Philosophy

The subject of Saintliness left us face to face with the question, Is the sense of divine presence a sense of anything objectively true? We turned first to mysticism for an answer, and found that although mysticism is entirely willing to corroborate religion, it is too private (and also too various) in its utterances to be able to claim a universal authority. But philosophy publishes results which claim to be universally valid if they are valid at all, so we now turn with our question to philosophy. Can philosophy stamp a warrant of veracity upon the religious man's sense of the divine?

The subject of Saintliness left us facing a question: Does the sense of a divine presence reflect an objective truth? We turned first to mysticism for an answer. We found that mysticism is entirely willing to support religion. But its claims are too personal and too varied to claim universal authority. Philosophy, however, offers conclusions that claim to be universally valid if they are valid at all. So we now turn to philosophy with our question. Can philosophy confirm that a religious person's sense of the divine is true?

I imagine that many of you at this point begin to indulge in guesses at the goal to which I am tending. I have undermined the authority of mysticism, you say, and the next thing I shall probably do is to seek to discredit that of philosophy. Religion, you expect to hear me conclude, is nothing but an affair of faith, based either on vague sentiment, or on that vivid sense of the reality of things unseen of which in my second lecture and in the lecture on Mysticism I gave so many examples. It is essentially private and individualistic; it always exceeds our powers of formulation; and although attempts to pour its contents into a philosophic mould will probably always go on, men being what they are, yet these attempts are always secondary processes which in no way add to the authority, or warrant the veracity, of the sentiments from which they derive their own stimulus and borrow whatever glow of conviction they may themselves possess. In short, you suspect that I am planning to defend feeling at the expense of reason, to rehabilitate the primitive and unreflective, and to dissuade you from the hope of any Theology worthy of the name.

I imagine that many of you are now guessing where I am headed. You might say that I have undermined the authority of mysticism. You probably expect me to try to discredit the authority of philosophy next. You expect me to conclude that religion is nothing but a matter of faith. You expect me to say that faith rests either on vague feelings or on a vivid sense that unseen things are real. I gave many examples of that sense in my second lecture and in the lecture on Mysticism. You expect me to say that religion is essentially private and individual. It always exceeds our ability to put it into words. People being what they are, attempts to shape religion into a philosophical form will probably always continue. Yet you expect me to say that these attempts are always secondary. They do nothing to strengthen the authority of the feelings behind them or to show that those feelings are true. Instead, these attempts draw their impetus and whatever glow of conviction they possess from those feelings. In short, you suspect that I plan to defend feeling at the expense of reason. You think I mean to restore the standing of what is primitive and unreflective. And you think I want to discourage your hope for any Theology worthy of the name.

To a certain extent I have to admit that you guess rightly. I do believe that feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products, like translations of a text into another tongue. But all such statements are misleading from their brevity, and it will take the whole hour for me to explain to you exactly what I mean.

To some extent, I have to admit that your guess is right. I do believe that feeling is the deeper source of religion. Philosophical and theological formulas come afterward, like translations of a text into another language. But all such statements are misleading because they are brief. It will take the whole hour to explain exactly what I mean.

When I call theological formulas secondary products, I mean that in a world in which no religious feeling had ever existed, I doubt whether any philosophic theology could ever have been framed. I doubt if dispassionate intellectual contemplation of the universe, apart from inner unhappiness and need of deliverance on the one hand and mystical emotion on the other, would ever have resulted in religious philosophies such as we now possess. Men would have begun with animistic explanations of natural fact, and criticised these away into scientific ones, as they actually have done. In the science they would have left a certain amount of “psychical research,” even as they now will probably have to re-admit a certain amount. But high-flying speculations like those of either dogmatic or idealistic theology, these they would have had no motive to venture on, feeling no need of commerce with such deities. These speculations must, it seems to me, be classed as over-beliefs, buildings-out performed by the intellect into directions of which feeling originally supplied the hint.

When I call theological formulas secondary products, I mean that I doubt any philosophical theology could exist without religious feeling. I doubt that detached intellectual contemplation of the universe would ever have produced religious philosophies like those we have today. Such contemplation would have to be accompanied by inner unhappiness and a need for deliverance on the one hand, or by mystical emotion on the other. People would have begun with animistic explanations of natural events. They would then have criticized those explanations until they gave way to scientific ones, as they actually have done. They would have retained a certain amount of “psychical research” within science, just as they will probably now have to readmit a certain amount. But they would have had no reason to pursue ambitious speculations like those of dogmatic or idealistic theology. They would have felt no need to have dealings with such deities. It seems to me that these speculations must be classed as over-beliefs. They are extensions of thought in directions originally suggested by feeling.

But even if religious philosophy had to have its first hint supplied by feeling, may it not have dealt in a superior way with the matter which feeling suggested? Feeling is private and dumb, and unable to give an account of itself. It allows that its results are mysteries and enigmas, declines to justify them rationally, and on occasion is willing that they should even pass for paradoxical and absurd. Philosophy takes just the opposite attitude. Her aspiration is to reclaim from mystery and paradox whatever territory she touches. To find an escape from obscure and wayward personal persuasion to truth objectively valid for all thinking men has ever been the intellect's most cherished ideal. To redeem religion from unwholesome privacy, and to give public status and universal right of way to its deliverances, has been reason's task.

But even if religious philosophy had to get its first hint from feeling, might it have handled what feeling suggested better? Feeling is private and cannot speak for itself. It admits that its conclusions are mysteries and puzzles, and it refuses to justify them through reason. Sometimes it is even willing to let them seem paradoxical and absurd. Philosophy takes the opposite approach. It aims to free whatever it examines from mystery and paradox. The intellect has always prized the ideal of escaping obscure and unpredictable personal convictions. It seeks instead a truth that is objectively valid for all thinking people. Reason’s task has been to free religion from unhealthy privacy and give its conclusions public standing and universal acceptance.

I believe that philosophy will always have opportunity to labor at this task.²⁸⁶ We are thinking beings, and we cannot exclude the intellect from participating in any of our functions. Even in soliloquizing with ourselves, we construe our feelings intellectually. Both our personal ideals and our religious and mystical experiences must be interpreted congruously with the kind of scenery which our thinking mind inhabits. The philosophic climate of our time inevitably forces its own clothing on us. Moreover, we must exchange our feelings with one another, and in doing so we have to speak, and to use general and abstract verbal formulas. Conceptions and constructions are thus a necessary part of our religion; and as moderator amid the clash of hypotheses, and mediator among the criticisms of one man's constructions by another, philosophy will always have much to do. It would be strange if I disputed this, when these very lectures which I am giving are (as you will see more clearly from now onwards) a laborious attempt to extract from the privacies of religious experience some general facts which can be defined in formulas upon which everybody may agree.

I believe philosophy will always have work to do on this task.²⁸⁶ We are thinking beings, and we cannot keep the intellect out of anything we do. Even when we talk to ourselves, we interpret our feelings intellectually. We must interpret both our personal ideals and our religious and mystical experiences in ways that fit our mental world. The philosophical climate of our time inevitably shapes how we express ourselves. Moreover, we must share our feelings with one another. To do this, we have to speak and use general and abstract verbal formulas. Ideas and theories are therefore a necessary part of our religion. Philosophy will always have much to do as it moderates clashes between hypotheses. It also mediates when people criticize one another’s theories. It would be strange for me to dispute this. After all, these very lectures are a painstaking attempt to draw some general facts from private religious experience. These facts can be expressed in formulas on which everyone may agree. You will see this more clearly from now on.

Religious experience, in other words, spontaneously and inevitably engenders myths, superstitions, dogmas, creeds, and metaphysical theologies, and criticisms of one set of these by the adherents of another. Of late, impartial classifications and comparisons have become possible, alongside of the denunciations and anathemas by which the commerce between creeds used exclusively to be carried on. We have the beginnings of a “Science of Religions,” so-called; and if these lectures could ever be accounted a crumb-like contribution to such a science, I should be made very happy.

In other words, religious experience naturally and inevitably gives rise to myths, superstitions, dogmas, creeds, and metaphysical theologies. It also leads followers of one set of beliefs to criticize another. Until recently, creeds dealt with one another exclusively through denunciations and condemnations. Now impartial classification and comparison have also become possible. We have the beginnings of a so-called “Science of Religions.” If these lectures could ever be considered even a tiny contribution to such a science, I would be very happy.

But all these intellectual operations, whether they be constructive or comparative and critical, presuppose immediate experiences as their subject-matter. They are interpretative and inductive operations, operations after the fact, consequent upon religious feeling, not coördinate with it, not independent of what it ascertains.

But all these intellectual activities depend on immediate experiences as their subject matter. This is true whether they construct ideas or compare and criticize them. They interpret experience and draw conclusions from it after the fact. They follow religious feeling, rather than standing alongside it or being independent of what it reveals.

The intellectualism in religion which I wish to discredit pretends to be something altogether different from this. It assumes to construct religious objects out of the resources of logical reason alone, or of logical reason drawing rigorous inference from non-subjective facts. It calls its conclusions dogmatic theology, or philosophy of the absolute, as the case may be; it does not call them science of religions. It reaches them in an a priori way, and warrants their veracity.

The religious intellectualism I want to discredit claims to be something altogether different from this. It claims to construct religious objects using logical reason alone. Or it claims to construct them through rigorous reasoning from objective facts. It calls its conclusions dogmatic theology or philosophy of the absolute, depending on the case. It does not call them the science of religions. It reaches these conclusions a priori, independently of experience, and guarantees their truth.

Warranted systems have ever been the idols of aspiring souls. All-inclusive, yet simple; noble, clean, luminous, stable, rigorous, true;—what more ideal refuge could there be than such a system would offer to spirits vexed by the muddiness and accidentality of the world of sensible things? Accordingly, we find inculcated in the theological schools of to-day, almost as much as in those of the fore-time, a disdain for merely possible or probable truth, and of results that only private assurance can grasp. Scholastics and idealists both express this disdain. Principal John Caird, for example, writes as follows in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion:—

Reliable systems have always been ideals for aspiring souls. Such a system would be all inclusive yet simple, noble, clear, illuminating, stable, rigorous, and true. What better refuge could it offer to spirits troubled by the muddle and chance of the physical world? Accordingly, theological schools today teach disdain for truth that is merely possible or probable. They also teach disdain for conclusions that can be grasped only through personal conviction. They do so almost as much as the schools of earlier times did. Both scholastics and idealists express this disdain. For example, Principal John Caird writes in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion:

Cardinal Newman, in his work, The Idea of a University, gives more emphatic expression still to this disdain for sentiment.²⁸⁹ Theology, he says, is a science in the strictest sense of the word. I will tell you, he says, what it is not—not “physical evidences” for God, not “natural religion,” for these are but vague subjective interpretations:—

Cardinal Newman expresses this disdain for sentiment even more emphatically in his work, The Idea of a University.²⁸⁹ Theology, he says, is a science in the strictest sense of the word. He says he will explain what theology is not. It is not “physical evidences” for God or “natural religion,” because these are only vague, subjective interpretations:

In both these extracts we have the issue clearly set before us: Feeling valid only for the individual is pitted against reason valid universally. The test is a perfectly plain one of fact. Theology based on pure reason must in point of fact convince men universally. If it did not, wherein would its superiority consist? If it only formed sects and schools, even as sentiment and mysticism form them, how would it fulfill its programme of freeing us from personal caprice and waywardness? This perfectly definite practical test of the pretensions of philosophy to found religion on universal reason simplifies my procedure to-day. I need not discredit philosophy by laborious criticism of its arguments. It will suffice if I show that as a matter of history it fails to prove its pretension to be “objectively” convincing. In fact, philosophy does so fail. It does not banish differences; it founds schools and sects just as feeling does. I believe, in fact, that the logical reason of man operates in this field of divinity exactly as it has always operated in love, or in patriotism, or in politics, or in any other of the wider affairs of life, in which our passions or our mystical intuitions fix our beliefs beforehand. It finds arguments for our conviction, for indeed it has to find them. It amplifies and defines our faith, and dignifies it and lends it words and plausibility. It hardly ever engenders it; it cannot now secure it.²⁹⁰

Both extracts make the issue clear: feeling, valid only for the individual, is set against reason, valid for everyone. The test is a simple matter of fact. Theology based on pure reason must actually convince everyone. If it did not, what would make it superior? If it only formed sects and schools, just as sentiment and mysticism do, how would it fulfill its aim? How would it free us from personal whims and waywardness? This clear practical test of philosophy’s claim to base religion on universal reason simplifies my task today. I do not need to discredit philosophy by painstakingly criticizing its arguments. It is enough to show that, historically, philosophy fails to support its claim to be “objectively” convincing. In fact, philosophy does fail. It does not eliminate differences. It forms schools and sects just as feeling does. Indeed, I believe that human reason works in the field of religion just as it always has in love, patriotism, politics, or any other broad area of life where our passions or mystical intuitions shape our beliefs in advance. Reason finds arguments for our convictions, because it has to find them. It expands and defines our faith. It gives faith dignity, words, and plausibility. It hardly ever creates faith, and it cannot now secure it.²⁹⁰

Lend me your attention while I run through some of the points of the older systematic theology. You find them in both Protestant and Catholic manuals, best of all in the innumerable text-books published since Pope Leo's Encyclical recommending the study of Saint Thomas. I glance first at the arguments by which dogmatic theology establishes God's existence, after that at those by which it establishes his nature.²⁹¹

Please give me your attention while I review some points of the older systematic theology. You can find them in both Protestant and Catholic manuals. The best sources are the countless textbooks published since Pope Leo’s Encyclical recommending the study of Saint Thomas. I will first look briefly at the arguments dogmatic theology uses to establish God’s existence. Then I will look at those it uses to establish his nature.²⁹¹

The arguments for God's existence have stood for hundreds of years with the waves of unbelieving criticism breaking against them, never totally discrediting them in the ears of the faithful, but on the whole slowly and surely washing out the mortar from between their joints. If you have a God already whom you believe in, these arguments confirm you. If you are atheistic, they fail to set you right. The proofs are various. The “cosmological” one, so-called, reasons from the contingence of the world to a First Cause which must contain whatever perfections the world itself contains. The “argument from design” reasons, from the fact that Nature's laws are mathematical, and her parts benevolently adapted to each other, that this cause is both intellectual and benevolent. The “moral argument” is that the moral law presupposes a lawgiver. The “argument ex consensu gentium” is that the belief in God is so widespread as to be grounded in the rational nature of man, and should therefore carry authority with it.

Arguments for God’s existence have stood for hundreds of years, while waves of skeptical criticism have broken against them. These criticisms have never completely discredited the arguments in the eyes of believers. But on the whole, they have slowly and surely washed away the mortar between the arguments’ joints. If you already believe in God, these arguments confirm your belief. If you are an atheist, they fail to convince you otherwise. There are several proofs. The so-called “cosmological” proof starts from the fact that the world might not have existed. It reasons that there must be a First Cause containing all the perfections found in the world itself. The “argument from design” starts from the fact that nature’s laws are mathematical and its parts are adapted to benefit one another. It reasons from these facts that the First Cause is both intelligent and benevolent. The “moral argument” holds that moral law requires a lawgiver. The “argument ex consensu gentium” holds that belief in God is so widespread that it must be rooted in human rational nature. Belief in God should therefore carry authority.

As I just said, I will not discuss these arguments technically. The bare fact that all idealists since Kant have felt entitled either to scout or to neglect them shows that they are not solid enough to serve as religion's all-sufficient foundation. Absolutely impersonal reasons would be in duty bound to show more general convincingness. Causation is indeed too obscure a principle to bear the weight of the whole structure of theology. As for the argument from design, see how Darwinian ideas have revolutionized it. Conceived as we now conceive them, as so many fortunate escapes from almost limitless processes of destruction, the benevolent adaptations which we find in Nature suggest a deity very different from the one who figured in the earlier versions of the argument.²⁹²

As I just said, I will not discuss these arguments in technical detail. All idealists since Kant have felt justified in either dismissing or ignoring them. That fact alone shows that the arguments are not solid enough to be the sole foundation of religion. Purely impersonal reasons ought to be more widely convincing. Causation is too obscure a principle to support the whole structure of theology. As for the argument from design, consider how Darwinian ideas have revolutionized it. We now see the beneficial adaptations found in Nature as fortunate escapes from almost limitless processes of destruction. Seen in this way, they suggest a deity very different from the one portrayed in earlier versions of the argument.²⁹²

The fact is that these arguments do but follow the combined suggestions of the facts and of our feeling. They prove nothing rigorously. They only corroborate our pre-existent partialities.

The fact is that these arguments only follow what the facts and our feelings suggest together. They prove nothing conclusively. They only reinforce the preferences we already have.

If philosophy can do so little to establish God's existence, how stands it with her efforts to define his attributes? It is worth while to look at the attempts of systematic theology in this direction.

If philosophy can do so little to establish God’s existence, how successful is it at defining his attributes? It is worth looking at how systematic theology has tried to define them.

I will not weary you by pursuing these metaphysical determinations farther, into the mysteries of God's Trinity, for example. What I have given will serve as a specimen of the orthodox philosophical theology of both Catholics and Protestants. Newman, filled with enthusiasm at God's list of perfections, continues the passage which I began to quote to you by a couple of pages of a rhetoric so magnificent that I can hardly refrain from adding them, in spite of the inroad they would make upon our time.²⁹⁴ He first enumerates God's attributes sonorously, then celebrates his ownership of everything in earth and Heaven, and the dependence of all that happens upon his permissive will. He gives us scholastic philosophy “touched with emotion,” and every philosophy should be touched with emotion to be rightly understood. Emotionally, then, dogmatic theology is worth something to minds of the type of Newman's. It will aid us to estimate what it is worth intellectually, if at this point I make a short digression.

I will not tire you by pursuing these metaphysical definitions further, into the mysteries of God's Trinity, for example. What I have given will serve as an example of orthodox philosophical theology among both Catholics and Protestants. Newman is filled with enthusiasm for God's list of perfections. He continues the passage I began to quote with a couple of pages of magnificent rhetoric. I can hardly resist adding them, even though they would take up so much of our time.²⁹⁴ He first lists God's attributes in resounding language. Then he celebrates God's ownership of everything on earth and in Heaven, and the dependence of all that happens on God's permissive will. He gives us scholastic philosophy “touched with emotion.” Every philosophy should be touched with emotion if it is to be rightly understood. Dogmatic theology, then, has some emotional value for minds like Newman's. A short digression at this point will help us judge its intellectual value.

What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder. The Continental schools of philosophy have too often overlooked the fact that man's thinking is organically connected with his conduct. It seems to me to be the chief glory of English and Scottish thinkers to have kept the organic connection in view. The guiding principle of British philosophy has in fact been that every difference must make a difference, every theoretical difference somewhere issue in a practical difference, and that the best method of discussing points of theory is to begin by ascertaining what practical difference would result from one alternative or the other being true. What is the particular truth in question known as? In what facts does it result? What is its cash-value in terms of particular experience? This is the characteristic English way of taking up a question. In this way, you remember, Locke takes up the question of personal identity. What you mean by it is just your chain of particular memories, says he. That is the only concretely verifiable part of its significance. All further ideas about it, such as the oneness or manyness of the spiritual substance on which it is based, are therefore void of intelligible meaning; and propositions touching such ideas may be indifferently affirmed or denied. So Berkeley with his “matter.” The cash-value of matter is our physical sensations. That is what it is known as, all that we concretely verify of its conception. That, therefore, is the whole meaning of the term “matter”—any other pretended meaning is mere wind of words. Hume does the same thing with causation. It is known as habitual antecedence, and as tendency on our part to look for something definite to come. Apart from this practical meaning it has no significance whatever, and books about it may be committed to the flames, says Hume. Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown, James Mill, John Mill, and Professor Bain, have followed more or less consistently the same method; and Shadworth Hodgson has used the principle with full explicitness. When all is said and done, it was English and Scotch writers, and not Kant, who introduced “the critical method” into philosophy, the one method fitted to make philosophy a study worthy of serious men. For what seriousness can possibly remain in debating philosophic propositions that will never make an appreciable difference to us in action? And what could it matter, if all propositions were practically indifferent, which of them we should agree to call true or which false?

What God has joined together, let no one separate. Continental schools of philosophy have too often overlooked the natural connection between human thought and conduct. In my view, the chief glory of English and Scottish thinkers is that they have kept this connection in mind. The guiding principle of British philosophy has been that every difference must make a difference. Every theoretical difference must lead to a practical difference somewhere. The best way to discuss a theoretical question is to start by asking what practical difference each possible answer would make. What is the particular truth in question known as? What facts does it result in? What is its cash value in terms of particular experience? This is the characteristic English way of approaching a question. You may remember that Locke approaches personal identity in this way. He says that personal identity means simply your chain of particular memories. That is the only part of its meaning that can be concretely verified. Further ideas about it therefore have no intelligible meaning. One such idea is whether the spiritual substance on which personal identity is based is one or many. Statements about such ideas can be affirmed or denied without making any difference. Berkeley does the same with “matter.” The cash value of matter is our physical sensations. That is what matter is known as, and all that we can concretely verify of the concept. So that is the whole meaning of the term “matter.” Any other supposed meaning is just empty words. Hume does the same with causation. Causation is known as one thing habitually coming before another, and as our tendency to expect something definite to follow. Apart from this practical meaning, causation has no significance whatever. Hume says that books about it may be thrown into the flames. Dugald Stewart and Thomas Brown, James Mill, John Mill, and Professor Bain have followed the same method with varying consistency. Shadworth Hodgson has used the principle with complete explicitness. In the end, it was English and Scottish writers, not Kant, who introduced “the critical method” into philosophy. It is the one method suited to making philosophy a study worthy of serious people. After all, how can we seriously debate philosophical propositions that will never make an appreciable difference to how we act? And if all propositions made no practical difference, what would it matter which we agreed to call true or false?

An American philosopher of eminent originality, Mr. Charles Sanders Peirce, has rendered thought a service by disentangling from the particulars of its application the principle by which these men were instinctively guided, and by singling it out as fundamental and giving to it a Greek name. He calls it the principle of pragmatism, and he defends it somewhat as follows:²⁹⁵—

Charles Sanders Peirce, a highly original American philosopher, has made a valuable contribution to thought. He separated the principle that instinctively guided these men from the particular ways they applied it. He identified the principle as fundamental and gave it a Greek name. He calls it the principle of pragmatism, and he defends it roughly as follows:²⁹⁵:

Thought in movement has for its only conceivable motive the attainment of belief, or thought at rest. Only when our thought about a subject has found its rest in belief can our action on the subject firmly and safely begin. Beliefs, in short, are rules for action; and the whole function of thinking is but one step in the production of active habits. If there were any part of a thought that made no difference in the thought's practical consequences, then that part would be no proper element of the thought's significance. To develop a thought's meaning we need therefore only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its sole significance; and the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, we need then only consider what sensations, immediate or remote, we are conceivably to expect from it, and what conduct we must prepare in case the object should be true. Our conception of these practical consequences is for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.

The only conceivable purpose of thinking is to reach a belief, where thought can come to rest. Only when our thinking about a subject has settled into belief can we begin to act on it firmly and safely. In short, beliefs are rules for action. The whole function of thinking is just one step in forming habits of action. If any part of a thought made no difference to its practical consequences, that part would have no proper place in its meaning. To understand a thought’s meaning, then, we need only determine what conduct it can produce. That conduct is its only meaning for us. The concrete fact underlying all the distinctions we make in thought is that even the finest distinction must involve some possible difference in practice. To make our thoughts about an object perfectly clear, we need only consider what sensations we might expect from it, immediately or later. We must also consider what conduct we should prepare for if the object is real. Our understanding of these practical consequences is the whole of our understanding of the object, insofar as that understanding has any positive meaning at all.

This is the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism. Such a principle will help us on this occasion to decide, among the various attributes set down in the scholastic inventory of God's perfections, whether some be not far less significant than others.

This is Peirce's principle, the principle of pragmatism. It will help us decide whether some qualities in the scholastic list of God's perfections are much less significant than others.

If, namely, we apply the principle of pragmatism to God's metaphysical attributes, strictly so called, as distinguished from his moral attributes, I think that, even were we forced by a coercive logic to believe them, we still should have to confess them to be destitute of all intelligible significance. Take God's aseity, for example; or his necessariness; his immateriality; his “simplicity” or superiority to the kind of inner variety and succession which we find in finite beings, his indivisibility, and lack of the inner distinctions of being and activity, substance and accident, potentiality and actuality, and the rest; his repudiation of inclusion in a genus; his actualized infinity; his “personality,” apart from the moral qualities which it may comport; his relations to evil being permissive and not positive; his self-sufficiency, self-love, and absolute felicity in himself:—candidly speaking, how do such qualities as these make any definite connection with our life? And if they severally call for no distinctive adaptations of our conduct, what vital difference can it possibly make to a man's religion whether they be true or false?

Suppose we apply the principle of pragmatism to God's metaphysical attributes, as distinct from his moral attributes. Even if strict logic forced us to believe in those metaphysical attributes, I think we would still have to admit that they have no intelligible meaning. Take God's aseity, for example, or his necessary existence or immateriality. Consider his “simplicity”, his freedom from the kind of inner variety and succession we find in finite beings. Consider his indivisibility and his lack of inner distinctions between being and activity, substance and accident, potentiality and actuality, and the rest. Consider the claim that he cannot be included in a genus, or that his infinity is fully realized. Consider his “personality”, apart from any moral qualities it may involve. Consider the claim that he permits evil but does not actively cause it. Consider his self-sufficiency, self-love, and absolute happiness in himself. Honestly, how do any of these qualities connect in a definite way with our lives? And if each calls for no distinct change in our conduct, what vital difference can its truth or falsity possibly make to a person's religion?

For my own part, although I dislike to say aught that may grate upon tender associations, I must frankly confess that even though these attributes were faultlessly deduced, I cannot conceive of its being of the smallest consequence to us religiously that any one of them should be true. Pray, what specific act can I perform in order to adapt myself the better to God's simplicity? Or how does it assist me to plan my behavior, to know that his happiness is anyhow absolutely complete? In the middle of the century just past, Mayne Reid was the great writer of books of out-of-door adventure. He was forever extolling the hunters and field-observers of living animals' habits, and keeping up a fire of invective against the “closet-naturalists,” as he called them, the collectors and classifiers, and handlers of skeletons and skins. When I was a boy, I used to think that a closet-naturalist must be the vilest type of wretch under the sun. But surely the systematic theologians are the closet-naturalists of the deity, even in Captain Mayne Reid's sense. What is their deduction of metaphysical attributes but a shuffling and matching of pedantic dictionary-adjectives, aloof from morals, aloof from human needs, something that might be worked out from the mere word “God” by one of those logical machines of wood and brass which recent ingenuity has contrived as well as by a man of flesh and blood. They have the trail of the serpent over them. One feels that in the theologians' hands, they are only a set of titles obtained by a mechanical manipulation of synonyms; verbality has stepped into the place of vision, professionalism into that of life. Instead of bread we have a stone; instead of a fish, a serpent. Did such a conglomeration of abstract terms give really the gist of our knowledge of the deity, schools of theology might indeed continue to flourish, but religion, vital religion, would have taken its flight from this world. What keeps religion going is something else than abstract definitions and systems of concatenated adjectives, and something different from faculties of theology and their professors. All these things are after-effects, secondary accretions upon those phenomena of vital conversation with the unseen divine, of which I have shown you so many instances, renewing themselves in sæcula sæculorum in the lives of humble private men.

For my part, I dislike saying anything that may offend cherished feelings. But I must confess something frankly. Even if these attributes were deduced without error, I cannot imagine their truth making the slightest religious difference to us. What specific act can I perform to adapt myself better to God's simplicity? How does knowing that his happiness is absolutely complete, in any case, help me plan my behavior? In the middle of the last century, Mayne Reid was the great writer of outdoor adventure books. He was forever praising hunters and field observers of living animals' habits. He also kept up a barrage of abuse against the “closet-naturalists,” as he called them. These were the collectors and classifiers who handled skeletons and skins. As a boy, I used to think that a closet-naturalist must be the vilest wretch under the sun. But surely systematic theologians are the closet-naturalists of the deity, even in Captain Mayne Reid's sense. What is their deduction of metaphysical attributes but a shuffling and matching of pedantic dictionary adjectives? Their deductions have nothing to do with morals or human needs. One of those logical machines of wood and brass, recently devised by ingenious inventors, could work them out from the mere word “God” as well as a person of flesh and blood could. The attributes bear the serpent's trail. In the theologians' hands, they seem only a set of titles produced by mechanically manipulating synonyms. Words have taken the place of vision, and professionalism the place of life. Instead of bread we have a stone. Instead of a fish, a serpent. If such a collection of abstract terms really summed up our knowledge of the deity, schools of theology might indeed continue to flourish. But religion, vital religion, would have fled from this world. What keeps religion alive is something other than abstract definitions and systems of linked adjectives. It is also something different from theology faculties and their professors. All these things are aftereffects, secondary additions to the experiences of living conversation with the unseen divine. I have shown you many examples of those experiences, which renew themselves forever in the lives of humble private individuals.

So much for the metaphysical attributes of God! From the point of view of practical religion, the metaphysical monster which they offer to our worship is an absolutely worthless invention of the scholarly mind.

So much for God’s metaphysical attributes! For practical religion, the metaphysical monster these attributes offer us to worship is a completely worthless invention of the scholarly mind.

What shall we now say of the attributes called moral? Pragmatically, they stand on an entirely different footing. They positively determine fear and hope and expectation, and are foundations for the saintly life. It needs but a glance at them to show how great is their significance.

What should we say about the attributes called moral? In practical terms, they are entirely different. They directly shape our fears, hopes, and expectations, and provide a foundation for the saintly life. A quick look at these attributes shows how important they are.

God's holiness, for example: being holy, God can will nothing but the good. Being omnipotent, he can secure its triumph. Being omniscient, he can see us in the dark. Being just, he can punish us for what he sees. Being loving, he can pardon too. Being unalterable, we can count on him securely. These qualities enter into connection with our life, it is highly important that we should be informed concerning them. That God's purpose in creation should be the manifestation of his glory is also an attribute which has definite relations to our practical life. Among other things it has given a definite character to worship in all Christian countries. If dogmatic theology really does prove beyond dispute that a God with characters like these exists, she may well claim to give a solid basis to religious sentiment. But verily, how stands it with her arguments?

Consider God's holiness, for example. Because God is holy, he can will only what is good. Because he is all-powerful, he can ensure that good triumphs. Because he knows everything, he can see us in the dark. Because he is just, he can punish us for what he sees. Because he is loving, he can also pardon us. Because he never changes, we can depend on him with confidence. These qualities affect our lives, so it is very important for us to know about them. God's purpose in creation, to reveal his glory, is another attribute that has definite effects on our practical lives. Among other things, it has given worship a distinct character in all Christian countries. If dogmatic theology really proves beyond dispute that a God with qualities like these exists, it may well claim to give religious feeling a solid foundation. But how strong are its arguments, really?

It stands with them as ill as with the arguments for his existence. Not only do post-Kantian idealists reject them root and branch, but it is a plain historic fact that they never have converted any one who has found in the moral complexion of the world, as he experienced it, reasons for doubting that a good God can have framed it. To prove God's goodness by the scholastic argument that there is no non-being in his essence would sound to such a witness simply silly.

These arguments fare no better than the arguments for his existence. Post-Kantian idealists reject them completely. But it is also a plain historical fact that they have never converted anyone who doubted that a good God made the world because of its moral character as they experienced it. To such a person, the scholastic argument for God's goodness would sound simply silly. That argument holds that there is no non-being in God's essence.

No! the book of Job went over this whole matter once for all and definitively. Ratiocination is a relatively superficial and unreal path to the deity: “I will lay mine hand upon my mouth; I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth Thee.” An intellect perplexed and baffled, yet a trustful sense of presence—such is the situation of the man who is sincere with himself and with the facts, but who remains religious still.²⁹⁶

No! The book of Job settled this whole matter once and for all. Reasoning is a relatively superficial and unreal way to reach God: “I will put my hand over my mouth. I had heard of you, but now I see you.” A person who is honest with himself and with the facts, but remains religious, is in this position. His mind is puzzled and confused, yet he feels a presence he trusts.²⁹⁶

We must therefore, I think, bid a definitive good-by to dogmatic theology. In all sincerity our faith must do without that warrant. Modern idealism, I repeat, has said good-by to this theology forever. Can modern idealism give faith a better warrant, or must she still rely on her poor self for witness?

So I think we must say a final goodbye to dogmatic theology. In all honesty, our faith must do without its support. As I have said, modern idealism has left this theology behind forever. Can modern idealism give faith a better foundation? Or must faith still rely on its poor self for evidence?

The basis of modern idealism is Kant's doctrine of the Transcendental Ego of Apperception. By this formidable term Kant merely meant the fact that the consciousness “I think them” must (potentially or actually) accompany all our objects. Former skeptics had said as much, but the “I” in question had remained for them identified with the personal individual. Kant abstracted and depersonalized it, and made it the most universal of all his categories, although for Kant himself the Transcendental Ego had no theological implications.

Modern idealism is based on Kant's doctrine of the Transcendental Ego of Apperception. By this intimidating term, Kant meant only that the thought “I think them” must accompany all our objects, either potentially or actually. Earlier skeptics had said as much, but they had identified the “I” in question with the individual person. Kant made this “I” abstract and impersonal. He also made it the most universal of all his categories. Although Kant did this, the Transcendental Ego had no theological implications for him.

It was reserved for his successors to convert Kant's notion of Bewusstsein überhaupt, or abstract consciousness, into an infinite concrete self-consciousness which is the soul of the world, and in which our sundry personal self-consciousnesses have their being. It would lead me into technicalities to show you even briefly how this transformation was in point of fact effected. Suffice it to say that in the Hegelian school, which to-day so deeply influences both British and American thinking, two principles have borne the brunt of the operation.

It was left to Kant's successors to transform his idea of Bewusstsein überhaupt, or abstract consciousness. They turned it into an infinite, concrete self-consciousness that is the soul of the world. Our various personal self-consciousnesses exist within this world soul. Even a brief explanation of how this transformation actually happened would lead me into technical details. It is enough to say that two principles did most of the work in the Hegelian school. That school has a profound influence on both British and American thought today.

The first of these principles is that the old logic of identity never gives us more than a post-mortem dissection of disjecta membra, and that the fullness of life can be construed to thought only by recognizing that every object which our thought may propose to itself involves the notion of some other object which seems at first to negate the first one.

The first principle is that the old logic of identity gives us nothing more than a dissection of scattered parts after death. We can understand the fullness of life only by recognizing something else. Every object we think about involves the idea of some other object that seems at first to contradict it.

The second principle is that to be conscious of a negation is already virtually to be beyond it. The mere asking of a question or expression of a dissatisfaction proves that the answer or the satisfaction is already imminent; the finite, realized as such, is already the infinite in posse.

The second principle is that to be aware of a negation is already, in effect, to be beyond it. Simply asking a question or expressing dissatisfaction proves that the answer or satisfaction is already close at hand. The finite, once recognized as finite, is already potentially infinite.

Applying these principles, we seem to get a propulsive force into our logic which the ordinary logic of a bare, stark self-identity in each thing never attains to. The objects of our thought now act within our thought, act as objects act when given in experience. They change and develop. They introduce something other than themselves along with them; and this other, at first only ideal or potential, presently proves itself also to be actual. It supersedes the thing at first supposed, and both verifies and corrects it, in developing the fullness of its meaning.

Applying these principles seems to give our logic a driving force. Ordinary logic, which treats each thing as simply identical to itself, never achieves this. The objects of our thought now act within our thoughts, just as objects act in our experience. They change and develop. They bring with them something other than themselves. At first, this other thing exists only as an idea or a possibility, but soon it proves to be real as well. It replaces what we first assumed. As it develops the full meaning of that first assumption, it both confirms and corrects it.

The program is excellent; the universe is a place where things are followed by other things that both correct and fulfill them; and a logic which gave us something like this movement of fact would express truth far better than the traditional school-logic, which never gets of its own accord from anything to anything else, and registers only predictions and subsumptions, or static resemblances and differences. Nothing could be more unlike the methods of dogmatic theology than those of this new logic. Let me quote in illustration some passages from the Scottish transcendentalist whom I have already named.

The program is excellent. The universe is a place where things are followed by other things that both correct and fulfill them. A logic that captured something like this movement of events would express truth far better than traditional school logic. That logic never moves on its own from one thing to another. It records only predictions and classifications, or fixed similarities and differences. The methods of this new logic could not be more different from those of dogmatic theology. To illustrate this, let me quote some passages from the Scottish transcendentalist I have already named.

Here, you see, Principal Caird makes the transition which Kant did not make: he converts the omnipresence of consciousness in general as a condition of “truth” being anywhere possible, into an omnipresent universal consciousness, which he identifies with God in his concreteness. He next proceeds to use the principle that to acknowledge your limits is in essence to be beyond them; and makes the transition to the religious experience of individuals in the following words:—

Here, you see, Principal Caird makes a transition that Kant did not make. For “truth” to be possible anywhere, consciousness in general must be present everywhere. Caird turns this condition into a universal consciousness present everywhere, which he identifies with God in his concrete reality. He then uses the principle that to acknowledge your limits is, in essence, to be beyond them. He moves to the religious experience of individuals in the following words:

Nevertheless, Principal Caird goes on to say, so far as we are able outwardly to realize this doctrine, the balm it offers remains incomplete. Whatever we may be in posse, the very best of us in actu falls very short of being absolutely divine. Social morality, love, and self-sacrifice even, merge our Self only in some other finite self or selves. They do not quite identify it with the Infinite. Man's ideal destiny, infinite in abstract logic, might thus seem in practice forever unrealizable.

Nevertheless, Principal Caird goes on to say that the comfort this doctrine offers remains incomplete, insofar as we can put it into practice. Whatever we may potentially be, even the best of us falls far short of being absolutely divine. Social morality, love, and even self-sacrifice merge our self only with another finite self or selves. They do not quite make our self one with the Infinite. Thus, although abstract logic treats humanity’s ideal destiny as infinite, in practice that destiny might seem forever impossible to attain.

You will readily admit that no description of the phenomena of the religious consciousness could be better than these words of your lamented preacher and philosopher. They reproduce the very rapture of those crises of conversion of which we have been hearing; they utter what the mystic felt but was unable to communicate; and the saint, in hearing them, recognizes his own experience. It is indeed gratifying to find the content of religion reported so unanimously. But when all is said and done, has Principal Caird—and I only use him as an example of that whole mode of thinking—transcended the sphere of feeling and of the direct experience of the individual, and laid the foundations of religion in impartial reason? Has he made religion universal by coercive reasoning, transformed it from a private faith into a public certainty? Has he rescued its affirmations from obscurity and mystery?

You will readily agree that no description of religious experience could be better than these words from your late preacher and philosopher. They capture the very rapture of the conversion experiences we have been hearing about. They express what the mystic felt but could not communicate. And when the saint hears them, he recognizes his own experience. It is indeed gratifying to find such agreement in accounts of what religion contains. But after all, has Principal Caird gone beyond feeling and the individual’s direct experience? I use him only as an example of that whole way of thinking. Has he laid the foundations of religion in impartial reason? Has he made religion universal through reasoning that compels agreement? Has he turned it from a private faith into a public certainty? Has he freed its claims from obscurity and mystery?

I believe that he has done nothing of the kind, but that he has simply reaffirmed the individual's experiences in a more generalized vocabulary. And again, I can be excused from proving technically that the transcendentalist reasonings fail to make religion universal, for I can point to the plain fact that a majority of scholars, even religiously disposed ones, stubbornly refuse to treat them as convincing. The whole of Germany, one may say, has positively rejected the Hegelian argumentation. As for Scotland, I need only mention Professor Fraser's and Professor Pringle-Pattison's memorable criticisms, with which so many of you are familiar.²⁹⁸ Once more, I ask, if transcendental idealism were as objectively and absolutely rational as it pretends to be, could it possibly fail so egregiously to be persuasive?

I believe he has done nothing of the kind. He has simply restated the individual's experiences in more general terms. Again, I need not offer a technical proof that transcendentalist arguments fail to make religion universal. I can point to a plain fact instead. Most scholars, even those inclined toward religion, stubbornly refuse to accept these arguments as convincing. One might say that all of Germany has expressly rejected Hegelian arguments. As for Scotland, I need only mention the memorable criticisms by Professor Fraser and Professor Pringle-Pattison. Many of you are familiar with them.²⁹⁸ Once again, I ask: if transcendental idealism were as objectively and absolutely rational as it claims to be, could it fail so badly to persuade?

What religion reports, you must remember, always purports to be a fact of experience: the divine is actually present, religion says, and between it and ourselves relations of give and take are actual. If definite perceptions of fact like this cannot stand upon their own feet, surely abstract reasoning cannot give them the support they are in need of. Conceptual processes can class facts, define them, interpret them; but they do not produce them, nor can they reproduce their individuality. There is always a plus, a thisness, which feeling alone can answer for. Philosophy in this sphere is thus a secondary function, unable to warrant faith's veracity, and so I revert to the thesis which I announced at the beginning of this lecture.

Remember that what religion reports always claims to be a fact of experience. Religion says that the divine is actually present and that we and the divine actually interact with one another. If definite perceptions of fact like these cannot stand on their own, surely abstract reasoning cannot give them the support they need. Thinking in concepts can classify facts, define them, and interpret them. But it cannot produce facts or reproduce their individuality. There is always a plus, a thisness, that only feeling can account for. Philosophy therefore plays a secondary role in this sphere. It cannot guarantee that faith is true. So I return to the thesis I announced at the beginning of this lecture.

In all sad sincerity I think we must conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experience is absolutely hopeless.

I say this with genuine sadness: we must conclude that the attempt to prove the truths of direct religious experience by reason alone is utterly hopeless.

It would be unfair to philosophy, however, to leave her under this negative sentence. Let me close, then, by briefly enumerating what she can do for religion. If she will abandon metaphysics and deduction for criticism and induction, and frankly transform herself from theology into science of religions, she can make herself enormously useful.

It would be unfair, however, to leave philosophy with this negative judgment. Let me close by briefly listing what philosophy can do for religion. If philosophy abandons metaphysics and deduction in favor of criticism and induction, it can become enormously useful. To do so, it must openly transform itself from theology into a science of religions.

The spontaneous intellect of man always defines the divine which it feels in ways that harmonize with its temporary intellectual prepossessions. Philosophy can by comparison eliminate the local and the accidental from these definitions. Both from dogma and from worship she can remove historic incrustations. By confronting the spontaneous religious constructions with the results of natural science, philosophy can also eliminate doctrines that are now known to be scientifically absurd or incongruous.

People naturally define the divine they sense in ways that fit their current intellectual assumptions. Philosophy, by comparison, can remove what is local and incidental from these definitions. It can strip away historical additions from both religious beliefs and worship. By comparing spontaneous religious ideas with the findings of natural science, philosophy can also eliminate doctrines now known to be scientifically absurd or inconsistent.

Sifting out in this way unworthy formulations, she can leave a residuum of conceptions that at least are possible. With these she can deal as hypotheses, testing them in all the manners, whether negative or positive, by which hypotheses are ever tested. She can reduce their number, as some are found more open to objection. She can perhaps become the champion of one which she picks out as being the most closely verified or verifiable. She can refine upon the definition of this hypothesis, distinguishing between what is innocent over-belief and symbolism in the expression of it, and what is to be literally taken. As a result, she can offer mediation between different believers, and help to bring about consensus of opinion. She can do this the more successfully, the better she discriminates the common and essential from the individual and local elements of the religious beliefs which she compares.

By sorting out unworthy formulations in this way, she can leave a set of ideas that are at least possible. She can treat these as hypotheses and test them in every way hypotheses are tested, whether negatively or positively. She can reduce their number as she finds stronger objections to some of them. Perhaps she can champion one that she selects as the most closely verified or verifiable. She can refine its definition, distinguishing harmless over-belief and symbolism in its expression from what should be taken literally. As a result, she can mediate between different believers and help bring about agreement. She can do this more successfully when she is better able to distinguish the common and essential elements of the religious beliefs she compares from those that are individual and local.

I do not see why a critical Science of Religions of this sort might not eventually command as general a public adhesion as is commanded by a physical science. Even the personally non-religious might accept its conclusions on trust, much as blind persons now accept the facts of optics—it might appear as foolish to refuse them. Yet as the science of optics has to be fed in the first instance, and continually verified later, by facts experienced by seeing persons; so the science of religions would depend for its original material on facts of personal experience, and would have to square itself with personal experience through all its critical reconstructions. It could never get away from concrete life, or work in a conceptual vacuum. It would forever have to confess, as every science confesses, that the subtlety of nature flies beyond it, and that its formulas are but approximations. Philosophy lives in words, but truth and fact well up into our lives in ways that exceed verbal formulation. There is in the living act of perception always something that glimmers and twinkles and will not be caught, and for which reflection comes too late. No one knows this as well as the philosopher. He must fire his volley of new vocables out of his conceptual shotgun, for his profession condemns him to this industry, but he secretly knows the hollowness and irrelevancy. His formulas are like stereoscopic or kinetoscopic photographs seen outside the instrument; they lack the depth, the motion, the vitality. In the religious sphere, in particular, belief that formulas are true can never wholly take the place of personal experience.

I see no reason why a critical science of religions could not eventually gain as much public acceptance as a physical science. Even people who are not religious themselves might accept its conclusions on trust, much as blind people now accept the facts of optics. Refusing to accept them might seem just as foolish. Yet the science of optics must draw its facts initially from the experiences of people who can see. It must also be continually checked against their experiences afterward. In the same way, a science of religions would depend for its original material on facts of personal experience. It would also have to remain consistent with personal experience through all its critical revisions. It could never leave concrete life behind or work in a conceptual vacuum. Like every science, it would always have to admit that nature is more subtle than it can grasp. Its formulas are only approximations. Philosophy lives in words, but truth and fact well up into our lives in ways that words cannot fully express. In the living act of perception, something always glimmers and twinkles and escapes our grasp. Reflection comes too late to catch it. No one knows this better than the philosopher. His profession condemns him to fire a volley of new words from his conceptual shotgun. But he secretly knows how hollow and irrelevant they are. His formulas are like stereoscopic or kinetoscopic photographs seen outside the instrument. They lack depth, motion, and vitality. In religion especially, believing that formulas are true can never wholly replace personal experience.

In my next lecture I will try to complete my rough description of religious experience; and in the lecture after that, which is the last one, I will try my own hand at formulating conceptually the truth to which it is a witness.

In my next lecture, I will try to finish my rough description of religious experience. In the lecture after that, my last, I will try to put into words the truth that religious experience reveals.