1. Beliefs which are sound and manifestly true are of necessity used even by those who deny them. And perhaps a man might adduce this as the greatest possible proof of the manifest truth of anything, that those who deny it are compelled to make use of it. Thus, if a man should deny that there is anything universally true, it is clear that he is obliged to affirm the contrary, the negation—that there is nothing universally true. Slave! not even this—for what is this but to say that if there is anything universal it is falsehood?
1. Even those who deny sound and clearly true beliefs must use them. Perhaps this is the strongest possible proof that something is clearly true. Even those who deny it are forced to use it. Suppose a man denies that anything is universally true. Clearly, he must affirm the opposite, that nothing is universally true. Slave! You cannot even claim that. What does it mean except that if anything is universal, it is falsehood?
2. Again, if one should come and say, Know that nothing can be known, but all things are incapable of proof; or another, Believe me, and it shall profit thee, that no man ought to believe any man; or again, another, Learn from me, O man, that it is not possible to learn anything, and I tell thee this, and I will teach thee, if thou wilt—now wherein do such men differ from those—whom shall I say?—those who call themselves Academics? Assent, O men, that no man can assent to aught; believe us that no man can believe any one.
2. Again, suppose someone comes and says, Know that nothing can be known, and nothing can be proved. Or another says, Believe me, and it will benefit you, that no one ought to believe anyone. Or another says, Learn from me, my friend, that it is impossible to learn anything. I tell you this, and I will teach you, if you wish. How do such people differ from those, what should I call them, who call themselves Academics? Accept, everyone, that no one can accept anything as true. Believe us that no one can believe anyone.
3. Thus Epicurus, when he would abolish the natural fellowship of men with one another, employeth the very thing that is being abolished. For what saith he? Be not deceived, O men, nor misguided nor mistaken—there is no natural fellowship among reasoning beings, believe me; and those who speak otherwise deceive us with sophisms. What is that to thee? let us be deceived! Will it be the worse for thee if all other men are persuaded that we have a natural fellowship with one another, and that we should in all ways maintain it? Nay—but much the better and safer. Man, why dost thou take thought for us, and watch at night for our sakes? Why dost thou kindle thy lamp and rise early? why dost thou write so many books, lest any of us should be deceived about the Gods, in supposing that they cared for men? or lest any one should take the essence of the Good to be anything else than Pleasure? For if these things are so, then lie down and sleep, and live the life of a worm, wherefor thou hast judged thyself fit; eat and drink and cohabit and ease thyself and snore. What is it to thee how other men think concerning these matters, whether soundly or unsoundly? What hast thou to do with us? With sheep hast thou some concern, for that they serve us when they are shorn, and when they are milked, and at last when they have their throats cut. Were it not, then, to be desired, if men could be lulled and charmed to slumber by the Stoics, and give themselves to thee and the like of thee, to be shorn and milked? These things shouldst thou say to thy brother Epicureans; but shouldst thou not keep them hidden from other men, and seek in every way to persuade them above all things that we are by nature social, and that temperance is good; in order that everything may be kept for thee? Or should we preserve this fellowship with some and not with others? With whom, then, should we preserve it? With those who also preserve it towards us, or with those who transgress it? And who transgress it more than ye, who set forth such doctrines?
3. So Epicurus uses the very thing he wants to abolish, our natural fellowship with one another. For what does he say? Do not be deceived, people, or misled or mistaken. There is no natural fellowship among rational beings, believe me. Those who say otherwise deceive us with clever but false arguments. What is that to you? Let us be deceived! Will you be worse off if everyone else believes we have a natural fellowship and should maintain it in every way? No, you will be much better off and safer. Man, why do you worry about us and stay awake at night for our sake? Why do you light your lamp and get up early? Why do you write so many books to keep us from mistakenly believing that the gods care about people? Or to keep anyone from thinking that the essence of good is anything other than pleasure? If these things are true, lie down and sleep. Live the life of a worm, which you have judged yourself fit for. Eat, drink, have sex, relieve yourself, and snore. What does it matter to you whether other people think rightly or wrongly about these things? What have you to do with us? You have some concern for sheep. They serve us when we shear them, milk them, and finally cut their throats. Wouldn't it be desirable, then, if the Stoics could lull people to sleep with their soothing words? Then people could surrender themselves to you and others like you, to be shorn and milked. You should say these things to your fellow Epicureans. But shouldn't you keep them hidden from everyone else? Shouldn't you do everything possible to convince them, above all, that we are naturally social and that self-restraint is good? That way, everything could be kept for you. Or should we maintain this fellowship with some people but not others? With whom, then, should we maintain it? With those who maintain it toward us, or with those who violate it? And who violates it more than you, who teach such doctrines?
4. What, then, was it that roused up Epicurus from his sleep, and compelled him to write the things he wrote? What else than Nature, the mightiest of all powers in humanity? Nature, that drags the man, reluctant and groaning, to her will. For, saith she, since it seems to thee that there is no fellowship among men, write this down, and deliver it to others, and watch and wake for this, and be thyself by thine own deed the accuser of thine own opinions. Shall we, then, say that Orestes was driven by the Furies and aroused from sleep, and did not crueller Furies and Avengers rouse this man as he slumbered, and suffered him not to rest, but compelled him, as madness and wine the priests of Cybele, to proclaim his own evils? So mighty and invincible a thing is man’s nature.
4. What, then, woke Epicurus from his sleep and compelled him to write what he wrote? What else but Nature, the mightiest of all powers in humanity? Nature drags a man to do her will, reluctant and groaning. For, she says, since you think there is no fellowship among people, write this down and pass it on. Stay awake and keep watch for this purpose. Let your own actions expose the faults in your own opinions. Shall we say that the Furies drove Orestes and woke him from sleep? Did not still crueler Furies and Avengers wake this man as he slept and give him no rest? They compelled him to proclaim his own evils, as madness and wine compel the priests of Cybele. So mighty and invincible is human nature.
Phrygia, the birthplace of Epictetus, was a major center of the wild and frightening worship of Cybele. Her priests cut and mutilated themselves in the frenzy of religious rituals.
5. For how can a vine be affected, and not in the manner of a vine, but of an olive? Or how, again, can an olive be affected not in the manner of an olive but of a vine? It is impossible, it cannot be conceived. Neither, then, is it possible for a man wholly to lose the affections of humanity, for even eunuchs cannot cut away for themselves the desires of men. And thus Epicurus has cut away all that belongs to a man as father of a family, and as citizen, and as friend; but the desires of humanity he hath not cut away, for he could not; no more than these pitiful Academics are able to cast away or to blind their own perceptions, although this is the thing that they have striven with all their zeal to do.
5. How can a vine respond to things like an olive tree rather than a vine? Or how can an olive tree respond like a vine rather than an olive tree? It is impossible. It cannot even be imagined. Nor can a man completely lose his human feelings. Even eunuchs cannot cut away the desires of men. So Epicurus has cut away everything that belongs to a man as a father, citizen, and friend. But he has not cut away human desires, because he could not. Nor can these pitiful Academics throw away their own perceptions or blind themselves to them. Yet this is what they have tried to do with all their zeal.
6. How shameful is this! that a man having received from Nature measures and canons for the recognition of truth, should study not to add to them and perfect them where they are wanting, but the very contrary of this; if there be anything that may lead us to the knowledge of the truth, they strive to abolish and destroy it.
6. How shameful this is! Nature has given us standards and rules for recognizing truth. Yet people do not try to improve them or fill in their gaps. Instead, they do the very opposite. If anything can lead us to the truth, they strive to abolish and destroy it.
7. What sayest thou, philosopher? religion and holiness, what dost thou take them for?
7. What do you say, philosopher? What do you think religion and holiness are?
Philosophy is presented as speaking first through a Stoic, then through an Epicurean. The practical results of each system are shown.
——“If thou wilt, I shall prove that they are good.”
“If you wish, I will prove that they are good.”
So be it; prove it then, in order that our citizens may be converted and honor the Divinity, and be no longer neglectful of the greatest things.
All right, then prove it, so our citizens may change their beliefs and honor God. Then they may stop neglecting the most important things.
——“Now hast thou received the proofs?”
“Have you received the proofs now?”
I have, and am thankful therefor.
I have, and I’m thankful for it.
8.——“Now since thou art exceedingly well pleased with these things, hear the contrary: There are no Gods, or if there be, they have no care for men, nor have we any communion with them; and this religion and holiness, whereof the multitude babble, is the lying of impostors and sophists, or of legislators, by Zeus! for the frighting and restraining of evil-doers.”
8. “Now, since these ideas please you so much, hear the opposite view. There are no gods. Or if there are, they do not care about humans, nor do we have any connection with them. And this religion and holiness that the masses chatter about are lies told by impostors and sophists. Or, by Zeus, they are lies told by lawmakers to frighten and restrain wrongdoers.”
Well said, philosopher! the citizens shall have much profit of thee! thou hast already brought back all our youths to the contempt of sacred things.
Well said, philosopher! The citizens will benefit greatly from you! You have already led all our young people back to contempt for sacred things.
——“What now? are these doctrines not pleasing to thee? Learn, then, that Righteousness is nothing, that Reverence is folly, that a father is nothing, a son nothing.”
“What now? Don’t these teachings please you? Then learn that righteousness is nothing, that reverence is foolishness, that a father is nothing, a son nothing.”
Well said, philosopher! proceed, persuade the young, that we may multiply the number of those who believe and speak with thee. From these teachings have grown our well-governed States, from these did Sparta spring, and these beliefs, by his laws and discipline, did Lycurgus plant among his people:—That slavery is no more base than honorable, nor to be free men more honorable than base. Through these opinions died those who fell at Thermopylæ, and through what others did the Athenians forsake their city?
Well said, philosopher! Go on, persuade the young, so that more people will believe and speak as you do. These teachings gave rise to our well-governed states. From these Sparta arose. Through his laws and discipline, Lycurgus planted these beliefs among his people: Slavery is no more shameful than honorable. Being free is no more honorable than shameful. These beliefs led those who fell at Thermopylae to their deaths. And what other beliefs led the Athenians to abandon their city?
Rather than submit to Xerxes, the Athenians abandoned their city to be plundered and boarded their fleet. Their victory at Salamis rewarded their determination.
9. Then those who speak such things marry, and beget children, and take part in public affairs, and make themselves priests and augurs—of what? Of beings that do not exist! and they question the Pythian oracle that they may learn falsehoods; and they declare the oracles to others. O monstrous impudence and imposture!
9. Then those who say such things marry, have children, and take part in public affairs. They become priests and augurs, readers of omens. Of what? Of beings that do not exist! They consult the Pythian oracle to learn falsehoods, and they pass its prophecies on to others. What monstrous shamelessness and fraud!