1. The Administrator having visited him (and this man was an Epicurean), It is proper, said Epictetus, that ignorant people like us should inquire of you that are philosophers (as men who come into a strange city make inquiry of the citizens and those familiar with the place) what is the chief thing in the world, to the end that, having learned it, we may go in search of it, and behold it, as men do with objects in the cities.
1. The Administrator, who was an Epicurean, came to visit Epictetus. Epictetus said, "It is right for ignorant people like us to ask you philosophers what matters most in the world. We are like travelers in an unfamiliar city who ask the citizens and others who know the place. Once we have learned what matters most, we can seek it out and see it, as travelers see a city's sights."
Administrator, διορθωτής; in Latin, Corrector. This state official is frequently mentioned in inscriptions and other sources. Little seems to be known about his duties beyond what this chapter of Epictetus reveals.
2. Now, that there are three things with which man is concerned—soul, and body, and the outer world—scarce any one will deny. It remaineth, then, for men like ye to answer which is the chief of these things? What shall we declare to men? Is it the flesh? And was it for this that Maximus sent forth his son, and sailed with him through the tempest as far as Cassiope, for somewhat that he should feel in the flesh?
2. Hardly anyone will deny that human concerns fall into three areas: the soul, the body, and the outside world. It remains for people like you to answer which of these is most important. What should we tell people? Is it the body? Was this why Maximus sent his son away and sailed with him through the storm as far as Cassiope, so that his son could experience some bodily sensation?
Cassiope was a port in Epirus, near Nicopolis, where Epictetus taught. Schw. suggests that Maximus was sending his son to Nicopolis to study philosophy under Epictetus.
3. But the Epicurean denying this, and saying, God forbid, Epictetus said:
3. But the Epicurean denied this, saying, God forbid. Epictetus said:
Is it not fit, then, that we should be zealous about that, the chief thing?
Isn't it right, then, that we should be devoted to what matters most?
——“Of all things most fit.”
“The most suitable of all things.”
What, then, have we greater than the flesh?
What, then, do we have that is greater than the body?
——“The soul,” he said.
“The soul,” he said.
And the good of the chief thing, is it greater than the good of the lower thing?
And is the good of the higher thing greater than the good of the lower thing?
——“The good of the chief thing is greater.”
“The good of the most important thing is greater.”
And the good things of the soul, are they in the power of the Will, or beyond the Will?
And the good things of the soul, are they within the will’s control or beyond it?
——“They are in the power of the Will.”
“They are under the control of the will.”
The pleasure of the soul, then, is within the power of the Will?
So, is the soul’s pleasure under the control of the will?
He assented.
He agreed.
And this pleasure itself, whence may it arise? From itself? But this is inconceivable; for we must suppose some original substance of the Good, whereof the soul doth make us sensible when we light upon it.
And where does this pleasure itself come from? From itself? But this is inconceivable. We must assume that the Good has some underlying substance. The soul makes us aware of it when we encounter it.
This, too, he admitted.
He admitted this too.
Wherein, then, are we sensible of this spiritual pleasure? for if it be in spiritual things, the nature of the Good is discovered. For the Good cannot be something different from the thing that justly delights us; nor, if the original thing be not good, can aught be good that proceeds from it; for, in order that the thing proceeding may be good, the original thing must be good also. But this ye would never say, if ye had your wits, for so ye would speak things that agree not with Epicurus and the rest of your opinions. It remains, then, that we are conscious in bodily things of this pleasure of the soul, and again, that these are the original things and the very substance of the Good.
Where, then, do we experience this spiritual pleasure? If it is in spiritual things, then the nature of the Good is revealed. The Good cannot be something different from what rightly gives us pleasure. Nor can anything good come from something that is not itself good. For what comes from something to be good, its source must also be good. But you would never say this if you had any sense. You would be contradicting Epicurus and the rest of your beliefs. The only conclusion left is that we experience this pleasure of the soul in bodily things. These, then, are its source and the very substance of the Good.
“For a correct view of these matters will reduce every movement of preference and avoidance to health of body and tranquillity of soul; for this is the perfection of a happy life.” Epicurus, Diog. Laert. x. 128. Epictetus’s analysis of Epicurean theory is that pleasure of the soul is the highest good. But it is felt only through the body and its conditions.
4. Wherefore Maximus did foolishly if he made his voyage for the sake of anything else than the flesh; that is, than the chief thing. And any man doth foolishly who restraineth himself from others’ good, if he be a judge, and able to take them. But, if you please, let us regard this only, how it may be done secretly and safely, and so that none may know it. For neither does Epicurus himself declare stealing to be bad, but only to be caught stealing; and because it is impossible to be certain of no discovery, therefore he saith, Ye shall not steal. But I say that if we steal with skill and discretion, we shall not be caught. And, moreover, if we have powerful friends among men and women at Rome, and the Greeks are feeble, no one will dare to go thither on this score. Why do you refrain from your own good? This is foolish—this is absurd. But not even if you tell me you do refrain will I believe you. For, as it is impossible to assent to anything that appeareth to be a falsehood or to turn away from what appeareth to be true, even so it is impossible to withhold oneself from anything that appeareth to be good. But riches are a good, and, at all events, the most potent means of pleasure. Wherefore, then, not compass them? And why not corrupt our neighbor’s wife, if we may do it secretly? and also, if the husband talk nonsense about it, let us fling him out! If you will be a true and perfect philosopher, and obedient to your own doctrines, thus must you do; but if you do not, you differ no whit from us that are called Stoics. For truly we ourselves say one thing and do another; we speak fair and honest things, and do vile ones. But the opposite distemper will be thine—a vile creed and honorable deeds.
4. So Maximus acted foolishly if he made his voyage for anything other than the flesh, the chief concern. Any judge who can take other people’s possessions acts foolishly if he holds back. But, if you like, let us consider only how to do this secretly and safely, without anyone knowing. For even Epicurus himself does not say stealing is bad, only getting caught stealing. And because no one can be certain of escaping discovery, he says, You shall not steal. But I say that if we steal skillfully and carefully, we will not get caught. Besides, suppose we have powerful friends among men and women at Rome, and the Greeks are weak. No one will dare to go there to complain about this. Why deny yourself what is good for you? This is foolish. This is absurd. Even if you tell me you do hold back, I will not believe you. For we cannot accept anything that seems false or reject anything that seems true. Likewise, we cannot deny ourselves anything that seems good. But wealth is good and, in any case, the most powerful means of gaining pleasure. Why, then, not acquire it? And why not seduce our neighbor’s wife, if we can do it secretly? And if her husband talks nonsense about it, let us throw him out! If you want to be a true and complete philosopher who follows your own teachings, this is how you must act. Otherwise, you are no different from those of us called Stoics. For we too say one thing and do another. We say fine and honorable things, but do shameful things. Your failing, however, will be the opposite. You will have shameful beliefs and honorable actions.
5. And you think, God help you! of a city of Epicureans? I do not marry. Nor I; for it is not right to marry, nor beget children, nor take part in public affairs. What will come to pass then? Whence shall we have citizens? who shall educate them? who shall be the overseer of youth? who the director of gymnastics? and how shall the youth be trained up? as the Lacedæmonians? or as the Athenians? Take me a youth, and bring him up after these doctrines of thine! Evil are they, subversive of States, mischievous to households, unbecoming to women. Abandon them, man! Thou dwellest in a chief city; it is thy part to rule, to judge righteously, to refrain from other men’s goods; nor must any woman seem beautiful to thee save thine own wife, nor vessel of gold or silver. Seek for doctrines in harmony with these words, from which setting out thou mayest with gladness abandon things so potent to attract and overcome. But if beside the seduction of these things we have sought out some philosophy like this that pushes us towards them, and confirms us in them, what shall come of it?
5. And you imagine, God help you, a city of Epicureans? I do not marry. Neither do I. It is not right to marry, have children, or take part in public affairs. What will happen then? Where will our citizens come from? Who will educate them? Who will supervise the young? Who will direct their physical training? And how will the young be raised? Like the Spartans? Or like the Athenians? Take a young man and raise him according to these teachings of yours! They are evil. They undermine states, harm households, and are unworthy of women. Give them up, man! You live in a leading city. Your duty is to govern, judge fairly, and keep your hands off other people's property. No woman should seem beautiful to you except your own wife, nor should any gold or silver vessel attract you. Find teachings that agree with these principles. With those as your starting point, you can gladly give up things so powerful in attracting and overpowering you. But suppose, besides these temptations, we seek out a philosophy like this, which drives us toward them and reinforces our attachment. What will come of it?
The overseer of youth. An official in certain Greek cities. See Mahaffy’s Greek Life and Thought, ch. xvii., on the organization of the ephebi.
6. In the graver’s work, which is the chief thing? the silver or the art? The substance of the hand is flesh, but the main things are the works of the hand. The obligations, therefore, are also three—those that concern us, firstly, in that we are; and secondly, as we are; and thirdly, the main things themselves. And thus in man, too, it is not meet to value the material, this flesh, but the main things. What are these? To take part in public affairs, to marry, to beget children, to fear God, to care for parents, and, in general, to pursue, to avoid, to desire, to dislike, as each of these things should be done, as Nature made us to do. And how made she us? To be free, generous, pious. For what other creature blushes? what other is capable of the sense of shame?
6. In an engraver’s work, what matters most, the silver or the skill? The hand is made of flesh, but what matters most is what the hand does. Our duties, then, are also of three kinds. First, those arising from our existence. Second, those arising from the kind of beings we are. Third, the essential tasks themselves. So in human beings, too, we should value not the material, this flesh, but the essential tasks. What are these? Taking part in public affairs, marrying, having children, honoring God, and caring for our parents. In general, we should pursue, avoid, desire, and dislike things as we should, as Nature made us to do. And how did Nature make us? To be free, generous, and reverent. For what other creature blushes? What other creature can feel shame?
7. And to these things let Pleasure be subject as a minister, a servant, that she may summon forth our ardor, and that she also may aid in works that are according to Nature.
7. Let Pleasure serve these things as a helper and servant. Let her stir our enthusiasm and help us act in harmony with Nature.
Aid in works that are according to Nature. The Greek is ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔργοις παρακρατῆ. Commentators differ somewhat about the meaning of παρακρατῆ. Wolf translates it as “hold the chief place” in natural works. Upton, Schw., and Long translate it as “keep us constant,” “sustain us,” in such works. I see no reason not to take the word in its simplest sense. Pleasure should act together with other forces to lead us to do well.
8. ——“But I am a wealthy man, and have no need of aught.”
8. “But I am a wealthy man and need nothing.”
Why, then, dost thou profess philosophy? Thy vessels of gold and vessels of silver are enough for thee; what need hast thou of doctrines?
Why, then, do you claim to be a philosopher? Your gold and silver vessels are enough for you. What need do you have for philosophical teachings?
——“But I am also a judge of the Greeks!”
“But I’m also a judge of the Greeks!”
Dost thou know how to judge—who made thee know?
Do you know how to judge? Who taught you how?
——“Cæsar wrote me a commission.”
“Caesar gave me an official appointment.”
Let him write thee a commission to be a judge of music, and what help will it be to thee? And how didst thou become a judge? by kissing of what man’s hand? Was it that of Symphorus or Numenius? Before whose bed-chamber didst thou sleep? To whom didst thou send gifts? Dost thou not perceive, then, that to be a judge is worth just as much as Numenius is worth?
Let him appoint you as a judge of music. What good will that do you? And how did you become a judge? Whose hand did you kiss? Was it Symphorus’s or Numenius’s? Outside whose bedroom did you sleep? To whom did you send gifts? Don’t you see, then, that being a judge is worth just as much as Numenius is worth?
——“But I can cast into prison whom I will.”
“But I can put anyone I want in prison.”
As if he were a stone.
As if he were a stone.
——“But I can flog any man I will.”
“But I can whip any man I want.”
As if he were an ass. This is no government of men. Rule us as reasoning beings; show us what is for our good, and we shall follow it; show us what is for our ill, and we shall turn away from it; make us emulators of thyself, as Socrates made his disciples. He, indeed, was one that governed men as men, who made them subject unto him in their pursuit and their avoidance, their desire and dislike. Do this, do not this, or I will cast thee into prison. This is not the rule of reasoning beings. But, As Zeus hath ordered, so do thou act; but if thou dost not, thou shall suffer loss and hurt. What hurt? None other than this—not to have done what it behooved thee to do. Thou shall lose faith, piety, decency—look for no greater injuries than these.
As if he were a donkey. This is no way to govern people. Govern us as rational beings. Show us what is good for us, and we will follow it. Show us what harms us, and we will turn away from it. Inspire us to follow your example, as Socrates did with his students. He truly governed people as human beings. He guided what they pursued and avoided, what they desired and rejected. Do this, do not do that, or I will throw you into prison. This is not how to govern rational beings. Instead, say, Act as Zeus has commanded. If you do not, you will suffer loss and harm. What harm? Only this, that you have failed to do what you ought to have done. You will lose your trustworthiness, your reverence for the gods, and your decency. Expect no greater injuries than these.