeed, cannot change it without danger of the utter ruin of the whole state. Such are the points I have here thought worthy of remark.

(18:75) These examples, then, confirm our belief that every state should keep its original form of government. Indeed, no state can change that form without risking the complete collapse of the entire state. These are the points I have considered worth noting here.