Theaetetus

2h 7m

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus.

PEOPLE IN THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus.

Euclid and Terpsion meet in front of Euclid's house in Megara; they enter the house, and the dialogue is read to them by a servant.

Euclid and Terpsion meet outside Euclid's house in Megara. They go inside, and a servant reads the dialogue to them.

EUCLID: Have you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion?

EUCLID: Did you just arrive from the countryside, Terpsion?

TERPSION: No, I came some time ago: and I have been in the Agora looking for you, and wondering that I could not find you.

TERPSION: No, I arrived a while ago. I've been looking for you in the Agora and wondering why I couldn't find you.

EUCLID: But I was not in the city.

EUCLID: But I wasn't in the city.

TERPSION: Where then?

TERPSION: Where, then?

EUCLID: As I was going down to the harbour, I met Theaetetus—he was being carried up to Athens from the army at Corinth.

EUCLID: As I was going down to the harbor, I met Theaetetus. He was being carried to Athens from the army at Corinth.

TERPSION: Was he alive or dead?

TERPSION: Was he alive or dead?

EUCLID: He was scarcely alive, for he has been badly wounded; but he was suffering even more from the sickness which has broken out in the army.

EUCLID: He was barely alive because he had been badly wounded. But he was suffering even more from the sickness that had broken out in the army.

TERPSION: The dysentery, you mean?

TERPSION: You mean dysentery?

EUCLID: Yes.

EUCLID: Yes.

TERPSION: Alas! what a loss he will be!

TERPSION: Oh, what a loss he will be!

EUCLID: Yes, Terpsion, he is a noble fellow; only to-day I heard some people highly praising his behaviour in this very battle.

EUCLID: Yes, Terpsion, he is a noble man. Just today, I heard some people praising his conduct in this very battle.

TERPSION: No wonder; I should rather be surprised at hearing anything else of him. But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara?

TERPSION: No wonder. I would be surprised to hear anything else about him. But why did he go on instead of stopping at Megara?

EUCLID: He wanted to get home: although I entreated and advised him to remain, he would not listen to me; so I set him on his way, and turned back, and then I remembered what Socrates had said of him, and thought how remarkably this, like all his predictions, had been fulfilled. I believe that he had seen him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a youth, and he had a memorable conversation with him, which he repeated to me when I came to Athens; he was full of admiration of his genius, and said that he would most certainly be a great man, if he lived.

EUCLID: He wanted to get home. Although I urged him to stay, he would not listen. So I saw him on his way and turned back. Then I remembered what Socrates had said about him. I thought how remarkably this prediction, like all the others, had come true. I believe Socrates had seen Theaetetus shortly before his own death, when Theaetetus was a young man. They had a memorable conversation, which Socrates recounted to me when I came to Athens. He greatly admired Theaetetus’s genius and said he would certainly be a great man, if he lived.

TERPSION: The prophecy has certainly been fulfilled; but what was the conversation? can you tell me?

TERPSION: The prophecy certainly came true. But what was the conversation? Can you tell me?

EUCLID: No, indeed, not offhand; but I took notes of it as soon as I got home; these I filled up from memory, writing them out at leisure; and whenever I went to Athens, I asked Socrates about any point which I had forgotten, and on my return I made corrections; thus I have nearly the whole conversation written down.

EUCLID: No, certainly not from memory alone. But I took notes as soon as I got home. Later, I filled them out from memory and wrote them up at my leisure. Whenever I went to Athens, I asked Socrates about anything I had forgotten. Then I made corrections when I returned home. In this way, I have written down almost the whole conversation.

TERPSION: I remember—you told me; and I have always been intending to ask you to show me the writing, but have put off doing so; and now, why should we not read it through?—having just come from the country, I should greatly like to rest.

TERPSION: I remember, you told me. I’ve always meant to ask you to show me what you wrote, but I’ve kept putting it off. Why don’t we read it now? I’ve just come from the country, and I’d really like to rest.

EUCLID: I too shall be very glad of a rest, for I went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum. Let us go in, then, and, while we are reposing, the servant shall read to us.

EUCLID: I’ll be glad to rest too, because I walked with Theaetetus as far as Erineum. Let’s go inside. The servant can read to us while we rest.

TERPSION: Very good.

TERPSION: Very good.

EUCLID: Here is the roll, Terpsion; I may observe that I have introduced Socrates, not as narrating to me, but as actually conversing with the persons whom he mentioned—these were, Theodorus the geometrician (of Cyrene), and Theaetetus. I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the interlocutory words 'I said,' 'I remarked,' which he used when he spoke of himself, and again, 'he agreed,' or 'disagreed,' in the answer, lest the repetition of them should be troublesome.

EUCLID: Here is the scroll, Terpsion. I have presented Socrates as speaking directly with the people he mentioned, rather than telling me about the conversation. They were Theodorus the geometer (of Cyrene) and Theaetetus. For convenience, I have left out phrases like 'I said' and 'I remarked,' which Socrates used when referring to himself. I have also left out 'he agreed' and 'disagreed' in the replies, so that repeating them would not become tiresome.

TERPSION: Quite right, Euclid.

TERPSION: That's right, Euclid.

EUCLID: And now, boy, you may take the roll and read.

EUCLID: Now, boy, you may take the scroll and read.

EUCLID'S SERVANT READS.

EUCLID'S SERVANT READS.

SOCRATES: If I cared enough about the Cyrenians, Theodorus, I would ask you whether there are any rising geometricians or philosophers in that part of the world. But I am more interested in our own Athenian youth, and I would rather know who among them are likely to do well. I observe them as far as I can myself, and I enquire of any one whom they follow, and I see that a great many of them follow you, in which they are quite right, considering your eminence in geometry and in other ways. Tell me then, if you have met with any one who is good for anything.

SOCRATES: Theodorus, if I cared enough about the Cyrenians, I would ask whether any promising geometers or philosophers are emerging there. But I am more interested in our own young Athenians. I would rather know which of them are likely to do well. I watch them myself as much as I can, and I ask anyone they study with about them. I see that many of them study with you. They are quite right to do so, given your distinction in geometry and other fields. Tell me, then, have you met anyone with real promise?

THEODORUS: Yes, Socrates, I have become acquainted with one very remarkable Athenian youth, whom I commend to you as well worthy of your attention. If he had been a beauty I should have been afraid to praise him, lest you should suppose that I was in love with him; but he is no beauty, and you must not be offended if I say that he is very like you; for he has a snub nose and projecting eyes, although these features are less marked in him than in you. Seeing, then, that he has no personal attractions, I may freely say, that in all my acquaintance, which is very large, I never knew any one who was his equal in natural gifts: for he has a quickness of apprehension which is almost unrivalled, and he is exceedingly gentle, and also the most courageous of men; there is a union of qualities in him such as I have never seen in any other, and should scarcely have thought possible; for those who, like him, have quick and ready and retentive wits, have generally also quick tempers; they are ships without ballast, and go darting about, and are mad rather than courageous; and the steadier sort, when they have to face study, prove stupid and cannot remember. Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in the path of knowledge and enquiry; and he is full of gentleness, flowing on silently like a river of oil; at his age, it is wonderful.

THEODORUS: Yes, Socrates, I have met a remarkable young Athenian whom I recommend as well worth your attention. If he were handsome, I would be afraid to praise him. You might think I was in love with him. But he is not handsome, and you must not be offended when I say he looks very much like you. He has a snub nose and bulging eyes, though less so than you. Since he has no physical beauty, I can speak freely. Among all the many people I know, I have never met anyone with equal natural gifts. He grasps things almost faster than anyone else, and he is exceptionally gentle and also the most courageous of men. He combines qualities I have never seen together in anyone else, and would hardly have thought possible. People like him, who think quickly and remember easily, usually have quick tempers too. They are like ships without ballast, darting about, and they are mad rather than courageous. The steadier sort, when they have to study, prove dull and cannot remember. But he makes his way through learning and inquiry with steady, smooth success. He is full of gentleness, flowing silently like a river of oil. At his age, that is wonderful.

SOCRATES: That is good news; whose son is he?

SOCRATES: That’s good news. Whose son is he?

THEODORUS: The name of his father I have forgotten, but the youth himself is the middle one of those who are approaching us; he and his companions have been anointing themselves in the outer court, and now they seem to have finished, and are coming towards us. Look and see whether you know him.

THEODORUS: I have forgotten his father's name, but the young man is in the middle of the group approaching us. He and his companions have been anointing themselves in the outer court. Now they seem to have finished and are coming toward us. Look and see if you know him.

SOCRATES: I know the youth, but I do not know his name; he is the son of Euphronius the Sunian, who was himself an eminent man, and such another as his son is, according to your account of him; I believe that he left a considerable fortune.

SOCRATES: I know the young man, but I do not know his name. He is the son of Euphronius of Sunium, who was a distinguished man himself. From your account, his son is much like him. I believe Euphronius left a considerable fortune.

THEODORUS: Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name; but I rather think that the property disappeared in the hands of trustees; notwithstanding which he is wonderfully liberal.

THEODORUS: His name is Theaetetus, Socrates. But I rather think his property was lost while trustees were managing it. Even so, he is remarkably generous.

SOCRATES: He must be a fine fellow; tell him to come and sit by me.

SOCRATES: He must be a fine man. Tell him to come and sit next to me.

THEODORUS: I will. Come hither, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates.

THEODORUS: I will. Come here, Theaetetus, and sit beside Socrates.

SOCRATES: By all means, Theaetetus, in order that I may see the reflection of myself in your face, for Theodorus says that we are alike; and yet if each of us held in his hands a lyre, and he said that they were tuned alike, should we at once take his word, or should we ask whether he who said so was or was not a musician?

SOCRATES: Of course, Theaetetus. I want to see my own reflection in your face, since Theodorus says we look alike. But suppose we each held a lyre, and he said they were tuned alike. Would we take his word for it? Or would we ask whether he was a musician?

THEAETETUS: We should ask.

THEAETETUS: We should ask.

SOCRATES: And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if not, not?

SOCRATES: And if we found that he was, we would believe him. If not, we wouldn't?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: And if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?

SOCRATES: And if we care whether our faces look alike, we should ask whether the person who says they do is a painter, shouldn't we?

THEAETETUS: Certainly we should.

THEAETETUS: Of course we should.

SOCRATES: And is Theodorus a painter?

SOCRATES: And is Theodorus a painter?

THEAETETUS: I never heard that he was.

THEAETETUS: I never heard that he was.

SOCRATES: Is he a geometrician?

SOCRATES: Is he a mathematician who specializes in geometry?

THEAETETUS: Of course he is, Socrates.

THEAETETUS: Of course he is, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man?

SOCRATES: And is he an astronomer, a mathematician, a musician, and an educated man in general?

THEAETETUS: I think so.

THEAETETUS: I think so.

SOCRATES: If, then, he remarks on a similarity in our persons, either by way of praise or blame, there is no particular reason why we should attend to him.

SOCRATES: So if he comments on how alike we look, whether in praise or criticism, we have no particular reason to listen to him.

THEAETETUS: I should say not.

THEAETETUS: I don't think so.

SOCRATES: But if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the mental endowments of either of us, then he who hears the praises will naturally desire to examine him who is praised: and he again should be willing to exhibit himself.

SOCRATES: But suppose he praises the virtue or wisdom of either of us. Anyone who hears the praise will naturally want to examine the person praised. And that person should be willing to show what he is like.

THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates.

THEAETETUS: That's very true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for me to examine, and for you to exhibit; since although Theodorus has praised many a citizen and stranger in my hearing, never did I hear him praise any one as he has been praising you.

SOCRATES: Now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for me to examine you and for you to show what you can do. Theodorus has praised many citizens and foreigners in my hearing. But I have never heard him praise anyone as highly as he has praised you.

THEAETETUS: I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest?

THEAETETUS: I'm glad to hear that, Socrates, but what if he was only joking?

SOCRATES: Nay, Theodorus is not given to jesting; and I cannot allow you to retract your consent on any such pretence as that. If you do, he will have to swear to his words; and we are perfectly sure that no one will be found to impugn him. Do not be shy then, but stand to your word.

SOCRATES: No, Theodorus is not one to joke. I cannot let you withdraw your agreement on that excuse. If you do, he will have to swear that his words are true. And we are quite sure no one will challenge him. So don't be shy. Stand by your word.

THEAETETUS: I suppose I must, if you wish it.

THEAETETUS: I suppose I must, if you want me to.

SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry, perhaps?

SOCRATES: First, I'd like to ask what you're learning from Theodorus. Geometry, perhaps?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And astronomy and harmony and calculation?

SOCRATES: And what about astronomy, harmony, and calculation?

THEAETETUS: I do my best.

THEAETETUS: I do my best.

SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, and so do I; and my desire is to learn of him, or of anybody who seems to understand these things. And I get on pretty well in general; but there is a little difficulty which I want you and the company to aid me in investigating. Will you answer me a question: 'Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?'

SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, so do I. I want to learn from him or anyone else who seems to understand these things. I generally do pretty well. But there is one small difficulty I want you and the others to help me investigate. Will you answer a question: 'Isn't learning becoming wiser about what you are learning?'

THEAETETUS: Of course.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And by wisdom the wise are wise?

SOCRATES: And wise people are wise because of wisdom?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And is that different in any way from knowledge?

SOCRATES: And is that any different from knowledge?

THEAETETUS: What?

THEAETETUS: What?

SOCRATES: Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know?

SOCRATES: Wisdom. Aren't people wise in what they know?

THEAETETUS: Certainly they are.

THEAETETUS: Yes, they are.

SOCRATES: Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?

SOCRATES: So wisdom and knowledge are the same?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction—What is knowledge? Can we answer that question? What say you? which of us will speak first? whoever misses shall sit down, as at a game of ball, and shall be donkey, as the boys say; he who lasts out his competitors in the game without missing, shall be our king, and shall have the right of putting to us any questions which he pleases...Why is there no reply? I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation? I only want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable.

SOCRATES: Here is a problem I can never solve to my satisfaction: What is knowledge? Can we answer that question? What do you say? Which of us will speak first? Whoever gets it wrong must sit down and be the donkey, as the boys say in a game of ball. Whoever outlasts the others without getting it wrong will be our king. The winner may ask us any questions they please... Why is no one answering? Theodorus, I hope my love of conversation has not led me to be rude. I only want us to talk and be friendly and sociable.

THEODORUS: The reverse of rudeness, Socrates: but I would rather that you would ask one of the young fellows; for the truth is, that I am unused to your game of question and answer, and I am too old to learn; the young will be more suitable, and they will improve more than I shall, for youth is always able to improve. And so having made a beginning with Theaetetus, I would advise you to go on with him and not let him off.

THEODORUS: Not rude at all, Socrates. But I would rather you ask one of the young men. The truth is, I’m not used to your game of questions and answers, and I’m too old to learn. The young men would be better suited to it, and they would improve more than I would. Young people can always improve. So, since you’ve started with Theaetetus, I advise you to continue with him and not let him off.

SOCRATES: Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says? The philosopher, whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word ought to be a command to a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say what you think that knowledge is.

SOCRATES: Do you hear what Theodorus says, Theaetetus? He is a philosopher you would not want to disobey. A young man should treat his word as a command. He tells me to question you. So take courage and tell us boldly what you think knowledge is.

THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me; and if I make a mistake, you will doubtless correct me.

THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, I’ll answer as you and he ask. If I make a mistake, you’ll no doubt correct me.

SOCRATES: We will, if we can.

SOCRATES: We will, if we can.

THEAETETUS: Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus—geometry, and those which you just now mentioned—are knowledge; and I would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen; these, each and all of, them, are knowledge.

THEAETETUS: Then I think the subjects I learn from Theodorus are knowledge. These include geometry and the others you just mentioned. I would also include the skills of cobblers and other craftspeople. Each and every one of these is knowledge.

SOCRATES: Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberality of your nature make you give many and diverse things, when I am asking for one simple thing.

SOCRATES: Too much, Theaetetus, too much. Your noble and generous nature leads you to give many different things when I ask for one simple thing.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates?

THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes?

SOCRATES: Perhaps nothing. But I will try to explain what I think I mean. When you speak of cobbling, do you mean the art or science of making shoes?

THEAETETUS: Just so.

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements?

SOCRATES: And when you say carpentry, do you mean the art of making wooden tools?

THEAETETUS: I do.

THEAETETUS: I do.

SOCRATES: In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two arts?

SOCRATES: In both cases, are you defining what each of the two arts deals with?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: But that, Theaetetus, was not the point of my question: we wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right?

SOCRATES: But Theaetetus, that was not what I was asking. We did not want to know the subjects or the number of arts and sciences. We were not going to count them. We wanted to know the nature of knowledge itself. Am I right?

THEAETETUS: Perfectly right.

THEAETETUS: Exactly right.

SOCRATES: Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing—for example, What is clay? and we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not the answer be ridiculous?

SOCRATES: Let me give an example. Suppose someone asked about something very simple and obvious, such as, What is clay? And suppose we answered that there is clay for potters, clay for oven-makers, and clay for brick-makers. Wouldn't that answer be ridiculous?

THEAETETUS: Truly.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that he who asked the question would understand from our answer the nature of 'clay,' merely because we added 'of the image-makers,' or of any other workers. How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it?

SOCRATES: First, it would be absurd to assume that our answer would tell the questioner what 'clay' is. Merely adding 'of the image-makers,' or of any other workers, would not explain it. How can someone understand the name of anything without knowing what it is?

THEAETETUS: He cannot.

THEAETETUS: He can't.

SOCRATES: Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?

SOCRATES: Then someone who doesn't know what science or knowledge is doesn't know the art or science of making shoes?

THEAETETUS: None.

THEAETETUS: None.

SOCRATES: Nor of any other science?

SOCRATES: Or any other science?

THEAETETUS: No.

THEAETETUS: No.

SOCRATES: And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous; for the question is, 'What is knowledge?' and he replies, 'A knowledge of this or that.'

SOCRATES: When someone asks what science or knowledge is, it is ridiculous to answer by naming an art or science. The question is, 'What is knowledge?' But the answer is, 'Knowledge of this or that.'

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay, he might have said simply, that clay is moistened earth—what sort of clay is not to the point.

SOCRATES: Moreover, he could answer briefly and simply, but he takes a long way around. For example, when asked about clay, he could have simply said that clay is wet earth. What kind of clay it is doesn't matter.

THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, there is no difficulty as you put the question. You mean, if I am not mistaken, something like what occurred to me and to my friend here, your namesake Socrates, in a recent discussion.

THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, there is no difficulty when you put the question that way. If I understand you, you mean something like what happened in a recent discussion. It happened to me and my friend here, who is also named Socrates.

SOCRATES: What was that, Theaetetus?

SOCRATES: What was that, Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: Theodorus was writing out for us something about roots, such as the roots of three or five, showing that they are incommensurable by the unit: he selected other examples up to seventeen—there he stopped. Now as there are innumerable roots, the notion occurred to us of attempting to include them all under one name or class.

THEAETETUS: Theodorus was showing us how to work out roots, such as the square roots of three and five. He showed that they are incommensurable with the unit. He chose other examples up to seventeen, where he stopped. Since there are countless roots, we thought we would try to put them all under one name or class.

SOCRATES: And did you find such a class?

SOCRATES: And did you find such a class?

THEAETETUS: I think that we did; but I should like to have your opinion.

THEAETETUS: I think we did, but I'd like to hear your opinion.

SOCRATES: Let me hear.

SOCRATES: Let's hear it.

THEAETETUS: We divided all numbers into two classes: those which are made up of equal factors multiplying into one another, which we compared to square figures and called square or equilateral numbers;—that was one class.

THEAETETUS: We divided all numbers into two classes. One class consists of numbers made by multiplying equal factors. We compared these to square shapes and called them square or equilateral numbers.

SOCRATES: Very good.

SOCRATES: Very good.

THEAETETUS: The intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every other number which is made up of unequal factors, either of a greater multiplied by a less, or of a less multiplied by a greater, and when regarded as a figure, is contained in unequal sides;—all these we compared to oblong figures, and called them oblong numbers.

THEAETETUS: The numbers in between include three, five, and every other number made up of unequal factors. The greater factor may be multiplied by the lesser, or the lesser by the greater. When represented as figures, these numbers have unequal sides. We compared them all to oblong figures and called them oblong numbers.

SOCRATES: Capital; and what followed?

SOCRATES: Excellent. What happened next?

THEAETETUS: The lines, or sides, which have for their squares the equilateral plane numbers, were called by us lengths or magnitudes; and the lines which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the oblong numbers, were called powers or roots; the reason of this latter name being, that they are commensurable with the former [i.e., with the so-called lengths or magnitudes] not in linear measurement, but in the value of the superficial content of their squares; and the same about solids.

THEAETETUS: We called lines, or sides, whose squares are equilateral plane numbers lengths or magnitudes. We called lines whose squares equal oblong numbers powers or roots. We gave them this name because they are commensurable with lengths not in linear measurement, but in the areas of their squares. The same applies to solids.

SOCRATES: Excellent, my boys; I think that you fully justify the praises of Theodorus, and that he will not be found guilty of false witness.

SOCRATES: Excellent, boys. I think you fully deserve Theodorus's praise, and that he will not be found guilty of giving false testimony.

THEAETETUS: But I am unable, Socrates, to give you a similar answer about knowledge, which is what you appear to want; and therefore Theodorus is a deceiver after all.

THEAETETUS: But I can't give you a similar answer about knowledge, Socrates, which seems to be what you want. So Theodorus is a deceiver after all.

SOCRATES: Well, but if some one were to praise you for running, and to say that he never met your equal among boys, and afterwards you were beaten in a race by a grown-up man, who was a great runner—would the praise be any the less true?

SOCRATES: But suppose someone praised your running and said they had never met a boy who could match you. Later, a grown man who was a great runner beat you in a race. Would that make the praise any less true?

THEAETETUS: Certainly not.

THEAETETUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a matter, as just now said? Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way?

SOCRATES: And is discovering the nature of knowledge such a small matter, as was just said? Wouldn't it challenge the abilities of men who are perfect in every way?

THEAETETUS: By heaven, they should be the top of all perfection!

THEAETETUS: By heaven, they should be the height of perfection!

SOCRATES: Well, then, be of good cheer; do not say that Theodorus was mistaken about you, but do your best to ascertain the true nature of knowledge, as well as of other things.

SOCRATES: Well, then, take heart. Do not say that Theodorus was mistaken about you. Instead, do your best to discover the true nature of knowledge and other things.

THEAETETUS: I am eager enough, Socrates, if that would bring to light the truth.

THEAETETUS: I'm eager enough, Socrates, if that would reveal the truth.

SOCRATES: Come, you made a good beginning just now; let your own answer about roots be your model, and as you comprehended them all in one class, try and bring the many sorts of knowledge under one definition.

SOCRATES: Come, you made a good start just now. Use your own answer about roots as a model. Just as you brought all roots together in one class, try to bring the many kinds of knowledge under one definition.

THEAETETUS: I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very often, when the report of questions asked by you was brought to me; but I can neither persuade myself that I have a satisfactory answer to give, nor hear of any one who answers as you would have him; and I cannot shake off a feeling of anxiety.

THEAETETUS: I assure you, Socrates, I have often tried when I heard about questions you had asked. But I cannot convince myself that I have a satisfactory answer. Nor have I heard of anyone who answers as you would want. And I cannot shake off my anxiety.

SOCRATES: These are the pangs of labour, my dear Theaetetus; you have something within you which you are bringing to the birth.

SOCRATES: These are labor pains, my dear Theaetetus. You have something inside you that you are bringing into the world.

THEAETETUS: I do not know, Socrates; I only say what I feel.

THEAETETUS: I don't know, Socrates. I'm only saying what I feel.

SOCRATES: And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete?

SOCRATES: Haven't you heard, you fool, that I am the son of a midwife? Her name was Phaenarete, and she was brave and strong.

THEAETETUS: Yes, I have.

THEAETETUS: Yes, I have.

SOCRATES: And that I myself practise midwifery?

SOCRATES: And that I practice midwifery myself?

THEAETETUS: No, never.

THEAETETUS: No, never.

SOCRATES: Let me tell you that I do though, my friend: but you must not reveal the secret, as the world in general have not found me out; and therefore they only say of me, that I am the strangest of mortals and drive men to their wits' end. Did you ever hear that too?

SOCRATES: Let me tell you, my friend, that I do. But you must keep it a secret, because most people have not figured me out. So they just say that I am the strangest person alive and drive people to their wits' end. Have you heard that too?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Shall I tell you the reason?

SOCRATES: Should I tell you why?

THEAETETUS: By all means.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Bear in mind the whole business of the midwives, and then you will see my meaning better:—No woman, as you are probably aware, who is still able to conceive and bear, attends other women, but only those who are past bearing.

SOCRATES: Think about the whole practice of midwifery, and you will better understand what I mean. As you probably know, women who can still conceive and give birth do not attend other women in childbirth. Only women who are past childbearing do.

THEAETETUS: Yes, I know.

THEAETETUS: Yes, I know.

SOCRATES: The reason of this is said to be that Artemis—the goddess of childbirth—is not a mother, and she honours those who are like herself; but she could not allow the barren to be midwives, because human nature cannot know the mystery of an art without experience; and therefore she assigned this office to those who are too old to bear.

SOCRATES: The reason, they say, is that Artemis, the goddess of childbirth, is not a mother. She honors those who are like her. But she could not allow women who cannot bear children to be midwives. That is because people cannot understand the mysteries of an art without experience. So she gave this duty to women who are too old to bear children.

THEAETETUS: I dare say.

THEAETETUS: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not?

SOCRATES: And I would also say, or rather I am absolutely certain, that midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who isn't?

THEAETETUS: Very true.

THEAETETUS: That's very true.

SOCRATES: And by the use of potions and incantations they are able to arouse the pangs and to soothe them at will; they can make those bear who have a difficulty in bearing, and if they think fit they can smother the embryo in the womb.

SOCRATES: And with potions and spells, they can bring on labor pains or ease them whenever they wish. They can help women who have difficulty giving birth. If they think it best, they can also kill the embryo in the womb.

THEAETETUS: They can.

THEAETETUS: They can.

SOCRATES: Did you ever remark that they are also most cunning matchmakers, and have a thorough knowledge of what unions are likely to produce a brave brood?

SOCRATES: Have you noticed that they are also very clever matchmakers? They know exactly which pairings are likely to produce brave offspring.

THEAETETUS: No, never.

THEAETETUS: No, never.

SOCRATES: Then let me tell you that this is their greatest pride, more than cutting the umbilical cord. And if you reflect, you will see that the same art which cultivates and gathers in the fruits of the earth, will be most likely to know in what soils the several plants or seeds should be deposited.

SOCRATES: Let me tell you that they take greater pride in this than in cutting the umbilical cord. And if you think about it, you will see that the art of growing and harvesting crops is also most likely to know which soils are best for different plants or seeds.

THEAETETUS: Yes, the same art.

THEAETETUS: Yes, the same art.

SOCRATES: And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise?

SOCRATES: And do you think it is different for women?

THEAETETUS: I should think not.

THEAETETUS: I don't think so.

SOCRATES: Certainly not; but midwives are respectable women who have a character to lose, and they avoid this department of their profession, because they are afraid of being called procuresses, which is a name given to those who join together man and woman in an unlawful and unscientific way; and yet the true midwife is also the true and only matchmaker.

SOCRATES: Certainly not. But midwives are respectable women with reputations to protect. They avoid matchmaking because they fear being called procuresses. That is the name given to women who bring men and women together unlawfully and without expert knowledge. Yet a true midwife is also the only true matchmaker.

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Such are the midwives, whose task is a very important one, but not so important as mine; for women do not bring into the world at one time real children, and at another time counterfeits which are with difficulty distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery—you would think so?

SOCRATES: Midwives have a very important job, but it is not as important as mine. Women do not sometimes give birth to real children and sometimes to fakes that are hard to tell apart. If they did, the greatest achievement of midwifery would be telling real children from fakes. Wouldn't you agree?

THEAETETUS: Indeed I should.

THEAETETUS: Yes, I certainly would.

SOCRATES: Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but differs, in that I attend men and not women; and look after their souls when they are in labour, and not after their bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And like the midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself, is very just—the reason is, that the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my own soul, but those who converse with me profit. Some of them appear dull enough at first, but afterwards, as our acquaintance ripens, if the god is gracious to them, they all make astonishing progress; and this in the opinion of others as well as in their own. It is quite clear that they never learned anything from me; the many fine discoveries to which they cling are of their own making. But to me and the god they owe their delivery. And the proof of my words is, that many of them in their ignorance, either in their self-conceit despising me, or falling under the influence of others, have gone away too soon; and have not only lost the children of whom I had previously delivered them by an ill bringing up, but have stifled whatever else they had in them by evil communications, being fonder of lies and shams than of the truth; and they have at last ended by seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, is one of them, and there are many others. The truants often return to me, and beg that I would consort with them again—they are ready to go to me on their knees—and then, if my familiar allows, which is not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. Dire are the pangs which my art is able to arouse and to allay in those who consort with me, just like the pangs of women in childbirth; night and day they are full of perplexity and travail which is even worse than that of the women. So much for them. And there are others, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently having nothing in them; and as I know that they have no need of my art, I coax them into marrying some one, and by the grace of God I can generally tell who is likely to do them good. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus, and many to other inspired sages. I tell you this long story, friend Theaetetus, because I suspect, as indeed you seem to think yourself, that you are in labour—great with some conception. Come then to me, who am a midwife's son and myself a midwife, and do your best to answer the questions which I will ask you. And if I abstract and expose your first-born, because I discover upon inspection that the conception which you have formed is a vain shadow, do not quarrel with me on that account, as the manner of women is when their first children are taken from them. For I have actually known some who were ready to bite me when I deprived them of a darling folly; they did not perceive that I acted from goodwill, not knowing that no god is the enemy of man—that was not within the range of their ideas; neither am I their enemy in all this, but it would be wrong for me to admit falsehood, or to stifle the truth. Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question, 'What is knowledge?'—and do not say that you cannot tell; but quit yourself like a man, and by the help of God you will be able to tell.

SOCRATES: Well, my art of midwifery is much like theirs in most respects. But it differs because I attend men, not women. I look after their souls in labor, not their bodies. The great achievement of my art is to examine thoroughly what a young man's mind brings forth. I determine whether it is a false image or a noble and true birth. And like the midwives, I am barren. People often reproach me for questioning others without having the wit to answer questions myself. That reproach is quite fair. The reason is that the god compels me to be a midwife, but does not allow me to give birth. So I am not wise at all myself. I have nothing to show that my own soul has invented or brought forth. But those who talk with me benefit. Some seem quite dull at first. Later, as our acquaintance grows, they all make astonishing progress, if the god is gracious to them. They think so themselves, and others agree. It is quite clear that they never learned anything from me. The many fine discoveries they hold dear are their own. But they owe their delivery to me and the god. Here is the proof. Many of them have left me too soon out of ignorance. Some were so conceited that they looked down on me. Others fell under the influence of others. They not only ruined the children I had already delivered by raising them badly. They also stifled whatever else was in them through bad company. They preferred lies and false appearances to the truth. In the end, they came to see themselves as others saw them, as great fools. Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, is one of them, and there are many others. These runaways often come back and beg me to spend time with them again. They are ready to get down on their knees. Then, if my familiar allows it, which is not always the case, I take them back. And they begin to grow again. My art can arouse and ease terrible pains in those who spend time with me. Their pains are just like those of women in childbirth. Night and day, they are full of confusion and labor pains even worse than the women's. So much for them. There are others, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently having nothing in them. I know they have no need of my art, so I persuade them to marry someone. By the grace of God, I can usually tell who is likely to do them good. I have given many of them away to Prodicus, and many to other inspired sages. I tell you this long story, friend Theaetetus, because I suspect that you are in labor. You seem to think so yourself. I suspect that you are full of some idea. So come to me, a midwife's son and a midwife myself. Do your best to answer the questions I ask you. I may take away your firstborn and expose it. I may find, on examining it, that the idea you have formed is an empty shadow. If so, do not quarrel with me on that account. Women do that when their first children are taken from them. In fact, I have known some people who were ready to bite me when I took away a cherished folly. They did not see that I acted out of goodwill. They did not know that no god is an enemy of human beings. That idea was beyond them. Nor am I their enemy in any of this. But it would be wrong for me to accept falsehood or stifle the truth. So, once again, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question, 'What is knowledge?' Do not say that you cannot tell me. Act like a man, and with God's help you will be able to tell me.

THEAETETUS: At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be ashamed of not trying to do my best. Now he who knows perceives what he knows, and, as far as I can see at present, knowledge is perception.

THEAETETUS: In any case, Socrates, after such encouragement, I would be ashamed not to try my best. Someone who knows something perceives what they know. As far as I can see for now, knowledge is perception.

SOCRATES: Bravely said, boy; that is the way in which you should express your opinion. And now, let us examine together this conception of yours, and see whether it is a true birth or a mere wind-egg:—You say that knowledge is perception?

SOCRATES: Well said, boy. That's how you should express your opinion. Now let's examine your idea together. Let's see whether it is a real birth or just an empty egg. You say that knowledge is perception?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing it. Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not:—You have read him?

SOCRATES: Well, you have stated a very important theory about knowledge. It is indeed Protagoras's view, though he expresses it differently. He says that man is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that exist and the nonexistence of things that do not. Have you read him?

THEAETETUS: O yes, again and again.

THEAETETUS: Oh yes, again and again.

SOCRATES: Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?

SOCRATES: Doesn't he say that things are to you as they appear to you, and to me as they appear to me? And that you and I are men?

THEAETETUS: Yes, he says so.

THEAETETUS: Yes, he says so.

SOCRATES: A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to understand him: the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold?

SOCRATES: A wise man is unlikely to talk nonsense. Let's try to understand him. The same wind is blowing, yet one of us may feel cold and the other may not. Or one of us may feel slightly cold and the other very cold?

THEAETETUS: Quite true.

THEAETETUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?

SOCRATES: Is the wind cold in itself, apart from how we feel it, or not? Or should we agree with Protagoras? He says the wind is cold to someone who feels cold, but not to someone who does not.

THEAETETUS: I suppose the last.

THEAETETUS: I suppose the last one.

SOCRATES: Then it must appear so to each of them?

SOCRATES: Then it must seem that way to each of them?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he perceives.'

SOCRATES: And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he perceives.'

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Then appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them?

SOCRATES: Then appearance and perception agree when it comes to hot and cold, and in similar cases. For things appear to each person as they perceive them, or may be assumed to be that way?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?

SOCRATES: Then perception is always of what exists, and since it is the same as knowledge, it cannot be wrong?

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: In the name of the Graces, what an almighty wise man Protagoras must have been! He spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but told the truth, 'his Truth,' (In allusion to a book of Protagoras' which bore this title.) in secret to his own disciples.

SOCRATES: By the Graces, Protagoras must have been incredibly wise! He spoke in parables to ordinary people like you and me. But he told the truth, 'his Truth,' in secret to his own disciples. (This refers to a book by Protagoras with that title.)

THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates?

THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: I am about to speak of a high argument, in which all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light—there is no single thing or quality, but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which 'becoming' is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming. Summon all philosophers—Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after another, and with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in this. Summon the great masters of either kind of poetry—Epicharmus, the prince of Comedy, and Homer of Tragedy; when the latter sings of

SOCRATES: I am about to discuss a profound argument that says everything is relative. You cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, heavy or light. For what is great will be small, and what is heavy will be light. There is no single thing or quality. Instead, all things arise from motion, change, and mixture, and become what they are in relation to one another. We incorrectly call this “being,” but it is really becoming. Nothing ever is, but everything is becoming. Call on all the philosophers, one after another: Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest. With the exception of Parmenides, they will agree with you on this. Call on the great masters of both kinds of poetry: Epicharmus, the prince of Comedy, and Homer, the prince of Tragedy. When Homer sings of

'Ocean whence sprang the gods, and mother Tethys,'

'Ocean, from whom the gods were born, and mother Tethys,'

does he not mean that all things are the offspring, of flux and motion?

Doesn't he mean that all things come from change and motion?

THEAETETUS: I think so.

THEAETETUS: I think so.

SOCRATES: And who could take up arms against such a great army having Homer for its general, and not appear ridiculous? (Compare Cratylus.)

SOCRATES: And who could fight such a great army, with Homer as its general, without looking ridiculous? (Compare Cratylus.)

THEAETETUS: Who indeed, Socrates?

THEAETETUS: Who, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Yes, Theaetetus; and there are plenty of other proofs which will show that motion is the source of what is called being and becoming, and inactivity of not-being and destruction; for fire and warmth, which are supposed to be the parent and guardian of all other things, are born of movement and of friction, which is a kind of motion;—is not this the origin of fire?

SOCRATES: Yes, Theaetetus. There are plenty of other proofs that motion is the source of what we call being and becoming. They also show that inactivity is the source of nonbeing and destruction. For fire and warmth are thought to be the parent and guardian of all other things. They arise from movement and friction, which is a kind of motion. Isn’t that how fire begins?

THEAETETUS: It is.

THEAETETUS: It is.

SOCRATES: And the race of animals is generated in the same way?

SOCRATES: And are animals produced in the same way?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but preserved for a long time by motion and exercise?

SOCRATES: And doesn't the body grow weaker with rest and inactivity, but stay healthy for a long time through movement and exercise?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: And what of the mental habit? Is not the soul informed, and improved, and preserved by study and attention, which are motions; but when at rest, which in the soul only means want of attention and study, is uninformed, and speedily forgets whatever she has learned?

SOCRATES: And what about the mind? Isn't the soul informed, improved, and preserved by study and attention, which are forms of motion? But when the soul is at rest, it lacks knowledge and quickly forgets whatever it has learned. For the soul, rest simply means a lack of attention and study.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as to the body?

SOCRATES: So motion is good and rest is bad for both the soul and the body?

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: I may add, that breathless calm, stillness and the like waste and impair, while wind and storm preserve; and the palmary argument of all, which I strongly urge, is the golden chain in Homer, by which he means the sun, thereby indicating that so long as the sun and the heavens go round in their orbits, all things human and divine are and are preserved, but if they were chained up and their motions ceased, then all things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is, turned upside down.

SOCRATES: I may add that windless calm, stillness, and the like wear things down and damage them, while wind and storm preserve them. The strongest argument of all, which I strongly urge, is Homer's golden chain. By the chain, Homer means the sun. He is showing that as long as the sun and the heavens move in their orbits, all things human and divine exist and are preserved. But if they were chained up and stopped moving, all things would be destroyed and, as the saying goes, turned upside down.

THEAETETUS: I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained his meaning.

THEAETETUS: I believe you have explained his meaning correctly, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then now apply his doctrine to perception, my good friend, and first of all to vision; that which you call white colour is not in your eyes, and is not a distinct thing which exists out of them. And you must not assign any place to it: for if it had position it would be, and be at rest, and there would be no process of becoming.

SOCRATES: Now apply his theory to perception, my friend, starting with vision. What you call white is not in your eyes. Nor is it a separate thing that exists outside them. And you must not assign it a place. For if it had a position, it would exist and be at rest. There would be no process of becoming.

THEAETETUS: Then what is colour?

THEAETETUS: Then what is color?

SOCRATES: Let us carry the principle which has just been affirmed, that nothing is self-existent, and then we shall see that white, black, and every other colour, arises out of the eye meeting the appropriate motion, and that what we call a colour is in each case neither the active nor the passive element, but something which passes between them, and is peculiar to each percipient; are you quite certain that the several colours appear to a dog or to any animal whatever as they appear to you?

SOCRATES: Let us apply the principle we have just affirmed, that nothing exists by itself. Then we shall see that white, black, and every other color arise when the eye meets the appropriate motion. What we call a color is neither the active nor the passive element. Instead, it passes between them and is unique to each observer. Are you quite certain that colors appear to a dog or any other animal as they appear to you?

THEAETETUS: Far from it.

THEAETETUS: Not at all.

SOCRATES: Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? Are you so profoundly convinced of this? Rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the same?

SOCRATES: Or that anything appears the same to you as it does to someone else? Are you really so sure of that? In fact, doesn't it never appear exactly the same even to you, because you are never exactly the same?

THEAETETUS: The latter.

THEAETETUS: The second one.

SOCRATES: And if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I apprehend by touch, were great or white or hot, it could not become different by mere contact with another unless it actually changed; nor again, if the comparing or apprehending subject were great or white or hot, could this, when unchanged from within, become changed by any approximation or affection of any other thing. The fact is that in our ordinary way of speaking we allow ourselves to be driven into most ridiculous and wonderful contradictions, as Protagoras and all who take his line of argument would remark.

SOCRATES: Suppose something I compare my size with or perceive by touch is large, white, or hot. It could not become different merely through contact with something else, unless it actually changed. Likewise, suppose the person comparing or perceiving it is large, white, or hot. If that person remained unchanged internally, they could not change merely because something else approached or affected them. The fact is that our ordinary way of speaking leads us into utterly ridiculous and astonishing contradictions. Protagoras and everyone who follows his argument would point this out.

THEAETETUS: How? and of what sort do you mean?

THEAETETUS: How? And what kind do you mean?

SOCRATES: A little instance will sufficiently explain my meaning: Here are six dice, which are more by a half when compared with four, and fewer by a half than twelve—they are more and also fewer. How can you or any one maintain the contrary?

SOCRATES: A simple example will explain what I mean. Here are six dice. Six is half again as many as four, and half as many as twelve. Six is both more and fewer. How can you or anyone else say otherwise?

THEAETETUS: Very true.

THEAETETUS: Very true.

SOCRATES: Well, then, suppose that Protagoras or some one asks whether anything can become greater or more if not by increasing, how would you answer him, Theaetetus?

SOCRATES: Suppose Protagoras or someone else asks whether anything can become greater or more without increasing. How would you answer, Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: I should say 'No,' Socrates, if I were to speak my mind in reference to this last question, and if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer.

THEAETETUS: I would say 'No,' Socrates, if I spoke my mind about your last question. But I am afraid of contradicting my earlier answer.

SOCRATES: Capital! excellent! spoken like an oracle, my boy! And if you reply 'Yes,' there will be a case for Euripides; for our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind. (In allusion to the well-known line of Euripides, Hippol.: e gloss omomoch e de thren anomotos.)

SOCRATES: Wonderful! Excellent! You speak like an oracle, my boy! And if you answer 'Yes,' you will prove Euripides right. Our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind. (This refers to the well-known line in Euripides' Hippol.: e gloss omomoch e de thren anomotos.)

THEAETETUS: Very true.

THEAETETUS: That's very true.

SOCRATES: The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known about the mind, and argue only out of the superfluity of their wits, would have had a regular sparring-match over this, and would have knocked their arguments together finely. But you and I, who have no professional aims, only desire to see what is the mutual relation of these principles,—whether they are consistent with each or not.

SOCRATES: The true Sophists know all there is to know about the mind. They argue just because they have more wit than they need. They would have had a proper sparring match over this and made their arguments clash splendidly. But you and I have no professional aims. We only want to see how these principles relate to each other, and whether they are consistent or not.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that would be my desire.

THEAETETUS: Yes, I would like that.

SOCRATES: And mine too. But since this is our feeling, and there is plenty of time, why should we not calmly and patiently review our own thoughts, and thoroughly examine and see what these appearances in us really are? If I am not mistaken, they will be described by us as follows:—first, that nothing can become greater or less, either in number or magnitude, while remaining equal to itself—you would agree?

SOCRATES: I feel the same way. But since we both feel this way and have plenty of time, why not calmly and patiently review our thoughts? We can examine them carefully and see what these impressions within us really are. If I’m not mistaken, we will describe them as follows. First, nothing can become greater or less in number or size while remaining equal to itself. Would you agree?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Secondly, that without addition or subtraction there is no increase or diminution of anything, but only equality.

SOCRATES: Second, without adding or subtracting anything, nothing increases or decreases. It stays the same.

THEAETETUS: Quite true.

THEAETETUS: That's true.

SOCRATES: Thirdly, that what was not before cannot be afterwards, without becoming and having become.

SOCRATES: Third, something that did not exist before cannot exist later without becoming and having become.

THEAETETUS: Yes, truly.

THEAETETUS: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: These three axioms, if I am not mistaken, are fighting with one another in our minds in the case of the dice, or, again, in such a case as this—if I were to say that I, who am of a certain height and taller than you, may within a year, without gaining or losing in height, be not so tall—not that I should have lost, but that you would have increased. In such a case, I am afterwards what I once was not, and yet I have not become; for I could not have become without becoming, neither could I have become less without losing somewhat of my height; and I could give you ten thousand examples of similar contradictions, if we admit them at all. I believe that you follow me, Theaetetus; for I suspect that you have thought of these questions before now.

SOCRATES: If I am not mistaken, these three axioms conflict in our minds when we consider the dice. The same happens in a case like this. Suppose I am a certain height and taller than you. Within a year, I may be shorter than you, though I have neither grown nor shrunk. That would happen not because I had shrunk, but because you had grown. In that case, I would be something I was not before, yet I would not have become that. For I could not have become something without becoming it. Nor could I have become shorter without losing some of my height. If we accept contradictions like these, I could give you ten thousand more examples. I believe you follow me, Theaetetus, for I suspect you have thought about these questions before.

THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them; by the Gods I am! and I want to know what on earth they mean; and there are times when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them.

THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, I’m amazed when I think about them. By the gods, I am! I want to know what on earth they mean. Sometimes my head spins when I think about them.

SOCRATES: I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. He was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child of Thaumas (wonder). But do you begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras?

SOCRATES: I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus understood your nature when he called you a philosopher. Wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. Whoever said that Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child of Thaumas (wonder) knew something about family trees. But do you begin to see how the hypothesis we attribute to Protagoras explains this puzzle?

THEAETETUS: Not as yet.

THEAETETUS: Not yet.

SOCRATES: Then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the hidden 'truth' of a famous man or school.

SOCRATES: Then you'll be grateful if I help you uncover the hidden 'truth' of a famous man or school.

THEAETETUS: To be sure, I shall be very much obliged.

THEAETETUS: Of course, I would be very grateful.

SOCRATES: Take a look round, then, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. Now by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in nothing but what they can grasp in their hands, and who will not allow that action or generation or anything invisible can have real existence.

SOCRATES: Look around and make sure none of the uninitiated are listening. By the uninitiated, I mean people who believe only in what they can grasp in their hands. They refuse to accept that action, creation, or anything invisible can be real.

THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very hard and impenetrable mortals.

THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, they are very hard and impossible to understand.

SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, outer barbarians. Far more ingenious are the brethren whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you. Their first principle is, that all is motion, and upon this all the affections of which we were just now speaking are supposed to depend: there is nothing but motion, which has two forms, one active and the other passive, both in endless number; and out of the union and friction of them there is generated a progeny endless in number, having two forms, sense and the object of sense, which are ever breaking forth and coming to the birth at the same moment. The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling; there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, and many more which have names, as well as innumerable others which are without them; each has its kindred object,—each variety of colour has a corresponding variety of sight, and so with sound and hearing, and with the rest of the senses and the objects akin to them. Do you see, Theaetetus, the bearings of this tale on the preceding argument?

SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, outsiders. The brothers whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you are far more ingenious. Their first principle is that everything is motion. They believe that all the experiences we were just discussing depend on this. There is nothing but motion, and it takes two forms, one active and the other passive. Both forms exist in endless numbers. Their union and friction produce endless offspring of two kinds: sensation and the object sensed. These are always emerging and coming into being at the same moment. The senses have various names, such as hearing, sight, and smell. There are also the senses of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, and fear. Many more have names, and countless others do not. Each sense has a corresponding object. Each variety of color has a corresponding variety of sight. The same is true of sound and hearing, and of the other senses and their corresponding objects. Do you see, Theaetetus, how this story relates to the argument we were just discussing?

THEAETETUS: Indeed I do not.

THEAETETUS: No, I don't.

SOCRATES: Then attend, and I will try to finish the story. The purport is that all these things are in motion, as I was saying, and that this motion is of two kinds, a slower and a quicker; and the slower elements have their motions in the same place and with reference to things near them, and so they beget; but what is begotten is swifter, for it is carried to fro, and moves from place to place. Apply this to sense:—When the eye and the appropriate object meet together and give birth to whiteness and the sensation connatural with it, which could not have been given by either of them going elsewhere, then, while the sight is flowing from the eye, whiteness proceeds from the object which combines in producing the colour; and so the eye is fulfilled with sight, and really sees, and becomes, not sight, but a seeing eye; and the object which combined to form the colour is fulfilled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but a white thing, whether wood or stone or whatever the object may be which happens to be coloured white. And this is true of all sensible objects, hard, warm, and the like, which are similarly to be regarded, as I was saying before, not as having any absolute existence, but as being all of them of whatever kind generated by motion in their intercourse with one another; for of the agent and patient, as existing in separation, no trustworthy conception, as they say, can be formed, for the agent has no existence until united with the patient, and the patient has no existence until united with the agent; and that which by uniting with something becomes an agent, by meeting with some other thing is converted into a patient. And from all these considerations, as I said at first, there arises a general reflection, that there is no one self-existent thing, but everything is becoming and in relation; and being must be altogether abolished, although from habit and ignorance we are compelled even in this discussion to retain the use of the term. But great philosophers tell us that we are not to allow either the word 'something,' or 'belonging to something,' or 'to me,' or 'this,' or 'that,' or any other detaining name to be used, in the language of nature all things are being created and destroyed, coming into being and passing into new forms; nor can any name fix or detain them; he who attempts to fix them is easily refuted. And this should be the way of speaking, not only of particulars but of aggregates; such aggregates as are expressed in the word 'man,' or 'stone,' or any name of an animal or of a class. O Theaetetus, are not these speculations sweet as honey? And do you not like the taste of them in the mouth?

SOCRATES: Now listen, and I will try to finish the story. The point is that all these things are in motion, as I was saying. There are two kinds of motion, slower and faster. The slower elements move in the same place and in relation to things near them. In this way, they produce offspring. But their offspring are faster, for they travel back and forth and move from place to place. Apply this to the senses. The eye and the appropriate object meet and give birth to whiteness and its corresponding sensation. Neither could have produced these by meeting something else. Sight then flows from the eye, while whiteness comes from the object that helps produce the color. So the eye is filled with sight and really sees. It becomes not sight itself, but a seeing eye. And the object that helped produce the color is filled with whiteness. It becomes not whiteness itself, but a white thing. It may be wood, stone, or whatever object happens to be colored white. The same is true of all objects of sensation, such as hard or warm things. As I said before, we must understand them in the same way. None has any independent existence. Whatever they are, they are all produced by motion as they interact with one another. For, as these philosophers say, we can form no reliable idea of an agent or a patient existing separately. The agent does not exist until it joins with the patient, nor the patient until it joins with the agent. And what becomes an agent by joining with one thing becomes a patient by meeting another. From all this comes a general conclusion, as I said at the beginning. Nothing exists by itself. Everything is becoming and exists in relation to something else. We must do away with the idea of being altogether. Yet habit and ignorance force us to keep using the term, even in this discussion. But great philosophers tell us not to allow the word 'something,' or 'belonging to something,' or 'to me,' or 'this,' or 'that,' or any other name that fixes things in place. In the language of nature, all things are being created and destroyed, coming into being and passing into new forms. No name can fix them or hold them still. Anyone who tries to fix them is easily refuted. This is how we should speak not only of individual things but also of groups. These are groups described by the word 'man,' or 'stone,' or any name for an animal or a class. Theaetetus, aren't these speculations sweet as honey? Don't you like their taste in your mouth?

THEAETETUS: I do not know what to say, Socrates; for, indeed, I cannot make out whether you are giving your own opinion or only wanting to draw me out.

THEAETETUS: I don't know what to say, Socrates. I can't tell whether you're giving your own opinion or just trying to get me talking.

SOCRATES: You forget, my friend, that I neither know, nor profess to know, anything of these matters; you are the person who is in labour, I am the barren midwife; and this is why I soothe you, and offer you one good thing after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that I may at last help to bring your own opinion into the light of day: when this has been accomplished, then we will determine whether what you have brought forth is only a wind-egg or a real and genuine birth. Therefore, keep up your spirits, and answer like a man what you think.

SOCRATES: You forget, my friend, that I neither know nor claim to know anything about these matters. You are the one in labor. I am the midwife who cannot give birth. That is why I comfort you and offer you one good thing after another to try. I hope that, in the end, I can help bring your own opinion into the light. Once that is done, we will decide whether you have produced an empty egg or a real birth. So keep your spirits up, and answer like a man: what do you think?

THEAETETUS: Ask me.

THEAETETUS: Ask me.

SOCRATES: Then once more: Is it your opinion that nothing is but what becomes?—the good and the noble, as well as all the other things which we were just now mentioning?

SOCRATES: Then let me ask again: Do you think nothing simply exists, but everything is becoming? Does that include the good and the noble, as well as everything else we just mentioned?

THEAETETUS: When I hear you discoursing in this style, I think that there is a great deal in what you say, and I am very ready to assent.

THEAETETUS: When I hear you speak this way, I think there is a great deal in what you say. I am very ready to agree.

SOCRATES: Let us not leave the argument unfinished, then; for there still remains to be considered an objection which may be raised about dreams and diseases, in particular about madness, and the various illusions of hearing and sight, or of other senses. For you know that in all these cases the esse-percipi theory appears to be unmistakably refuted, since in dreams and illusions we certainly have false perceptions; and far from saying that everything is which appears, we should rather say that nothing is which appears.

SOCRATES: Let us not leave the argument unfinished. We still need to consider an objection about dreams and illnesses, especially madness, and illusions of hearing, sight, and the other senses. You know that all these cases seem to clearly refute the esse-percipi theory. In dreams and illusions, we certainly have false perceptions. Far from saying that everything that appears is real, we should instead say that nothing that appears is real.

THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates.

THEAETETUS: That's very true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: But then, my boy, how can any one contend that knowledge is perception, or that to every man what appears is?

SOCRATES: But then, my boy, how can anyone claim that knowledge is perception? Or that whatever appears true to someone is true?

THEAETETUS: I am afraid to say, Socrates, that I have nothing to answer, because you rebuked me just now for making this excuse; but I certainly cannot undertake to argue that madmen or dreamers think truly, when they imagine, some of them that they are gods, and others that they can fly, and are flying in their sleep.

THEAETETUS: I’m afraid to say I have no answer, Socrates, because you just scolded me for making that excuse. But I certainly can’t argue that madmen or dreamers think truly. Some imagine they are gods, while others dream that they can fly and are flying.

SOCRATES: Do you see another question which can be raised about these phenomena, notably about dreaming and waking?

SOCRATES: Do you see another question we can ask about these experiences, especially dreaming and waking?

THEAETETUS: What question?

THEAETETUS: What question?

SOCRATES: A question which I think that you must often have heard persons ask:—How can you determine whether at this moment we are sleeping, and all our thoughts are a dream; or whether we are awake, and talking to one another in the waking state?

SOCRATES: I think you must often have heard people ask this question: How can you tell whether we are asleep right now and all our thoughts are a dream? Or whether we are awake and talking to each other?

THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know how to prove the one any more than the other, for in both cases the facts precisely correspond;—and there is no difficulty in supposing that during all this discussion we have been talking to one another in a dream; and when in a dream we seem to be narrating dreams, the resemblance of the two states is quite astonishing.

THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I don't know how to prove one any more than the other. The facts are exactly the same in both cases. It is easy to imagine that we have been talking to each other in a dream throughout this discussion. And when we seem to be telling dreams in a dream, the resemblance between the two states is astonishing.

SOCRATES: You see, then, that a doubt about the reality of sense is easily raised, since there may even be a doubt whether we are awake or in a dream. And as our time is equally divided between sleeping and waking, in either sphere of existence the soul contends that the thoughts which are present to our minds at the time are true; and during one half of our lives we affirm the truth of the one, and, during the other half, of the other; and are equally confident of both.

SOCRATES: You see, then, how easily we can doubt whether what we sense is real. We may even doubt whether we are awake or dreaming. We spend equal amounts of time sleeping and waking. In each state, the soul insists that the thoughts present to our minds are true. For half our lives, we affirm the truth of our waking thoughts. For the other half, we affirm the truth of our dreams. And we are equally confident of both.

THEAETETUS: Most true.

THEAETETUS: Very true.

SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders? the difference is only that the times are not equal.

SOCRATES: And couldn't the same be said of madness and other disorders? The only difference is that the times are not equal.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time?

SOCRATES: And does the length of time determine whether something is true or false?

THEAETETUS: That would be in many ways ridiculous.

THEAETETUS: That would be ridiculous in many ways.

SOCRATES: But can you certainly determine by any other means which of these opinions is true?

SOCRATES: But is there any other way to know for sure which of these opinions is true?

THEAETETUS: I do not think that I can.

THEAETETUS: I don't think I can.

SOCRATES: Listen, then, to a statement of the other side of the argument, which is made by the champions of appearance. They would say, as I imagine—Can that which is wholly other than something, have the same quality as that from which it differs? and observe, Theaetetus, that the word 'other' means not 'partially,' but 'wholly other.'

SOCRATES: Now listen to the other side of the argument, as presented by the defenders of appearance. I imagine they would ask: Can something wholly different from another thing have the same quality as that thing? And note, Theaetetus, that 'other' means not 'partially,' but 'wholly other.'

THEAETETUS: Certainly, putting the question as you do, that which is wholly other cannot either potentially or in any other way be the same.

THEAETETUS: Certainly, as you put it, what is completely different cannot be the same, either potentially or in any other way.

SOCRATES: And must therefore be admitted to be unlike?

SOCRATES: And so must be acknowledged as different?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another, when it becomes like we call it the same—when unlike, other?

SOCRATES: So, if something becomes like or unlike itself or something else, what do we call it? When it becomes like, do we call it the same? When it becomes unlike, do we call it different?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite?

SOCRATES: Weren't we saying that there are infinitely many things that act and infinitely many that are acted upon?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And also that different combinations will produce results which are not the same, but different?

SOCRATES: And different combinations will also produce different results?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:—There is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick—Are they like or unlike?

SOCRATES: Let us take you and me, or anything else, as an example. Consider Socrates healthy and Socrates sick. Are they alike or different?

THEAETETUS: You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and Socrates in sickness as a whole?

THEAETETUS: You mean to compare Socrates as a whole when he is healthy with Socrates as a whole when he is sick?

SOCRATES: Exactly; that is my meaning.

SOCRATES: Exactly. That's what I mean.

THEAETETUS: I answer, they are unlike.

THEAETETUS: I answer, they are different.

SOCRATES: And if unlike, they are other?

SOCRATES: And if they are unlike, are they different?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning?

SOCRATES: And wouldn't you say the same of Socrates when he is asleep or awake, or in any of the states we mentioned?

THEAETETUS: I should.

THEAETETUS: I would.

SOCRATES: All agents have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as he is well or ill.

SOCRATES: So all agents act on a different Socrates depending on whether he is healthy or ill.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases?

SOCRATES: And will I, as the one acted upon, and the agent produce something different in each case?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me?

SOCRATES: The wine I drink when I am healthy tastes sweet and pleasant to me?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient and agent meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes from the patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

SOCRATES: For, as we have already agreed, the patient and the agent meet and produce sweetness and the perception of sweetness. These move together at the same time. The perception comes from the patient and makes the tongue able to perceive. The sweetness arises from and moves about in the wine. It makes the wine both sweet and seemingly sweet to a healthy tongue.

THEAETETUS: Certainly; that has been already acknowledged.

THEAETETUS: Certainly. That has already been acknowledged.

SOCRATES: But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a different person?

SOCRATES: But when I am sick, does the wine really act on another, different person?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates who is sick, produces quite another result; which is the sensation of bitterness in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness in and about the wine, which becomes not bitterness but something bitter; as I myself become not perception but percipient?

SOCRATES: A drink of wine and a sick Socrates together produce quite a different result. The tongue senses bitterness, and bitterness moves and comes into being in and around the wine. The wine becomes not bitterness itself, but something bitter. In the same way, I become not perception itself, but someone who perceives?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: There is no other object of which I shall ever have the same perception, for another object would give another perception, and would make the percipient other and different; nor can that object which affects me, meeting another subject, produce the same, or become similar, for that too would produce another result from another subject, and become different.

SOCRATES: I can never have the same perception of any other object. A different object would produce a different perception and make me, the perceiver, different. Nor can the object that affects me produce the same perception or become similar when it encounters another perceiver. For it would produce a different result with a different perceiver and become different itself.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Neither can I by myself, have this sensation, nor the object by itself, this quality.

SOCRATES: I cannot have this sensation by myself, nor can the object have this quality by itself.

THEAETETUS: Certainly not.

THEAETETUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: When I perceive I must become percipient of something—there can be no such thing as perceiving and perceiving nothing; the object, whether it become sweet, bitter, or of any other quality, must have relation to a percipient; nothing can become sweet which is sweet to no one.

SOCRATES: When I perceive, I must perceive something. There is no such thing as perceiving nothing. An object becomes sweet, bitter, or takes on some other quality only in relation to someone who perceives it. Nothing can become sweet if it is sweet to no one.

THEAETETUS: Certainly not.

THEAETETUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: Then the inference is, that we (the agent and patient) are or become in relation to one another; there is a law which binds us one to the other, but not to any other existence, nor each of us to himself; and therefore we can only be bound to one another; so that whether a person says that a thing is or becomes, he must say that it is or becomes to or of or in relation to something else; but he must not say or allow any one else to say that anything is or becomes absolutely:—such is our conclusion.

SOCRATES: Then we conclude that we (the agent and patient) exist or become in relation to one another. A law binds us to each other, but not to anything else, or each of us to ourselves. So we can only be bound to one another. Therefore, whether someone says a thing exists or becomes, they must say it does so in relation to something else. They must not say, or allow anyone else to say, that anything exists or becomes on its own. That is our conclusion.

THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates.

THEAETETUS: That's very true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other, I and no other am the percipient of it?

SOCRATES: So, if what acts on me relates only to me, am I the only one who perceives it?

THEAETETUS: Of course.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Then my perception is true to me, being inseparable from my own being; and, as Protagoras says, to myself I am judge of what is and what is not to me.

SOCRATES: Then my perception is true for me because it cannot be separated from my own being. And, as Protagoras says, I am the judge of what is and is not for me.

THEAETETUS: I suppose so.

THEAETETUS: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive?

SOCRATES: If I never make mistakes, and my mind never stumbles in understanding being or becoming, how can I fail to know what I perceive?

THEAETETUS: You cannot.

THEAETETUS: You can't.

SOCRATES: Then you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is only perception; and the meaning turns out to be the same, whether with Homer and Heracleitus, and all that company, you say that all is motion and flux, or with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things; or with Theaetetus, that, given these premises, perception is knowledge. Am I not right, Theaetetus, and is not this your new-born child, of which I have delivered you? What say you?

SOCRATES: Then you were quite right to say that knowledge is only perception. It amounts to the same thing whichever way you put it. You can say, with Homer, Heracleitus, and all their company, that everything is in motion and constantly changing. Or you can say, with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things. Or you can say, with Theaetetus, that given these premises, perception is knowledge. Am I not right, Theaetetus? Is this not your newborn child, whom I have helped you deliver? What do you say?

THEAETETUS: I cannot but agree, Socrates.

THEAETETUS: I have to agree, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then this is the child, however he may turn out, which you and I have with difficulty brought into the world. And now that he is born, we must run round the hearth with him, and see whether he is worth rearing, or is only a wind-egg and a sham. Is he to be reared in any case, and not exposed? or will you bear to see him rejected, and not get into a passion if I take away your first-born?

SOCRATES: Then this is the child you and I have struggled to bring into the world, whatever he may turn out to be. Now that he is born, we must carry him around the hearth. We must see whether he is worth raising or is just an empty egg, a sham. Must we raise him no matter what, rather than expose him? Or can you bear to see him rejected without getting angry if I take away your firstborn?

THEODORUS: Theaetetus will not be angry, for he is very good-natured. But tell me, Socrates, in heaven's name, is this, after all, not the truth?

THEODORUS: Theaetetus won't be angry because he's very good-natured. But tell me, Socrates, for heaven's sake, isn't this true after all?

SOCRATES: You, Theodorus, are a lover of theories, and now you innocently fancy that I am a bag full of them, and can easily pull one out which will overthrow its predecessor. But you do not see that in reality none of these theories come from me; they all come from him who talks with me. I only know just enough to extract them from the wisdom of another, and to receive them in a spirit of fairness. And now I shall say nothing myself, but shall endeavour to elicit something from our young friend.

SOCRATES: Theodorus, you love theories. Now you innocently imagine that I am a bag full of them. You think I can easily pull out one that will overturn the last. But you do not see that none of these theories actually come from me. They all come from the person talking with me. I know only enough to draw them out of another person’s wisdom and receive them fairly. So now I will say nothing myself, but will try to draw something out of our young friend.

THEODORUS: Do as you say, Socrates; you are quite right.

THEODORUS: Do as you suggest, Socrates. You're quite right.

SOCRATES: Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance Protagoras?

SOCRATES: Theodorus, shall I tell you what amazes me about your acquaintance Protagoras?

THEODORUS: What is it?

THEODORUS: What is it?

SOCRATES: I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other yet stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things; then he might have shown a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him by informing us at the outset that while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom he was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his fellow-men—would not this have produced an overpowering effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right to determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why, my friend, should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom? Must he not be talking 'ad captandum' in all this? I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in which my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed; for the attempt to supervise or refute the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; and this must be the case if Protagoras' Truth is the real truth, and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of the shrine of his book.

SOCRATES: I am charmed by his doctrine that whatever appears to be true is true for each person. But I wonder why he did not begin his book on Truth with a different declaration. He could have said that a pig, a dog-faced baboon, or some even stranger creature with sensations is the measure of all things. That would have shown magnificent contempt for our opinion of him. He could have told us from the start that we revered him like a god for his wisdom. Yet he was no better than a tadpole, let alone his fellow humans. Wouldn’t that have made an overwhelming impression? For suppose truth is only sensation. Then no one can discern another person’s feelings better than that person can. Nor does anyone have a greater right to decide whether another’s opinion is true or false. Instead, as we have said several times, each person is the sole judge for themselves. Everything they judge is true and right. If so, my friend, why should Protagoras be singled out as wise, entitled to teach, and worthy of good pay? And why should we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each person is the measure of their own wisdom? Must he not be saying all this just to win people over? I say nothing of the ridiculous position this puts my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic in. If each person’s own ideas and opinions are right for them, examining or refuting those of others would be a tedious and enormous act of folly. And each person’s opinions must be right if Protagoras’ Truth is the real truth. Unless, that is, the philosopher is merely amusing himself by pronouncing oracles from the shrine of his book.

THEODORUS: He was a friend of mine, Socrates, as you were saying, and therefore I cannot have him refuted by my lips, nor can I oppose you when I agree with you; please, then, to take Theaetetus again; he seemed to answer very nicely.

THEODORUS: As you were saying, Socrates, he was a friend of mine. So I cannot refute him myself, but I cannot oppose you when I agree with you. Please turn back to Theaetetus. He seemed to answer very well.

SOCRATES: If you were to go into a Lacedaemonian palestra, Theodorus, would you have a right to look on at the naked wrestlers, some of them making a poor figure, if you did not strip and give them an opportunity of judging of your own person?

SOCRATES: Theodorus, suppose you entered a Lacedaemonian wrestling school and watched the naked wrestlers, some of whom looked less than impressive. Would you have the right to watch if you didn't strip and let them judge your body too?

THEODORUS: Why not, Socrates, if they would allow me, as I think you will, in consideration of my age and stiffness; let some more supple youth try a fall with you, and do not drag me into the gymnasium.

THEODORUS: Why not, Socrates, if they will excuse me? I think you will, considering my age and stiffness. Let a more agile young man wrestle with you, and don't drag me into the gymnasium.

SOCRATES: Your will is my will, Theodorus, as the proverbial philosophers say, and therefore I will return to the sage Theaetetus: Tell me, Theaetetus, in reference to what I was saying, are you not lost in wonder, like myself, when you find that all of a sudden you are raised to the level of the wisest of men, or indeed of the gods?—for you would assume the measure of Protagoras to apply to the gods as well as men?

SOCRATES: Your will is my will, Theodorus, as the philosophers say. So I will return to the wise Theaetetus. Tell me, Theaetetus, are you as amazed as I am by what I was saying? Suddenly you find yourself on a level with the wisest people, or even the gods. For surely you would apply Protagoras' measure to gods as well as people?

THEAETETUS: Certainly I should, and I confess to you that I am lost in wonder. At first hearing, I was quite satisfied with the doctrine, that whatever appears is to each one, but now the face of things has changed.

THEAETETUS: Of course I would, and I admit I am completely puzzled. When I first heard the idea that things are as they appear to each person, I was quite satisfied. But now things look different.

SOCRATES: Why, my dear boy, you are young, and therefore your ear is quickly caught and your mind influenced by popular arguments. Protagoras, or some one speaking on his behalf, will doubtless say in reply,—Good people, young and old, you meet and harangue, and bring in the gods, whose existence or non-existence I banish from writing and speech, or you talk about the reason of man being degraded to the level of the brutes, which is a telling argument with the multitude, but not one word of proof or demonstration do you offer. All is probability with you, and yet surely you and Theodorus had better reflect whether you are disposed to admit of probability and figures of speech in matters of such importance. He or any other mathematician who argued from probabilities and likelihoods in geometry, would not be worth an ace.

SOCRATES: My dear boy, you are young. So popular arguments quickly catch your ear and influence your mind. Protagoras, or someone speaking for him, will doubtless reply: Good people, young and old, you gather and make speeches. You bring up the gods, although I refuse to speak or write about whether they exist. Or you talk about human reason being lowered to the level of animals. That argument impresses the crowd, but you offer no proof or demonstration at all. Everything you say is based on probability. Yet surely you and Theodorus should consider whether to accept probability and figures of speech in such important matters. If Theodorus or any other mathematician argued from probabilities and likelihoods in geometry, he would be worthless.

THEAETETUS: But neither you nor we, Socrates, would be satisfied with such arguments.

THEAETETUS: But neither you nor we would be satisfied with those arguments, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must look at the matter in some other way?

SOCRATES: So you and Theodorus are saying we need to look at the matter differently?

THEAETETUS: Yes, in quite another way.

THEAETETUS: Yes, in a completely different way.

SOCRATES: And the way will be to ask whether perception is or is not the same as knowledge; for this was the real point of our argument, and with a view to this we raised (did we not?) those many strange questions.

SOCRATES: We can do this by asking whether perception is the same as knowledge. That was the real point of our argument. And that is why we raised so many strange questions, isn't it?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Shall we say that we know every thing which we see and hear? for example, shall we say that not having learned, we do not hear the language of foreigners when they speak to us? or shall we say that we not only hear, but know what they are saying? Or again, if we see letters which we do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them? or shall we aver that, seeing them, we must know them?

SOCRATES: Shall we say that we know everything we see and hear? For example, foreigners may speak to us in a language we have not learned. Shall we say that we do not hear them? Or shall we say that we not only hear them but know what they are saying? Again, if we see letters we do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them? Or shall we say that, because we see them, we must know them?

THEAETETUS: We shall say, Socrates, that we know what we actually see and hear of them—that is to say, we see and know the figure and colour of the letters, and we hear and know the elevation or depression of the sound of them; but we do not perceive by sight and hearing, or know, that which grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

THEAETETUS: Socrates, we will say that we know what we actually see and hear of them. That is, we see and know the shape and color of the letters. We hear and know whether their sounds are high or low. But we do not see, hear, or know what grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

SOCRATES: Capital, Theaetetus; and about this there shall be no dispute, because I want you to grow; but there is another difficulty coming, which you will also have to repulse.

SOCRATES: Excellent, Theaetetus. I won't argue about this, because I want you to grow. But another difficulty is coming, and you will have to overcome that too.

THEAETETUS: What is it?

THEAETETUS: What is it?

SOCRATES: Some one will say, Can a man who has ever known anything, and still has and preserves a memory of that which he knows, not know that which he remembers at the time when he remembers? I have, I fear, a tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know?

SOCRATES: Someone will ask: Can a person remember something they once knew, yet not know it while remembering it? I’m afraid I’ve taken too long to ask a simple question. Can a person who has learned something and remembers it fail to know it?

THEAETETUS: Impossible, Socrates; the supposition is monstrous.

THEAETETUS: Impossible, Socrates. That idea is outrageous.

SOCRATES: Am I talking nonsense, then? Think: is not seeing perceiving, and is not sight perception?

SOCRATES: Am I talking nonsense, then? Think about it: isn't seeing perceiving? And isn't sight perception?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which he has seen?

SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, does everyone know what they have seen?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory?

SOCRATES: And you would agree that memory exists?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And is memory of something or of nothing?

SOCRATES: And is memory always of something, or can it be of nothing?

THEAETETUS: Of something, surely.

THEAETETUS: Of something, of course.

SOCRATES: Of things learned and perceived, that is?

SOCRATES: You mean things that are learned and perceived?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Often a man remembers that which he has seen?

SOCRATES: A man often remembers what he has seen?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: And if he closed his eyes, would he forget?

SOCRATES: And if he closed his eyes, would he forget?

THEAETETUS: Who, Socrates, would dare to say so?

THEAETETUS: Socrates, who would dare say that?

SOCRATES: But we must say so, if the previous argument is to be maintained.

SOCRATES: But we must say so if we are to stand by our earlier argument.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean? I am not quite sure that I understand you, though I have a strong suspicion that you are right.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean? I'm not quite sure I understand you, though I have a strong feeling you're right.

SOCRATES: As thus: he who sees knows, as we say, that which he sees; for perception and sight and knowledge are admitted to be the same.

SOCRATES: For example, we say that someone who sees knows what they see. This is because we agree that perception, sight, and knowledge are the same.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: But he who saw, and has knowledge of that which he saw, remembers, when he closes his eyes, that which he no longer sees.

SOCRATES: But someone who has seen something and knows it remembers it when he closes his eyes, even though he no longer sees it.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: And seeing is knowing, and therefore not-seeing is not-knowing?

SOCRATES: And seeing is knowing, so not seeing is not knowing?

THEAETETUS: Very true.

THEAETETUS: That's very true.

SOCRATES: Then the inference is, that a man may have attained the knowledge of something, which he may remember and yet not know, because he does not see; and this has been affirmed by us to be a monstrous supposition.

SOCRATES: Then it follows that a man may have learned something and still remember it, yet not know it because he does not see it. And we have said that this is an absurd idea.

THEAETETUS: Most true.

THEAETETUS: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, involves a manifest impossibility?

SOCRATES: So the claim that knowledge and perception are the same involves an obvious impossibility?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then they must be distinguished?

SOCRATES: Then we must tell them apart?

THEAETETUS: I suppose that they must.

THEAETETUS: I suppose they must.

SOCRATES: Once more we shall have to begin, and ask 'What is knowledge?' and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do?

SOCRATES: Once again, we must start over and ask, 'What is knowledge?' But what are we going to do, Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: About what?

THEAETETUS: About what?

SOCRATES: Like a good-for-nothing cock, without having won the victory, we walk away from the argument and crow.

SOCRATES: Like a worthless rooster, we walk away from the argument and crow without having won.

THEAETETUS: How do you mean?

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: After the manner of disputers (Lys.; Phaedo; Republic), we were satisfied with mere verbal consistency, and were well pleased if in this way we could gain an advantage. Although professing not to be mere Eristics, but philosophers, I suspect that we have unconsciously fallen into the error of that ingenious class of persons.

SOCRATES: Like debaters (Lys.; Phaedo; Republic), we were satisfied with making our words consistent. We were pleased if that gave us an advantage. We claim to be philosophers, not mere Eristics. But I suspect we have unknowingly fallen into the same error as those clever people.

THEAETETUS: I do not as yet understand you.

THEAETETUS: I don't understand you yet.

SOCRATES: Then I will try to explain myself: just now we asked the question, whether a man who had learned and remembered could fail to know, and we showed that a person who had seen might remember when he had his eyes shut and could not see, and then he would at the same time remember and not know. But this was an impossibility. And so the Protagorean fable came to nought, and yours also, who maintained that knowledge is the same as perception.

SOCRATES: Then I will try to explain what I mean. We just asked whether someone who had learned and remembered something could fail to know it. We showed that a person who had seen something could remember it with their eyes shut, when they could not see. That person would then both remember and not know it at the same time. But that was impossible. So the Protagorean fable fell apart, as did your claim that knowledge is the same as perception.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that the result would have been different if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of the two brats, had been alive; he would have had a great deal to say on their behalf. But he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and even the guardians whom he left, and of whom our friend Theodorus is one, are unwilling to give any help, and therefore I suppose that I must take up his cause myself, and see justice done?

SOCRATES: And yet, my friend, I suspect the result would have been different if Protagoras were alive. He was the father of the first of the two brats, and he would have had a great deal to say in their defense. But he is dead, and we mock his orphaned child. Even the guardians he left behind, including our friend Theodorus, are unwilling to help. So I suppose I must take up his cause myself and see that justice is done?

THEODORUS: Not I, Socrates, but rather Callias, the son of Hipponicus, is guardian of his orphans. I was too soon diverted from the abstractions of dialectic to geometry. Nevertheless, I shall be grateful to you if you assist him.

THEODORUS: Not me, Socrates. Callias, the son of Hipponicus, is the guardian of his orphans. I turned away from abstract dialectic to geometry too soon. Still, I would be grateful if you helped him.

SOCRATES: Very good, Theodorus; you shall see how I will come to the rescue. If a person does not attend to the meaning of terms as they are commonly used in argument, he may be involved even in greater paradoxes than these. Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus?

SOCRATES: Very good, Theodorus. You will see how I come to the rescue. If someone ignores the usual meaning of terms in an argument, they may end up with even greater paradoxes than these. Should I explain this to you or to Theaetetus?

THEODORUS: To both of us, and let the younger answer; he will incur less disgrace if he is discomfited.

THEODORUS: To both of us, and let the younger one answer. He will suffer less shame if he is defeated.

SOCRATES: Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this:—Can a man know and also not know that which he knows?

SOCRATES: Then let me ask the terrible question: Can a person both know and not know what they know?

THEODORUS: How shall we answer, Theaetetus?

THEODORUS: How should we answer, Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: He cannot, I should say.

THEAETETUS: I would say he can't.

SOCRATES: He can, if you maintain that seeing is knowing. When you are imprisoned in a well, as the saying is, and the self-assured adversary closes one of your eyes with his hand, and asks whether you can see his cloak with the eye which he has closed, how will you answer the inevitable man?

SOCRATES: He can, if you claim that seeing is knowing. Suppose you are trapped in a well, as the saying goes. Your confident opponent covers one of your eyes with his hand. He asks whether you can see his cloak with the eye he has covered. How will you answer this inevitable man?

THEAETETUS: I should answer, 'Not with that eye but with the other.'

THEAETETUS: I would answer, 'Not with that eye, but with the other.'

SOCRATES: Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time.

SOCRATES: So you see and do not see the same thing at the same time.

THEAETETUS: Yes, in a certain sense.

THEAETETUS: Yes, in a way.

SOCRATES: None of that, he will reply; I do not ask or bid you answer in what sense you know, but only whether you know that which you do not know. You have been proved to see that which you do not see; and you have already admitted that seeing is knowing, and that not-seeing is not-knowing: I leave you to draw the inference.

SOCRATES: “None of that,” he will reply. “I am not asking how you know it. I am only asking whether you know what you do not know. It has been proved that you see what you do not see. And you have already admitted that seeing is knowing, and not seeing is not knowing. I leave you to draw the conclusion.”

THEAETETUS: Yes; the inference is the contradictory of my assertion.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that conclusion contradicts what I said.

SOCRATES: Yes, my marvel, and there might have been yet worse things in store for you, if an opponent had gone on to ask whether you can have a sharp and also a dull knowledge, and whether you can know near, but not at a distance, or know the same thing with more or less intensity, and so on without end. Such questions might have been put to you by a light-armed mercenary, who argued for pay. He would have lain in wait for you, and when you took up the position, that sense is knowledge, he would have made an assault upon hearing, smelling, and the other senses;—he would have shown you no mercy; and while you were lost in envy and admiration of his wisdom, he would have got you into his net, out of which you would not have escaped until you had come to an understanding about the sum to be paid for your release. Well, you ask, and how will Protagoras reinforce his position? Shall I answer for him?

SOCRATES: Yes, my marvel, and worse things might have been in store for you. An opponent might have gone on to ask whether knowledge can be sharp or dull. Can you know something nearby but not at a distance? Can you know the same thing more or less intensely? The questions could go on forever. A light-armed mercenary who argued for pay might have asked you such questions. He would have lain in wait for you. When you took the position that perception is knowledge, he would have attacked hearing, smell, and the other senses. He would have shown you no mercy. And while you were lost in envy and admiration of his wisdom, he would have caught you in his net. You would not have escaped until you had agreed on the price of your release. Well, you ask, how will Protagoras strengthen his position? Shall I answer for him?

THEAETETUS: By all means.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: He will repeat all those things which we have been urging on his behalf, and then he will close with us in disdain, and say:—The worthy Socrates asked a little boy, whether the same man could remember and not know the same thing, and the boy said No, because he was frightened, and could not see what was coming, and then Socrates made fun of poor me. The truth is, O slatternly Socrates, that when you ask questions about any assertion of mine, and the person asked is found tripping, if he has answered as I should have answered, then I am refuted, but if he answers something else, then he is refuted and not I. For do you really suppose that any one would admit the memory which a man has of an impression which has passed away to be the same with that which he experienced at the time? Assuredly not. Or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing? Or, if he is afraid of making this admission, would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? Or would he admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him? I speak by the card in order to avoid entanglements of words. But, O my good sir, he will say, come to the argument in a more generous spirit; and either show, if you can, that our sensations are not relative and individual, or, if you admit them to be so, prove that this does not involve the consequence that the appearance becomes, or, if you will have the word, is, to the individual only. As to your talk about pigs and baboons, you are yourself behaving like a pig, and you teach your hearers to make sport of my writings in the same ignorant manner; but this is not to your credit. For I declare that the truth is as I have written, and that each of us is a measure of existence and of non-existence. Yet one man may be a thousand times better than another in proportion as different things are and appear to him. And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the evils which appear and are to a man, into goods which are and appear to him. And I would beg you not to press my words in the letter, but to take the meaning of them as I will explain them. Remember what has been already said,—that to the sick man his food appears to be and is bitter, and to the man in health the opposite of bitter. Now I cannot conceive that one of these men can be or ought to be made wiser than the other: nor can you assert that the sick man because he has one impression is foolish, and the healthy man because he has another is wise; but the one state requires to be changed into the other, the worse into the better. As in education, a change of state has to be effected, and the sophist accomplishes by words the change which the physician works by the aid of drugs. Not that any one ever made another think truly, who previously thought falsely. For no one can think what is not, or, think anything different from that which he feels; and this is always true. But as the inferior habit of mind has thoughts of kindred nature, so I conceive that a good mind causes men to have good thoughts; and these which the inexperienced call true, I maintain to be only better, and not truer than others. And, O my dear Socrates, I do not call wise men tadpoles: far from it; I say that they are the physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of plants—for the husbandmen also take away the evil and disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and healthy sensations—aye and true ones; and the wise and good rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil to seem just to states; for whatever appears to a state to be just and fair, so long as it is regarded as such, is just and fair to it; but the teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the evil, both in appearance and in reality. And in like manner the Sophist who is able to train his pupils in this spirit is a wise man, and deserves to be well paid by them. And so one man is wiser than another; and no one thinks falsely, and you, whether you will or not, must endure to be a measure. On these foundations the argument stands firm, which you, Socrates, may, if you please, overthrow by an opposite argument, or if you like you may put questions to me—a method to which no intelligent person will object, quite the reverse. But I must beg you to put fair questions: for there is great inconsistency in saying that you have a zeal for virtue, and then always behaving unfairly in argument. The unfairness of which I complain is that you do not distinguish between mere disputation and dialectic: the disputer may trip up his opponent as often as he likes, and make fun; but the dialectician will be in earnest, and only correct his adversary when necessary, telling him the errors into which he has fallen through his own fault, or that of the company which he has previously kept. If you do so, your adversary will lay the blame of his own confusion and perplexity on himself, and not on you. He will follow and love you, and will hate himself, and escape from himself into philosophy, in order that he may become different from what he was. But the other mode of arguing, which is practised by the many, will have just the opposite effect upon him; and as he grows older, instead of turning philosopher, he will come to hate philosophy. I would recommend you, therefore, as I said before, not to encourage yourself in this polemical and controversial temper, but to find out, in a friendly and congenial spirit, what we really mean when we say that all things are in motion, and that to every individual and state what appears, is. In this manner you will consider whether knowledge and sensation are the same or different, but you will not argue, as you were just now doing, from the customary use of names and words, which the vulgar pervert in all sorts of ways, causing infinite perplexity to one another. Such, Theodorus, is the very slight help which I am able to offer to your old friend; had he been living, he would have helped himself in a far more gloriose style.

SOCRATES: He will repeat everything we have argued on his behalf. Then he will confront us with contempt and say: “Worthy Socrates asked a little boy whether the same man could remember and not know the same thing. The boy said no because he was frightened and could not see what was coming. Then Socrates made fun of poor me. “The truth is, sloppy Socrates, that you ask someone questions about a claim of mine and find him stumbling. If he has answered as I would have answered, then I am refuted. But if he answers differently, he is refuted, not I. Do you really suppose anyone would admit that remembering a past impression is the same as experiencing it at the time? Certainly not. Or would anyone hesitate to admit that the same man can know and not know the same thing? And if he is afraid to admit this, would he grant that someone who has changed is the same as before? Or would he admit that a man is one at all? Would he not say instead that a man is many, indeed infinitely many, just as the changes in him are infinite? I speak precisely to avoid getting tangled up in words. “But, my good sir,” he will say, “approach the argument more generously. Either show, if you can, that our sensations are not relative and individual, or admit that they are. If you admit it, prove that this does not mean that what appears becomes real for the individual alone. Or, if you prefer the word, prove that it is real for the individual alone. You talk about pigs and baboons, but you are behaving like a pig yourself. And you teach your listeners to make fun of my writings in the same ignorant way. That does you no credit. “For I declare that the truth is as I have written it. Each of us is a measure of what exists and what does not. Yet one man may be a thousand times better than another, because different things are and appear to him. I am far from saying that wisdom and wise people do not exist. Rather, I say that a wise person changes the things that appear and are bad to someone. He makes them appear and be good to that person. And I ask you not to take my words too literally, but to understand their meaning as I explain it. “Remember what we have already said. Food appears bitter to a sick man, and it is bitter to him. To a healthy man, it appears and is the opposite of bitter. Now I cannot see how either man can or should be made wiser than the other. Nor can you say that the sick man is foolish because he has one impression, while the healthy man is wise because he has another. But one condition needs to be changed into the other, the worse into the better. Education likewise requires a change of condition. The sophist brings about with words the change that the physician brings about with drugs. “That does not mean anyone has ever made someone think truly who previously thought falsely. For no one can think what is not, or think anything other than what he feels. And what he thinks is always true. But a worse state of mind produces thoughts of the same kind. In the same way, I believe a good state of mind produces good thoughts. The inexperienced call these thoughts true. I maintain that they are only better than other thoughts, not truer. “And, my dear Socrates, I do not call wise people tadpoles. Far from it. I say that they are physicians to the human body and farmers to plants. For farmers too remove the bad and disordered sensations of plants and give them good and healthy sensations. Yes, and true ones. And wise and good rhetoricians make good things, rather than bad things, appear just to states. For whatever appears just and fair to a state is just and fair to it, as long as it regards it as such. But the teacher of wisdom makes the good replace the bad, both in appearance and in reality. Likewise, a Sophist who can train his pupils in this spirit is wise and deserves to be well paid by them. “So one person is wiser than another, and no one thinks falsely. And you, whether you like it or not, must accept that you are a measure. The argument stands firm on these foundations. You may, Socrates, overthrow it with an opposing argument if you can. Or, if you prefer, you may question me. No intelligent person will object to that method, quite the opposite. But I must ask you to ask fair questions. For it is highly inconsistent to claim to be devoted to virtue while always arguing unfairly. “The unfairness I complain of is that you do not distinguish between disputation and dialectic. A disputer may trip up his opponent and make fun of him as often as he likes. But a dialectician will be serious and correct his opponent only when necessary. He will point out the errors his opponent has fallen into through his own fault or because of his previous companions. If you do this, your opponent will blame himself, not you, for his confusion and uncertainty. He will follow and love you, and he will hate himself. He will escape from himself into philosophy, so that he can become different from what he was. “But the other way of arguing, which most people practice, will have the opposite effect on him. As he grows older, he will come to hate philosophy instead of becoming a philosopher. So I recommend, as I said before, that you stop encouraging this quarrelsome and argumentative temper. Instead, try in a friendly and sympathetic spirit to discover what we really mean. We say that all things are in motion, and that what appears to each individual and state is. In this way you will consider whether knowledge and sensation are the same or different. You will not argue as you just did, from the customary use of names and words. Ordinary people distort these in all sorts of ways, causing one another endless confusion.” That, Theodorus, is the very little help I can offer your old friend. If he were alive, he would have defended himself in a far more glorious style.

THEODORUS: You are jesting, Socrates; indeed, your defence of him has been most valorous.

THEODORUS: You're joking, Socrates. You've defended him very bravely indeed.

SOCRATES: Thank you, friend; and I hope that you observed Protagoras bidding us be serious, as the text, 'Man is the measure of all things,' was a solemn one; and he reproached us with making a boy the medium of discourse, and said that the boy's timidity was made to tell against his argument; he also declared that we made a joke of him.

SOCRATES: Thank you, friend. I hope you noticed that Protagoras told us to be serious. His statement, 'Man is the measure of all things,' was a serious one. He criticized us for using a boy to carry on the discussion. He said we used the boy's shyness against his argument. He also said we made fun of him.

THEODORUS: How could I fail to observe all that, Socrates?

THEODORUS: How could I not notice all that, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Well, and shall we do as he says?

SOCRATES: Well, should we do as he says?

THEODORUS: By all means.

THEODORUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: But if his wishes are to be regarded, you and I must take up the argument, and in all seriousness, and ask and answer one another, for you see that the rest of us are nothing but boys. In no other way can we escape the imputation, that in our fresh analysis of his thesis we are making fun with boys.

SOCRATES: But if we are to respect his wishes, you and I must take up the argument seriously. We must ask and answer each other, since, as you can see, everyone else here is just a boy. Otherwise, we cannot escape the accusation that, in reexamining his thesis, we are making fun of boys.

THEODORUS: Well, but is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards?

THEODORUS: But isn't Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical discussion than many men with long beards?

SOCRATES: Yes, Theodorus, but not better than you; and therefore please not to imagine that I am to defend by every means in my power your departed friend; and that you are to defend nothing and nobody. At any rate, my good man, do not sheer off until we know whether you are a true measure of diagrams, or whether all men are equally measures and sufficient for themselves in astronomy and geometry, and the other branches of knowledge in which you are supposed to excel them.

SOCRATES: Yes, Theodorus, but not better than you. So please do not imagine that I must defend your departed friend by every means I can, while you defend nothing and nobody. In any case, my good man, do not slip away until we settle this question. Are you a true measure of diagrams? Or are all people equally good measures, able to judge for themselves in astronomy, geometry, and the other fields where you are supposed to excel them?

THEODORUS: He who is sitting by you, Socrates, will not easily avoid being drawn into an argument; and when I said just now that you would excuse me, and not, like the Lacedaemonians, compel me to strip and fight, I was talking nonsense—I should rather compare you to Scirrhon, who threw travellers from the rocks; for the Lacedaemonian rule is 'strip or depart,' but you seem to go about your work more after the fashion of Antaeus: you will not allow any one who approaches you to depart until you have stripped him, and he has been compelled to try a fall with you in argument.

THEODORUS: Anyone sitting beside you, Socrates, will not easily avoid being drawn into an argument. I was talking nonsense just now when I said you would excuse me. I said you would not, like the Lacedaemonians, force me to strip and fight. But I should compare you to Scirrhon, who threw travelers off cliffs. The Lacedaemonian rule is 'strip or leave,' but you seem to work more like Antaeus. You won't let anyone who approaches you leave until you've stripped him and forced him to wrestle with you in argument.

SOCRATES: There, Theodorus, you have hit off precisely the nature of my complaint; but I am even more pugnacious than the giants of old, for I have met with no end of heroes; many a Heracles, many a Theseus, mighty in words, has broken my head; nevertheless I am always at this rough exercise, which inspires me like a passion. Please, then, to try a fall with me, whereby you will do yourself good as well as me.

SOCRATES: There, Theodorus, you have described my complaint exactly. But I am even more eager to fight than the giants of old. I have faced countless heroes. Many a Heracles and many a Theseus, mighty with words, has broken my head. Still, I keep up this rough exercise, which inspires me like a passion. Please wrestle with me. It will do us both good.

THEODORUS: I consent; lead me whither you will, for I know that you are like destiny; no man can escape from any argument which you may weave for him. But I am not disposed to go further than you suggest.

THEODORUS: I agree. Lead me wherever you like, because I know you are like fate. No one can escape an argument you weave around them. But I am not inclined to go any further than you suggest.

SOCRATES: Once will be enough; and now take particular care that we do not again unwittingly expose ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly.

SOCRATES: Once is enough. Now be especially careful that we don't unwittingly give anyone reason to accuse us of talking childishly again.

THEODORUS: I will do my best to avoid that error.

THEODORUS: I’ll do my best to avoid that mistake.

SOCRATES: In the first place, let us return to our old objection, and see whether we were right in blaming and taking offence at Protagoras on the ground that he assumed all to be equal and sufficient in wisdom; although he admitted that there was a better and worse, and that in respect of this, some who as he said were the wise excelled others.

SOCRATES: First, let us return to our old objection. Were we right to blame Protagoras and take offense at him for assuming that everyone was equally wise and wise enough? He did admit that some things are better than others. He also said that some people, whom he called wise, were better than others at recognizing this difference.

THEODORUS: Very true.

THEODORUS: That's very true.

SOCRATES: Had Protagoras been living and answered for himself, instead of our answering for him, there would have been no need of our reviewing or reinforcing the argument. But as he is not here, and some one may accuse us of speaking without authority on his behalf, had we not better come to a clearer agreement about his meaning, for a great deal may be at stake?

SOCRATES: If Protagoras were alive, he could answer for himself instead of having us answer for him. Then we would not need to review or strengthen his argument. But he is not here, and someone may accuse us of speaking for him without the authority to do so. Shouldn't we reach a clearer agreement about what he meant? A great deal may be at stake.

THEODORUS: True.

THEODORUS: True.

SOCRATES: Then let us obtain, not through any third person, but from his own statement and in the fewest words possible, the basis of agreement.

SOCRATES: Then let us find the basis for agreement in his own words, not through someone else, as briefly as possible.

THEODORUS: In what way?

THEODORUS: How?

SOCRATES: In this way:—His words are, 'What seems to a man, is to him.'

SOCRATES: Like this: His words are, 'What seems true to a person is true for that person.'

THEODORUS: Yes, so he says.

THEODORUS: Yes, that's what he says.

SOCRATES: And are not we, Protagoras, uttering the opinion of man, or rather of all mankind, when we say that every one thinks himself wiser than other men in some things, and their inferior in others? In the hour of danger, when they are in perils of war, or of the sea, or of sickness, do they not look up to their commanders as if they were gods, and expect salvation from them, only because they excel them in knowledge? Is not the world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals? and there are plenty who think that they are able to teach and able to rule. Now, in all this is implied that ignorance and wisdom exist among them, at least in their own opinion.

SOCRATES: Protagoras, aren't we expressing the opinion of people, or rather of all humanity, when we say this? Everyone thinks they are wiser than others in some things and less wise in others. In times of danger, whether in war, at sea, or in sickness, don't people look up to their leaders as if they were gods? Don't they expect those leaders to save them, only because the leaders have greater knowledge? Isn't the world full of people in different occupations who seek teachers and rulers for themselves and their animals? And plenty of people think they can teach and rule. All this implies that, at least in their own opinion, some people are ignorant and others are wise.

THEODORUS: Certainly.

THEODORUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And wisdom is assumed by them to be true thought, and ignorance to be false opinion.

SOCRATES: And they assume that wisdom is true thought and ignorance is false opinion.

THEODORUS: Exactly.

THEODORUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument? Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? In either case, the result is the same, and their opinions are not always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false. For tell me, Theodorus, do you suppose that you yourself, or any other follower of Protagoras, would contend that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken in his opinion?

SOCRATES: So, Protagoras, how should we deal with the argument? Should we say that people's opinions are always true, or that they are sometimes true and sometimes false? Either way, the result is the same. Their opinions are not always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false. Tell me, Theodorus, would you or any other follower of Protagoras claim that no one thinks another person ignorant or mistaken?

THEODORUS: The thing is incredible, Socrates.

THEODORUS: That’s hard to believe, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And yet that absurdity is necessarily involved in the thesis which declares man to be the measure of all things.

SOCRATES: And yet that absurdity necessarily follows from the claim that man is the measure of all things.

THEODORUS: How so?

THEODORUS: How so?

SOCRATES: Why, suppose that you determine in your own mind something to be true, and declare your opinion to me; let us assume, as he argues, that this is true to you. Now, if so, you must either say that the rest of us are not the judges of this opinion or judgment of yours, or that we judge you always to have a true opinion? But are there not thousands upon thousands who, whenever you form a judgment, take up arms against you and are of an opposite judgment and opinion, deeming that you judge falsely?

SOCRATES: Suppose you decide that something is true and tell me your opinion. Let us assume, as he argues, that it is true for you. If so, you must say one of two things. Either the rest of us cannot judge your opinion, or we always judge it to be true. But whenever you make a judgment, aren't there thousands upon thousands who oppose you? They hold the opposite opinion and think your judgment is false.

THEODORUS: Yes, indeed, Socrates, thousands and tens of thousands, as Homer says, who give me a world of trouble.

THEODORUS: Yes, Socrates, thousands and tens of thousands, as Homer says, and they give me a lot of trouble.

SOCRATES: Well, but are we to assert that what you think is true to you and false to the ten thousand others?

SOCRATES: But should we say that what you think is true for you and false for the ten thousand others?

THEODORUS: No other inference seems to be possible.

THEODORUS: There seems to be no other possible conclusion.

SOCRATES: And how about Protagoras himself? If neither he nor the multitude thought, as indeed they do not think, that man is the measure of all things, must it not follow that the truth of which Protagoras wrote would be true to no one? But if you suppose that he himself thought this, and that the multitude does not agree with him, you must begin by allowing that in whatever proportion the many are more than one, in that proportion his truth is more untrue than true.

SOCRATES: And what about Protagoras himself? Neither he nor the majority believes that man is the measure of all things. If neither believes it, must the truth Protagoras wrote about not be true for anyone? But suppose he believed it himself, and the majority disagreed. Then you must first admit that his truth is more untrue than true. And it is so by the same proportion that the many outnumber the one.

THEODORUS: That would follow if the truth is supposed to vary with individual opinion.

THEODORUS: That would follow if truth depends on each person's opinion.

SOCRATES: And the best of the joke is, that he acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his own opinion to be false; for he admits that the opinions of all men are true.

SOCRATES: And the best part of the joke is that he agrees with those who believe his own opinion is false. After all, he admits that everyone’s opinions are true.

THEODORUS: Certainly.

THEODORUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true?

SOCRATES: And doesn't he admit that his own opinion is false if he agrees with those who think he is wrong?

THEODORUS: Of course.

THEODORUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely?

SOCRATES: But the other side does not admit that they are speaking falsely?

THEODORUS: They do not.

THEODORUS: They don't.

SOCRATES: And he, as may be inferred from his writings, agrees that this opinion is also true.

SOCRATES: And his writings suggest that he also agrees this opinion is true.

THEODORUS: Clearly.

THEODORUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Then all mankind, beginning with Protagoras, will contend, or rather, I should say that he will allow, when he concedes that his adversary has a true opinion—Protagoras, I say, will himself allow that neither a dog nor any ordinary man is the measure of anything which he has not learned—am I not right?

SOCRATES: Then all people, starting with Protagoras, will argue this. Or rather, Protagoras himself will admit it when he concedes that his opponent has a true opinion. He will admit that neither a dog nor an ordinary person is the measure of anything they have not learned. Am I right?

THEODORUS: Yes.

THEODORUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true neither to himself to any one else?

SOCRATES: And since everyone doubts Protagoras's truth, will it be true neither to him nor to anyone else?

THEODORUS: I think, Socrates, that we are running my old friend too hard.

THEODORUS: I think, Socrates, that we are pushing my old friend too hard.

SOCRATES: But I do not know that we are going beyond the truth. Doubtless, as he is older, he may be expected to be wiser than we are. And if he could only just get his head out of the world below, he would have overthrown both of us again and again, me for talking nonsense and you for assenting to me, and have been off and underground in a trice. But as he is not within call, we must make the best use of our own faculties, such as they are, and speak out what appears to us to be true. And one thing which no one will deny is, that there are great differences in the understandings of men.

SOCRATES: But I am not sure we are going beyond the truth. Since he is older, we can surely expect him to be wiser than we are. If he could just get his head out of the world below, he would defeat us both again and again. He would defeat me for talking nonsense and you for agreeing with me. Then he would be back underground in no time. But since he is not here to consult, we must make the best use of our own abilities, such as they are. We must say what seems true to us. And no one will deny that people differ greatly in their understanding.

THEODORUS: In that opinion I quite agree.

THEODORUS: I completely agree with that opinion.

SOCRATES: And is there not most likely to be firm ground in the distinction which we were indicating on behalf of Protagoras, viz. that most things, and all immediate sensations, such as hot, dry, sweet, are only such as they appear; if however difference of opinion is to be allowed at all, surely we must allow it in respect of health or disease? for every woman, child, or living creature has not such a knowledge of what conduces to health as to enable them to cure themselves.

SOCRATES: And is there not likely to be some solid ground in the distinction we suggested on Protagoras's behalf? Most things, and all immediate sensations, such as hot, dry, and sweet, are only as they appear. But if we allow differences of opinion at all, surely we must allow them about health and disease. For not every woman, child, or living creature knows enough about what promotes health to cure themselves.

THEODORUS: I quite agree.

THEODORUS: I completely agree.

SOCRATES: Or again, in politics, while affirming that just and unjust, honourable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in reality to each state such as the state thinks and makes lawful, and that in determining these matters no individual or state is wiser than another, still the followers of Protagoras will not deny that in determining what is or is not expedient for the community one state is wiser and one counsellor better than another—they will scarcely venture to maintain, that what a city enacts in the belief that it is expedient will always be really expedient. But in the other case, I mean when they speak of justice and injustice, piety and impiety, they are confident that in nature these have no existence or essence of their own—the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of the agreement, and as long as the agreement lasts; and this is the philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with Protagoras. Here arises a new question, Theodorus, which threatens to be more serious than the last.

SOCRATES: Or consider politics. Protagoras's followers claim that, for each state, justice and injustice, honor and disgrace, holiness and unholiness are what the state thinks they are and establishes by law. They also claim that, in deciding these matters, no individual or state is wiser than another. Still, they will not deny that one state is wiser than another in deciding what benefits the community, or that one adviser is better than another. They would hardly dare claim that a city's laws will always benefit it just because it believes they will. But when they speak of justice and injustice, piety and impiety, they are confident that these have no existence or essence of their own in nature. What people agree on is true when they agree to it, and remains true as long as the agreement lasts. Many people who do not entirely agree with Protagoras also hold this view. A new question arises here, Theodorus, and it threatens to be more serious than the last.

THEODORUS: Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure.

THEODORUS: Well, Socrates, we have plenty of time.

SOCRATES: That is true, and your remark recalls to my mind an observation which I have often made, that those who have passed their days in the pursuit of philosophy are ridiculously at fault when they have to appear and speak in court. How natural is this!

SOCRATES: That is true, and your remark reminds me of something I have often noticed. People who spend their lives studying philosophy are ridiculously awkward when they have to appear and speak in court. How natural that is!

THEODORUS: What do you mean?

THEODORUS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: I mean to say, that those who have been trained in philosophy and liberal pursuits are as unlike those who from their youth upwards have been knocking about in the courts and such places, as a freeman is in breeding unlike a slave.

SOCRATES: I mean that people trained in philosophy and other liberal pursuits are very different from those who have spent time in the courts and similar places since they were young. They differ as much in upbringing as a free person does from a slave.

THEODORUS: In what is the difference seen?

THEODORUS: Where do you see the difference?

SOCRATES: In the leisure spoken of by you, which a freeman can always command: he has his talk out in peace, and, like ourselves, he wanders at will from one subject to another, and from a second to a third,—if the fancy takes him, he begins again, as we are doing now, caring not whether his words are many or few; his only aim is to attain the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the water of the clepsydra driving him on, and not allowing him to expatiate at will: and there is his adversary standing over him, enforcing his rights; the indictment, which in their phraseology is termed the affidavit, is recited at the time: and from this he must not deviate. He is a servant, and is continually disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his hands; the trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always concerns himself; and often the race is for his life. The consequence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd; he has learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed; but his soul is small and unrighteous. His condition, which has been that of a slave from his youth upwards, has deprived him of growth and uprightness and independence; dangers and fears, which were too much for his truth and honesty, came upon him in early years, when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them, and he has been driven into crooked ways; from the first he has practised deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness in him; and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument? Do not let us abuse the freedom of digression which we claim.

SOCRATES: You spoke of leisure, which a free man can always enjoy. He can talk in peace and, like us, wander from one subject to another, then to a third. If he feels like it, he can begin again, as we are doing now. He does not care whether he speaks at length or briefly. His only aim is to reach the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry. The water in the clepsydra drives him on and prevents him from speaking as long as he likes. His opponent stands over him, insisting on his rights. The indictment, which they call the affidavit, is read out, and the lawyer must not stray from it. He is a servant, always arguing about a fellow servant before his master. The master sits there with the case in his hands. The trial is never about something that does not matter to the lawyer. It always concerns him, and often his life is at stake. As a result, the lawyer has become sharp and cunning. He has learned to flatter his master with words and please him with deeds. But his soul is small and unjust. His life as a slave from his youth has deprived him of growth, honesty, and independence. Dangers and fears came upon him early, when he was too young to face them. They were too much for his truthfulness and honesty, and they drove him into crooked ways. From the start, he practiced deception and retaliation, and he became stunted and warped. So he passed from youth into manhood with nothing sound in him. Now he thinks he has mastered wisdom. Such is the lawyer, Theodorus. Would you like a companion picture of the philosopher, who belongs to our brotherhood? Or shall we return to the argument? Let us not abuse the freedom to wander from the subject that we claim.

THEODORUS: Nay, Socrates, not until we have finished what we are about; for you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, and are not the servants of the argument; but the argument is our servant, and must wait our leisure. Who is our judge? Or where is the spectator having any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets?

THEODORUS: No, Socrates, not until we have finished what we are doing. You were right to say that we belong to a free brotherhood. We are not servants of the argument. The argument is our servant, and it must wait until we are ready. Who is our judge? Where is the spectator who has any right to criticize or control us, as he might the poets?

SOCRATES: Then, as this is your wish, I will describe the leaders; for there is no use in talking about the inferior sort. In the first place, the lords of philosophy have never, from their youth upwards, known their way to the Agora, or the dicastery, or the council, or any other political assembly; they neither see nor hear the laws or decrees, as they are called, of the state written or recited; the eagerness of political societies in the attainment of offices—clubs, and banquets, and revels, and singing-maidens,—do not enter even into their dreams. Whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace may have descended to any one from his ancestors, male or female, are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell, as they say, how many pints are contained in the ocean. Neither is he conscious of his ignorance. For he does not hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation; but the truth is, that the outer form of him only is in the city: his mind, disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human things, is 'flying all abroad' as Pindar says, measuring earth and heaven and the things which are under and on the earth and above the heaven, interrogating the whole nature of each and all in their entirety, but not condescending to anything which is within reach.

SOCRATES: Since you wish it, I will describe the leaders. There is no use talking about the lesser sort. First, the leading philosophers have never, since their youth, known their way to the Agora, the law courts, the council, or any other political assembly. They neither see nor hear the written or spoken laws and decrees, as they are called, of the state. Political groups eagerly pursue office through clubs, banquets, revels, and singing girls. But such things do not even enter the philosophers' dreams. The philosopher knows no more about whether events in the city have turned out well or badly than he knows, as they say, how many pints are in the ocean. He knows no more about any disgrace a person may have inherited from male or female ancestors. Nor is he aware of his ignorance. He does not keep his distance to gain a reputation. The truth is that only his body is in the city. His mind despises the smallness and worthlessness of human affairs. It is 'flying all abroad', as Pindar says, measuring earth and heaven, and what lies beneath and on the earth and above heaven. It examines the whole nature of each thing and of all things together. But it does not stoop to anything close at hand.

THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates?

THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest which the clever witty Thracian handmaid is said to have made about Thales, when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This is a jest which is equally applicable to all philosophers. For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next-door neighbour; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a man or an animal; he is searching into the essence of man, and busy in enquiring what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer different from any other;—I think that you understand me, Theodorus?

SOCRATES: Theodorus, I will explain what I mean with a joke a clever, witty Thracian maid is said to have made about Thales. He fell into a well while looking up at the stars. She said he was so eager to know what was happening in heaven that he couldn't see what was at his feet. The same joke applies to all philosophers. A philosopher knows nothing at all about his next-door neighbor. He doesn't know what his neighbor is doing, and he hardly knows whether his neighbor is a man or an animal. Instead, he is searching for the essence of man. He is busy asking what human nature is suited to do or experience, unlike any other nature. I think you understand me, Theodorus?

THEODORUS: I do, and what you say is true.

THEODORUS: I do, and you are right.

SOCRATES: And thus, my friend, on every occasion, private as well as public, as I said at first, when he appears in a law-court, or in any place in which he has to speak of things which are at his feet and before his eyes, he is the jest, not only of Thracian handmaids but of the general herd, tumbling into wells and every sort of disaster through his inexperience. His awkwardness is fearful, and gives the impression of imbecility. When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals of any one, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being praised and glorified, in the simplicity of his heart he cannot help going into fits of laughter, so that he seems to be a downright idiot. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of cattle—a swineherd, or shepherd, or perhaps a cowherd, who is congratulated on the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them; and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any shepherd—for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed proprietors of ten thousand acres and more, our philosopher deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he can show seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that their sentiments only betray a dull and narrow vision in those who utter them, and who are not educated enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man has had thousands and ten thousands of progenitors, and among them have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians, innumerable. And when people pride themselves on having a pedigree of twenty-five ancestors, which goes back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, he cannot understand their poverty of ideas. Why are they unable to calculate that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor, who might have been anybody, and was such as fortune made him, and he had a fiftieth, and so on? He amuses himself with the notion that they cannot count, and thinks that a little arithmetic would have got rid of their senseless vanity. Now, in all these cases our philosopher is derided by the vulgar, partly because he is thought to despise them, and also because he is ignorant of what is before him, and always at a loss.

SOCRATES: And so, my friend, it happens on every occasion, private or public, as I said at first. When he appears in court or anywhere else, he may have to speak about things right before his eyes. Then everyone laughs at him, not just Thracian servant girls but ordinary people too. His lack of experience sends him tumbling into wells and all sorts of trouble. His awkwardness is dreadful and makes him seem stupid. When people insult him, he has no personal reply to their courtesies. He knows no scandals about anyone, and they do not interest him. So people laugh at him for being so sheepish. And when others are praised and glorified, he innocently bursts out laughing. This makes him seem like a complete idiot. When he hears people praising a tyrant or king, he imagines they are praising a cattle keeper. He might be a swineherd, a shepherd, or perhaps a cowherd, congratulated on how much milk he squeezes from his animals. The philosopher remarks that the creature the ruler tends and squeezes wealth from is less manageable and more deceitful. He also observes that the great man must be as ill-mannered and uneducated as any shepherd. He has no leisure, and the wall surrounding him is his mountain pen. When the philosopher hears of huge landowners with ten thousand acres or more, he thinks little of it. He is used to thinking of the whole earth. People praise family background and call someone a gentleman because he can show seven generations of wealthy ancestors. The philosopher thinks their words reveal only a dull and narrow outlook. They are not educated enough to look at the whole picture. Nor do they consider that every person has had thousands upon thousands of ancestors. Among those ancestors have been countless rich and poor people, kings and slaves, Greeks and foreigners. Some people pride themselves on a line of twenty-five ancestors, going back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon. The philosopher cannot understand how limited their thinking is. Why can they not work out that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor of his own? That ancestor might have been anyone, and fortune made him whatever he was. Amphitryon also had a fiftieth ancestor, and so on. The philosopher amuses himself with the thought that these people cannot count. He thinks a little arithmetic would have cured their senseless vanity. Now, in all these cases, ordinary people make fun of the philosopher. This is partly because they think he despises them. It is also because he does not know what is right in front of him and is always at a loss.

THEODORUS: That is very true, Socrates.

THEODORUS: That's very true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: But, O my friend, when he draws the other into upper air, and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of justice and injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another and from all other things; or from the commonplaces about the happiness of a king or of a rich man to the consideration of government, and of human happiness and misery in general—what they are, and how a man is to attain the one and avoid the other—when that narrow, keen, little legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the philosopher his revenge; for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, whence he looks down into space, which is a strange experience to him, he being dismayed, and lost, and stammering broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the situation, but by every man who has not been brought up a slave. Such are the two characters, Theodorus: the one of the freeman, who has been trained in liberty and leisure, whom you call the philosopher,—him we cannot blame because he appears simple and of no account when he has to perform some menial task, such as packing up bed-clothes, or flavouring a sauce or fawning speech; the other character is that of the man who is able to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman; still less with the music of discourse can he hymn the true life aright which is lived by immortals or men blessed of heaven.

SOCRATES: But, my friend, the philosopher may lead the other man up into the open air. He draws him away from legal arguments and replies to consider justice and injustice themselves. He asks how they differ from each other and from everything else. Or he draws him away from conventional claims about the happiness of a king or a rich man. Instead, he asks him to consider government and human happiness and misery in general. What are they? How can a person achieve happiness and avoid misery? When that sharp but narrow little legal mind must answer such questions, the philosopher gets his revenge. The man is dizzy at the height where he hangs, looking down into empty space. This is a strange experience for him. Dismayed and lost, he stammers out broken words. He is laughed at, not by Thracian servant girls or other uneducated people, who cannot see what is happening. Rather, everyone who has not been raised as a slave laughs at him. Those are the two characters, Theodorus. One is the free man, trained in freedom and leisure, whom you call the philosopher. We cannot blame him if he seems simple and useless when he has to do some menial task. He may have to pack up bedding, season a sauce, or make a flattering speech. The other can do all these kinds of service quickly and neatly, but cannot wear his cloak like a gentleman. Still less can he use the music of speech to sing properly of the true life lived by immortals or people blessed by heaven.

THEODORUS: If you could only persuade everybody, Socrates, as you do me, of the truth of your words, there would be more peace and fewer evils among men.

THEODORUS: Socrates, if you could convince everyone, as you have convinced me, that your words are true, there would be more peace and less evil among people.

SOCRATES: Evils, Theodorus, can never pass away; for there must always remain something which is antagonistic to good. Having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity they hover around the mortal nature, and this earthly sphere. Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy, just, and wise. But, O my friend, you cannot easily convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or avoid vice, not merely in order that a man may seem to be good, which is the reason given by the world, and in my judgment is only a repetition of an old wives' fable. Whereas, the truth is that God is never in any way unrighteous—he is perfect righteousness; and he of us who is the most righteous is most like him. Herein is seen the true cleverness of a man, and also his nothingness and want of manhood. For to know this is true wisdom and virtue, and ignorance of this is manifest folly and vice. All other kinds of wisdom or cleverness, which seem only, such as the wisdom of politicians, or the wisdom of the arts, are coarse and vulgar. The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer of unholy things, had far better not be encouraged in the illusion that his roguery is clever; for men glory in their shame—they fancy that they hear others saying of them, 'These are not mere good-for-nothing persons, mere burdens of the earth, but such as men should be who mean to dwell safely in a state.' Let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they do not think they are because they do not know it; for they do not know the penalty of injustice, which above all things they ought to know—not stripes and death, as they suppose, which evil-doers often escape, but a penalty which cannot be escaped.

SOCRATES: Evils can never disappear, Theodorus, because there must always be something opposed to good. They have no place among the gods in heaven. So they must linger around mortal nature and this earthly world. That is why we should flee from earth to heaven as quickly as we can. To flee is to become as much like God as possible. And to become like him is to become holy, just, and wise. But, my friend, it is not easy to convince people to pursue virtue and avoid vice for their own sake. Most people say we should do so just to appear good. In my judgment, that is only a retelling of an old wives' tale. The truth is that God is never unjust in any way. He is perfectly just, and the most just among us is most like him. This is the measure of a person's true intelligence, as well as their worthlessness and lack of courage. Knowing this is true wisdom and virtue. Ignorance of it is plainly folly and vice. All other forms of apparent wisdom or cleverness, such as political skill or skill in the arts, are crude and vulgar. A person who acts unjustly, or says and does unholy things, should not be encouraged to think their wrongdoing is clever. Such people take pride in what should shame them. They imagine others saying of them, 'These are not mere good-for-nothings, burdens on the earth. They are the sort of people one must be to live safely in a state.' Let us tell them that their ignorance makes them all the more truly the good-for-nothings they think they are not. For they do not know the penalty for injustice, though they should know it above all else. It is not whipping or death, as they suppose. Wrongdoers often escape those punishments, but they cannot escape the true penalty.

THEODORUS: What is that?

THEODORUS: What is that?

SOCRATES: There are two patterns eternally set before them; the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched: but they do not see them, or perceive that in their utter folly and infatuation they are growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of their evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they are growing like. And if we tell them, that unless they depart from their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death; and that here on earth, they will live ever in the likeness of their own evil selves, and with evil friends—when they hear this they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to the talk of idiots.

SOCRATES: Two patterns stand before them forever. One is blessed and divine, the other godless and miserable. But they do not see either pattern. In their utter foolishness and delusion, they do not realize what their evil deeds are doing to them. They are becoming more like the one pattern and less like the other. Their punishment is to live a life that matches the pattern they are coming to resemble. We may tell them that unless they give up their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death. We may also tell them that here on earth, they will always live like their own evil selves, surrounded by evil friends. But when they hear this, they will seem, in their superior cunning, to be listening to idiots.

THEODORUS: Very true, Socrates.

THEODORUS: That's very true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Too true, my friend, as I well know; there is, however, one peculiarity in their case: when they begin to reason in private about their dislike of philosophy, if they have the courage to hear the argument out, and do not run away, they grow at last strangely discontented with themselves; their rhetoric fades away, and they become helpless as children. These however are digressions from which we must now desist, or they will overflow, and drown the original argument; to which, if you please, we will now return.

SOCRATES: Very true, my friend, as I well know. But there is something peculiar about them. When they begin to reason in private about their dislike of philosophy, they eventually become strangely dissatisfied with themselves. That is, if they have the courage to hear the argument out and do not run away. Their rhetoric fades, and they become as helpless as children. But we must stop digressing now, or these digressions will overflow and drown the original argument. If you please, let us return to it.

THEODORUS: For my part, Socrates, I would rather have the digressions, for at my age I find them easier to follow; but if you wish, let us go back to the argument.

THEODORUS: I prefer the digressions, Socrates, because at my age I find them easier to follow. But if you want, let's return to the argument.

SOCRATES: Had we not reached the point at which the partisans of the perpetual flux, who say that things are as they seem to each one, were confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded and thought just, were just to the state which imposed them, while they were in force; this was especially asserted of justice; but as to the good, no one had any longer the hardihood to contend of any ordinances which the state thought and enacted to be good that these, while they were in force, were really good;—he who said so would be playing with the name 'good,' and would not touch the real question—it would be a mockery, would it not?

SOCRATES: Had we not reached this point? The supporters of perpetual flux say that things are as they seem to each person. They confidently maintained that a state's laws were just for that state if it judged them just. They said the laws remained just as long as they were in force. They asserted this especially about justice. But when it came to the good, no one dared make the same claim. No one dared say that laws were really good simply because the state judged them good and enacted them. Even if the laws remained in force, no one dared claim they were really good. Anyone who said so would be playing with the name 'good' and avoiding the real question. That would be a mockery, would it not?

THEODORUS: Certainly it would.

THEODORUS: Of course it would.

SOCRATES: He ought not to speak of the name, but of the thing which is contemplated under the name.

SOCRATES: He should speak not about the name, but about the thing the name refers to.

THEODORUS: Right.

THEODORUS: Right.

SOCRATES: Whatever be the term used, the good or expedient is the aim of legislation, and as far as she has an opinion, the state imposes all laws with a view to the greatest expediency; can legislation have any other aim?

SOCRATES: Whatever you call it, the aim of making laws is what is good or useful. The state makes all its laws with the greatest benefit in mind, as it sees it. Can making laws have any other aim?

THEODORUS: Certainly not.

THEODORUS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: But is the aim attained always? do not mistakes often happen?

SOCRATES: But is the aim always achieved? Don't mistakes often happen?

THEODORUS: Yes, I think that there are mistakes.

THEODORUS: Yes, I think there are mistakes.

SOCRATES: The possibility of error will be more distinctly recognised, if we put the question in reference to the whole class under which the good or expedient falls. That whole class has to do with the future, and laws are passed under the idea that they will be useful in after-time; which, in other words, is the future.

SOCRATES: We can see the possibility of error more clearly if we consider the whole category of good or useful things. This whole category concerns the future. Laws are passed because people believe they will be useful later, in other words, in the future.

THEODORUS: Very true.

THEODORUS: That's very true.

SOCRATES: Suppose now, that we ask Protagoras, or one of his disciples, a question:—O, Protagoras, we will say to him, Man is, as you declare, the measure of all things—white, heavy, light: of all such things he is the judge; for he has the criterion of them in himself, and when he thinks that things are such as he experiences them to be, he thinks what is and is true to himself. Is it not so?

SOCRATES: Suppose we ask Protagoras, or one of his followers, a question. We might say: Protagoras, you claim that man is the measure of all things. He judges whether things are white, heavy, light, or anything of that sort. He has the standard for judging these things within himself. When he believes that things are as he experiences them, he believes what is real and true for him. Isn't that right?

THEODORUS: Yes.

THEODORUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And do you extend your doctrine, Protagoras (as we shall further say), to the future as well as to the present; and has he the criterion not only of what in his opinion is but of what will be, and do things always happen to him as he expected? For example, take the case of heat:—When an ordinary man thinks that he is going to have a fever, and that this kind of heat is coming on, and another person, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion is likely to prove right? Or are they both right?—he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician's judgment?

SOCRATES: And, Protagoras, do you extend your doctrine to the future as well as the present, as we shall go on to ask? Is a person the judge not only of what he thinks is true, but also of what will happen? And do things always happen as he expects? Take heat, for example. An ordinary man thinks he is going to have a fever, and that this kind of heat is coming on. A physician thinks otherwise. Whose opinion is likely to prove right? Or are they both right? Will the man have heat and a fever in his own judgment, but not have a fever in the physician's judgment?

THEODORUS: How ludicrous!

THEODORUS: How ridiculous!

SOCRATES: And the vinegrower, if I am not mistaken, is a better judge of the sweetness or dryness of the vintage which is not yet gathered than the harp-player?

SOCRATES: And if I'm not mistaken, a grape grower can judge the sweetness or dryness of an unharvested crop better than a harpist can?

THEODORUS: Certainly.

THEODORUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And in musical composition the musician will know better than the training master what the training master himself will hereafter think harmonious or the reverse?

SOCRATES: And when composing music, will the musician know better than the training master what the training master will later find harmonious or not?

THEODORUS: Of course.

THEODORUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And the cook will be a better judge than the guest, who is not a cook, of the pleasure to be derived from the dinner which is in preparation; for of present or past pleasure we are not as yet arguing; but can we say that every one will be to himself the best judge of the pleasure which will seem to be and will be to him in the future?—nay, would not you, Protagoras, better guess which arguments in a court would convince any one of us than the ordinary man?

SOCRATES: The cook will be a better judge than a guest who is not a cook of how enjoyable the dinner being prepared will be. We are not yet discussing present or past pleasure. But can we say that everyone is the best judge of what will seem pleasurable, and be pleasurable, to them in the future? And wouldn't you, Protagoras, be better than an ordinary person at guessing which arguments in court would convince any of us?

THEODORUS: Certainly, Socrates, he used to profess in the strongest manner that he was the superior of all men in this respect.

THEODORUS: Certainly, Socrates, he used to insist that he was better than everyone else in this respect.

SOCRATES: To be sure, friend: who would have paid a large sum for the privilege of talking to him, if he had really persuaded his visitors that neither a prophet nor any other man was better able to judge what will be and seem to be in the future than every one could for himself?

SOCRATES: Of course, friend. Who would have paid a large sum to talk to him if he had really convinced his visitors of this? He would have had to convince them that no prophet or anyone else could judge the future better than they could themselves. That includes judging both what will happen and what will seem to happen.

THEODORUS: Who indeed?

THEODORUS: Who, indeed?

SOCRATES: And legislation and expediency are all concerned with the future; and every one will admit that states, in passing laws, must often fail of their highest interests?

SOCRATES: And laws and what is beneficial both concern the future. Surely everyone would agree that states often fail to serve their highest interests when they make laws?

THEODORUS: Quite true.

THEODORUS: That's true.

SOCRATES: Then we may fairly argue against your master, that he must admit one man to be wiser than another, and that the wiser is a measure: but I, who know nothing, am not at all obliged to accept the honour which the advocate of Protagoras was just now forcing upon me, whether I would or not, of being a measure of anything.

SOCRATES: Then we may fairly argue that your master must admit that one man is wiser than another. He must also admit that the wiser man is a measure. But I know nothing, so I am not at all obliged to accept the honor of being a measure of anything. Protagoras’s advocate was just now trying to force that honor on me, whether I wanted it or not.

THEODORUS: That is the best refutation of him, Socrates; although he is also caught when he ascribes truth to the opinions of others, who give the lie direct to his own opinion.

THEODORUS: That is the best refutation of him, Socrates. Although he is also caught out when he calls other people's opinions true, even when they directly contradict his own.

SOCRATES: There are many ways, Theodorus, in which the doctrine that every opinion of every man is true may be refuted; but there is more difficulty in proving that states of feeling, which are present to a man, and out of which arise sensations and opinions in accordance with them, are also untrue. And very likely I have been talking nonsense about them; for they may be unassailable, and those who say that there is clear evidence of them, and that they are matters of knowledge, may probably be right; in which case our friend Theaetetus was not so far from the mark when he identified perception and knowledge. And therefore let us draw nearer, as the advocate of Protagoras desires; and give the truth of the universal flux a ring: is the theory sound or not? at any rate, no small war is raging about it, and there are combination not a few.

SOCRATES: Theodorus, there are many ways to refute the claim that everyone’s opinion is true. But it is harder to prove that a person’s present feelings are also untrue. Sensations and opinions arise from these feelings and correspond to them. I may well have been talking nonsense about feelings. For they may be beyond dispute. Those who say that we have clear evidence of them and can know them may be right. If so, our friend Theaetetus was not so far off when he said perception and knowledge were the same. So let us take a closer look, as Protagoras’s advocate wants us to. Let us test the claim of universal flux. Is the theory sound or not? In any case, a major war is raging over it, with many alliances on both sides.

THEODORUS: No small, war, indeed, for in Ionia the sect makes rapid strides; the disciples of Heracleitus are most energetic upholders of the doctrine.

THEODORUS: No small war, indeed, for the sect is growing rapidly in Ionia. The followers of Heracleitus are vigorous defenders of the doctrine.

SOCRATES: Then we are the more bound, my dear Theodorus, to examine the question from the foundation as it is set forth by themselves.

SOCRATES: Then, my dear Theodorus, we have even more reason to examine the question from the beginning, as they themselves present it.

THEODORUS: Certainly we are. About these speculations of Heracleitus, which, as you say, are as old as Homer, or even older still, the Ephesians themselves, who profess to know them, are downright mad, and you cannot talk with them on the subject. For, in accordance with their text-books, they are always in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or a question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they can no more do so than they can fly; or rather, the determination of these fellows not to have a particle of rest in them is more than the utmost powers of negation can express. If you ask any of them a question, he will produce, as from a quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them at you; and if you inquire the reason of what he has said, you will be hit by some other new-fangled word, and will make no way with any of them, nor they with one another; their great care is, not to allow of any settled principle either in their arguments or in their minds, conceiving, as I imagine, that any such principle would be stationary; for they are at war with the stationary, and do what they can to drive it out everywhere.

THEODORUS: We certainly are. You say Heracleitus’s ideas are as old as Homer, or even older. The Ephesians themselves claim to understand them, but they are downright mad. You cannot talk with them about these ideas. In keeping with their textbooks, they are always in motion. But they cannot stick to an argument or a question and calmly take turns asking and answering. They can no more do that than fly. In fact, no words can fully express how determined these fellows are never to be still. If you ask one of them a question, he pulls out a short, obscure saying, as if from a quiver, and shoots it at you. If you ask why he said it, he hits you with another newfangled word. You will get nowhere with any of them, and they get nowhere with one another. Their main concern is to allow no settled principle in their arguments or their minds. I suppose they think any such principle would be stationary. They are at war with anything stationary and do what they can to drive it out everywhere.

SOCRATES: I suppose, Theodorus, that you have only seen them when they were fighting, and have never stayed with them in time of peace, for they are no friends of yours; and their peace doctrines are only communicated by them at leisure, as I imagine, to those disciples of theirs whom they want to make like themselves.

SOCRATES: I suppose, Theodorus, you have only seen them fighting. You have never spent time with them in peacetime, because they are not friends of yours. And I imagine they teach their doctrines of peace only when they have time. They share them with disciples they want to make like themselves.

THEODORUS: Disciples! my good sir, they have none; men of their sort are not one another's disciples, but they grow up at their own sweet will, and get their inspiration anywhere, each of them saying of his neighbour that he knows nothing. From these men, then, as I was going to remark, you will never get a reason, whether with their will or without their will; we must take the question out of their hands, and make the analysis ourselves, as if we were doing geometrical problem.

THEODORUS: Disciples! My good sir, they have none. Men like these are not one another's disciples. They develop however they please and find inspiration anywhere. Each says that his neighbor knows nothing. As I was about to say, you will never get a reasoned explanation from these men, willingly or unwillingly. So we must take the question out of their hands and analyze it ourselves, as if solving a geometry problem.

SOCRATES: Quite right too; but as touching the aforesaid problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their wisdom from the many in poetical figures, that Oceanus and Tethys, the origin of all things, are streams, and that nothing is at rest? And now the moderns, in their superior wisdom, have declared the same openly, that the cobbler too may hear and learn of them, and no longer foolishly imagine that some things are at rest and others in motion—having learned that all is motion, he will duly honour his teachers. I had almost forgotten the opposite doctrine, Theodorus,

SOCRATES: Quite right. But what about the problem we mentioned? The ancients hid their wisdom from most people in poetic images. Haven't we heard them say that Oceanus and Tethys, the source of all things, are streams? And that nothing is at rest? Now the moderns, in their superior wisdom, have said the same thing openly. Even the cobbler can hear and learn from them. He will no longer foolishly imagine that some things are at rest and others are in motion. Having learned that everything is in motion, he will pay his teachers due respect. I had almost forgotten the opposite doctrine, Theodorus,

     'Alone Being remains unmoved, which is the name for the all.'

This is the language of Parmenides, Melissus, and their followers, who stoutly maintain that all being is one and self-contained, and has no place in which to move. What shall we do, friend, with all these people; for, advancing step by step, we have imperceptibly got between the combatants, and, unless we can protect our retreat, we shall pay the penalty of our rashness—like the players in the palaestra who are caught upon the line, and are dragged different ways by the two parties. Therefore I think that we had better begin by considering those whom we first accosted, 'the river-gods,' and, if we find any truth in them, we will help them to pull us over, and try to get away from the others. But if the partisans of 'the whole' appear to speak more truly, we will fly off from the party which would move the immovable, to them. And if I find that neither of them have anything reasonable to say, we shall be in a ridiculous position, having so great a conceit of our own poor opinion and rejecting that of ancient and famous men. O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in proceeding when the danger is so great?

This is what Parmenides, Melissus, and their followers say. They insist that all being is one and self-contained, with no place to move. What shall we do with all these people, my friend? Step by step, we have slipped between the two sides without noticing. Unless we can protect our retreat, we will pay for our recklessness. We are like players in the wrestling school who are caught on the line and pulled in opposite directions by the two sides. So I think we should begin by considering the people we approached first, 'the river-gods.' If we find any truth in what they say, we will help them pull us to their side and try to escape the others. But if the supporters of 'the whole' seem to speak more truly, we will flee to them from the party that would move what cannot be moved. And if I find that neither side has anything reasonable to say, we will look ridiculous. We will be setting such store by our own poor opinion while rejecting the opinions of ancient and famous men. Theodorus, do you think there is any use in going on when the danger is so great?

THEODORUS: Nay, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly what the two parties have to say would be quite intolerable.

THEODORUS: No, Socrates, it would be quite intolerable not to examine thoroughly what both sides have to say.

SOCRATES: Then examine we must, since you, who were so reluctant to begin, are so eager to proceed. The nature of motion appears to be the question with which we begin. What do they mean when they say that all things are in motion? Is there only one kind of motion, or, as I rather incline to think, two? I should like to have your opinion upon this point in addition to my own, that I may err, if I must err, in your company; tell me, then, when a thing changes from one place to another, or goes round in the same place, is not that what is called motion?

SOCRATES: Then we must examine it, since you were so reluctant to begin but are now so eager to continue. We should begin with the nature of motion. What do they mean when they say that all things are in motion? Is there only one kind of motion, or are there two, as I am inclined to think? I would like to hear your opinion as well as my own. Then, if I must be wrong, I can be wrong in your company. Tell me, when something moves from one place to another, or turns around in the same place, isn't that called motion?

THEODORUS: Yes.

THEODORUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Here then we have one kind of motion. But when a thing, remaining on the same spot, grows old, or becomes black from being white, or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other change, may not this be properly called motion of another kind?

SOCRATES: So we have one kind of motion. But suppose something stays in the same place while it grows old, turns from white to black, or from soft to hard. Or suppose it changes in some other way. Could we properly call that another kind of motion?

THEODORUS: I think so.

THEODORUS: I think so.

SOCRATES: Say rather that it must be so. Of motion then there are these two kinds, 'change,' and 'motion in place.'

SOCRATES: Say instead that it must be so. So there are two kinds of motion: 'change' and 'motion in place.'

THEODORUS: You are right.

THEODORUS: You are right.

SOCRATES: And now, having made this distinction, let us address ourselves to those who say that all is motion, and ask them whether all things according to them have the two kinds of motion, and are changed as well as move in place, or is one thing moved in both ways, and another in one only?

SOCRATES: Now that we have made this distinction, let us turn to those who say that everything is in motion. Do they say that all things undergo both kinds of motion, changing as well as moving from place to place? Or do some things undergo both kinds, while others undergo only one?

THEODORUS: Indeed, I do not know what to answer; but I think they would say that all things are moved in both ways.

THEODORUS: I don't know what to say, but I think they would say that everything moves in both ways.

SOCRATES: Yes, comrade; for, if not, they would have to say that the same things are in motion and at rest, and there would be no more truth in saying that all things are in motion, than that all things are at rest.

SOCRATES: Yes, my friend. Otherwise, they would have to say that the same things are both moving and at rest. And saying that everything is moving would be no more true than saying that everything is at rest.

THEODORUS: To be sure.

THEODORUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion, all things must always have every sort of motion?

SOCRATES: And if everything must be in motion, must everything always have every kind of motion?

THEODORUS: Most true.

THEODORUS: Absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Consider a further point: did we not understand them to explain the generation of heat, whiteness, or anything else, in some such manner as the following:—were they not saying that each of them is moving between the agent and the patient, together with a perception, and that the patient ceases to be a perceiving power and becomes a percipient, and the agent a quale instead of a quality? I suspect that quality may appear a strange and uncouth term to you, and that you do not understand the abstract expression. Then I will take concrete instances: I mean to say that the producing power or agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness but hot and white, and the like of other things. For I must repeat what I said before, that neither the agent nor patient have any absolute existence, but when they come together and generate sensations and their objects, the one becomes a thing of a certain quality, and the other a percipient. You remember?

SOCRATES: Consider another point. Didn’t we understand them to explain how heat, whiteness, and other such things arise in something like the following way? Weren’t they saying that each moves between the agent and the patient, along with a perception? And that the patient stops being a power of perception and becomes a perceiver? Meanwhile, the agent becomes a thing with a quality, rather than a quality itself. I suspect that “quality” may seem a strange and awkward term to you. You may not understand the abstract expression. So I’ll give concrete examples. I mean that the producing power, or agent, becomes hot and white, not heat or whiteness. The same goes for other things. I must repeat what I said before: neither the agent nor the patient has any absolute existence. But when they come together and produce sensations and their objects, one becomes a thing with a certain quality. The other becomes a perceiver. You remember?

THEODORUS: Of course.

THEODORUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: We may leave the details of their theory unexamined, but we must not forget to ask them the only question with which we are concerned: Are all things in motion and flux?

SOCRATES: We can leave the details of their theory unexplored. But we must remember to ask them the only question that concerns us: Are all things in motion and constantly changing?

THEODORUS: Yes, they will reply.

THEODORUS: Yes, they will answer.

SOCRATES: And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished, that is to say, they move in place and are also changed?

SOCRATES: And do they move in both ways we identified? That is, do they move from place to place and also change?

THEODORUS: Of course, if the motion is to be perfect.

THEODORUS: Of course, if the motion is to be perfect.

SOCRATES: If they only moved in place and were not changed, we should be able to say what is the nature of the things which are in motion and flux?

SOCRATES: If they only moved in place and did not change, could we say what these moving, shifting things are?

THEODORUS: Exactly.

THEODORUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: But now, since not even white continues to flow white, and whiteness itself is a flux or change which is passing into another colour, and is never to be caught standing still, can the name of any colour be rightly used at all?

SOCRATES: But now, even white does not remain white as it flows. Whiteness itself is constantly changing into another color and never stands still. Since this is so, can we rightly use the name of any color at all?

THEODORUS: How is that possible, Socrates, either in the case of this or of any other quality—if while we are using the word the object is escaping in the flux?

THEODORUS: How is that possible, Socrates, for this quality or any other? The thing keeps changing even as we use the word for it.

SOCRATES: And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and hearing, or any other kind of perception? Is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing?

SOCRATES: And what would you say about perceptions, such as sight, hearing, or any other kind? Is there any stopping while we see and hear?

THEODORUS: Certainly not, if all things are in motion.

THEODORUS: Certainly not, if everything is moving.

SOCRATES: Then we must not speak of seeing any more than of not-seeing, nor of any other perception more than of any non-perception, if all things partake of every kind of motion?

SOCRATES: Then, if all things undergo every kind of motion, shouldn't we speak of seeing no more than not seeing? And shouldn't we speak of any other perception no more than its absence?

THEODORUS: Certainly not.

THEODORUS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: Yet perception is knowledge: so at least Theaetetus and I were saying.

SOCRATES: Yet perception is knowledge. At least, that is what Theaetetus and I were saying.

THEODORUS: Very true.

THEODORUS: That's very true.

SOCRATES: Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge?

SOCRATES: Then, when asked what knowledge is, did we answer that any more than we answered what knowledge is not?

THEODORUS: I suppose not.

THEODORUS: I suppose not.

SOCRATES: Here, then, is a fine result: we corrected our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest. But if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right: you may say that a thing is or is not thus; or, if you prefer, 'becomes' thus; and if we say 'becomes,' we shall not then hamper them with words expressive of rest.

SOCRATES: Well, this is a fine result. We corrected our first answer because we were eager to prove that nothing is at rest. But if nothing is at rest, every answer on any subject is equally right. You may say that a thing is or is not a certain way. Or, if you prefer, you may say it 'becomes' that way. If we say 'becomes,' we will not burden them with words that suggest rest.

THEODORUS: Quite true.

THEODORUS: That's true.

SOCRATES: Yes, Theodorus, except in saying 'thus' and 'not thus.' But you ought not to use the word 'thus,' for there is no motion in 'thus' or in 'not thus.' The maintainers of the doctrine have as yet no words in which to express themselves, and must get a new language. I know of no word that will suit them, except perhaps 'no how,' which is perfectly indefinite.

SOCRATES: Yes, Theodorus, except when you say 'thus' and 'not thus.' But you shouldn't use 'thus,' because there is no motion in 'thus' or 'not thus.' Those who support this doctrine have no words yet to express themselves. They must invent a new language. I know of no word that would suit them, except perhaps 'no how,' which is completely indefinite.

THEODORUS: Yes, that is a manner of speaking in which they will be quite at home.

THEODORUS: Yes, that's a way of speaking they'll feel quite at home with.

SOCRATES: And so, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend without assenting to his doctrine, that every man is the measure of all things—a wise man only is a measure; neither can we allow that knowledge is perception, certainly not on the hypothesis of a perpetual flux, unless perchance our friend Theaetetus is able to convince us that it is.

SOCRATES: So, Theodorus, we have dismissed your friend without accepting his doctrine that every person is the measure of all things. Only a wise person is a measure. Nor can we accept that knowledge is perception, certainly not if everything is constantly changing. Perhaps, though, our friend Theaetetus can convince us otherwise.

THEODORUS: Very good, Socrates; and now that the argument about the doctrine of Protagoras has been completed, I am absolved from answering; for this was the agreement.

THEODORUS: Very good, Socrates. Now that we have finished discussing Protagoras’s doctrine, I no longer have to answer questions. That was our agreement.

THEAETETUS: Not, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who say that all things are at rest, as you were proposing.

THEAETETUS: Not yet, Theodorus. You and Socrates must first discuss the view that everything is at rest, as you proposed.

THEODORUS: You, Theaetetus, who are a young rogue, must not instigate your elders to a breach of faith, but should prepare to answer Socrates in the remainder of the argument.

THEODORUS: Theaetetus, you young rascal, you must not encourage your elders to break their word. Instead, prepare to answer Socrates as the argument continues.

THEAETETUS: Yes, if he wishes; but I would rather have heard about the doctrine of rest.

THEAETETUS: Yes, if he wants to. But I would rather have heard about the doctrine of rest.

THEODORUS: Invite Socrates to an argument—invite horsemen to the open plain; do but ask him, and he will answer.

THEODORUS: Invite Socrates to an argument, and you might as well invite horsemen to an open plain. Just ask him, and he will answer.

SOCRATES: Nevertheless, Theodorus, I am afraid that I shall not be able to comply with the request of Theaetetus.

SOCRATES: Still, Theodorus, I'm afraid I won't be able to do what Theaetetus asks.

THEODORUS: Not comply! for what reason?

THEODORUS: Not comply? Why not?

SOCRATES: My reason is that I have a kind of reverence; not so much for Melissus and the others, who say that 'All is one and at rest,' as for the great leader himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as in Homeric language he may be called;—him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man, and I was a mere youth, and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind. And I am afraid that we may not understand his words, and may be still further from understanding his meaning; above all I fear that the nature of knowledge, which is the main subject of our discussion, may be thrust out of sight by the unbidden guests who will come pouring in upon our feast of discourse, if we let them in—besides, the question which is now stirring is of immense extent, and will be treated unfairly if only considered by the way; or if treated adequately and at length, will put into the shade the other question of knowledge. Neither the one nor the other can be allowed; but I must try by my art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge.

SOCRATES: My reason is that I feel a kind of reverence. I feel it less for Melissus and the others, who say that 'All is one and at rest,' than for their great leader, Parmenides himself. In Homer's language, he was venerable and awe-inspiring. I would be ashamed to approach him in a way unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man and I was very young. He seemed to me to have a gloriously deep mind. I am afraid that we may not understand his words, and may be even further from understanding what he meant. Above all, I fear that the nature of knowledge, our main subject, may be pushed out of sight. That could happen if we let uninvited guests pour into our feast of conversation. Besides, the question now arising is enormous. We would treat it unfairly if we considered it only in passing. But if we treated it adequately and at length, it would overshadow the question of knowledge. We cannot allow either outcome. Instead, I must use my art of midwifery to help Theaetetus give birth to his ideas about knowledge.

THEAETETUS: Very well; do so if you will.

THEAETETUS: All right, do it if you like.

SOCRATES: Then now, Theaetetus, take another view of the subject: you answered that knowledge is perception?

SOCRATES: Now, Theaetetus, let's look at this another way. You said that knowledge is perception?

THEAETETUS: I did.

THEAETETUS: I did.

SOCRATES: And if any one were to ask you: With what does a man see black and white colours? and with what does he hear high and low sounds?—you would say, if I am not mistaken, 'With the eyes and with the ears.'

SOCRATES: Suppose someone asked you: What does a person use to see black and white colors? What does a person use to hear high and low sounds? If I'm not mistaken, you would say, 'The eyes and the ears.'

THEAETETUS: I should.

THEAETETUS: I would.

SOCRATES: The free use of words and phrases, rather than minute precision, is generally characteristic of a liberal education, and the opposite is pedantic; but sometimes precision is necessary, and I believe that the answer which you have just given is open to the charge of incorrectness; for which is more correct, to say that we see or hear with the eyes and with the ears, or through the eyes and through the ears.

SOCRATES: A liberal education generally encourages flexible use of words rather than strict precision. The opposite is pedantic. But sometimes precision is necessary, and I believe your answer was not quite correct. Which is more accurate: to say we see and hear with our eyes and ears, or through them?

THEAETETUS: I should say 'through,' Socrates, rather than 'with.'

THEAETETUS: I'd say 'through,' Socrates, rather than 'with.'

SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, for no one can suppose that in each of us, as in a sort of Trojan horse, there are perched a number of unconnected senses, which do not all meet in some one nature, the mind, or whatever we please to call it, of which they are the instruments, and with which through them we perceive objects of sense.

SOCRATES: Yes, my boy. No one can suppose that each of us is like a Trojan horse, filled with separate, unconnected senses. All the senses must come together in one nature, the mind, or whatever we choose to call it. The senses are its instruments, and through them the mind perceives objects.

THEAETETUS: I agree with you in that opinion.

THEAETETUS: I agree with you.

SOCRATES: The reason why I am thus precise is, because I want to know whether, when we perceive black and white through the eyes, and again, other qualities through other organs, we do not perceive them with one and the same part of ourselves, and, if you were asked, you might refer all such perceptions to the body. Perhaps, however, I had better allow you to answer for yourself and not interfere. Tell me, then, are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the body?

SOCRATES: I am being so precise because I want to know something. We perceive black and white through our eyes, and other qualities through other organs. But do we perceive them all with one and the same part of ourselves? If asked, you might say that all these perceptions belong to the body. Perhaps, though, I should let you answer for yourself and not interfere. So tell me, aren't the organs through which you perceive warmth, hardness, light, and sweetness organs of the body?

THEAETETUS: Of the body, certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of the body, certainly.

SOCRATES: And you would admit that what you perceive through one faculty you cannot perceive through another; the objects of hearing, for example, cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through hearing?

SOCRATES: And would you agree that what you perceive through one sense, you cannot perceive through another? For example, you cannot see sounds or hear sights.

THEAETETUS: Of course not.

THEAETETUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception cannot come to you, either through the one or the other organ?

SOCRATES: If you have a thought about both of them, that shared perception can't come through either organ?

THEAETETUS: It cannot.

THEAETETUS: It can't.

SOCRATES: How about sounds and colours: in the first place you would admit that they both exist?

SOCRATES: What about sounds and colors? First, would you agree that both exist?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with itself?

SOCRATES: And that each is different from the other and the same as itself?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And that both are two and each of them one?

SOCRATES: And that together they are two, and each is one?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one another?

SOCRATES: Can you also tell whether they are alike or different?

THEAETETUS: I dare say.

THEAETETUS: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: But through what do you perceive all this about them? for neither through hearing nor yet through seeing can you apprehend that which they have in common. Let me give you an illustration of the point at issue:—If there were any meaning in asking whether sounds and colours are saline or not, you would be able to tell me what faculty would consider the question. It would not be sight or hearing, but some other.

SOCRATES: But what do you use to perceive all this about them? You cannot grasp what they have in common through hearing or sight. Let me illustrate the point. Suppose it made sense to ask whether sounds and colors are salty. You could tell me what faculty would consider that question. It would not be sight or hearing, but some other faculty.

THEAETETUS: Certainly; the faculty of taste.

THEAETETUS: Certainly, the sense of taste.

SOCRATES: Very good; and now tell me what is the power which discerns, not only in sensible objects, but in all things, universal notions, such as those which are called being and not-being, and those others about which we were just asking—what organs will you assign for the perception of these notions?

SOCRATES: Very good. Now tell me what ability recognizes general ideas, not only in things we sense, but in all things. These include being and not-being, and the other ideas we were just discussing. What organs would you say we use to perceive these ideas?

THEAETETUS: You are thinking of being and not being, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also of unity and other numbers which are applied to objects of sense; and you mean to ask, through what bodily organ the soul perceives odd and even numbers and other arithmetical conceptions.

THEAETETUS: You are thinking of being and not being, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference. You are also thinking of unity and other numbers applied to things we perceive through the senses. You mean to ask which bodily organ the soul uses to perceive odd and even numbers and other mathematical concepts.

SOCRATES: You follow me excellently, Theaetetus; that is precisely what I am asking.

SOCRATES: You understand me perfectly, Theaetetus. That is exactly what I’m asking.

THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot answer; my only notion is, that these, unlike objects of sense, have no separate organ, but that the mind, by a power of her own, contemplates the universals in all things.

THEAETETUS: Honestly, Socrates, I cannot answer. My only thought is that, unlike objects of sense, these have no separate organ. Instead, the mind uses its own power to consider the universals in all things.

SOCRATES: You are a beauty, Theaetetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus was saying; for he who utters the beautiful is himself beautiful and good. And besides being beautiful, you have done me a kindness in releasing me from a very long discussion, if you are clear that the soul views some things by herself and others through the bodily organs. For that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree with me.

SOCRATES: You are beautiful, Theaetetus, not ugly as Theodorus was saying. For anyone who speaks beautifully is himself beautiful and good. And besides being beautiful, you have done me a kindness. You have spared me a very long discussion, if you are sure that the soul sees some things by itself and others through the bodily organs. That was my own view, and I wanted you to agree with me.

THEAETETUS: I am quite clear.

THEAETETUS: I understand completely.

SOCRATES: And to which class would you refer being or essence; for this, of all our notions, is the most universal?

SOCRATES: And which class would you put being or essence in? Of all our ideas, it is the most universal.

THEAETETUS: I should say, to that class which the soul aspires to know of herself.

THEAETETUS: I would say it belongs to the class of things the soul seeks to know on its own.

SOCRATES: And would you say this also of like and unlike, same and other?

SOCRATES: And would you say the same about alike and different, same and other?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good and evil?

SOCRATES: And would you say the same about what is noble and shameful, and what is good and evil?

THEAETETUS: These I conceive to be notions which are essentially relative, and which the soul also perceives by comparing in herself things past and present with the future.

THEAETETUS: I think these are essentially relative concepts. The soul also perceives them by comparing past and present things with future ones.

SOCRATES: And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch?

SOCRATES: And doesn't she feel the hardness of a hard object and the softness of a soft one through touch?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: But their essence and what they are, and their opposition to one another, and the essential nature of this opposition, the soul herself endeavours to decide for us by the review and comparison of them?

SOCRATES: But the soul itself tries to decide what they are and what their essence is. It also tries to decide how they oppose each other and the essential nature of that opposition. It does this for us by examining and comparing them?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflections on the being and use of them are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by education and long experience.

SOCRATES: Nature gives humans and animals simple sensations at birth. These sensations reach the soul through the body. But thinking about their existence and use comes slowly and with difficulty, if it comes at all. It takes education and long experience.

THEAETETUS: Assuredly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being?

SOCRATES: And can someone reach truth without reaching being?

THEAETETUS: Impossible.

THEAETETUS: Impossible.

SOCRATES: And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing?

SOCRATES: And can someone know anything if they miss the truth about it?

THEAETETUS: He cannot.

THEAETETUS: He can't.

SOCRATES: Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being can be attained?

SOCRATES: Then knowledge comes not from sensory impressions, but from reasoning about them? Only through reasoning, not through impressions alone, can we reach truth and being?

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them?

SOCRATES: And would you call the two processes by the same name when they are so different?

THEAETETUS: That would certainly not be right.

THEAETETUS: That certainly wouldn't be right.

SOCRATES: And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?

SOCRATES: And what would you call seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling cold, and feeling hot?

THEAETETUS: I should call all of them perceiving—what other name could be given to them?

THEAETETUS: I would call all of them perceiving. What else could they be called?

SOCRATES: Perception would be the collective name of them?

SOCRATES: Would perception be the name for all of them?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being?

SOCRATES: Which, as we say, plays no part in reaching truth any more than it does in reaching being?

THEAETETUS: Certainly not.

THEAETETUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: And therefore not in science or knowledge?

SOCRATES: So, not in science or knowledge?

THEAETETUS: No.

THEAETETUS: No.

SOCRATES: Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science?

SOCRATES: Then, Theaetetus, perception can never be the same as knowledge or science?

THEAETETUS: Clearly not, Socrates; and knowledge has now been most distinctly proved to be different from perception.

THEAETETUS: Clearly not, Socrates. And it has now been clearly proved that knowledge is different from perception.

SOCRATES: But the original aim of our discussion was to find out rather what knowledge is than what it is not; at the same time we have made some progress, for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in that other process, however called, in which the mind is alone and engaged with being.

SOCRATES: But our original aim was to find out what knowledge is, rather than what it is not. Still, we have made some progress. We no longer look for knowledge in perception at all. Instead, we look for it in that other process, whatever we call it, in which the mind engages with being on its own.

THEAETETUS: You mean, Socrates, if I am not mistaken, what is called thinking or opining.

THEAETETUS: Socrates, if I'm not mistaken, you mean what we call thinking or forming an opinion.

SOCRATES: You conceive truly. And now, my friend, please to begin again at this point; and having wiped out of your memory all that has preceded, see if you have arrived at any clearer view, and once more say what is knowledge.

SOCRATES: You understand correctly. Now, my friend, please begin again at this point. Put everything that came before out of your mind. See if you have a clearer understanding, and tell me once more what knowledge is.

THEAETETUS: I cannot say, Socrates, that all opinion is knowledge, because there may be a false opinion; but I will venture to assert, that knowledge is true opinion: let this then be my reply; and if this is hereafter disproved, I must try to find another.

THEAETETUS: I cannot say that all opinion is knowledge, Socrates, because an opinion can be false. But I will suggest that knowledge is true opinion. Let that be my answer. If it is later disproved, I must try to find another.

SOCRATES: That is the way in which you ought to answer, Theaetetus, and not in your former hesitating strain, for if we are bold we shall gain one of two advantages; either we shall find what we seek, or we shall be less likely to think that we know what we do not know—in either case we shall be richly rewarded. And now, what are you saying?—Are there two sorts of opinion, one true and the other false; and do you define knowledge to be the true?

SOCRATES: That is how you should answer, Theaetetus, rather than hesitating as you did before. If we are bold, we will gain one of two advantages. Either we will find what we seek, or we will be less likely to think we know what we don't. Either way, we will be richly rewarded. Now, what are you saying? Are there two kinds of opinion, one true and the other false? And do you define knowledge as true opinion?

THEAETETUS: Yes, according to my present view.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that's what I think now.

SOCRATES: Is it still worth our while to resume the discussion touching opinion?

SOCRATES: Is it still worth continuing our discussion about opinion?

THEAETETUS: To what are you alluding?

THEAETETUS: What are you referring to?

SOCRATES: There is a point which often troubles me, and is a great perplexity to me, both in regard to myself and others. I cannot make out the nature or origin of the mental experience to which I refer.

SOCRATES: Something often troubles and puzzles me deeply, both in myself and in others. I cannot understand the nature or origin of this mental experience.

THEAETETUS: Pray what is it?

THEAETETUS: What is it?

SOCRATES: How there can be false opinion—that difficulty still troubles the eye of my mind; and I am uncertain whether I shall leave the question, or begin over again in a new way.

SOCRATES: How can an opinion be false? That question still troubles my mind. I am not sure whether to leave it or start again in a new way.

THEAETETUS: Begin again, Socrates,—at least if you think that there is the slightest necessity for doing so. Were not you and Theodorus just now remarking very truly, that in discussions of this kind we may take our own time?

THEAETETUS: Begin again, Socrates, if you think there is even the slightest need. Weren't you and Theodorus just saying, quite rightly, that we can take our time in discussions like this?

SOCRATES: You are quite right, and perhaps there will be no harm in retracing our steps and beginning again. Better a little which is well done, than a great deal imperfectly.

SOCRATES: You are quite right, and perhaps it won't hurt to go back and start again. It's better to do a little well than a lot imperfectly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Well, and what is the difficulty? Do we not speak of false opinion, and say that one man holds a false and another a true opinion, as though there were some natural distinction between them?

SOCRATES: Well, what is the difficulty? Don't we speak of false opinions? We say that one person has a false opinion and another has a true one, as if there were a natural distinction between them.

THEAETETUS: We certainly say so.

THEAETETUS: We certainly do.

SOCRATES: All things and everything are either known or not known. I leave out of view the intermediate conceptions of learning and forgetting, because they have nothing to do with our present question.

SOCRATES: Everything is either known or not known. I am leaving out learning and forgetting, which fall between the two, because they have nothing to do with our question.

THEAETETUS: There can be no doubt, Socrates, if you exclude these, that there is no other alternative but knowing or not knowing a thing.

THEAETETUS: Socrates, if you rule these out, there is no doubt that you either know something or you don't.

SOCRATES: That point being now determined, must we not say that he who has an opinion, must have an opinion about something which he knows or does not know?

SOCRATES: Now that we have settled that point, must we not say that anyone who has an opinion has it about something they either know or do not know?

THEAETETUS: He must.

THEAETETUS: He must.

SOCRATES: He who knows, cannot but know; and he who does not know, cannot know?

SOCRATES: Someone who knows cannot help knowing, and someone who does not know cannot know?

THEAETETUS: Of course.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: What shall we say then? When a man has a false opinion does he think that which he knows to be some other thing which he knows, and knowing both, is he at the same time ignorant of both?

SOCRATES: What should we say, then? When a man has a false opinion, does he mistake one thing he knows for another? Does he know both things and yet, at the same time, not know either of them?

THEAETETUS: That, Socrates, is impossible.

THEAETETUS: That's impossible, Socrates.

SOCRATES: But perhaps he thinks of something which he does not know as some other thing which he does not know; for example, he knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates, and yet he fancies that Theaetetus is Socrates, or Socrates Theaetetus?

SOCRATES: But perhaps he mistakes one thing he does not know for another thing he does not know. For example, he knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates. Yet he thinks Theaetetus is Socrates, or Socrates is Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: How can he?

THEAETETUS: How can he?

SOCRATES: But surely he cannot suppose what he knows to be what he does not know, or what he does not know to be what he knows?

SOCRATES: But surely he can't think that what he knows is something he doesn't know, or vice versa?

THEAETETUS: That would be monstrous.

THEAETETUS: That would be monstrous.

SOCRATES: Where, then, is false opinion? For if all things are either known or unknown, there can be no opinion which is not comprehended under this alternative, and so false opinion is excluded.

SOCRATES: Where, then, is false opinion? If all things are either known or unknown, every opinion must fall into one of those categories. So there can be no false opinion.

THEAETETUS: Most true.

THEAETETUS: Absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Suppose that we remove the question out of the sphere of knowing or not knowing, into that of being and not-being.

SOCRATES: Suppose we shift the question from knowing or not knowing to being or not being.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: May we not suspect the simple truth to be that he who thinks about anything, that which is not, will necessarily think what is false, whatever in other respects may be the state of his mind?

SOCRATES: Could the simple truth be that anyone who thinks about what does not exist must think falsely? Would this be true whatever else may be happening in their mind?

THEAETETUS: That, again, is not unlikely, Socrates.

THEAETETUS: That, too, is possible, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then suppose some one to say to us, Theaetetus:—Is it possible for any man to think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance or as a predicate of something else? And suppose that we answer, 'Yes, he can, when he thinks what is not true.'—That will be our answer?

SOCRATES: Then suppose someone asks us, Theaetetus: Is it possible to think of something that does not exist? Either as a thing in itself or as a quality of something else? Suppose we answer, 'Yes, he can, when he thinks something that is not true.' Would that be our answer?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: But is there any parallel to this?

SOCRATES: But is there anything like this?

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: Can a man see something and yet see nothing?

SOCRATES: Can someone see something and yet see nothing?

THEAETETUS: Impossible.

THEAETETUS: Impossible.

SOCRATES: But if he sees any one thing, he sees something that exists. Do you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non-existing things?

SOCRATES: But if he sees any one thing, he sees something that exists. Do you think that what is one can ever be found among things that don't exist?

THEAETETUS: I do not.

THEAETETUS: I don't.

SOCRATES: He then who sees some one thing, sees something which is?

SOCRATES: So, someone who sees a thing sees something that exists?

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And he who hears anything, hears some one thing, and hears that which is?

SOCRATES: And anyone who hears something hears one thing, and hears something that exists?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And he who touches anything, touches something which is one and therefore is?

SOCRATES: And when someone touches anything, they touch something that is one and therefore exists?

THEAETETUS: That again is true.

THEAETETUS: That's true again.

SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks, think some one thing?

SOCRATES: And doesn't someone who thinks, think about one thing?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which is?

SOCRATES: And doesn't someone who thinks of one thing think of something that exists?

THEAETETUS: I agree.

THEAETETUS: I agree.

SOCRATES: Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing?

SOCRATES: Then someone who thinks of what does not exist thinks of nothing?

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all?

SOCRATES: And someone who thinks of nothing isn't thinking at all?

THEAETETUS: Obviously.

THEAETETUS: Obviously.

SOCRATES: Then no one can think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance or as a predicate of something else?

SOCRATES: So no one can think of what does not exist, either on its own or as a quality of something else?

THEAETETUS: Clearly not.

THEAETETUS: Clearly not.

SOCRATES: Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is not?

SOCRATES: So is thinking falsely different from thinking about something that does not exist?

THEAETETUS: It would seem so.

THEAETETUS: It seems so.

SOCRATES: Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere of being or of knowledge?

SOCRATES: So false opinion exists in us neither in the realm of being nor in the realm of knowledge?

THEAETETUS: Certainly not.

THEAETETUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: But may not the following be the description of what we express by this name?

SOCRATES: But could the following describe what we mean by this name?

THEAETETUS: What?

THEAETETUS: What?

SOCRATES: May we not suppose that false opinion or thought is a sort of heterodoxy; a person may make an exchange in his mind, and say that one real object is another real object. For thus he always thinks that which is, but he puts one thing in place of another; and missing the aim of his thoughts, he may be truly said to have false opinion.

SOCRATES: Could false opinion or thought be a kind of mistaken belief? A person may mix things up in their mind, thinking that one real thing is another. In this way, they always think of something real, but mistake one thing for another. And because their thoughts miss the mark, they can truly be said to have a false opinion.

THEAETETUS: Now you appear to me to have spoken the exact truth: when a man puts the base in the place of the noble, or the noble in the place of the base, then he has truly false opinion.

THEAETETUS: Now I think you are exactly right. When someone mistakes what is base for what is noble, or what is noble for what is base, they truly have a false opinion.

SOCRATES: I see, Theaetetus, that your fear has disappeared, and that you are beginning to despise me.

SOCRATES: I see, Theaetetus, that you're no longer afraid and are beginning to despise me.

THEAETETUS: What makes you say so?

THEAETETUS: What makes you say that?

SOCRATES: You think, if I am not mistaken, that your 'truly false' is safe from censure, and that I shall never ask whether there can be a swift which is slow, or a heavy which is light, or any other self-contradictory thing, which works, not according to its own nature, but according to that of its opposite. But I will not insist upon this, for I do not wish needlessly to discourage you. And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, or the thought of something else?

SOCRATES: If I understand you correctly, you think your 'truly false' is beyond criticism. You think I will never ask whether something swift can be slow, or something heavy can be light. Or whether anything else can contradict itself by acting against its own nature and according to its opposite. But I will not press this point, because I do not want to discourage you needlessly. So, are you satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, or thinking of something else?

THEAETETUS: I am.

THEAETETUS: I am.

SOCRATES: It is possible then upon your view for the mind to conceive of one thing as another?

SOCRATES: So, in your view, can the mind think of one thing as another?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: But must not the mind, or thinking power, which misplaces them, have a conception either of both objects or of one of them?

SOCRATES: But must the mind, or thinking power, that misplaces them have an idea of both objects or at least one?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Either together or in succession?

SOCRATES: Together or one after the other?

THEAETETUS: Very good.

THEAETETUS: Very good.

SOCRATES: And do you mean by conceiving, the same which I mean?

SOCRATES: And do you mean the same thing by conceiving as I do?

THEAETETUS: What is that?

THEAETETUS: What is that?

SOCRATES: I mean the conversation which the soul holds with herself in considering of anything. I speak of what I scarcely understand; but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken,—I mean, to oneself and in silence, not aloud or to another: What think you?

SOCRATES: I mean the conversation the soul has with itself when it considers anything. I am speaking of something I scarcely understand. But when the soul thinks, it seems to me to be talking to itself. It asks itself questions and answers them, affirming and denying. Eventually, it reaches a decision, either gradually or through a sudden impulse. Once it has settled on that decision and no longer doubts, the decision is called its opinion. So I say that forming an opinion is speaking, and an opinion is something spoken. I mean spoken silently to oneself, not aloud or to another person. What do you think?

THEAETETUS: I agree.

THEAETETUS: I agree.

SOCRATES: Then when any one thinks of one thing as another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another?

SOCRATES: So when someone mistakes one thing for another, they are telling themselves that one thing is another?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: But do you ever remember saying to yourself that the noble is certainly base, or the unjust just; or, best of all—have you ever attempted to convince yourself that one thing is another? Nay, not even in sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of the kind?

SOCRATES: But do you remember ever telling yourself that the noble is certainly base, or that the unjust is just? Or, better still, have you ever tried to convince yourself that one thing is another? Even in a dream, have you ever dared to tell yourself that odd is even, or anything like that?

THEAETETUS: Never.

THEAETETUS: Never.

SOCRATES: And do you suppose that any other man, either in his senses or out of them, ever seriously tried to persuade himself that an ox is a horse, or that two are one?

SOCRATES: And do you think anyone else, sane or insane, ever seriously tried to convince himself that an ox is a horse, or that two are one?

THEAETETUS: Certainly not.

THEAETETUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: But if thinking is talking to oneself, no one speaking and thinking of two objects, and apprehending them both in his soul, will say and think that the one is the other of them, and I must add, that even you, lover of dispute as you are, had better let the word 'other' alone (i.e. not insist that 'one' and 'other' are the same (Both words in Greek are called eteron: compare Parmen.; Euthyd.)). I mean to say, that no one thinks the noble to be base, or anything of the kind.

SOCRATES: But if thinking is talking to oneself, no one can think of two things and grasp both in their mind, yet say and think that one is the other. I must add that even you, fond as you are of arguing, had better leave the word 'other' alone. (That is, do not insist that 'one' and 'other' are the same. Both words in Greek are called eteron: compare Parmen.; Euthyd.) I mean that no one thinks the noble is base, or anything of that kind.

THEAETETUS: I will give up the word 'other,' Socrates; and I agree to what you say.

THEAETETUS: I'll give up the word 'other,' Socrates, and I agree with what you say.

SOCRATES: If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he cannot think that the one of them is the other?

SOCRATES: If a person is thinking of both things, can he think that one is the other?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Neither, if he has one of them only in his mind and not the other, can he think that one is the other?

SOCRATES: And if he has only one of them in mind, not the other, can he think one is the other?

THEAETETUS: True; for we should have to suppose that he apprehends that which is not in his thoughts at all.

THEAETETUS: True, because we would have to suppose that he understands something he is not thinking about at all.

SOCRATES: Then no one who has either both or only one of the two objects in his mind can think that the one is the other. And therefore, he who maintains that false opinion is heterodoxy is talking nonsense; for neither in this, any more than in the previous way, can false opinion exist in us.

SOCRATES: So no one who has either both objects or just one in mind can mistake one for the other. Therefore, anyone who says that false opinion is heterodoxy is talking nonsense. For false opinion can no more exist in us in this way than in the previous way.

THEAETETUS: No.

THEAETETUS: No.

SOCRATES: But if, Theaetetus, this is not admitted, we shall be driven into many absurdities.

SOCRATES: But if we don’t accept this, Theaetetus, we’ll be led to many absurd conclusions.

THEAETETUS: What are they?

THEAETETUS: What are they?

SOCRATES: I will not tell you until I have endeavoured to consider the matter from every point of view. For I should be ashamed of us if we were driven in our perplexity to admit the absurd consequences of which I speak. But if we find the solution, and get away from them, we may regard them only as the difficulties of others, and the ridicule will not attach to us. On the other hand, if we utterly fail, I suppose that we must be humble, and allow the argument to trample us under foot, as the sea-sick passenger is trampled upon by the sailor, and to do anything to us. Listen, then, while I tell you how I hope to find a way out of our difficulty.

SOCRATES: I will not tell you until I have tried to consider the matter from every angle. I would be ashamed if our confusion forced us to admit the absurd consequences I mentioned. But if we find a solution and escape those consequences, we can regard them as other people’s difficulties. Then we will not be ridiculed for them. On the other hand, if we fail completely, I suppose we must be humble. We must let the argument trample us underfoot, as a sailor tramples a seasick passenger, and do whatever it will to us. So listen while I tell you how I hope to find a way out of our difficulty.

THEAETETUS: Let me hear.

THEAETETUS: Let's hear it.

SOCRATES: I think that we were wrong in denying that a man could think what he knew to be what he did not know; and that there is a way in which such a deception is possible.

SOCRATES: I think we were wrong to deny that someone could mistake something they know for something they don't know. There is a way this mistake can happen.

THEAETETUS: You mean to say, as I suspected at the time, that I may know Socrates, and at a distance see some one who is unknown to me, and whom I mistake for him—then the deception will occur?

THEAETETUS: Do you mean what I suspected at the time? I may know Socrates and see a stranger in the distance. If I mistake that person for Socrates, that is when the error occurs?

SOCRATES: But has not that position been relinquished by us, because involving the absurdity that we should know and not know the things which we know?

SOCRATES: But didn't we give up that position? It led to the absurd conclusion that we both know and don't know what we know.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Let us make the assertion in another form, which may or may not have a favourable issue; but as we are in a great strait, every argument should be turned over and tested. Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know?

SOCRATES: Let us put the claim another way. It may or may not lead to a good result. But since we are in a difficult position, we should examine and test every argument. Tell me, then, am I right in saying that you can learn something you did not know before?

THEAETETUS: Certainly you may.

THEAETETUS: Of course you can.

SOCRATES: And another and another?

SOCRATES: And another and another?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: I would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the mind of man a block of wax, which is of different sizes in different men; harder, moister, and having more or less of purity in one than another, and in some of an intermediate quality.

SOCRATES: Imagine, then, that there is a block of wax in each person's mind. These blocks vary in size from person to person. Some are harder, moister, or more or less pure than others. Some are of an intermediate quality.

THEAETETUS: I see.

THEAETETUS: I see.

SOCRATES: Let us say that this tablet is a gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses; and that when we wish to remember anything which we have seen, or heard, or thought in our own minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions and thoughts, and in that material receive the impression of them as from the seal of a ring; and that we remember and know what is imprinted as long as the image lasts; but when the image is effaced, or cannot be taken, then we forget and do not know.

SOCRATES: Let us say that this tablet is a gift from Memory, the mother of the Muses. When we want to remember something we have seen, heard, or thought, we hold the wax to those perceptions and thoughts. They leave an impression in it, like the impression of a ring’s seal. We remember and know what is imprinted as long as the image lasts. But when the image is erased or cannot be made, we forget and do not know.

THEAETETUS: Very good.

THEAETETUS: Very good.

SOCRATES: Now, when a person has this knowledge, and is considering something which he sees or hears, may not false opinion arise in the following manner?

SOCRATES: Now, suppose a person has this knowledge and is thinking about something they see or hear. Could a false opinion arise in the following way?

THEAETETUS: In what manner?

THEAETETUS: How?

SOCRATES: When he thinks what he knows, sometimes to be what he knows, and sometimes to be what he does not know. We were wrong before in denying the possibility of this.

SOCRATES: When he thinks that what he knows is sometimes something he knows, and sometimes something he does not know. We were wrong to deny that this was possible.

THEAETETUS: And how would you amend the former statement?

THEAETETUS: And how would you change the earlier statement?

SOCRATES: I should begin by making a list of the impossible cases which must be excluded. (1) No one can think one thing to be another when he does not perceive either of them, but has the memorial or seal of both of them in his mind; nor can any mistaking of one thing for another occur, when he only knows one, and does not know, and has no impression of the other; nor can he think that one thing which he does not know is another thing which he does not know, or that what he does not know is what he knows; nor (2) that one thing which he perceives is another thing which he perceives, or that something which he perceives is something which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something which he perceives; nor again (3) can he think that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense;—this last case, if possible, is still more inconceivable than the others; nor (4) can he think that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the memorial coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows; nor so long as these agree, can he think that a thing which he knows and perceives is another thing which he perceives; or that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive, is the same as another thing which he does not know and does not perceive;—nor again, can he suppose that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is the same as another thing which he does not know; or that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is another thing which he does not perceive:—All these utterly and absolutely exclude the possibility of false opinion. The only cases, if any, which remain, are the following.

SOCRATES: I should begin by listing the impossible cases we must rule out. (1) No one can mistake one thing for another when he perceives neither, but has a memory or impression of both. Nor can he mistake one thing for another when he knows only one and neither knows nor has an impression of the other. Nor can he think that one thing he does not know is another thing he does not know. Nor can he think that something he does not know is something he knows. (2) Nor can he think that one thing he perceives is another thing he perceives. Nor can he think that something he perceives is something he does not perceive. Nor can he think that something he does not perceive is another thing he does not perceive. Nor can he think that something he does not perceive is something he perceives. (3) Nor can he mistake one thing he knows and perceives for another thing he knows and perceives. This is true when his impression of each thing matches what he perceives. This last case, if possible, is even harder to imagine than the others. (4) Nor can he think that something he knows and perceives is something else he knows. This is true when his memory of the first thing matches what he perceives. Nor, as long as his memory and perception match, can he think that something he knows and perceives is another thing he perceives. Nor can he think that something he neither knows nor perceives is another thing he neither knows nor perceives. Nor can he think that something he neither knows nor perceives is another thing he does not know. Nor can he think that something he neither knows nor perceives is another thing he does not perceive. All these cases utterly and absolutely rule out the possibility of a false opinion. The only cases left, if any, are the following.

THEAETETUS: What are they? If you tell me, I may perhaps understand you better; but at present I am unable to follow you.

THEAETETUS: What are they? If you tell me, I might understand you better. But right now, I can’t follow you.

SOCRATES: A person may think that some things which he knows, or which he perceives and does not know, are some other things which he knows and perceives; or that some things which he knows and perceives, are other things which he knows and perceives.

SOCRATES: A person may mistake things they know for other things they both know and perceive. They may also mistake things they perceive but do not know for things they both know and perceive. Or they may mistake things they both know and perceive for other things they both know and perceive.

THEAETETUS: I understand you less than ever now.

THEAETETUS: I understand you even less now.

SOCRATES: Hear me once more, then:—I, knowing Theodorus, and remembering in my own mind what sort of person he is, and also what sort of person Theaetetus is, at one time see them, and at another time do not see them, and sometimes I touch them, and at another time not, or at one time I may hear them or perceive them in some other way, and at another time not perceive them, but still I remember them, and know them in my own mind.

SOCRATES: Listen to me once more. I know Theodorus and remember what he is like. I also remember what Theaetetus is like. Sometimes I see them, and sometimes I do not. Sometimes I touch them, and sometimes I do not. At other times, I may hear them or perceive them in some other way. And sometimes I do not perceive them at all. But I still remember them and know them in my own mind.

THEAETETUS: Very true.

THEAETETUS: That's very true.

SOCRATES: Then, first of all, I want you to understand that a man may or may not perceive sensibly that which he knows.

SOCRATES: First, I want you to understand that a person may or may not perceive what they know through their senses.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: And that which he does not know will sometimes not be perceived by him and sometimes will be perceived and only perceived?

SOCRATES: And will he sometimes not perceive what he does not know, and sometimes merely perceive it?

THEAETETUS: That is also true.

THEAETETUS: That's also true.

SOCRATES: See whether you can follow me better now: Socrates can recognize Theodorus and Theaetetus, but he sees neither of them, nor does he perceive them in any other way; he cannot then by any possibility imagine in his own mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I not right?

SOCRATES: See if you can follow me better now. Socrates can recognize Theodorus and Theaetetus, but he cannot see either of them or sense them in any other way. So he cannot possibly imagine that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I right?

THEAETETUS: You are quite right.

THEAETETUS: You're absolutely right.

SOCRATES: Then that was the first case of which I spoke.

SOCRATES: Then that was the first case I mentioned.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: The second case was, that I, knowing one of you and not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, can never think him whom I know to be him whom I do not know.

SOCRATES: In the second case, I know one of you but not the other, and I perceive neither of you. I can never mistake the one I know for the one I do not know.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: In the third case, not knowing and not perceiving either of you, I cannot think that one of you whom I do not know is the other whom I do not know. I need not again go over the catalogue of excluded cases, in which I cannot form a false opinion about you and Theodorus, either when I know both or when I am in ignorance of both, or when I know one and not the other. And the same of perceiving: do you understand me?

SOCRATES: In the third case, I neither know nor perceive either of you. So I cannot mistake one of you for the other, since I know neither of you. I need not list the excluded cases again. In those cases, I cannot form a false opinion about you and Theodorus. This holds whether I know both of you, neither of you, or only one of you. The same holds for perceiving you. Do you understand me?

THEAETETUS: I do.

THEAETETUS: I do.

SOCRATES: The only possibility of erroneous opinion is, when knowing you and Theodorus, and having on the waxen block the impression of both of you given as by a seal, but seeing you imperfectly and at a distance, I try to assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression, and to fit this into its own print: if I succeed, recognition will take place; but if I fail and transpose them, putting the foot into the wrong shoe—that is to say, putting the vision of either of you on to the wrong impression, or if my mind, like the sight in a mirror, which is transferred from right to left, err by reason of some similar affection, then 'heterodoxy' and false opinion ensues.

SOCRATES: The only way a mistaken opinion can arise is like this. I know you and Theodorus, and both of you have left seal-like impressions on my wax tablet. But I see you indistinctly and from a distance. I try to match what I see with the right impression in my memory, fitting it into its own imprint. If I succeed, I recognize you. But if I fail and switch the impressions, I put the foot in the wrong shoe. In other words, I match what I see of either of you with the wrong impression. Or my mind may make a similar mistake, like an image in a mirror with its right and left sides reversed. Then 'heterodoxy' and false opinion result.

THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, you have described the nature of opinion with wonderful exactness.

THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, you have described the nature of opinion with wonderful accuracy.

SOCRATES: Or again, when I know both of you, and perceive as well as know one of you, but not the other, and my knowledge of him does not accord with perception—that was the case put by me just now which you did not understand.

SOCRATES: Or suppose I know both of you, but I perceive only one of you. And suppose my knowledge of him does not match what I perceive. That was the case I mentioned just now, which you did not understand.

THEAETETUS: No, I did not.

THEAETETUS: No, I did not.

SOCRATES: I meant to say, that when a person knows and perceives one of you, his knowledge coincides with his perception, he will never think him to be some other person, whom he knows and perceives, and the knowledge of whom coincides with his perception—for that also was a case supposed.

SOCRATES: I meant that a person might know and perceive one of you, with knowledge matching perception. In that case, he would never mistake you for someone else he knows and perceives. His knowledge of that other person would also match his perception. That was another case we supposed.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: But there was an omission of the further case, in which, as we now say, false opinion may arise, when knowing both, and seeing, or having some other sensible perception of both, I fail in holding the seal over against the corresponding sensation; like a bad archer, I miss and fall wide of the mark—and this is called falsehood.

SOCRATES: But we left out another case in which, as we now say, a false opinion may arise. I know both things and see or otherwise perceive both, but fail to match the seal to the corresponding sensation. Like a bad archer, I miss the mark. This is called falsehood.

THEAETETUS: Yes; it is rightly so called.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that is the right name for it.

SOCRATES: When, therefore, perception is present to one of the seals or impressions but not to the other, and the mind fits the seal of the absent perception on the one which is present, in any case of this sort the mind is deceived; in a word, if our view is sound, there can be no error or deception about things which a man does not know and has never perceived, but only in things which are known and perceived; in these alone opinion turns and twists about, and becomes alternately true and false;—true when the seals and impressions of sense meet straight and opposite—false when they go awry and crooked.

SOCRATES: Suppose a perception is present for one of the seals or impressions but not the other. If the mind matches the seal of the absent perception to the one present, it is deceived. In short, if our view is right, there can be no error or deception about things someone neither knows nor has ever perceived. Error can occur only with things known and perceived. Opinion shifts and changes only about these things, becoming true or false in turn. It is true when the seals and sensory impressions line up directly. It is false when they do not.

THEAETETUS: And is not that, Socrates, nobly said?

THEAETETUS: And isn't that nobly said, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Nobly! yes; but wait a little and hear the explanation, and then you will say so with more reason; for to think truly is noble and to be deceived is base.

SOCRATES: Noble, yes. But wait and hear the explanation. Then you will have more reason to say so. For thinking truly is noble, and being deceived is shameful.

THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And the origin of truth and error is as follows:—When the wax in the soul of any one is deep and abundant, and smooth and perfectly tempered, then the impressions which pass through the senses and sink into the heart of the soul, as Homer says in a parable, meaning to indicate the likeness of the soul to wax (Kerh Kerhos); these, I say, being pure and clear, and having a sufficient depth of wax, are also lasting, and minds, such as these, easily learn and easily retain, and are not liable to confusion, but have true thoughts, for they have plenty of room, and having clear impressions of things, as we term them, quickly distribute them into their proper places on the block. And such men are called wise. Do you agree?

SOCRATES: This is how truth and error arise. Suppose the wax in a person's soul is deep, plentiful, smooth, and perfectly tempered. Impressions pass through the senses and sink into the heart of the soul, as Homer says in a parable. Homer means to suggest that the soul is like wax (Kerh Kerhos). These impressions are pure and clear, and because the wax is deep enough, they also last. People with souls like these learn and remember easily. They are not prone to confusion, but have true thoughts. That is because they have plenty of room and clear impressions of things. They quickly put those impressions in their proper places on the wax block. Such people are called wise. Do you agree?

THEAETETUS: Entirely.

THEAETETUS: Completely.

SOCRATES: But when the heart of any one is shaggy—a quality which the all-wise poet commends, or muddy and of impure wax, or very soft, or very hard, then there is a corresponding defect in the mind—the soft are good at learning, but apt to forget; and the hard are the reverse; the shaggy and rugged and gritty, or those who have an admixture of earth or dung in their composition, have the impressions indistinct, as also the hard, for there is no depth in them; and the soft too are indistinct, for their impressions are easily confused and effaced. Yet greater is the indistinctness when they are all jostled together in a little soul, which has no room. These are the natures which have false opinion; for when they see or hear or think of anything, they are slow in assigning the right objects to the right impressions—in their stupidity they confuse them, and are apt to see and hear and think amiss—and such men are said to be deceived in their knowledge of objects, and ignorant.

SOCRATES: But some people have hearts made of shaggy wax, a quality the all-wise poet praises. Others have wax that is muddy and impure, very soft, or very hard. Each has a corresponding defect in the mind. Those with soft wax learn easily but tend to forget. Those with hard wax have the opposite traits. Those with shaggy, rough, or gritty wax, or wax mixed with earth or dung, have indistinct impressions. So do those with hard wax, because their impressions lack depth. Those with soft wax also have indistinct impressions, because the impressions are easily confused and erased. The impressions are even less distinct when they are all crowded together in a small soul with no room. People with these natures form false opinions. When they see, hear, or think of anything, they are slow to match the right objects with the right impressions. In their stupidity, they confuse them and are likely to see, hear, and think incorrectly. Such people are said to be mistaken about the objects they know and to be ignorant.

THEAETETUS: No man, Socrates, can say anything truer than that.

THEAETETUS: No one could say anything truer than that, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us?

SOCRATES: So can we now admit that we can have false opinions?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And of true opinion also?

SOCRATES: And of true opinion too?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: We have at length satisfactorily proven beyond a doubt there are these two sorts of opinion?

SOCRATES: Have we finally proven beyond doubt that there are two kinds of opinion?

THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Alas, Theaetetus, what a tiresome creature is a man who is fond of talking!

SOCRATES: Oh, Theaetetus, how tiresome a man who loves to talk can be!

THEAETETUS: What makes you say so?

THEAETETUS: What makes you say that?

SOCRATES: Because I am disheartened at my own stupidity and tiresome garrulity; for what other term will describe the habit of a man who is always arguing on all sides of a question; whose dulness cannot be convinced, and who will never leave off?

SOCRATES: Because I am discouraged by my own stupidity and tiresome talk. What else can you call the habit of someone who always argues every side of a question? He is too dull to be convinced and will never stop.

THEAETETUS: But what puts you out of heart?

THEAETETUS: But what discourages you?

SOCRATES: I am not only out of heart, but in positive despair; for I do not know what to answer if any one were to ask me:—O Socrates, have you indeed discovered that false opinion arises neither in the comparison of perceptions with one another nor yet in thought, but in union of thought and perception? Yes, I shall say, with the complacence of one who thinks that he has made a noble discovery.

SOCRATES: I am not just discouraged, but in utter despair. I do not know how I would answer if someone asked me: Socrates, have you really discovered where false opinion comes from? Does it arise neither from comparing perceptions with one another nor from thought alone, but from combining thought and perception? Yes, I would say, with the self-satisfaction of someone who thinks he has made a great discovery.

THEAETETUS: I see no reason why we should be ashamed of our demonstration, Socrates.

THEAETETUS: I don't see why we should be ashamed of our argument, Socrates.

SOCRATES: He will say: You mean to argue that the man whom we only think of and do not see, cannot be confused with the horse which we do not see or touch, but only think of and do not perceive? That I believe to be my meaning, I shall reply.

SOCRATES: He will say: Are you arguing that we cannot confuse the man we only think of, but do not see, with the horse we only think of? We neither see nor touch the horse, nor do we perceive it in any way. I will reply: Yes, I believe that is what I mean.

THEAETETUS: Quite right.

THEAETETUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: Well, then, he will say, according to that argument, the number eleven, which is only thought, can never be mistaken for twelve, which is only thought: How would you answer him?

SOCRATES: Well, then, he will say that, according to that argument, the number eleven exists only in thought. So does twelve. And eleven can never be mistaken for twelve. How would you answer him?

THEAETETUS: I should say that a mistake may very likely arise between the eleven or twelve which are seen or handled, but that no similar mistake can arise between the eleven and twelve which are in the mind.

THEAETETUS: I would say that we could easily mistake eleven for twelve when we see or handle them. But we cannot make the same mistake with the eleven and twelve in our minds.

SOCRATES: Well, but do you think that no one ever put before his own mind five and seven,—I do not mean five or seven men or horses, but five or seven in the abstract, which, as we say, are recorded on the waxen block, and in which false opinion is held to be impossible; did no man ever ask himself how many these numbers make when added together, and answer that they are eleven, while another thinks that they are twelve, or would all agree in thinking and saying that they are twelve?

SOCRATES: But do you think no one has ever pictured five and seven in their mind? I don't mean five or seven men or horses, but the numbers themselves. We say these numbers are recorded on the wax block and that false opinions about them are impossible. Has no one ever asked how much five and seven add up to and answered eleven, while someone else thinks twelve? Or would everyone think and say that they add up to twelve?

THEAETETUS: Certainly not; many would think that they are eleven, and in the higher numbers the chance of error is greater still; for I assume you to be speaking of numbers in general.

THEAETETUS: Certainly not. Many would think they are eleven, and the chance of error is even greater with higher numbers. I assume you mean numbers in general.

SOCRATES: Exactly; and I want you to consider whether this does not imply that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven?

SOCRATES: Exactly. Does this imply that the twelve in the wax block are thought to be eleven?

THEAETETUS: Yes, that seems to be the case.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it seems so.

SOCRATES: Then do we not come back to the old difficulty? For he who makes such a mistake does think one thing which he knows to be another thing which he knows; but this, as we said, was impossible, and afforded an irresistible proof of the non-existence of false opinion, because otherwise the same person would inevitably know and not know the same thing at the same time.

SOCRATES: Then aren’t we back to the same problem? Someone who makes such a mistake thinks that one thing he knows is another thing he knows. But, as we said, that was impossible. It seemed to prove beyond doubt that false opinion does not exist. Otherwise, the same person would inevitably know and not know the same thing at the same time.

THEAETETUS: Most true.

THEAETETUS: Very true.

SOCRATES: Then false opinion cannot be explained as a confusion of thought and sense, for in that case we could not have been mistaken about pure conceptions of thought; and thus we are obliged to say, either that false opinion does not exist, or that a man may not know that which he knows;—which alternative do you prefer?

SOCRATES: Then false opinion cannot be explained as a confusion between thought and perception. If it could, we could not be mistaken about purely abstract ideas. So we must say either that false opinion does not exist or that a person may not know what they know. Which do you prefer?

THEAETETUS: It is hard to determine, Socrates.

THEAETETUS: It's hard to tell, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And yet the argument will scarcely admit of both. But, as we are at our wits' end, suppose that we do a shameless thing?

SOCRATES: And yet the argument hardly allows for both. But since we are at a loss, shall we do something shameless?

THEAETETUS: What is it?

THEAETETUS: What is it?

SOCRATES: Let us attempt to explain the verb 'to know.'

SOCRATES: Let's try to explain the verb 'to know.'

THEAETETUS: And why should that be shameless?

THEAETETUS: And why would that be shameless?

SOCRATES: You seem not to be aware that the whole of our discussion from the very beginning has been a search after knowledge, of which we are assumed not to know the nature.

SOCRATES: You seem unaware that our whole discussion has been a search for knowledge from the beginning. We are assuming that we do not know what knowledge is.

THEAETETUS: Nay, but I am well aware.

THEAETETUS: No, but I know that well.

SOCRATES: And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the verb 'to know'? The truth is, Theaetetus, that we have long been infected with logical impurity. Thousands of times have we repeated the words 'we know,' and 'do not know,' and 'we have or have not science or knowledge,' as if we could understand what we are saying to one another, so long as we remain ignorant about knowledge; and at this moment we are using the words 'we understand,' 'we are ignorant,' as though we could still employ them when deprived of knowledge or science.

SOCRATES: And isn't it shameless to explain the verb 'to know' when we don't know what knowledge is? The truth is, Theaetetus, that our reasoning has long been muddled. Thousands of times we have said 'we know,' and 'do not know,' and 'we have or have not science or knowledge.' We speak as if we could understand each other while we remain ignorant about knowledge. And right now we are using the words 'we understand,' 'we are ignorant,' as though we could still use them without knowledge or science.

THEAETETUS: But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you ever argue at all?

THEAETETUS: But Socrates, if you avoid those expressions, how can you argue at all?

SOCRATES: I could not, being the man I am. The case would be different if I were a true hero of dialectic: and O that such an one were present! for he would have told us to avoid the use of these terms; at the same time he would not have spared in you and me the faults which I have noted. But, seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say what knowing is? for I think that the attempt may be worth making.

SOCRATES: I could not, being the man I am. It would be different if I were truly skilled in dialectic. I wish someone like that were here! He would have told us not to use these terms. But he would also have criticized the faults I noted in both of us. Since we are not very clever, shall I venture to say what knowing is? I think it may be worth trying.

THEAETETUS: Then by all means venture, and no one shall find fault with you for using the forbidden terms.

THEAETETUS: Then go ahead. No one will blame you for using the forbidden terms.

SOCRATES: You have heard the common explanation of the verb 'to know'?

SOCRATES: Have you heard the common explanation of the verb 'to know'?

THEAETETUS: I think so, but I do not remember it at the moment.

THEAETETUS: I think so, but I can't remember it right now.

SOCRATES: They explain the word 'to know' as meaning 'to have knowledge.'

SOCRATES: They say that 'to know' means 'to have knowledge.'

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: I should like to make a slight change, and say 'to possess' knowledge.

SOCRATES: I'd like to make a small change and say 'to possess' knowledge.

THEAETETUS: How do the two expressions differ?

THEAETETUS: What's the difference between the two expressions?

SOCRATES: Perhaps there may be no difference; but still I should like you to hear my view, that you may help me to test it.

SOCRATES: Perhaps there is no difference. But I would still like you to hear my view so you can help me test it.

THEAETETUS: I will, if I can.

THEAETETUS: I will, if I can.

SOCRATES: I should distinguish 'having' from 'possessing': for example, a man may buy and keep under his control a garment which he does not wear; and then we should say, not that he has, but that he possesses the garment.

SOCRATES: I would distinguish 'having' from 'possessing'. For example, a man may buy a garment and keep it under his control without wearing it. In that case, we would say he possesses the garment, but does not have it.

THEAETETUS: It would be the correct expression.

THEAETETUS: That would be the right way to say it.

SOCRATES: Well, may not a man 'possess' and yet not 'have' knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking? As you may suppose a man to have caught wild birds—doves or any other birds—and to be keeping them in an aviary which he has constructed at home; we might say of him in one sense, that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?

SOCRATES: Well, can a person 'possess' knowledge without 'having' it in the sense I mean? Suppose someone catches wild birds, doves or any other birds, and keeps them in an aviary he has built at home. In one sense, we could say he always has them because he possesses them, couldn't we?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And yet, in another sense, he has none of them; but they are in his power, and he has got them under his hand in an enclosure of his own, and can take and have them whenever he likes;—he can catch any which he likes, and let the bird go again, and he may do so as often as he pleases.

SOCRATES: And yet, in another sense, he has none of them. But they are under his control, in an enclosure of his own. He can catch and have any bird he likes, whenever he likes. He can also let it go again and do this as often as he pleases.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Once more, then, as in what preceded we made a sort of waxen figment in the mind, so let us now suppose that in the mind of each man there is an aviary of all sorts of birds—some flocking together apart from the rest, others in small groups, others solitary, flying anywhere and everywhere.

SOCRATES: Earlier, we imagined something like a block of wax in the mind. Now, let us suppose that each person's mind contains an aviary with all kinds of birds. Some flock together apart from the others, some gather in small groups, and some fly alone in every direction.

THEAETETUS: Let us imagine such an aviary—and what is to follow?

THEAETETUS: Let's imagine an aviary like that. What comes next?

SOCRATES: We may suppose that the birds are kinds of knowledge, and that when we were children, this receptacle was empty; whenever a man has gotten and detained in the enclosure a kind of knowledge, he may be said to have learned or discovered the thing which is the subject of the knowledge: and this is to know.

SOCRATES: Let us suppose that the birds are kinds of knowledge, and that this enclosure was empty when we were children. Whenever someone catches and keeps a kind of knowledge in the enclosure, they may be said to have learned or discovered its subject. This is what it means to know.

THEAETETUS: Granted.

THEAETETUS: Agreed.

SOCRATES: And further, when any one wishes to catch any of these knowledges or sciences, and having taken, to hold it, and again to let them go, how will he express himself?—will he describe the 'catching' of them and the original 'possession' in the same words? I will make my meaning clearer by an example:—You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?

SOCRATES: And consider someone who wants to catch one of these kinds of knowledge or sciences, hold it, and then let it go. How will they express this? Will they use the same words for 'catching' it and originally coming into 'possession' of it? An example will make my meaning clearer. You agree that arithmetic is an art?

THEAETETUS: To be sure.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of odd and even in general.

SOCRATES: Think of this as a search for knowledge of odd and even numbers in general.

THEAETETUS: I follow.

THEAETETUS: I understand.

SOCRATES: Having the use of the art, the arithmetician, if I am not mistaken, has the conceptions of number under his hand, and can transmit them to another.

SOCRATES: If I am not mistaken, someone skilled in arithmetic has a grasp of numbers and can teach that understanding to someone else.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And when transmitting them he may be said to teach them, and when receiving to learn them, and when receiving to learn them, and when having them in possession in the aforesaid aviary he may be said to know them.

SOCRATES: And when he passes them on, he may be said to teach them. When he receives them, he may be said to learn them. And when he has them in the aviary mentioned earlier, he may be said to know them.

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind?

SOCRATES: Consider this: must a perfect arithmetician know all numbers, since he has the knowledge of all numbers in his mind?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about him which are numerable?

SOCRATES: And can he calculate abstract numbers in his head, or count the things around him?

THEAETETUS: Of course he can.

THEAETETUS: Of course he can.

SOCRATES: And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to?

SOCRATES: And calculating simply means considering how much a given number amounts to?

THEAETETUS: Very true.

THEAETETUS: That's very true.

SOCRATES: And so he appears to be searching into something which he knows, as if he did not know it, for we have already admitted that he knows all numbers;—you have heard these perplexing questions raised?

SOCRATES: So he seems to be investigating something he knows, as if he didn't know it. We have already agreed that he knows all numbers. Have you heard these puzzling questions raised?

THEAETETUS: I have.

THEAETETUS: I have.

SOCRATES: May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to possession and for the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking and holding in the hands that which is possessed already. And thus, when a man has learned and known something long ago, he may resume and get hold of the knowledge which he has long possessed, but has not at hand in his mind.

SOCRATES: Could we continue with the image of the doves and say there are two kinds of search for knowledge? The first comes before we possess knowledge and is meant to acquire it. The second is meant to take hold of knowledge we already possess. So a man may have learned and known something long ago. He may then recall and grasp knowledge he has possessed for a long time, but does not have readily in mind.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading? Shall we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to learn what he already knows?

SOCRATES: That is why I asked how we should describe a mathematician who starts counting or a grammarian who starts reading. Should we say that, although he knows, he goes back to himself to learn what he already knows?

THEAETETUS: It would be too absurd, Socrates.

THEAETETUS: That would be too absurd, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Shall we say then that he is going to read or number what he does not know, although we have admitted that he knows all letters and all numbers?

SOCRATES: Are we saying he will read or count what he doesn't know, although we have agreed that he knows all letters and all numbers?

THEAETETUS: That, again, would be an absurdity.

THEAETETUS: That, too, would be absurd.

SOCRATES: Then shall we say that about names we care nothing?—any one may twist and turn the words 'knowing' and 'learning' in any way which he likes, but since we have determined that the possession of knowledge is not the having or using it, we do assert that a man cannot not possess that which he possesses; and, therefore, in no case can a man not know that which he knows, but he may get a false opinion about it; for he may have the knowledge, not of this particular thing, but of some other;—when the various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about in the aviary, and wishing to capture a certain sort of knowledge out of the general store, he takes the wrong one by mistake, that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the ring-dove which he had in his mind, when he wanted the pigeon.

SOCRATES: Then shall we say that names do not matter to us? Anyone may twist and turn the words 'knowing' and 'learning' however they like. But we have agreed that possessing knowledge is not the same as having or using it. We do insist that a person cannot fail to possess what they possess. So a person can never fail to know what they know. But they may have a false opinion about it. They may have knowledge, not of that particular thing, but of something else. Imagine numbers and kinds of knowledge flying around in the aviary. A person wants to catch a particular kind of knowledge from the whole collection, but catches the wrong one by mistake. So, when they thought eleven was twelve, they caught the ring-dove in their mind when they wanted the pigeon.

THEAETETUS: A very rational explanation.

THEAETETUS: A very reasonable explanation.

SOCRATES: But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not deceived, and has an opinion of what is, and thus false and true opinion may exist, and the difficulties which were previously raised disappear. I dare say that you agree with me, do you not?

SOCRATES: But when he catches the one he wants, he is not mistaken and has an opinion about what is real. So false and true opinions can both exist, and the difficulties we raised earlier disappear. I expect you agree with me, don't you?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man's not knowing what he knows, for we are not driven to the inference that he does not possess what he possesses, whether he be or be not deceived. And yet I fear that a greater difficulty is looking in at the window.

SOCRATES: So we have solved the problem of a person not knowing what he knows. We do not have to conclude that he lacks what he possesses, whether he is mistaken or not. And yet I fear a greater problem is peering in at the window.

THEAETETUS: What is it?

THEAETETUS: What is it?

SOCRATES: How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion?

SOCRATES: How can mistaking one piece of knowledge for another ever result in a false opinion?

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance, but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be another thing;—that, having knowledge present with him in his mind, he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?—you might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant.

SOCRATES: First, how can someone who knows something be ignorant of it because of his knowledge, rather than his ignorance? And isn't it utterly absurd that he should mistake one thing for another and that other thing for the first? Isn't it absurd that, with knowledge in his mind, he should still know nothing and be ignorant of everything? You might as well argue that ignorance can make a person know, or blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant.

THEAETETUS: Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making only forms of knowledge our birds: whereas there ought to have been forms of ignorance as well, flying about together in the mind, and then he who sought to take one of them might sometimes catch a form of knowledge, and sometimes a form of ignorance; and thus he would have a false opinion from ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about the same thing.

THEAETETUS: Perhaps, Socrates, we were wrong to make all our birds forms of knowledge. There should also have been forms of ignorance flying around with them in the mind. Then someone trying to catch one might sometimes catch a form of knowledge and sometimes a form of ignorance. So, about the same thing, he would have a false opinion from ignorance, but a true one from knowledge.

SOCRATES: I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words. Let us grant what you say—then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion—am I right?

SOCRATES: I can't help praising you, Theaetetus, but I must ask you to reconsider what you said. Let's accept your claim for now. Then, according to you, someone who takes ignorance will have a false opinion. Am I right?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion?

SOCRATES: Surely he won't think his opinion is false?

THEAETETUS: Of course not.

THEAETETUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived?

SOCRATES: Will he think his opinion is true and believe he knows the things he has been deceived about?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance?

SOCRATES: Then he will think he has gained knowledge, not ignorance?

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And thus, after going a long way round, we are once more face to face with our original difficulty. The hero of dialectic will retort upon us:—'O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know? or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows? or will you tell me that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds, and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or graven on waxen blocks according to your foolish images, and which he may be said to know while he possesses them, even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled to go round and round, and you will make no progress.' What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus?

SOCRATES: So, after taking a long way around, we face our original difficulty again. The hero of dialectic will laugh and reply: 'My excellent friends, suppose a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge. Can he think that either one he knows is the other? Or suppose he knows neither. Can he think that one he does not know is the other he does not know? Or suppose he knows one but not the other. Can he think that the one he knows is the one he does not know? Or can he think that the one he does not know is the one he knows? Or will you tell me there are other forms of knowledge that distinguish the right birds from the wrong ones? According to your foolish images, their owner keeps these other forms in other aviaries or engraved on blocks of wax. And you say he knows them while he possesses them, even when he does not have them ready in his mind. So you will be forced to go around in a circle forever, without making any progress.' What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus?

THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know what we are to say.

THEAETETUS: Honestly, Socrates, I don't know what we should say.

SOCRATES: Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what knowledge is; that must be first ascertained; then, the nature of false opinion?

SOCRATES: Aren't his criticisms fair? Doesn't the argument show that we're wrong to investigate false opinion before we know what knowledge is? We must first establish what knowledge is, and then the nature of false opinion.

THEAETETUS: I cannot but agree with you, Socrates, so far as we have yet gone.

THEAETETUS: I have to agree with you, Socrates, as far as we have gone.

SOCRATES: Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is?—for we are not going to lose heart as yet.

SOCRATES: So, once again, what shall we say knowledge is? We are not giving up yet.

THEAETETUS: Certainly, I shall not lose heart, if you do not.

THEAETETUS: Of course, I won't give up if you don't.

SOCRATES: What definition will be most consistent with our former views?

SOCRATES: Which definition best fits our earlier views?

THEAETETUS: I cannot think of any but our old one, Socrates.

THEAETETUS: I can't think of anything but our old one, Socrates.

SOCRATES: What was it?

SOCRATES: What was it?

THEAETETUS: Knowledge was said by us to be true opinion; and true opinion is surely unerring, and the results which follow from it are all noble and good.

THEAETETUS: We said that knowledge is true opinion. And true opinion is surely always correct. All its results are noble and good.

SOCRATES: He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'The experiment will show;' and perhaps if we go forward in the search, we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay where we are, nothing will come to light.

SOCRATES: Theaetetus, the man who led the way into the river said, 'We will find out by trying.' Perhaps if we keep searching, we may stumble upon what we are looking for. But if we stay where we are, we will discover nothing.

THEAETETUS: Very true; let us go forward and try.

THEAETETUS: That's true. Let's go on and try.

SOCRATES: The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is against us.

SOCRATES: The trail soon ends because an entire profession is against us.

THEAETETUS: How is that, and what profession do you mean?

THEAETETUS: How so? And what profession do you mean?

SOCRATES: The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and make them think whatever they like, but they do not teach them. Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convince others of the truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which they were not eye-witnesses, while a little water is flowing in the clepsydra?

SOCRATES: I mean the profession of those great wise people called orators and lawyers. They use their skill to persuade people and make them think whatever they want, but they do not teach them. Do you think any teachers are clever enough to convince others of the truth about robberies or acts of violence they did not witness? Could they do it in the short time it takes for a little water to flow through the clepsydra?

THEAETETUS: Certainly not, they can only persuade them.

THEAETETUS: Of course not. They can only persuade them.

SOCRATES: And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion?

SOCRATES: And wouldn't you say that persuading them means making them form an opinion?

THEAETETUS: To be sure.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged well.

SOCRATES: Some matters can be known only by seeing them, not in any other way. Suppose judges are justly persuaded about such matters and reach a true opinion by judging them from reports. Then they judge without knowledge. Yet, if they have judged well, they are rightly persuaded.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the same.

SOCRATES: And yet, my friend, suppose true opinion in the courts and knowledge were the same. Then the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge. So I must conclude that true opinion and knowledge are not the same.

THEAETETUS: That is a distinction, Socrates, which I have heard made by some one else, but I had forgotten it. He said that true opinion, combined with reason, was knowledge, but that the opinion which had no reason was out of the sphere of knowledge; and that things of which there is no rational account are not knowable—such was the singular expression which he used—and that things which have a reason or explanation are knowable.

THEAETETUS: Socrates, I heard someone else make that distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that true opinion combined with reason was knowledge, but opinion without reason was not knowledge. He also said that things with no rational explanation cannot be known. That was the unusual expression he used. But things with a reason or explanation can be known.

SOCRATES: Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not 'knowable'? I wish that you would repeat to me what he said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale.

SOCRATES: Excellent. But how did he distinguish between things that are 'knowable' and things that are not? Please repeat what he said. Then I’ll know whether you and I have heard the same story.

THEAETETUS: I do not know whether I can recall it; but if another person would tell me, I think that I could follow him.

THEAETETUS: I don't know if I can remember it. But if someone else told me, I think I could follow them.

SOCRATES: Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream:—Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or explanation; you can only name them, but no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them, for in the one case existence, in the other non-existence is already implied, neither of which must be added, if you mean to speak of this or that thing by itself alone. It should not be called itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like; for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things, but are distinct from them; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had a definition of their own, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is the essence of a definition. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known; but the syllables or combinations of them are known and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that thing; but when he adds rational explanation, then, he is perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you?

SOCRATES: Let me offer you a dream in return for yours. I dreamed that I heard this: The original letters or elements that make up you, me, and everything else have no reason or explanation. You can only name them. You cannot say either what they are or what they are not. Saying what they are implies that they exist. Saying what they are not implies that they do not exist. You must add neither claim if you mean to speak of an element entirely on its own. You should not call it “itself,” “that,” “each,” “alone,” “this,” or anything similar. These words are used everywhere and applied to everything, but they are distinct from the things themselves. If the first elements could be described and had definitions of their own, they would be spoken of apart from everything else. But none of these original elements can be defined. They can only be named, because they have nothing but a name. The things made up of them are complex and can be expressed by a combination of names. For a combination of names is the essence of a definition. So the elements or letters can only be perceived. They cannot be defined or known. But the syllables or combinations of elements are known and expressed, and are grasped through true opinion. So when someone has a true opinion about something without a rational explanation, their mind is thinking truly, but has no knowledge. For anyone who cannot give or receive a reason for something has no knowledge of it. But when they add a rational explanation, their knowledge is complete, and they may possess everything I have denied them. Is that how the dream appeared to you?

THEAETETUS: Precisely.

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge?

SOCRATES: And do you agree that true opinion, combined with a definition or rational explanation, is knowledge?

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in this casual manner, we have found a truth which in former times many wise men have grown old and have not found?

SOCRATES: Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that today we have found a truth so casually? Many wise men in the past grew old without finding it.

THEAETETUS: At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the present statement.

THEAETETUS: In any case, Socrates, I am satisfied with what we have said so far.

SOCRATES: Which is probably correct—for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what has been said which does not quite satisfy me.

SOCRATES: That is probably correct. After all, how can there be knowledge without definition and true opinion? Yet one point in what has been said does not quite satisfy me.

THEAETETUS: What was it?

THEAETETUS: What was it?

SOCRATES: What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all:—That the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables known.

SOCRATES: What might seem the most ingenious idea of all: The elements or letters are unknown, but their combinations or syllables are known.

THEAETETUS: And was that wrong?

THEAETETUS: And was that wrong?

SOCRATES: We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances which the author of the argument himself used.

SOCRATES: We’ll soon find out, because we hold the examples the author of the argument used as hostages.

THEAETETUS: What hostages?

THEAETETUS: What hostages?

SOCRATES: The letters, which are the clements; and the syllables, which are the combinations;—he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the alphabet?

SOCRATES: Letters are the elements, and syllables are combinations of letters. He reasoned from the letters of the alphabet, didn't he?

THEAETETUS: Yes; he did.

THEAETETUS: Yes, he did.

SOCRATES: Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves:—What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition?

SOCRATES: Let us put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves. How did we learn letters? First, are we right to say that syllables can be defined, but letters cannot?

THEAETETUS: I think so.

THEAETETUS: I think so.

SOCRATES: I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:—Theaetetus, he says, what is SO?

SOCRATES: I think so too. Suppose someone asks you to spell the first syllable of my name. He says, Theaetetus, what is SO?

THEAETETUS: I should reply S and O.

THEAETETUS: I would say S and O.

SOCRATES: That is the definition which you would give of the syllable?

SOCRATES: Is that how you would define a syllable?

THEAETETUS: I should.

THEAETETUS: I would.

SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S.

SOCRATES: I would like you to give me a similar definition of the S.

THEAETETUS: But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an element? I can only reply, that S is a consonant, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B, and most other letters, again, are neither vowel-sounds nor noises. Thus letters may be most truly said to be undefined; for even the most distinct of them, which are the seven vowels, have a sound only, but no definition at all.

THEAETETUS: But Socrates, how can anyone describe the elements of an element? I can only say that S is a consonant, a mere sound, like the hiss of a tongue. B and most other letters, on the other hand, are neither vowel sounds nor noises. So letters may truly be called undefined. Even the clearest of them, the seven vowels, have a sound but no definition at all.

SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge?

SOCRATES: Then, my friend, I suppose we've been right about knowledge so far?

THEAETETUS: Yes; I think that we have.

THEAETETUS: Yes, I think we have.

SOCRATES: Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters?

SOCRATES: Well, but were we right to say that syllables can be known, but letters cannot?

THEAETETUS: I think so.

THEAETETUS: I think so.

SOCRATES: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them?

SOCRATES: Does a syllable mean two letters, or all the letters if there are more? Or is it a single idea that arises from combining them?

THEAETETUS: I should say that we mean all the letters.

THEAETETUS: I'd say we mean all the letters.

SOCRATES: Take the case of the two letters S and O, which form the first syllable of my own name; must not he who knows the syllable, know both of them?

SOCRATES: Take the letters S and O, which form the first syllable of my name. If someone knows the syllable, must they not know both letters?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and O?

SOCRATES: You mean he knows the S and O?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together?

SOCRATES: But can he not know either one separately and still know both together?

THEAETETUS: Such a supposition, Socrates, is monstrous and unmeaning.

THEAETETUS: That idea, Socrates, is outrageous and makes no sense.

SOCRATES: But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the fine theory has again taken wings and departed.

SOCRATES: But if he cannot know both letters without knowing each one, he must know the letters before he can know the syllable. And so the fine theory has once again taken flight and disappeared.

THEAETETUS: Yes, with wonderful celerity.

THEAETETUS: Yes, remarkably quickly.

SOCRATES: Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single idea framed out of them, having a separate form distinct from them.

SOCRATES: Yes, we weren't careful enough. Perhaps we should have argued that a syllable is not the letters themselves. Rather, it is a single idea formed from them, with a form distinct from theirs.

THEAETETUS: Very true; and a more likely notion than the other.

THEAETETUS: Very true, and a more likely idea than the other one.

SOCRATES: Take care; let us not be cowards and betray a great and imposing theory.

SOCRATES: Be careful. Let's not be cowards and betray a great and impressive theory.

THEAETETUS: No, indeed.

THEAETETUS: No, certainly not.

SOCRATES: Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements—of letters or of any other elements.

SOCRATES: Let us assume, then, as we now say, that a syllable is a simple form. It arises from various combinations of harmonious elements, whether letters or other elements.

THEAETETUS: Very good.

THEAETETUS: Very good.

SOCRATES: And it must have no parts.

SOCRATES: And it must have no parts.

THEAETETUS: Why?

THEAETETUS: Why?

SOCRATES: Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts. Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts?

SOCRATES: Because anything with parts must be a whole made up of all those parts. Or would you say that a whole, though made up of parts, is a single thing distinct from all its parts?

THEAETETUS: I should.

THEAETETUS: I would.

SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different?

SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same or different?

THEAETETUS: I am not certain; but, as you like me to answer at once, I shall hazard the reply, that they are different.

THEAETETUS: I’m not sure. But since you want me to answer at once, I’ll guess that they are different.

SOCRATES: I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time to think whether I equally approve of your answer.

SOCRATES: I admire your readiness, Theaetetus. But I need time to consider whether I approve of your answer as much.

THEAETETUS: Yes; the answer is the point.

THEAETETUS: Yes, the answer is the point.

SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all?

SOCRATES: According to this new view, is the whole different from all?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, but is there any difference between all (in the plural) and the all (in the singular)? Take the case of number:—When we say one, two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of the same or of different numbers?

SOCRATES: But is there any difference between all (plural) and the all (singular)? Consider numbers. We can say one, two, three, four, five, six. Or we can say twice three, three times two, four and two, or three and two and one. Are we speaking of the same number or different numbers?

THEAETETUS: Of the same.

THEAETETUS: Of the same thing.

SOCRATES: That is of six?

SOCRATES: Is that six?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six?

SOCRATES: And did we mention all six in each way of expressing it?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Again, in speaking of all (in the plural) is there not one thing which we express?

SOCRATES: Again, when we speak of all (in the plural), don't we express one thing?

THEAETETUS: Of course there is.

THEAETETUS: Of course there is.

SOCRATES: And that is six?

SOCRATES: And that is six?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then in predicating the word 'all' of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural?

SOCRATES: Then when we use the word 'all' for things measured by number, are we describing them as both singular and plural?

THEAETETUS: Clearly we do.

THEAETETUS: Clearly we do.

SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not?

SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same, aren't they?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium?

SOCRATES: And likewise, is the number of the stadium the stadium?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing?

SOCRATES: And the army is the number of people in it? In all similar cases, is the total number of anything the whole thing?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: And the number of each is the parts of each?

SOCRATES: And is the number of each thing its parts?

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts?

SOCRATES: Then is everything that has parts made up of parts?

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all?

SOCRATES: But if the entire number is the whole, aren't all the parts also agreed to be the whole?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts?

SOCRATES: So the whole is not made up of parts? If it consisted of all the parts, it would be the all.

THEAETETUS: That is the inference.

THEAETETUS: That is the conclusion.

SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole?

SOCRATES: But can a part belong to anything other than the whole?

THEAETETUS: Yes, of the all.

THEAETETUS: Yes, of everything.

SOCRATES: You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting?

SOCRATES: You make a brave defense, Theaetetus. But isn't the all that which has nothing missing?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;—if wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature.

SOCRATES: And isn't a whole likewise something from which nothing is missing? But if anything is missing from it, it is neither a whole nor all. If anything is missing, both equally lose their complete nature.

THEAETETUS: I now think that there is no difference between a whole and all.

THEAETETUS: I now think there is no difference between a whole and all.

SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all?

SOCRATES: But didn't we say that when a thing has parts, all its parts make up a whole, an all?

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, and will therefore be equally known with them?

SOCRATES: Then, as I said before, must it not be one of two things? Either the syllable is not the letters, and the letters are not parts of the syllable. Or the syllable is the same as the letters, and so is known equally well.

THEAETETUS: You are right.

THEAETETUS: You are right.

SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them?

SOCRATES: And to avoid this, do we assume it is different from them?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters?

SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you name any other parts of syllables that are not letters?

THEAETETUS: No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of parts in a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for other parts.

THEAETETUS: No, certainly not, Socrates. If I admit that a syllable has parts, it would be ridiculous to set aside letters and look for other parts.

SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form?

SOCRATES: That's right, Theaetetus. So, according to our current view, a syllable must be an indivisible form, mustn't it?

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded; nor can one rightly attribute to them the words 'being' or 'this,' because they are alien and inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or elements were indefinable and unknown?

SOCRATES: But do you remember, my friend, what we agreed to just a little while ago? We agreed that the first elements, from which all other things are made, could not be defined. That was because each element, taken by itself, is not made up of parts. Nor can we rightly use the words 'being' or 'this' for them, because those words do not belong or apply to them. For this reason, the letters or elements could not be defined or known.

THEAETETUS: I remember.

THEAETETUS: I remember.

SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? I can see no other.

SOCRATES: And isn't this also why they are simple and indivisible? I can't see any other reason.

THEAETETUS: No other reason can be given.

THEAETETUS: There is no other reason.

SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form?

SOCRATES: Then isn’t the syllable like the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is a single form?

THEAETETUS: To be sure.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible and expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole?

SOCRATES: If a syllable is a whole with many parts, or letters, must the letters be understandable and expressible too? We agree that all the parts are the same as the whole.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason?

SOCRATES: But if it is one and indivisible, then syllables and letters are both undefined and unknown for the same reason?

THEAETETUS: I cannot deny that.

THEAETETUS: I can't deny that.

SOCRATES: We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters.

SOCRATES: So we cannot agree with someone who says that syllables can be known and expressed, but letters cannot.

THEAETETUS: Certainly not; if we may trust the argument.

THEAETETUS: Certainly not, if we can trust the argument.

SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read?

SOCRATES: But wouldn't you be just as likely to disagree with him when you remember learning to read?

THEAETETUS: What experience?

THEAETETUS: What experience?

SOCRATES: Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their position.

SOCRATES: Well, when you were learning, you kept practicing how to tell the letters apart by sight and sound. This was so you would not be confused by their order when you heard them spoken or saw them written.

THEAETETUS: Very true.

THEAETETUS: That's very true.

SOCRATES: And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one would allow, are the elements or letters of music?

SOCRATES: Is a harp player's education complete unless he can tell which string produces a particular note? Everyone would agree that notes are the elements, or letters, of music.

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables, and much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject; and if some one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking nonsense?

SOCRATES: Then let us reason from the letters and syllables we know to other simple elements and compounds. Would we say that letters, or simple elements, are generally known with much greater certainty than syllables? And are they much more essential to a complete knowledge of any subject? If someone says that the syllable is known but the letter is not, would we think they are talking nonsense, whether deliberately or not?

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge.

SOCRATES: If I am not mistaken, there may be other proofs of this belief. But let us not lose sight of the question before us while looking for them. What does it mean to say that correct opinion with a rational definition or explanation is the most complete form of knowledge?

THEAETETUS: We must not.

THEAETETUS: We must not.

SOCRATES: Well, and what is the meaning of the term 'explanation'? I think that we have a choice of three meanings.

SOCRATES: Well, what does 'explanation' mean? I think it has three possible meanings.

THEAETETUS: What are they?

THEAETETUS: What are they?

SOCRATES: In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one's thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not explanation appear to be of this nature?

SOCRATES: First, it may mean expressing a thought aloud in verbs and nouns. In this way, an opinion is reflected in the stream of words from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Doesn’t explanation seem to be like this?

THEAETETUS: Certainly; he who so manifests his thought, is said to explain himself.

THEAETETUS: Certainly. Someone who expresses their thoughts in this way is said to explain themselves.

SOCRATES: And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or later to manifest what he thinks of anything; and if so, all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation; nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge.

SOCRATES: And anyone who is not born deaf or unable to speak can eventually express what they think about anything. If so, everyone with a correct opinion about anything can also give a correct explanation of it. So a correct opinion can never exist without knowledge.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he only intended to say, that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything, he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the thing.

SOCRATES: So let us not hastily accuse the man who gave this account of knowledge of using a meaningless word. Perhaps he only meant that a person should be able to answer a question about something’s nature by listing its elements.

THEAETETUS: As for example, Socrates...?

THEAETETUS: For example, Socrates...?

SOCRATES: As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of them individually; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke.

SOCRATES: For example, Hesiod says that a wagon is made of a hundred planks. Neither you nor I could describe each one. But if someone asked what a wagon is, we would be content to say that it consists of wheels, an axle, a body, rims, and a yoke.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would if we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of the name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters of your name—that would be true opinion, and not knowledge; for knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed.

SOCRATES: And our opponent will probably laugh at us. He would do the same if we claimed to be grammarians who could explain the spelling of Theaetetus. Yet suppose we could only name the syllables of your name, not the letters. That would be true opinion, not knowledge. For, as we have already said, knowledge requires both true opinion and a list of the elements that make up a thing.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a waggon; but he who can describe its essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon, in that he attains to the whole through the elements.

SOCRATES: In much the same way, we might also have a true opinion about a wagon. But someone who can describe its essence by listing its hundred planks adds a rational explanation to that true opinion. Instead of opinion, he has skill and knowledge of the wagon’s nature, because he understands the whole through its parts.

THEAETETUS: And do you not agree in that view, Socrates?

THEAETETUS: And don't you agree with that view, Socrates?

SOCRATES: If you do, my friend; but I want to know first, whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them to be irrational—is this your view?

SOCRATES: If you do, my friend. But first, I want to know whether this is your view. Is breaking everything down into its elements a rational explanation of it? And is considering things as syllables or larger combinations of elements irrational?

THEAETETUS: Precisely.

THEAETETUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of something, or thinks that the same thing is composed of different elements at different times?

SOCRATES: Well, do you think a man knows an element if he sometimes says it is part of something and sometimes denies it? Or if he thinks the same thing is made up of different elements at different times?

THEAETETUS: Assuredly not.

THEAETETUS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read?

SOCRATES: And don't you remember that this often happened to you and others when you were learning to read?

THEAETETUS: You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables?

THEAETETUS: You mean I got the letters wrong and misspelled the syllables?

SOCRATES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Yes.

THEAETETUS: To be sure; I perfectly remember, and I am very far from supposing that they who are in this condition have knowledge.

THEAETETUS: Of course, I remember perfectly. And I certainly don't think that people in this condition have knowledge.

SOCRATES: When a person at the time of learning writes the name of Theaetetus, and thinks that he ought to write and does write Th and e; but, again, meaning to write the name of Theododorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write T and e—can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of your two names?

SOCRATES: Suppose someone is learning to write the name Theaetetus. They think they should write Th and e, and they do. But when they mean to write Theododorus, they think they should write T and e, and they do. Can we say they know the first syllables of your two names?

THEAETETUS: We have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained knowledge.

THEAETETUS: We have already agreed that such a person does not yet have knowledge.

SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name?

SOCRATES: And in the same way, can he list the second, third, and fourth syllables of your name without knowing them?

THEAETETUS: He may.

THEAETETUS: He may.

SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can write them out correctly, he has right opinion?

SOCRATES: And in that case, if he knows the order of the letters and can write them correctly, does he have the right opinion?

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge?

SOCRATES: But even if we agree that his opinion is correct, he still lacks knowledge?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And yet he will have explanation, as well as right opinion, for he knew the order of the letters when he wrote; and this we admit to be explanation.

SOCRATES: Yet he will have an explanation as well as a correct opinion. He knew the order of the letters when he wrote, and we agree that this counts as an explanation.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge.

SOCRATES: Then, my friend, a correct opinion can be combined with a definition or explanation. But it still falls short of the precision of knowledge.

THEAETETUS: It would seem so.

THEAETETUS: It seems so.

SOCRATES: And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were there not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with rational explanation? And very likely there may be found some one who will not prefer this but the third.

SOCRATES: And what we thought was a perfect definition of knowledge is only a dream. But perhaps we should not say that yet. Weren't there three explanations of knowledge? As we said, anyone who claims that knowledge is true opinion combined with rational explanation must adopt one of them. And someone may well prefer the third explanation to this one.

THEAETETUS: You are quite right; there is still one remaining. The first was the image or expression of the mind in speech; the second, which has just been mentioned, is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements. But what is the third definition?

THEAETETUS: You are quite right. There is still one definition left. The first was the image or expression of the mind in speech. The second, which we just mentioned, is a way of reaching the whole by listing its elements. But what is the third definition?

SOCRATES: There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others.

SOCRATES: There is also the common idea of identifying what distinguishes the thing in question from everything else.

THEAETETUS: Can you give me any example of such a definition?

THEAETETUS: Can you give me an example of that kind of definition?

SOCRATES: As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that you would be contented with the statement that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth.

SOCRATES: Take the sun, for example. I think you would be satisfied to say that it is the brightest heavenly body revolving around the earth.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Understand why:—the reason is, as I was just now saying, that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons affirm, you will get at the definition or explanation of it; but while you lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs.

SOCRATES: Understand why. As I was just saying, many people believe that identifying what makes each thing distinct gives you its definition or explanation. But if you grasp only what it has in common with other things, you define only what shares that common quality.

THEAETETUS: I understand you, and your account of definition is in my judgment correct.

THEAETETUS: I understand you, and I think your explanation of definition is correct.

SOCRATES: But he, who having right opinion about anything, can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other things will know that of which before he had only an opinion.

SOCRATES: But suppose someone has a correct opinion about something. If they can identify what distinguishes it from other things, they will know what they previously only had an opinion about.

THEAETETUS: Yes; that is what we are maintaining.

THEAETETUS: Yes, that is what we are saying.

SOCRATES: Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself quite disappointed; the picture, which at a distance was not so bad, has now become altogether unintelligible.

SOCRATES: Still, Theaetetus, I am quite disappointed on closer inspection. The picture did not look so bad from a distance, but now it makes no sense at all.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

THEAETETUS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: I will suppose myself to have true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, then I have knowledge, but if not, opinion only.

SOCRATES: I will try to explain. Suppose I have a true opinion about you. If I add your definition to that opinion, I have knowledge. If not, I have only opinion.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your difference.

SOCRATES: We assumed that the definition was an explanation of your difference.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: But when I had only opinion, I had no conception of your distinguishing characteristics.

SOCRATES: But when I had only an opinion, I had no idea what made you distinct.

THEAETETUS: I suppose not.

THEAETETUS: I don't think so.

SOCRATES: Then I must have conceived of some general or common nature which no more belonged to you than to another.

SOCRATES: Then I must have thought of some general or shared nature that belonged no more to you than to anyone else.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: Tell me, now—How in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of any one else? Suppose that I imagine Theaetetus to be a man who has nose, eyes, and mouth, and every other member complete; how would that enable me to distinguish Theaetetus from Theodorus, or from some outer barbarian?

SOCRATES: Tell me, then, how could I judge you any more than anyone else in that case? Suppose I imagine Theaetetus as a man with a nose, eyes, a mouth, and all his other body parts. How would that help me distinguish Theaetetus from Theodorus or from some foreigner?

THEAETETUS: How could it?

THEAETETUS: How could it?

SOCRATES: Or if I had further conceived of you, not only as having nose and eyes, but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes, should I have any more notion of you than of myself and others who resemble me?

SOCRATES: Or suppose I thought of you as having not just a nose and eyes, but a snub nose and prominent eyes. Would I have any clearer idea of you than of myself and others who resemble me?

THEAETETUS: Certainly not.

THEAETETUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus until your snub-nosedness has left an impression on my mind different from the snub-nosedness of all others whom I have ever seen, and until your other peculiarities have a like distinctness; and so when I meet you to-morrow the right opinion will be re-called?

SOCRATES: Surely I cannot form an idea of Theaetetus until your snub nose leaves a distinct impression on my mind. It must be different from the snub noses of everyone else I have ever seen. Your other distinctive features must also leave equally distinct impressions. Then, when I meet you tomorrow, the correct opinion will come back to me?

THEAETETUS: Most true.

THEAETETUS: Very true.

SOCRATES: Then right opinion implies the perception of differences?

SOCRATES: So, does having the right opinion mean noticing differences?

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

THEAETETUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion? If the meaning is, that we should form an opinion of the way in which something differs from another thing, the proposal is ridiculous.

SOCRATES: What should we say, then, about adding reason or explanation to a correct opinion? If it means forming an opinion about how one thing differs from another, the proposal is ridiculous.

THEAETETUS: How so?

THEAETETUS: How so?

SOCRATES: We are supposed to acquire a right opinion of the differences which distinguish one thing from another when we have already a right opinion of them, and so we go round and round:—the revolution of the scytal, or pestle, or any other rotatory machine, in the same circles, is as nothing compared with such a requirement; and we may be truly described as the blind directing the blind; for to add those things which we already have, in order that we may learn what we already think, is like a soul utterly benighted.

SOCRATES: We are supposed to form a correct opinion about what distinguishes one thing from another. But we are supposed to do this when we already have that correct opinion. So we go round and round. A scytal, a pestle, or any other rotating machine goes in circles far less than this demand does. We may truly be called the blind leading the blind. For adding what we already have so that we can learn what we already think is like a soul in utter darkness.

THEAETETUS: Tell me; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question?

THEAETETUS: Tell me, what were you going to say when you asked that question just now?

SOCRATES: If, my boy, the argument, in speaking of adding the definition, had used the word to 'know,' and not merely 'have an opinion' of the difference, this which is the most promising of all the definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty end, for to know is surely to acquire knowledge.

SOCRATES: My boy, suppose the argument had used the word 'know' when speaking of adding the definition. Suppose it had not merely said 'have an opinion' of the difference. Then this most promising definition of knowledge would have come to a sorry end. For surely, to know is to acquire knowledge.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

SOCRATES: And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge? this fair argument will answer 'Right opinion with knowledge,'—knowledge, that is, of difference, for this, as the said argument maintains, is adding the definition.

SOCRATES: So, when asked, What is knowledge? this fine argument answers, 'Right opinion with knowledge,' meaning knowledge of difference. For the argument maintains that adding knowledge of difference is adding the definition.

THEAETETUS: That seems to be true.

THEAETETUS: That seems true.

SOCRATES: But how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything! And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to true opinion?

SOCRATES: But how foolish to ask what knowledge is and answer, “True opinion with knowledge of difference or anything else”! So, Theaetetus, is knowledge neither sensation nor true opinion, nor true opinion accompanied by a definition and explanation?

THEAETETUS: I suppose not.

THEAETETUS: I don't think so.

SOCRATES: And are you still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth?

SOCRATES: Are you still in labor, my dear friend, or have you given birth to all you have to say about knowledge?

THEAETETUS: I am sure, Socrates, that you have elicited from me a good deal more than ever was in me.

THEAETETUS: I'm sure, Socrates, that you've brought out far more than I ever had in me.

SOCRATES: And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up?

SOCRATES: And doesn't my art show that you've given birth to nothing but wind, and that your brain's offspring aren't worth raising?

THEAETETUS: Very true.

THEAETETUS: That's very true.

SOCRATES: But if, Theaetetus, you should ever conceive afresh, you will be all the better for the present investigation, and if not, you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, and will be too modest to fancy that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art; I can no further go, nor do I know aught of the things which great and famous men know or have known in this or former ages. The office of a midwife I, like my mother, have received from God; she delivered women, I deliver men; but they must be young and noble and fair.

SOCRATES: But if you ever conceive another idea, Theaetetus, this inquiry will have made you better prepared. If not, you will be more clearheaded, humble, and gentle with others. You will also be too modest to think you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art. I can go no further. Nor do I know any of the things great and famous men know or have known, now or in the past. Like my mother, I have received the work of a midwife from God. She delivered women. I deliver men, but they must be young, noble, and beautiful.

And now I have to go to the porch of the King Archon, where I am to meet Meletus and his indictment. To-morrow morning, Theodorus, I shall hope to see you again at this place.

Now I have to go to the porch of the King Archon to meet Meletus and face his indictment. Theodorus, I hope to see you here again tomorrow morning.

The end