1. A certain man having inquired how one may make his meals in a manner pleasing to the Gods, If he do it uprightly, said Epictetus, and considerately, and equably, and temperately, and orderly, shall it not also be thus pleasing to the Gods? But when you ask for hot water, and the boy does not hear, or, hearing, brings it only luke-warm; or if he is not even to be found in the house, then is it not pleasing to the Gods if you refrain from indignation, and do not burst with passion? How shall one endure such fellows? Wretch, wilt thou not bear with thine own brother, who is of the progeny of Zeus, like a son sprung of the same seed as thyself, and of the same heavenly descent, but thou must straightway make thyself a tyrant, for the place of command in which thou art set? Wilt thou not remember who thou art, and whom thou rulest—that they are kinsmen, brethren by nature, the progeny of Zeus? But I have bought them, and they have not bought me! Seest thou, then, whither thou art looking—towards the earth, towards the pit of perdition, towards these miserable laws of dead men? but towards the laws of the Gods thou dost not look.
1. A man asked how he could eat his meals in a way pleasing to the Gods. Epictetus replied, If he eats honestly, considerately, calmly, moderately, and in an orderly way, will that not please the Gods? But suppose you ask for hot water, and the slave boy does not hear you. Or he hears but brings it only lukewarm. Or he cannot even be found in the house. Would it not please the Gods if you held back your anger instead of flying into a rage? How can anyone put up with such people? You wretch, will you not bear with your own brother? He is a child of Zeus, born from the same seed as you, with the same heavenly ancestry. Must you immediately become a tyrant because you have been put in command? Will you not remember who you are and whom you rule? They are your relatives, your brothers by nature, the children of Zeus. But I bought them, and they did not buy me! Do you see, then, where you are looking? Toward the earth, toward the pit of destruction, toward these miserable laws made by dead men. But you do not look toward the laws of the Gods.
2. That which thou wouldst not suffer thyself, seek not to lay upon others. Thou wouldst not be a slave—look to it that others be not slaves to thee. For if thou endure to have slaves, it seems that thou thyself art first of all a slave. For virtue hath no communion with vice nor freedom with slavery.
2. Do not impose on others what you would not want to suffer yourself. You would not want to be a slave. Make sure, then, that others are not slaves to you. For if you accept having slaves, it seems that you yourself are first of all a slave. For virtue has nothing in common with vice, nor freedom with slavery.
3. As one who is in health would not choose to be served by the sick, nor that those dwelling with him should be sick, so neither would one that is free bear to be served by slaves, or that those living with him should be slaves.
3. A healthy person would not choose to be served by sick people or to live with them. Likewise, a free person would not tolerate being served by slaves or living with people who are slaves.
Epictetus had a strong sense of human dignity. He wanted people to respect it in their dealings with one another. Compare Ch. v. 7. Zeller must have overlooked these Fragments of Epictetus when he asserted (p. 301) that no Stoic philosopher had ever condemned slavery. As far as we know, however, this is the only condemnation of slavery ever made by any Pagan thinker. Chrysippus set out the usual Stoic view. Much like Carlyle, he defined the slave as a “perpetuus mercenarius”. This meant a man “hired for life, from whom work was to be required, a just return for it being accorded (operam exegendam, justa prœbenda)”. Epictetus’s statement is especially noteworthy because he had experienced slavery himself and certainly was not inclined to exaggerate its hardships.