State Foundations, Individuals’ Natural and Civil Rights, and the Rights of Sovereign Power

Hitherto our care has been to separate philosophy from theology, and to show the freedom of thought which such separation insures to both. It is now time to determine the limits to which such freedom of thought and discussion may extend itself in the ideal state. For the due consideration of this question we must examine the foundations of a State, first turning our attention to the natural rights of individuals, and afterwards to religion and the state as a whole.

So far, we have worked to separate philosophy from theology. We have also shown how this separation secures freedom of thought for both. Now we must determine how far freedom of thought and discussion may extend in the ideal state. To consider this question properly, we must examine the foundations of a state. We will first consider the natural rights of individuals, then religion and the state as a whole.

(16:4) By the right and ordinance of nature, I merely mean those natural laws wherewith we conceive every individual to be conditioned by nature, so as to live and act in a given way. For instance, fishes are naturally conditioned for swimming, and the greater for devouring the less; therefore fishes enjoy the water, and the greater devour the less by sovereign natural right. For it is certain that nature, taken in the abstract, has sovereign right to do anything she can; in other words, her right is co-extensive with her power. The power of nature is the power of God, which has sovereign right over all things; and, inasmuch as the power of nature is simply the aggregate of the powers of all her individual components, it follows that every individual has sovereign right to do all that he can; in other words, the rights of an individual extend to the utmost limits of his power as it has been conditioned. Now it is the sovereign law and right of nature that each individual should endeavour to preserve itself as it is, without regard to anything but itself; therefore this sovereign law and right belongs to every individual, namely, to exist and act according to its natural conditions. We do not here acknowledge any difference between mankind and other individual natural entities, nor between men endowed with reason and those to whom reason is unknown; nor between fools, madmen, and sane men. Whatsoever an individual does by the laws of its nature it has a sovereign right to do, inasmuch as it acts as it was conditioned by nature, and cannot act otherwise. Wherefore among men, so long as they are considered as living under the sway of nature, he who does not yet know reason, or who has not yet acquired the habit of virtue, acts solely according to the laws of his desire with as sovereign a right as he who orders his life entirely by the laws of reason.

(16:4) By the right and rule of nature, I mean simply the natural laws that determine how each individual lives and acts. For example, fish are naturally suited to swimming, and larger fish to eating smaller ones. So fish inhabit the water, and larger fish eat smaller ones, by supreme natural right. For nature, considered in itself, certainly has the supreme right to do anything within its power. In other words, nature’s right extends as far as its power. Nature’s power is God’s power, which has supreme right over all things. And nature’s power is simply the combined powers of all the individuals that make up nature. It follows that every individual has the supreme right to do everything within its power. In other words, an individual’s rights extend to the furthest limits of its naturally determined power. Now nature’s supreme law and right is that each individual should strive to preserve itself as it is. Each individual does so without regard for anything but itself. Therefore every individual has this supreme law and right: to exist and act as its nature determines. Here we recognize no difference between human beings and other individual things in nature. Nor do we distinguish between people who possess reason and those who do not know reason. Nor do we distinguish between fools, people who are insane, and people who are sane. Whatever an individual does according to the laws of its nature, it has the supreme right to do. For the individual acts as nature has determined and cannot act otherwise. Therefore, consider people as long as they live under nature’s rule. Someone who does not yet know reason, or has not yet developed the habit of virtue, follows only their desires. That person acts with just as supreme a right as someone who lives entirely by the laws of reason.

(16:12) That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to do all that reason dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also the ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire dictates, or to live according to the laws of desire. This is identical with the teaching of Paul, who acknowledges that previous to the law - that is, so long as men are considered of as living under the sway of nature, there is no sin.

(16:12) That is, a wise man has the sovereign right to do all that reason dictates, or live by reason’s laws. Likewise, an ignorant and foolish man has the sovereign right to do all that desire dictates, or live by desire’s laws. This is exactly what Paul teaches when he acknowledges that before the law, there is no sin. In other words, there is no sin as long as people are considered to be living under nature’s rule.

(16:14) The natural right of the individual man is thus determined, not by sound reason, but by desire and power. All are not naturally conditioned so as to act according to the laws and rules of reason; nay, on the contrary, all men are born ignorant, and before they can learn the right way of life and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater part of their life, even if they have been well brought up, has passed away. Nevertheless, they are in the meanwhile bound to live and preserve themselves as far as they can by the unaided impulses of desire. Nature has given them no other guide, and has denied them the present power of living according to sound reason; so that they are no more bound to live by the dictates of an enlightened mind, than a cat is bound to live by the laws of the nature of a lion.

(16:14) An individual's natural right is therefore determined not by sound reason, but by desire and power. Not everyone is naturally equipped to act according to the laws and rules of reason. On the contrary, all people are born ignorant. Most of their lives pass before they learn the right way to live and develop the habit of virtue. This is true even if they have been brought up well. Meanwhile, they must live and preserve themselves as best they can, guided only by the impulses of desire. Nature has given them no other guide. Nor has nature given them the immediate ability to live according to sound reason. So they are no more bound to follow an enlightened mind than a cat is to follow a lion's nature.

(16:18) Whatsoever, therefore, an individual (considered as under the sway of nature) thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to seek and to take for himself as he best can, whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or any other means; consequently he may regard as an enemy anyone who hinders the accomplishment of his purpose.

(16:18) Therefore, an individual under nature’s rule has an absolute right to seek whatever he thinks useful to himself. This holds whether sound reason guides him or passions drive him. He may take what he seeks however he can, through force, cunning, pleading, or any other means. Consequently, he may regard anyone who blocks his purpose as an enemy.

(16:19) It follows from what we have said that the right and ordinance of nature, under which all men are born, and under which they mostly live, only prohibits such things as no one desires, and no one can attain: it does not forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, any of the means suggested by desire.

(16:19) From what we have said, the following conclusion follows about nature’s right and law. All people are born under this right and law, and mostly live under it. It prohibits only things that no one desires and no one can attain. It does not forbid conflict, hatred, anger, deceit, or indeed any means that desire suggests.

(16:20) This we need not wonder at, for nature is not bounded by the laws of human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation; her limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the eternal order of nature, wherein man is but a speck; it is by the necessity of this alone that all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a particular way. If anything, therefore, in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we only know in part, and are almost entirely ignorant of the order and interdependence of nature as a whole, and also because we want everything to be arranged according to the dictates of our human reason; in reality that which reason considers evil, is not evil in respect to the order and laws of nature as a whole, but only in respect to the laws of our reason.

(16:20) We should not be surprised by this, because nature is not limited by the laws of human reason. Human reason aims only at humanity's true benefit and preservation. Nature's limits are infinitely wider and reflect nature's eternal order, in which humanity is only a speck. The necessity of this order alone determines how all individuals live and act. So if anything in nature seems ridiculous, absurd, or evil to us, our knowledge is only partial. We are almost entirely ignorant of nature's overall order and of how its parts depend on one another. Another reason is that we want everything arranged according to the demands of our human reason. In reality, what reason considers evil is not evil in relation to the order and laws of nature as a whole. It is evil only in relation to the laws of our reason.

(16:22) Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said, they have men's true good for their object. Moreover, everyone wishes to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this would be quite impossible so long as everyone did everything he liked, and reason's claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger; there is no one who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity, hatred, anger, and deceit, and who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can. When we reflect that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must needs live most miserably, as we clearly proved in Chap. V., we shall plainly see that men must necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely and well as possible if they are to enjoy as a whole the rights which naturally belong to them as individuals, and their life should be no more conditioned by the force and desire of individuals, but by the power and will of the whole body. This end they will be unable to attain if desire be their only guide (for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a different direction); they must, therefore, most firmly decree and establish that they will be guided in everything by reason (which nobody will dare openly to repudiate lest he should be taken for a madman), and will restrain any desire which is injurious to a man's fellows, that they will do to all as they would be done by, and that they will defend their neighbour's rights as their own.

(16:22) Nevertheless, no one can doubt that we are much better off following the laws and firm guidance of reason. For, as we said, reason aims at people's true good. Moreover, everyone wants to live as securely as possible, free from fear. But such security would be impossible as long as everyone did whatever they liked. It would also be impossible if reason's authority were placed on the same level as hatred and anger. Everyone feels uneasy amid hostility, hatred, anger, and deceit, and everyone tries to avoid them as much as possible. Without mutual help or the aid of reason, people must live in great misery, as we clearly proved in Chapter V. Reflecting on this, we can plainly see that people must agree to live together as securely and well as possible. Such agreement is necessary if people are to enjoy collectively the rights that naturally belong to them as individuals. Their lives must then be governed not by individual power and desire, but by the power and will of the whole community. They cannot achieve this goal if desire alone guides them, because the laws of desire draw each person in a different direction. They must therefore firmly agree and establish that reason will guide them in everything. No one will dare openly reject reason for fear of being considered mad. They must also agree to restrain any desire that harms others. They must treat everyone as they themselves would wish to be treated, and defend their neighbors' rights as their own.

(16:26) How such a compact as this should be entered into, how ratified and established, we will now inquire.

(16:26) We will now examine how such an agreement should be entered into, formally approved, and established.

Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever neglects anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of gaining a greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does anyone endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or gaining a greater good. That is, everyone will, of two goods, choose that which he thinks the greatest; and, of two evils, that which he thinks the least. I say advisedly that which he thinks the greatest or the least, for it does not necessarily follow that he judges right. This law is so deeply implanted in the human mind that it ought to be counted among eternal truths and axioms.

Now, it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever gives up something they consider good, except in the hope of gaining a greater good or from fear of a greater evil. Nor does anyone endure an evil except to avoid a greater evil or gain a greater good. In other words, everyone chooses whichever of two goods they think is greater. And everyone chooses whichever of two evils they think is less. I deliberately say “they think,” because their judgment is not necessarily right. This law is so deeply rooted in the human mind that it should count among eternal truths and axioms.

(16:31) As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated, no one can honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all things²⁶, and in general no one will abide by his promises, unless under the fear of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good. An example will make the matter clearer. Suppose that a robber forces me to promise that I will give him my goods at his will and pleasure. It is plain (inasmuch as my natural right is, as I have shown, co-extensive with my power) that if I can free myself from this robber by stratagem, by assenting to his demands, I have the natural right to do so, and to pretend to accept his conditions. Or again, suppose I have genuinely promised someone that for the space of twenty days I will not taste food or any nourishment; and suppose I afterwards find that was foolish, and cannot be kept without very great injury to myself; as I am bound by natural law and right to choose the least of two evils, I have complete right to break my compact, and act as if my promise had never been uttered. I say that I should have perfect natural right to do so, whether I was actuated by true and evident reason, or whether I was actuated by mere opinion in thinking I had promised rashly; whether my reasons were true or false, I should be in fear of a greater evil, which, by the ordinance of nature, I should strive to avoid by every means in my power.

(16:31) It necessarily follows from the principle just stated that no one can honestly promise to surrender their right over all things²⁶. In general, no one will keep their promises unless they fear a greater evil or hope for a greater good. An example will make the point clearer. Suppose a robber forces me to promise to give him my possessions whenever he wishes. As I have shown, my natural right extends as far as my power. So if I can escape the robber by tricking him and agreeing to his demands, I have the natural right to do so. I may pretend to accept his conditions. Or suppose I have sincerely promised someone that I will take no food or nourishment for twenty days. Suppose I later realize the promise was foolish and cannot be kept without causing me very great harm. Since natural law and right require me to choose the lesser of two evils, I have every right to break my agreement. I may act as if I had never made the promise. I say I would have this full natural right whether clear, sound reasoning guided me or merely an opinion that I had promised rashly. Whether my reasons were true or false, I would fear a greater evil. And by nature's law, I would strive to avoid that evil by every means in my power.

(16:37) We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid by its utility, without which it becomes null and void. It is, therefore, foolish to ask a man to keep his faith with us for ever, unless we also endeavour that the violation of the compact we enter into shall involve for the violator more harm than good. This consideration should have very great weight in forming a state. However, if all men could be easily led by reason alone, and could recognize what is best and most useful for a state, there would be no one who would not forswear deceit, for everyone would keep most religiously to their compact in their desire for the chief good, namely, the shield and buckler of the commonwealth. However, it is far from being the case that all men can always be easily led by reason alone; everyone is drawn away by his pleasure, while avarice, ambition, envy, hatred, and the like so engross the mind that, reason has no place therein. Hence, though men make promises with all the appearances of good faith, and agree that they will keep to their engagement, no one can absolutely rely on another man's promise unless there is something behind it. Everyone has by nature a right to act deceitfully, and to break his compacts, unless he be restrained by the hope of some greater good, or the fear of some greater evil.

(16:37) We may therefore conclude that an agreement is valid only because it is useful. Without that usefulness, the agreement becomes null and void. So it is foolish to ask someone to keep their word to us forever unless we also take precautions. We must try to ensure that breaking the agreement brings the person who breaks it more harm than good. This consideration should carry great weight when forming a state. But suppose all people could easily be guided by reason alone and recognize what is best and most useful for a state. Then everyone would renounce deceit. Everyone would honor their agreement with the utmost devotion, seeking the highest good, namely, the commonwealth's protection and defense. But people are far from always being easily guided by reason alone. Everyone is drawn away by pleasure. Greed, ambition, envy, hatred, and similar passions so consume the mind that reason has no place in it. So, although people promise with every appearance of good faith and agree to keep their commitments, promises alone are not enough. No one can rely absolutely on another person's promise unless something backs it up. Everyone has a natural right to deceive and break agreements unless restrained by hope of greater good or fear of greater harm.

(16:44) However, as we have shown that the natural right of the individual is only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he in so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and further, that the Sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign power, wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats of the universally feared punishment of death; such sovereign right he will retain only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his will; otherwise he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger than he will be bound unwillingly to obey him.

(16:44) However, we have shown that an individual's natural right is limited only by his power. So, clearly, when he transfers his power to another, willingly or under force, he necessarily gives up some of his right. Furthermore, sovereign right over all people belongs to whoever holds supreme power. With that power, he can force people to obey or restrain them by threatening death, a punishment everyone fears. He retains this sovereign right only as long as he can enforce his will. Otherwise, his throne will become unstable, and no one stronger than him will be bound to obey him unwillingly.

(16:45) In this manner a society can be formed without any violation of natural right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept - that is, if each individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that is, it will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and everyone will be bound to obey, under pain of the severest punishment. A body politic of this kind is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a society which wields all its power as a whole. The sovereign power is not restrained by any laws, but everyone is bound to obey it in all things; such is the state of things implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed over to it all their power of self-defence, or in other words, all their right. For if they had wished to retain any right for themselves, they ought to have taken precautions for its defence and preservation; as they have not done so, and indeed could not have done so without dividing and consequently ruining the state, they placed themselves absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign power; and, therefore, having acted (as we have shown) as reason and necessity demanded, they are obliged to fulfil the commands of the sovereign power, however absurd these may be, else they will be public enemies, and will act against reason, which urges the preservation of the state as a primary duty. For reason bids us choose the least of two evils.

(16:45) In this way, a society can be formed without violating natural right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept. This is possible if each individual transfers all his power to the political community. The community will then hold sovereign natural right over everything. In other words, it alone will have unquestioned authority, and everyone must obey or face the severest punishment. A political community of this kind is called a Democracy. A Democracy may be defined as a society that exercises all its power collectively. The sovereign power is not limited by any laws, but everyone must obey it in all things. These are the terms people accepted when they transferred all their power of self-defense, whether silently or explicitly. In other words, they transferred all their right. For if they had wanted to keep any right for themselves, they should have taken steps to defend and preserve it. But they took no such steps. Indeed, they could not have done so without dividing the state and consequently destroying it. They therefore placed themselves entirely at the mercy of the sovereign power. As we have shown, they acted as reason and necessity demanded. They are therefore obliged to obey the sovereign power’s commands, however absurd those commands may be. Otherwise, they will be public enemies and act against reason, which makes preserving the state a primary duty. For reason tells us to choose the lesser of two evils.

(16:50) Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the dominion and will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light heart: for we have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of imposing their will, so long as they have the full power to enforce it: if such power be lost their right to command is lost also, or lapses to those who have assumed it and can keep it. Thus it is very rare for sovereigns to impose thoroughly irrational commands, for they are bound to consult their own interests, and retain their power by consulting the public good and acting according to the dictates of reason, as Seneca says, "violenta imperia nemo continuit diu." No one can long retain a tyrant's sway.

(16:50) Furthermore, we may accept without much worry the danger of submitting completely to another person's rule and will. For we have shown that sovereigns have the right to impose their will only while fully able to enforce it. If sovereigns lose that power, they also lose their right to command. Or that right passes to those who have taken power and can hold on to it. Thus, sovereigns very rarely impose completely irrational commands, because they must consider their own interests. To retain power, sovereigns must serve the public good and act according to reason. As Seneca says, "violenta imperia nemo continuit diu." No one can maintain a tyrant's rule for long.

(16:53) In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared: for it is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it be a large one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and to bring men as far as possible under the control of reason, so that they may live in peace and harmony: if this basis be removed the whole fabric falls to ruin.

(16:53) In a democracy, irrational commands are even less to be feared. For a majority of the people is almost certain not to agree on an irrational plan, especially in a large population. Moreover, democracy’s foundation and aim is to avoid irrational desires and bring people under reason’s control as far as possible. The purpose is to allow people to live in peace and harmony. If this foundation is removed, the whole structure collapses.

(16:54) Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty of subjects is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to recognize no right save that which it sanctions.

(16:54) With these goals guiding the sovereign power, subjects must, as I have said, obey its commands. They must recognize no right except those the sovereign power authorizes.

It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects into slaves: for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like; but this idea is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he who is led away by his pleasures and can neither see what is good for him nor act accordingly: he alone is free who lives with free consent under the entire guidance of reason.

Perhaps some will think we are turning subjects into slaves, because slaves obey commands while free people live as they like. But that view is mistaken. The true slave is someone ruled by pleasures, unable to see what is good for them or act accordingly. Only those who freely choose to live entirely under the guidance of reason are free.

(16:56) Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a certain sense, but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave, all depends on the object of the action. If the object of the action be the good of the state, and not the good of the agent, the latter is a slave and does himself no good: but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole people, and not that of the ruler, is the supreme law, obedience to the sovereign power does not make a man a slave, of no use to himself, but a subject. Therefore, that state is the freest whose laws are founded on sound reason, so that every member of it may, if he will, be free²⁷; that is, live with full consent under the entire guidance of reason.

(16:56) Following orders does take away freedom in a certain sense, but it does not therefore make someone a slave. Everything depends on the purpose of the action. If the action serves the state's good rather than the person's own good, that person is a slave and gains nothing. But consider a state or kingdom whose highest law is the welfare of all the people, not the ruler. There, obeying the sovereign power makes a person a subject, not a slave who gains nothing from obedience. Therefore, the freest state is one whose laws are based on sound reason. Such laws allow every member, if they choose, to be free²⁷. That is, they can live willingly under the complete guidance of reason.

(16:59) Children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of their parents, are yet not slaves: for the commands of parents look generally to the children's benefit.

(16:59) Although children must obey all their parents' commands, children are not slaves. This is because parents' commands generally aim to benefit their children.

We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between a slave, a son, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined. A slave is one who is bound to obey his master's orders, though they are given solely in the master's interest: a son is one who obeys his father's orders, given in his own interest; a subject obeys the orders of the sovereign power, given for the common interest, wherein he is included.

We must therefore recognize a major difference between a slave, a son, and a subject. Their positions can be defined as follows. A slave must obey his master's orders, even though those orders serve only the master's interests. A son obeys his father's orders, given for the son's own benefit. A subject obeys the orders of the ruling power, given for the common good, including the subject's own good.

(16:62) I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a democracy: I have especially desired to do so, for I believe it to be of all forms of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual liberty. In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs, he only hands it over to the majority of a society, whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain as they were in the state of nature, equals.

(16:62) I think I have now explained the basis of democracy clearly enough. I have made a special effort because I believe democracy is the most natural form of government. I also believe democracy is the form most consistent with individual liberty. In a democracy, no one gives up their natural right so completely that they lose all say in public affairs. Instead, each person hands that right over only to the majority of a society to which they themselves belong. So all people remain equal, just as they were in the state of nature.

(16:64) This is the only form of government which I have treated of at length, for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the benefits of freedom in a state.

(16:64) This is the only form of government I have discussed in detail. That is because it best serves my purpose of showing the benefits of freedom in a state.

I may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms of government, for we may gather from what has been said whence their right arises without going into its origin. The possessor of sovereign power, whether he be one, or many, or the whole body politic, has the sovereign right of imposing any commands he pleases: and he who has either voluntarily, or under compulsion, transferred the right to defend him to another, has, in so doing, renounced his natural right and is therefore bound to obey, in all things, the commands of the sovereign power; and will be bound so to do so long as the king, or nobles, or the people preserve the sovereign power which formed the basis of the original transfer. I need add no more.

I can skip the basic principles of other forms of government. What has already been said shows where their right comes from, without examining its origin. Whoever holds sovereign power has the supreme right to issue any commands they please. This holds whether power belongs to one person, several people, or the entire political community. Anyone who transfers their right to defend themselves to another, whether voluntarily or under compulsion, gives up their natural right. They are therefore bound to obey the sovereign power’s commands in all things. This obligation lasts as long as the king, nobles, or people retain the sovereign power underlying the original transfer. I need say no more.

The bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed, we shall readily be able to define private civil right, wrong, justice, and injustice, with their relations to the state; and also to determine what constitutes an ally, or an enemy, or the crime of treason.

Now that we have explained the foundations and rights of government, we can readily define individual civil rights and wrongs. We can also define justice and injustice, and how these concepts relate to the state. We can then determine what makes someone an ally or an enemy, and what constitutes treason.

(16:69) By private civil right we can only mean the liberty every man possesses to preserve his existence, a liberty limited by the edicts of the sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority: for when a man has transferred to another his right of living as he likes, which was only limited by his power, that is, has transferred his liberty and power of self-defence, he is bound to live as that other dictates, and to trust to him entirely for his defence. Wrong takes place when a citizen, or subject, is forced by another to undergo some loss or pain in contradiction to the authority of the law, or the edict of the sovereign power.

(16:69) By private civil right, we can only mean each person's freedom to preserve his own existence. This freedom is limited by the sovereign power's commands and protected only by its authority. For when a person transfers to another his right to live as he chooses, he must follow that other's commands. Before the transfer, this right was limited only by his own power. In other words, he has transferred his freedom and his power to defend himself. He must therefore rely entirely on the other person for his defense. A wrong occurs when someone forces a citizen or subject to suffer some loss or pain contrary to the law or the sovereign power's commands.

(16:71) Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community: nor can it ever accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has the right to do what he likes. It can only arise, therefore, between private persons, who are bound by law and right not to injure one another. Justice consists in the habitual rendering to every man his lawful due: injustice consists in depriving a man, under the pretence of legality, of what the laws, rightly interpreted, would allow him. These last are also called equity and iniquity, because those who administer the laws are bound to show no respect of persons, but to account all men equal, and to defend every man's right equally, neither envying the rich nor despising the poor.

(16:71) Wrongdoing is possible only in an organized community. Nor can subjects ever be wronged by any act of the sovereign, who has the right to do whatever he likes. Wrongdoing can therefore arise only between private individuals, who are bound by law and right not to harm one another. Justice means consistently giving everyone what the law entitles them to. Injustice means using a pretense of legality to deny someone what the laws, properly interpreted, would grant them. Justice and injustice are also called equity and inequity. This is because those who administer the laws must show no favoritism, but must regard everyone as equal. They must also defend everyone's rights equally, neither envying the rich nor looking down on the poor.

The men of two states become allies, when for the sake of avoiding war, or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each other no hurt, but on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity arises, each retaining his independence. Such a covenant is valid so long as its basis of danger or advantage is in force: no one enters into an engagement, or is bound to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope of some accruing good, or the fear of some evil: if this basis be removed the compact thereby becomes void: this has been abundantly shown by experience. For although different states make treaties not to harm one another, they always take every possible precaution against such treaties being broken by the stronger party, and do not rely on the compact, unless there is a sufficiently obvious object and advantage to both parties in observing it. Otherwise they would fear a breach of faith, nor would there be any wrong done thereby: for who in his proper senses, and aware of the right of the sovereign power, would trust in the promises of one who has the will and the power to do what he likes, and who aims solely at the safety and advantage of his dominion? Moreover, if we consult loyalty and religion, we shall see that no one in possession of power ought to abide by his promises to the injury of his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises without breaking the engagement he made with his subjects, by which both he and they are most solemnly bound. An enemy is one who lives apart from the state, and does not recognize its authority either as a subject or as an ally. It is not hatred which makes a man an enemy, but the rights of the state. The rights of the state are the same in regard to him who does not recognize by any compact the state authority, as they are against him who has done the state an injury: it has the right to force him as best it can, either to submit, or to contract an alliance.

The people of two states become allies when they agree not to harm each other, but to help each other when needed. They make this agreement to avoid war or gain some other advantage, and each state remains independent. Such an agreement is valid as long as the danger or advantage behind it continues. No one makes a commitment, or is bound to keep an agreement, without hope of gaining some good or fear of some evil. If that basis disappears, the agreement becomes void. Experience has shown this abundantly. For although states sign treaties not to harm one another, they always take every possible precaution against the stronger party breaking them. They do not rely on a treaty unless both parties have a clear enough purpose and advantage in keeping it. Otherwise, they would fear a breach of trust, and such a breach would do no wrong. For who in their right mind, knowing the rights of sovereign power, would trust such a ruler's promises? Such a ruler has both the will and the power to do whatever he likes. His sole aim is the safety and advantage of his state. Moreover, if we consider loyalty and religion, we see that no ruler ought to keep promises that harm his state. For keeping such promises would break the agreement he made with his subjects, which binds both sides most solemnly. An enemy is someone who lives outside the state and recognizes its authority neither as a subject nor as an ally. Hatred does not make someone an enemy. The rights of the state do. The state has the same rights against someone who has made no agreement recognizing its authority as against someone who has harmed it. The state has the right to use whatever force it can to make either person submit or enter an alliance.

Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects, who by compact, either tacit or expressed, have transferred all their rights to the state: a subject is said to have committed this crime when he has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the sovereign power, or to place it in different hands. I say, has attempted, for if punishment were not to overtake him till he had succeeded, it would often come too late, the sovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred already.

Finally, only subjects can commit treason. Through an agreement, either implied or explicit, subjects have transferred all their rights to the state. A subject commits treason by attempting, for any reason, to seize sovereign power or transfer it to someone else. I say “attempting” because if punishment came only after the subject succeeded, punishment would often come too late. Sovereign rights would already have been acquired or transferred.

(16:84) I also say, has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the sovereign power, and I recognize no difference whether such an attempt should be followed by public loss or public gain. Whatever be his reason for acting, the crime is treason, and he is rightly condemned: in war, everyone would admit the justice of his sentence. If a man does not keep to his post, but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his commander, whatever may be his motive, so long as he acts on his own motion, even if he advances with the design of defeating the enemy, he is rightly put to death, because he has violated his oath, and infringed the rights of his commander. That all citizens are equally bound by these rights in time of peace, is not so generally recognized, but the reasons for obedience are in both cases identical. The state must be preserved and directed by the sole authority of the sovereign, and such authority and right have been accorded by universal consent to him alone: if, therefore, anyone else attempts, without his consent, to execute any public enterprise, even though the state might (as we said) reap benefit therefrom, such person has none the less infringed the sovereign’s right, and would be rightly punished for treason.

(16:84) I also mean anyone who has tried, for whatever reason, to seize sovereign power. I make no distinction between an attempt that harms the public and one that benefits the public. Whatever the person’s reason for acting, the crime is treason, and he is rightly condemned. In war, everyone would agree that such a sentence is just. Suppose a man leaves his post and approaches the enemy without his commander’s knowledge. Whatever his motive, if he acts on his own initiative, he is rightly put to death. This holds even if his aim is to defeat the enemy, because he has broken his oath and violated his commander’s rights. People less widely recognize that all citizens are equally bound by these rights in peacetime. But the reasons for obedience are identical in both cases. The state must be preserved and governed under the sovereign’s authority alone. By universal consent, that authority and right have been granted to the sovereign alone. Therefore, suppose anyone else tries to carry out a public undertaking without the sovereign’s consent. Even though the state might benefit, as we said, that person has still violated the sovereign’s right. He would rightly be punished for treason.

(16:89) In order that every scruple may be removed, we may now answer the inquiry, whether our former assertion that everyone who has not the practice of reason, may, in the state of nature, live by sovereign natural right, according to the laws of his desires, is not in direct opposition to the law and right of God as revealed. For as all men absolutely (whether they be less endowed with reason or more) are equally bound by the Divine command to love their neighbour as themselves, it may be said that they cannot, without wrong, do injury to anyone, or live according to their desires.

(16:89) To remove any remaining doubts, we can now address a question about our earlier claim. We claimed that anyone who does not use reason may live according to their desires in the state of nature. They may do so by their supreme natural right. Does this claim directly contradict the revealed law and right of God? For all people, whether more or less guided by reason, are equally bound by God's command to love their neighbours as themselves. It may therefore be argued that they cannot harm anyone or live according to their desires without doing wrong.

(16:91) This objection, so far as the state of nature is concerned, can be easily answered, for the state of nature is, both in nature and in time, prior to religion. No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God²⁸, nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his reason, but solely by revelation confirmed by signs. Therefore, previous to revelation, no one is bound by a Divine law and right of which he is necessarily in ignorance. The state of nature must by no means be confounded with a state of religion, but must be conceived as without either religion or law, and consequently without sin or wrong: this is how we have described it, and we are confirmed by the authority of Paul. It is not only in respect of ignorance that we conceive the state of nature as prior to, and lacking the Divine revealed law and right; but in respect of freedom also, wherewith all men are born endowed.

(16:91) As far as the state of nature is concerned, this objection is easy to answer. The state of nature comes before religion, both in its nature and in time. No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God²⁸. Nor can anyone gain this knowledge through reason alone, but only through revelation confirmed by signs. Therefore, before revelation, no one is bound by divine law and right, of which he is necessarily ignorant. The state of nature must never be confused with a religious state. Instead, it must be understood as having neither religion nor law, and therefore neither sin nor wrongdoing. We have described the state of nature in these terms, and Paul's authority supports our account. We understand the state of nature as preceding, and lacking, revealed divine law and right, not only because of ignorance. We also understand it this way because of the freedom with which all people are born.

(16:96) If men were naturally bound by the Divine law and right, or if the Divine law and right were a natural necessity, there would have been no need for God to make a covenant with mankind, and to bind them thereto with an oath and agreement.

(16:96) If people were naturally bound by divine law and right, or if divine law and right were a natural necessity, God would not have needed to make a covenant with humanity. Nor would he have needed to bind humanity to that covenant through an oath and agreement.

(16:97) We must, then, fully grant that the Divine law and right originated at the time when men by express covenant agreed to obey God in all things, and ceded, as it were, their natural freedom, transferring their rights to God in the manner described in speaking of the formation of a state.

(16:97) We must therefore fully accept that divine law and right began when people explicitly agreed to obey God in all things. Through this covenant, people gave up, so to speak, their natural freedom and transferred their rights to God. They did so in the way described earlier when discussing the formation of a state.

However, I will treat of these matters more at length presently.

However, I will discuss these matters in more detail shortly.

It may be insisted that sovereigns are as much bound by the Divine law as subjects: whereas we have asserted that they retain their natural rights, and may do whatever they like.

Some may insist that sovereigns are just as bound by divine law as their subjects are. Yet we have argued that sovereigns keep their natural rights and may do whatever they like.

(16:100) In order to clear up the whole difficulty, which arises rather concerning the natural right than the natural state, I maintain that everyone is bound, in the state of nature, to live according to Divine law, in the same way as he is bound to live according to the dictates of sound reason; namely, inasmuch as it is to his advantage, and necessary for his salvation; but, if he will not so live, he may do otherwise at his own risk. He is thus bound to live according to his own laws, not according to anyone else's, and to recognize no man as a judge, or as a superior in religion. Such, in my opinion, is the position of a sovereign, for he may take advice from his fellow-men, but he is not bound to recognize any as a judge, nor anyone besides himself as an arbitrator on any question of right, unless it be a prophet sent expressly by God and attesting his mission by indisputable signs. Even then he does not recognize a man, but God Himself as His judge.

(16:100) To resolve the whole difficulty, I make the following claim. The difficulty concerns natural right more than the state of nature. In the state of nature, everyone is bound to live by Divine law, just as by sound reason. This obligation applies insofar as living this way benefits a person and is necessary for that person’s salvation. But anyone who refuses may live otherwise at their own risk. Each person is therefore bound to live by their own laws, not anyone else’s. They need not recognize anyone as a judge or as a religious superior. In my opinion, a sovereign is in the same position. A sovereign may take advice from others but is not bound to recognize anyone as a judge. Nor must a sovereign recognize anyone else as an arbitrator on any question of right. The only exception is a prophet sent expressly by God, who proves this mission through indisputable signs. Even then, the sovereign recognizes not a human being but God himself as judge.

If a sovereign refuses to obey God as revealed in His law, he does so at his own risk and loss, but without violating any civil or natural right. For the civil right is dependent on his own decree; and natural right is dependent on the laws of nature, which latter are not adapted to religion, whose sole aim is the good of humanity, but to the order of nature - that is, to God's eternal decree unknown to us.

If a sovereign refuses to obey God as revealed in his law, he risks harm and loss to himself. But he violates no civil or natural right by doing so. For civil right depends on the sovereign's own decrees, and natural right depends on the laws of nature. These laws are not designed to serve religion, whose only aim is humanity's good. Instead, they serve the order of nature, that is, God's eternal decree, which is unknown to us.

(16:106) This truth seems to be adumbrated in a somewhat obscurer form by those who maintain that men can sin against God's revelation, but not against the eternal decree by which He has ordained all things.

(16:106) This truth seems to be hinted at less clearly by those who say people can sin against God's revelation. But they maintain that people cannot sin against the eternal decree by which God has ordained all things.

We may be asked, what should we do if the sovereign commands anything contrary to religion, and the obedience which we have expressly vowed to God? should we obey the Divine law or the human law? I shall treat of this question at length hereafter, and will therefore merely say now, that God should be obeyed before all else, when we have a certain and indisputable revelation of His will: but men are very prone to error on religious subjects, and, according to the diversity of their dispositions, are wont with considerable stir to put forward their own inventions, as experience more than sufficiently attests, so that if no one were bound to obey the state in matters which, in his own opinion concern religion, the rights of the state would be dependent on every man's judgment and passions. No one would consider himself bound to obey laws framed against his faith or superstition; and on this pretext he might assume unbounded license. In this way, the rights of the civil authorities would be utterly set at nought, so that we must conclude that the sovereign power, which alone is bound both by Divine and natural right to preserve and guard the laws of the state, should have supreme authority for making any laws about religion which it thinks fit; all are bound to obey its behests on the subject in accordance with their promise which God bids them to keep.

We may be asked what we should do if the sovereign commands something contrary to religion and our express vow to obey God. Should we obey divine law or human law? I will discuss this question at length later, so for now I will say only this. God should be obeyed above all else when we have a certain and indisputable revelation of his will. But people are very prone to error in religious matters. Depending on their different temperaments, they often promote their own inventions with considerable commotion. Experience provides more than enough evidence of this. So suppose no one had to obey the state in matters that, in their own opinion, concerned religion. The state's rights would then depend on each person's judgment and passions. No one would consider themselves bound to obey laws that conflicted with their faith or superstition. On this pretext, they might claim unlimited freedom to act as they pleased. In this way, the rights of the civil authorities would be completely disregarded. We must therefore conclude that the sovereign power should have supreme authority to make whatever laws about religion it considers appropriate. For the sovereign power alone is bound by both divine and natural right to preserve and protect the state's laws. Everyone is bound to obey its commands on religion, in keeping with their promise, which God commands them to keep.

(16:111) However, if the sovereign power be heathen, we should either enter into no engagements therewith, and yield up our lives sooner than transfer to it any of our rights; or, if the engagement be made, and our rights transferred, we should (inasmuch as we should have ourselves transferred the right of defending ourselves and our religion) be bound to obey them, and to keep our word: we might even rightly be bound so to do, except in those cases where God, by indisputable revelation, has promised His special aid against tyranny, or given us special exemption from obedience. Thus we see that, of all the Jews in Babylon, there were only three youths who were certain of the help of God, and, therefore, refused to obey Nebuchadnezzar. All the rest, with the sole exception of Daniel, who was beloved by the king, were doubtless compelled by right to obey, perhaps thinking that they had been delivered up by God into the hands of the king, and that the king had obtained and preserved his dominion by God's design. On the other hand, Eleazar, before his country had utterly fallen, wished to give a proof of his constancy to his compatriots, in order that they might follow in his footsteps, and go to any lengths, rather than allow their right and power to be transferred to the Greeks, or brave any torture rather than swear allegiance to the heathen. Instances are occurring every day in confirmation of what I here advance. The rulers of Christian kingdoms do not hesitate, with a view to strengthening their dominion, to make treaties with Turks and heathen, and to give orders to their subjects who settle among such peoples not to assume more freedom, either in things secular or religious, than is set down in the treaty, or allowed by the foreign government. We may see this exemplified in the Dutch treaty with the Japanese, which I have already mentioned.

(16:111) However, if the sovereign power is heathen, we should make no agreement with it. We should give up our lives rather than transfer any of our rights to that power. Or, if we have made the agreement and transferred our rights, we must obey the sovereign and keep our word. For we ourselves would have transferred the right to defend ourselves and our religion. We could even rightly be required to obey, except where God has promised special help against tyranny through indisputable revelation. Another exception would be where God has specifically exempted us from obedience. Thus, among all the Jews in Babylon, only three youths were certain of God's help. Those three therefore refused to obey Nebuchadnezzar. All the rest, except Daniel, whom the king loved, were undoubtedly bound by right to obey. Perhaps they thought God had handed them over to the king. Perhaps they also thought the king had gained and maintained his rule according to God's plan. Eleazar, by contrast, wanted to show his fellow countrymen his steadfastness before his country had fallen completely. He wanted them to follow his example and go to any lengths rather than surrender their rights and power to the Greeks. He wanted them to endure any torture rather than swear allegiance to the heathen. Examples confirming my argument occur every day. To strengthen their rule, the rulers of Christian kingdoms do not hesitate to make treaties with Turks and heathen. These rulers also give orders to their subjects who settle among those peoples. Such subjects must claim no more freedom in secular or religious matters than the treaty specifies or the foreign government allows. The Dutch treaty with the Japanese, which I mentioned earlier, provides an example.