Theology and Reason: Neither Serves the Other. Defining the Basis for Accepting the Bible’s Authority

Those who know not that philosophy and reason are distinct, dispute whether Scripture should be made subservient to reason, or reason to Scripture: that is, whether the meaning of Scripture should be made to agreed with reason; or whether reason should be made to agree with Scripture: the latter position is assumed by the sceptics who deny the certitude of reason, the former by the dogmatists. Both parties are, as I have shown, utterly in the wrong, for either doctrine would require us to tamper with reason or with Scripture.

People who do not know that philosophy and reason are distinct debate which should serve the other, Scripture or reason. In other words, should Scripture’s meaning be made to agree with reason, or should reason be made to agree with Scripture? Sceptics, who deny that reason gives certainty, take the second position. Dogmatists take the first. As I have shown, both sides are completely wrong, because either view would require us to distort reason or Scripture.

We have shown that Scripture does not teach philosophy, but merely obedience, and that all it contains has been adapted to the understanding and established opinions of the multitude. Those, therefore, who wish to adapt it to philosophy, must needs ascribe to the prophets many ideas which they never even dreamed of, and give an extremely forced interpretation to their words: those on the other hand, who would make reason and philosophy subservient to theology, will be forced to accept as Divine utterances the prejudices of the ancient Jews, and to fill and confuse their mind therewith. In short, one party will run wild with the aid of reason, and the other will run wild without the aid of reason.

We have shown that Scripture does not teach philosophy, but only obedience. Everything in Scripture has been adapted to ordinary people’s understanding and established beliefs. So those who want to make Scripture fit philosophy must attribute many ideas to the prophets. Yet the prophets never even dreamed of those ideas. These interpreters must also twist the prophets’ words to an extreme degree. On the other hand, those who would make reason and philosophy serve theology must accept ancient Jewish prejudices as divine pronouncements. They must fill their minds with those prejudices and become confused by them. In short, one group will run wild with reason’s help, and the other will run wild without it.

The first among the Pharisees who openly maintained that Scripture should be made to agree with reason, was Maimonides, whose opinion we reviewed, and abundantly refuted in Chap. VIII.: now, although this writer had much authority among his contemporaries, he was deserted on this question by almost all, and the majority went straight over to the opinion of a certain R. Jehuda Alpakhar, who, in his anxiety to avoid the error of Maimonides, fell into another, which was its exact contrary. He held that reason should be made subservient, and entirely give way to Scripture. He thought that a passage should not be interpreted metaphorically, simply because it was repugnant to reason, but only in the cases when it is inconsistent with Scripture itself - that is, with its clear doctrines. Therefore he laid down the universal rule, that whatsoever Scripture teaches dogmatically, and affirms expressly, must on its own sole authority be admitted as absolutely true: that there is no doctrine in the Bible which directly contradicts the general tenour of the whole: but only some which appear to involve a difference, for the phrases of Scripture often seem to imply something contrary to what has been expressly taught. Such phrases, and such phrases only, we may interpret metaphorically.

Maimonides was the first among the Pharisees to argue openly that Scripture should be made to agree with reason. We reviewed his opinion and thoroughly refuted it in Chapter VIII. Although Maimonides had great authority among his contemporaries, almost all abandoned him on this question. The majority went straight over to the opinion of a certain R. Jehuda Alpakhar. In his eagerness to avoid Maimonides’ error, Alpakhar fell into the exact opposite error. He held that reason should be subordinate to Scripture and give way to it entirely. He thought a passage should not be interpreted metaphorically simply because it conflicted with reason. A metaphorical interpretation was justified only when the passage conflicted with Scripture itself, meaning its clear doctrines. Alpakhar therefore laid down a universal rule. Whatever Scripture teaches as doctrine and expressly affirms must be accepted as absolutely true on Scripture’s authority alone. No doctrine in the Bible directly contradicts the general meaning of the whole. Only some doctrines appear to differ, because Scripture’s wording often seems to imply something contrary to its explicit teachings. We may interpret such wording metaphorically, but only such wording.

For instance, Scripture clearly teaches the unity of God (see Deut. vi:4), nor is there any text distinctly asserting a plurality of gods; but in several passages God speaks of Himself, and the prophets speak of Him, in the plural number; such phrases are simply a manner of speaking, and do not mean that there actually are several gods: they are to be explained metaphorically, not because a plurality of gods is repugnant to reason, but because Scripture distinctly asserts that there is only one.

For instance, Scripture clearly teaches that God is one (see Deut. 6:4). No text clearly states that there are several gods. But in several passages, God speaks of himself in the plural, and the prophets speak of him the same way. Such phrases are simply a way of speaking and do not mean that several gods actually exist. These phrases must be understood metaphorically, not because the existence of several gods conflicts with reason. Rather, they must be understood this way because Scripture clearly states that there is only one God.

So, again, as Scripture asserts (as Alpakhar thinks) in Deut. iv:15, that God is incorporeal, we are bound, solely by the authority of this text, and not by reason, to believe that God has no body: consequently we must explain metaphorically, on the sole authority of Scripture, all those passages which attribute to God hands, feet, &c., and take them merely as figures of speech. Such is the opinion of Alpakhar. In so far as he seeks to explain Scripture by Scripture, I praise him, but I marvel that a man gifted with reason should wish to debase that faculty. It is true that Scripture should be explained by Scripture, so long as we are in difficulties about the meaning and intention of the prophets, but when we have elicited the true meaning, we must of necessity make use of our judgment and reason in order to assent thereto. If reason, however, much as she rebels, is to be entirely subjected to Scripture, I ask, are we to effect her submission by her own aid, or without her, and blindly? If the latter, we shall surely act foolishly and injudiciously; if the former, we assent to Scripture under the dominion of reason, and should not assent to it without her. Moreover, I may ask now, is a man to assent to anything against his reason? What is denial if it be not reason's refusal to assent? In short, I am astonished that anyone should wish to subject reason, the greatest of gifts and a light from on high, to the dead letter which may have been corrupted by human malice; that it should be thought no crime to speak with contempt of mind, the true handwriting of God's Word, calling it corrupt, blind, and lost, while it is considered the greatest of crimes to say the same of the letter, which is merely the reflection and image of God's Word. Men think it pious to trust nothing to reason and their own judgment, and impious to doubt the faith of those who have transmitted to us the sacred books. Such conduct is not piety, but mere folly. And, after all, why are they so anxious? What are they afraid of? Do they think that faith and religion cannot be upheld unless men purposely keep themselves in ignorance, and turn their backs on reason? If this be so, they have but a timid trust in Scripture.

Again, according to Alpakhar, Scripture states in Deut. iv:15 that God has no body. We must therefore believe that God has no body solely on the authority of this text, not through reason. Consequently, Scripture alone requires us to interpret metaphorically all passages that give God hands, feet, and so on. We must take these descriptions merely as figures of speech. This is Alpakhar’s view. I praise his attempt to explain Scripture through Scripture. But I am amazed that someone gifted with reason would want to degrade that ability. It is true that we should explain Scripture through Scripture while we remain uncertain about the prophets’ meaning and intentions. But once we have found their true meaning, we must use our judgment and reason to accept it. Suppose, however, that reason must submit entirely to Scripture, however strongly reason resists. I ask: must we use reason itself to bring about this submission, or submit blindly, without reason? If we submit blindly, we will surely act foolishly and without judgment. If we use reason, then we accept Scripture under reason’s authority, and we should not accept Scripture without reason. Moreover, I ask: should anyone accept anything that goes against their reason? What is denial, if not reason’s refusal to accept something? In short, I am astonished that anyone would want to subject reason to the dead letter of Scripture. Reason is the greatest of gifts, a light from above. The written text, by contrast, may have been corrupted by human malice. People think it no crime to speak contemptuously of the mind, the true handwriting of God’s Word. They call the mind corrupt, blind, and lost. Yet they consider it the greatest of crimes to say the same about the written text. That text is merely the reflection and image of God’s Word. People think it pious to trust nothing to reason and their own judgment. Yet they think it impious to doubt the trustworthiness of those who passed the sacred books down to us. Such conduct is not piety, but sheer folly. And after all, why are they so anxious? What are they afraid of? Do they think faith and religion cannot survive unless people deliberately remain ignorant and turn their backs on reason? If so, their trust in Scripture is timid indeed.

However, be it far from me to say that religion should seek to enslave reason, or reason religion, or that both should not be able to keep their sovereignity in perfect harmony. I will revert to this question presently, for I wish now to discuss Alpakhar's rule.

However, I would never suggest that religion should enslave reason, or reason enslave religion. Nor would I suggest that both cannot remain sovereign in perfect harmony. I will return to this question shortly, because for now I want to discuss Alpakhar's rule.

He requires, as we have stated, that we should accept as true, or reject as false, everything asserted or denied by Scripture, and he further states that Scripture never expressly asserts or denies anything which contradicts its assertions or negations elsewhere. The rashness of such a requirement and statement can escape no one. For (passing over the fact that he does not notice that Scripture consists of different books, written at different times, for different people, by different authors: and also that his requirement is made on his own authority without any corroboration from reason or Scripture) he would be bound to show that all passages which are indirectly contradictory of the rest, can be satisfactorily explained metaphorically through the nature of the language and the context: further, that Scripture has come down to us untampered with. However, we will go into the matter at length.

As we have stated, he requires us to accept as true everything Scripture asserts and reject as false everything Scripture denies. He also claims that Scripture never explicitly asserts or denies anything that contradicts its assertions or denials elsewhere. No one can fail to see how rash this requirement and claim are. For now, let us set aside his failure to recognize that Scripture consists of different books. These books were written at different times, for different people, by different authors. Let us also set aside his reliance on his own authority, without support from reason or Scripture, for this requirement. Even so, he would have to explain satisfactorily all passages that indirectly contradict the rest of Scripture. He would have to show that the language and context justify reading all such passages metaphorically. He would also have to show that Scripture has reached us without being altered. However, we will examine the matter at length.

Firstly, I ask what shall we do if reason prove recalcitrant? Shall we still be bound to affirm whatever Scripture affirms, and to deny whatever Scripture denies? Perhaps it will be answered that Scripture contains nothing repugnant to reason. But I insist that it expressly affirms and teaches that God is jealous (namely, in the decalogue itself, and in Exod. xxxiv:14, and in Deut. iv:24, and in many other places), and I assert that such a doctrine is repugnant to reason. It must, I suppose, in spite of all, be accepted as true. If there are any passages in Scripture which imply that God is not jealous, they must be taken metaphorically as meaning nothing of the kind. So, also, Scripture expressly states (Exod. xix:20, &c.) that God came down to Mount Sinai, and it attributes to Him other movements from place to place, nowhere directly stating that God does not so move. Wherefore, we must take the passage literally, and Solomon's words (I Kings viii:27), "But will God dwell on the earth? Behold the heavens and earth cannot contain thee," inasmuch as they do not expressly state that God does not move from place to place, but only imply it, must be explained away till they have no further semblance of denying locomotion to the Deity. So also we must believe that the sky is the habitation and throne of God, for Scripture expressly says so; and similarly many passages expressing the opinions of the prophets or the multitude, which reason and philosophy, but not Scripture, tell us to be false, must be taken as true if we are to follow the guidance of our author, for according to him, reason has nothing to do with the matter. Further, it is untrue that Scripture never contradicts itself directly, but only by implication. For Moses says, in so many words (Deut. iv:24), "The Lord thy God is a consuming fire," and elsewhere expressly denies that God has any likeness to visible things. (Deut. iv. 12.) If it be decided that the latter passage only contradicts the former by implication, and must be adapted thereto, lest it seem to negative it, let us grant that God is a fire; or rather, lest we should seem to have taken leave of our senses, let us pass the matter over and take another example.

First, I ask: what should we do if reason refuses to agree? Must we still affirm whatever Scripture affirms and deny whatever Scripture denies? Perhaps someone will answer that Scripture contains nothing contrary to reason. But I insist that Scripture explicitly affirms and teaches that God is jealous. It does so in the Ten Commandments themselves, in Exod. xxxiv:14, Deut. iv:24, and many other places. And I maintain that this doctrine is contrary to reason. Still, I suppose, we must accept the doctrine as true despite everything. If any passages in Scripture imply that God is not jealous, we must read those passages metaphorically. We must take them to mean nothing of the kind. Likewise, Scripture explicitly states (Exod. xix:20, and elsewhere) that God came down to Mount Sinai. Scripture also describes other movements of God from place to place, without ever directly saying that God does not move. Therefore, we must take the passage literally. Solomon's words (I Kings viii:27) must be treated differently: "But will God dwell on the earth? Behold the heavens and earth cannot contain thee,". These words do not explicitly state that God does not move from place to place. They only imply that he does not. So we must explain Solomon's words away until they no longer seem to deny that God moves from place to place. We must also believe that the sky is God's home and throne, because Scripture explicitly says so. The same applies to many passages expressing the opinions of the prophets or the general public. Reason and philosophy tell us these opinions are false, but Scripture does not. If we follow our author's guidance, we must accept these opinions as true. For according to him, reason has nothing to do with the matter. Furthermore, the claim that Scripture never contradicts itself directly, but only by implication, is untrue. For Moses says explicitly (Deut. iv:24), "The Lord thy God is a consuming fire,". Elsewhere, Moses explicitly denies that God resembles anything visible (Deut. iv. 12). Suppose we decide that the second passage contradicts the first only by implication. Suppose we must therefore interpret the second to fit the first, so that the second does not seem to contradict it. Then let us admit that God is a fire. Or rather, lest we seem to have lost our minds, let us pass over the matter and take another example.

Samuel expressly denies that God ever repents, "for he is not a man that he should repent" (I Sam. xv:29). Jeremiah, on the other hand, asserts that God does repent, both of the evil and of the good which He had intended to do (Jer. xviii:8-10). What? Are not these two texts directly contradictory? Which of the two, then, would our author want to explain metaphorically? Both statements are general, and each is the opposite of the other - what one flatly affirms, the other flatly, denies. So, by his own rule, he would be obliged at once to reject them as false, and to accept them as true.

Samuel explicitly denies that God ever changes his mind, "for he is not a man that he should repent" (I Sam. xv:29). Jeremiah, however, says that God does change his mind about both the harm and the good he intended to do (Jer. xviii:8-10). What? Aren't these two passages directly contradictory? Which passage, then, would our author want to interpret metaphorically? Both statements are general, and each says the opposite of the other. What one flatly affirms, the other flatly denies. So, by his own rule, he would have to reject both statements as false and accept both as true.

Again, what is the point of one passage, not being contradicted by another directly, but only by implication, if the implication is clear, and the nature and context of the passage preclude metaphorical interpretation? There are many such instances in the Bible, as we saw in Chap. II. (where we pointed out that the prophets held different and contradictory opinions), and also in Chaps. IX. and X., where we drew attention to the contradictions in the historical narratives. There is no need for me to go through them all again, for what I have said sufficiently exposes the absurdities which would follow from an opinion and rule such as we are discussing, and shows the hastiness of its propounder.

Again, what difference does it make if one passage contradicts another only by implication, rather than directly? What if the implication is clear, and the passage’s nature and context rule out a metaphorical reading? There are many such examples in the Bible, as we saw in Chapter II. (There we showed that the prophets held different and contradictory opinions.) We also noted contradictions in the historical accounts in Chapters IX and X. I do not need to go through all these examples again. What I have said sufficiently exposes the absurdities that would follow from the opinion and rule we are discussing. It also shows how hastily the person proposing them reached his conclusions.

We may, therefore, put this theory, as well as that of Maimonides, entirely out of court; and we may take it for indisputable that theology is not bound to serve reason, nor reason theology, but that each has her own domain.

We may therefore reject this theory entirely, along with the theory of Maimonides. And we may take it as indisputable that theology need not serve reason, nor reason theology. Instead, each has its own domain.

The sphere of reason is, as we have said, truth and wisdom; the sphere of theology, is piety and obedience. The power of reason does not extend so far as to determine for us that men may be blessed through simple obedience, without understanding. Theology, tells us nothing else, enjoins on us no command save obedience, and has neither the will nor the power to oppose reason: she defines the dogmas of faith (as we pointed out in the last chapter) only in so far as they may be necessary for obedience, and leaves reason to determine their precise truth: for reason is the light of the mind, and without her all things are dreams and phantoms.

As we have said, reason deals with truth and wisdom, while theology deals with piety and obedience. Reason cannot establish that people may be blessed through simple obedience, without understanding. Theology tells us nothing else and commands nothing but obedience. Theology neither seeks nor has the power to oppose reason. As we pointed out in the last chapter, theology defines doctrines of faith only as far as obedience requires. Theology leaves reason to determine the precise truth of these doctrines. For reason is the light of the mind, and without reason all things are dreams and phantoms.

By theology, I here mean, strictly speaking, revelation, in so far as it indicates the object aimed at by Scripture namely, the scheme and manner of obedience, or the true dogmas of piety and faith. This may truly be called the Word of God, which does not consist in a certain number of books (see Chap. XII.). Theology thus understood, if we regard its precepts or rules of life, will be found in accordance with reason; and, if we look to its aim and object, will be seen to be in nowise repugnant thereto, wherefore it is universal to all men.

By theology, I mean, strictly speaking, revelation insofar as revelation shows the purpose of Scripture. That purpose is to teach the principles and practice of obedience, or the true teachings of piety and faith. Theology in this sense may truly be called the Word of God. The Word of God does not consist of a fixed set of books (see Chapter XII.). If we consider theology’s commands or rules for living, we will find that they agree with reason. If we consider theology’s aim and purpose, we will see that they do not conflict with reason in any way. Theology therefore applies to everyone.

As for its bearing on Scripture, we have shown in Chap. VII. that the meaning of Scripture should be gathered from its own history, and not from the history of nature in general, which is the basis of philosophy.

As for its relevance to Scripture, we showed in Chapter VII that Scripture’s meaning should come from its own history. It should not come from the history of nature in general, which is the basis of philosophy.

We ought not to be hindered if we find that our investigation of the meaning of Scripture thus conducted shows us that it is here and there repugnant to reason; for whatever we may find of this sort in the Bible, which men may be in ignorance of, without injury to their charity, has, we may be sure, no bearing on theology or the Word of God, and may, therefore, without blame, be viewed by every one as he pleases.

We should not be discouraged if studying Scripture in this way reveals passages that conflict with reason. For people may be ignorant of such passages in the Bible without harming their love for others. If so, we can be sure those passages have no bearing on theology or the Word of God. Everyone may therefore view those passages as they please, without blame.

To sum up, we may draw the absolute conclusion that the Bible must not be accommodated to reason, nor reason to the Bible.

In short, we can draw a firm conclusion: the Bible must not be made to fit reason. Nor must reason be made to fit the Bible.

Now, inasmuch as the basis of theology - the doctrine that man may be saved by obedience alone - cannot be proved by reason whether it be true or false, we may be asked, Why, then, should we believe it? If we do so without the aid of reason, we accept it blindly, and act foolishly and injudiciously; if, on the other hand, we settle that it can be proved by reason, theology becomes a part of philosophy, and inseparable therefrom. But I make answer that I have absolutely established that this basis of theology cannot be investigated by the natural light of reason, or, at any rate, that no one ever has proved it by such means, and, therefore, revelation was necessary. We should, however, make use of our reason, in order to grasp with moral certainty what is revealed - I say, with moral certainty, for we cannot hope to attain greater certainty than the prophets: yet their certainty was only, moral, as I showed in Chap. II.

The basis of theology is the doctrine that people may be saved through obedience alone. Reason cannot prove whether this doctrine is true or false. So we may be asked: Why, then, should we believe it? If we believe it without the help of reason, we accept it blindly and act foolishly and without sound judgment. If, on the other hand, we decide that reason can prove the doctrine, theology becomes part of philosophy, inseparable from it. But my answer is that I have conclusively established that this foundation of theology cannot be investigated through natural reason. Or, at any rate, no one has ever proved it through reason, and therefore revelation was necessary. We should, however, use our reason to understand with moral certainty what is revealed. I say “with moral certainty” because we cannot hope for greater certainty than the prophets had. Yet their certainty was only moral, as I showed in Chapter II.

Those, therefore, who attempt to set forth the authority of Scripture with mathematical demonstrations are wholly in error: for the authority of the Bible is dependent on the authority of the prophets, and can be supported by no stronger arguments than those employed in old time by the prophets for convincing the people of their own authority. Our certainty on the same subject can be founded on no other basis than that which served as foundation for the certainty of the prophets.

Therefore, those who try to prove Scripture’s authority through mathematical demonstrations are completely mistaken. For the Bible’s authority depends on the authority of the prophets. No arguments supporting the Bible’s authority can be stronger than those the prophets once used to establish their own authority. The prophets used those arguments to convince the people. Our certainty about the Bible’s authority can rest only on the same foundation as the prophets’ certainty.

Now the certainty of the prophets consisted (as we pointed out) in these elements:-

As we pointed out, the prophets’ certainty was based on the following elements:

(I.) A distinct and vivid imagination.

(I.) A clear and vivid imagination.

(II.) A sign.

(II.) A sign.

(III.) Lastly, and chiefly, a mind turned to what is just and good. It was based on no other reasons than these, and consequently they cannot prove their authority by any other reasons, either to the multitude whom they addressed orally, nor to us whom they address in writing.

(III.) Finally, and most importantly, a mind focused on what is right and good. It rested on these reasons alone. So they cannot establish their authority on any other grounds, either for the crowds they addressed in person or for us, whom they address in writing.

The first of these reasons, namely, the vivid imagination, could be valid only for the prophets; therefore, our certainty concerning revelation must, and ought to be, based on the remaining two - namely, the sign and the teaching. Such is the express doctrine of Moses, for (in Deut. xviii.) he bids the people obey the prophet who should give a true sign in the name of the Lord, but if he should predict falsely, even though it were in the name of the Lord, he should be put to death, as should also he who strives to lead away the people from the true religion, though he confirm his authority with signs and portents. We may compare with the above Deut. xiii. Whence it follows that a true prophet could be distinguished from a false one, both by his doctrine and by the miracles he wrought, for Moses declares such an one to be a true prophet, and bids the people trust him without fear of deceit. He condemns as false, and worthy of death, those who predict anything falsely even in the name of the Lord, or who preach false gods, even though their miracles be real.

The first reason, a vivid imagination, could apply only to the prophets. Therefore, our certainty about revelation must, and ought to, rest on the other two reasons: the sign and the teaching. Moses explicitly teaches this. In Deuteronomy 18, he tells the people to obey a prophet who gives a true sign in the Lord’s name. But if a prophet makes a false prediction, even in the Lord’s name, he must be put to death. The same applies to anyone who tries to lead the people away from the true religion. This holds even if he supports his authority with signs and wonders. Compare this with Deuteronomy 13. It follows that a true prophet could be distinguished from a false prophet by both his teaching and his miracles. Moses declares a prophet who meets these standards to be true. He tells the people to trust such a prophet without fear of being deceived. He condemns as false and deserving death anyone who makes a false prediction, even in the Lord’s name. He passes the same judgment on anyone who preaches false gods, even though his miracles are real.

The only reason, then, which we have for belief in Scripture or the writings of the prophets, is the doctrine we find therein, and the signs by which it is confirmed. For as we see that the prophets extol charity and justice above all things, and have no other object, we conclude that they did not write from unworthy motives, but because they really thought that men might become blessed through obedience and faith: further, as we see that they confirmed their teaching with signs and wonders, we become persuaded that they did not speak at random, nor run riot in their prophecies. We are further strengthened in our conclusion by the fact that the morality they teach is in evident agreement with reason, for it is no accidental coincidence that the Word of God which we find in the prophets coincides with the Word of God written in our hearts. We may, I say, conclude this from the sacred books as certainly as did the Jews of old from the living voice of the prophets: for we showed in Chap. XII. that Scripture has come down to us intact in respect to its doctrine and main narratives.

Our only reason, then, for believing Scripture or the prophets’ writings is their teaching and the signs that confirm it. For we see that the prophets value charity and justice above all else and have no other aim. So we conclude that they did not write from unworthy motives. Rather, they truly believed that people could become blessed through obedience and faith. We also see that the prophets confirmed their teaching with signs and wonders. This persuades us that they did not speak carelessly or let their prophecies run wild. Our conclusion is further strengthened because the morality the prophets teach clearly agrees with reason. For the agreement between the Word of God in the prophets and the Word of God written in our hearts is no accident. We may, I say, draw this conclusion from the sacred books with the same certainty as the Jews of old. The Jews drew it from hearing the prophets speak. For we showed in Chapter XII that Scripture has reached us with its teaching and main narratives intact.

Therefore this whole basis of theology and Scripture, though it does not admit of mathematical proof, may yet be accepted with the approval of our judgment. It would be folly to refuse to accept what is confirmed by such ample prophetic testimony, and what has proved such a comfort to those whose reason is comparatively weak, and such a benefit to the state; a doctrine, moreover, which we may believe in without the slightest peril or hurt, and should reject simply because it cannot be mathematically proved: it is as though we should admit nothing as true, or as a wise rule of life, which could ever, in any possible way, be called in question; or as though most of our actions were not full of uncertainty and hazards.

Therefore, although this whole foundation of theology and Scripture cannot be proved mathematically, our judgment may still approve its acceptance. It would be foolish to reject a doctrine supported by such abundant prophetic testimony. The doctrine has brought such comfort to people whose powers of reasoning are comparatively weak, and such benefit to the state. Moreover, we may believe it without the slightest danger or harm. Rejecting this doctrine simply because it cannot be proved mathematically would be foolish. That would be like accepting nothing as true, or as a wise guide to life, if anyone could possibly question it. Or it would be as though most of our actions were not full of uncertainty and risk.

I admit that those who believe that theology and philosophy are mutually contradictory, and that therefore either one or the other must be thrust from its throne - I admit, I say, that such persons are not unreasonable in attempting to put theology on a firm basis, and to demonstrate its truth mathematically. Who, unless he were desperate or mad, would wish to bid an incontinent farewell to reason, or to despise the arts and sciences, or to deny reason's certitude? But, in the meanwhile, we cannot wholly absolve them from blame, inasmuch as they invoke the aid of reason for her own defeat, and attempt infallibly to prove her fallible. While they are trying to prove mathematically the authority and truth of theology, and to take away the authority of natural reason, they are in reality only bringing theology under reason's dominion, and proving that her authority has no weight unless natural reason be at the back of it.

I admit that some people believe theology and philosophy contradict each other, so one must lose its authority. I admit, then, that such people are not unreasonable to try to give theology a firm foundation. Nor are they unreasonable to try to prove its truth mathematically. Who, unless desperate or mad, would want to abandon reason recklessly, despise the arts and sciences, or deny reason’s certainty? But we cannot entirely excuse these people. They call on reason to defeat reason itself, and try to prove with absolute certainty that reason can be wrong. They try to prove theology’s authority and truth mathematically, while stripping natural reason of its authority. But in doing so, they actually place theology under reason’s rule. They prove that theology’s authority carries no weight unless natural reason supports it.

If they boast that they themselves assent because of the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit, and that they only invoke the aid of reason because of unbelievers, in order to convince them, not even so can this meet with our approval, for we can easily show that they have spoken either from emotion or vain-glory. It most clearly follows from the last chapter that the Holy Spirit only gives its testimony in favour of works, called by Paul (in Gal. v:22) the fruits of the Spirit, and is in itself really nothing but the mental acquiescence which follows a good action in our souls. No spirit gives testimony concerning the certitude of matters within the sphere of speculation, save only reason, who is mistress, as we have shown, of the whole realm of truth. If then they assert that they possess this Spirit which makes them certain of truth, they speak falsely, and according to the prejudices of the emotions, or else they are in great dread lest they should be vanquished by philosophers and exposed to public ridicule, and therefore they flee, as it were, to the altar; but their refuge is vain, for what altar will shelter a man who has outraged reason? However, I pass such persons over, for I think I have fulfilled my purpose, and shown how philosophy should be separated from theology, and wherein each consists; that neither should be subservient to the other, but that each should keep her unopposed dominion. Lastly, as occasion offered, I have pointed out the absurdities, the inconveniences, and the evils following from the extraordinary confusion which has hitherto prevailed between the two subjects, owing to their not being properly distinguished and separated. Before I go further I would expressly state (though I have said it before) that I consider the utility and the need for Holy Scripture or Revelation to be very great. For as we cannot perceive by the natural light of reason that simple obedience is the path of salvation²⁵, and are taught by revelation only that it is so by the special grace of God, which our reason cannot attain, it follows that the Bible has brought a very great consolation to mankind. All are able to obey, whereas there are but very few, compared with the aggregate of humanity, who can acquire the habit of virtue under the unaided guidance of reason. Thus if we had not the testimony of Scripture, we should doubt of the salvation of nearly all men.

Suppose they boast that they themselves believe because of the Holy Spirit’s inner testimony. Suppose they claim to use reason only to convince unbelievers. Even then, we cannot approve their position. We can easily show that they speak from emotion or vanity. The last chapter makes it very clear that the Holy Spirit testifies only in support of works. Paul calls these works the fruits of the Spirit (in Gal. v:22). The Holy Spirit itself is really nothing but the peace of mind that follows a good action in our souls. No spirit except reason testifies to the certainty of matters of speculation. As we have shown, reason rules the whole realm of truth. So if they claim to possess a Spirit that makes them certain of truth, they speak falsely, from emotional prejudices. Or else they greatly fear being defeated by philosophers and exposed to public ridicule. They therefore flee, as it were, to the altar. But their refuge is useless. What altar will shelter someone who has insulted reason? However, I will leave such people aside, since I think I have achieved my purpose. I have shown how philosophy should be separated from theology, and what each consists of. Neither should serve the other. Each should rule its own domain without interference. Finally, as opportunities arose, I pointed out the absurdities, difficulties, and evils caused by confusing the two subjects. This extraordinary confusion has prevailed until now because philosophy and theology have not been properly distinguished and separated. Before going further, I want to state explicitly something I have said before. I consider Holy Scripture, or Revelation, extremely useful and necessary. Through the natural light of reason, we cannot see that simple obedience is the path to salvation²⁵. Revelation alone teaches us that obedience leads to salvation through God’s special grace, which our reason cannot reach. It follows that the Bible has brought humanity very great comfort. Everyone can obey. But compared with humanity as a whole, very few can develop a habit of virtue through reason alone. So without the testimony of Scripture, we would doubt the salvation of nearly everyone.