Against Epicurus

Chapter 2

Against Epicurus

3 min

1. Even Epicurus is conscious that we are by nature social, but having once placed the Good in the husk, he cannot thereafter speak anything but what agrees with this; for again he affirms, and rightly affirms, that nothing is to be admired or received that is separated from the nature of the Good. How, then, Epicurus, do you suspect that we are social, if Nature had given us no affection for our offspring? Wherefore do you counsel the sage against bringing up children? Why do you fear lest he fall into sorrow by so doing? Doth he fall into sorrow for the mouse that lives in his house? What careth he if a little mouse complain to him at home. But he knows well that if a little child be born, it is no longer in our power not to love it and be anxious for it.

1. Even Epicurus recognizes that we are social by nature. But once he places the Good in the outer shell, everything he says must agree with that view. He also affirms, rightly, that nothing should be admired or accepted if it is separate from the Good’s nature. How, then, Epicurus, do you suppose we are social if Nature has given us no affection for our offspring? Why do you advise the wise person not to raise children? Why do you fear that doing so will bring him sorrow? Does he feel sorrow for the mouse living in his house? What does he care if a little mouse cries out to him at home? But he knows well that once a little child is born, we cannot help loving it and worrying about it.

The husk is, of course, the body. If Nature made bodily comfort our only proper goal, then altruistic or social instincts must be rejected and denied.

The text here is almost certainly corrupt. It reads πῶς οὖν ὑπονοητικοί ἐσμεν, οἷς μὴ φυσική ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἔκγονα φιλοστοργία. All the manuscripts agree on ὑπονοητικοί. Schweighäuser proposes replacing it with προνοητικοί, and Wolf with ἔτι κοινωνικοί. Salmasius strongly supports πῶς οὖν ἐπινοεῖς ὅτι κοινωνικοί ἐσμεν. I have adopted this reading, with a slight change suggested to me by a distinguished living scholar. Let us suppose Epictetus said πῶς οὖν ὑπονοεῖς ὅτι κ.ε. Suppose this was written in the short lines common in Greek manuscripts:

2. Thus, too, he saith that no man of sense will take part in affairs of the state, for he knows what he who takes part in them must do; but what should hinder one to take part, if he may behave among men as in a swarm of flies? But Epicurus, knowing these things, dares to say that we should not rear up our children. But even a sheep will not desert its young, nor a wolf; and shall a man? What! will you have us to be silly creatures, like the sheep? Yet they desert not their young. Or savage, like wolves? Yet even they desert them not. Come, then, who would obey you if he saw his little child fall on the ground and cry? For my part, I suppose that had it been prophesied to your mother and your father that you would say these things, not even so would they have cast you out.

2. He also says that no sensible person will take part in politics. Such a person knows what anyone involved in politics must do. But why should someone not take part if he can treat people like a swarm of flies? Yet Epicurus, knowing these things, dares to say that we should not raise our children. But even a sheep will not abandon its young, nor will a wolf. Should a human being do so? What! Do you want us to be foolish creatures, like sheep? Yet they do not abandon their young. Or savage, like wolves? Yet even they do not abandon them. Come, then, who would obey you if he saw his little child fall to the ground and cry? For my part, I suppose your mother and father would not have abandoned you even then. Not even if someone had foretold that you would say these things.

3. But how can it be said of these outward things that they are according to Nature, or contrary to Nature? That is to speak as if we were solitary and disunited from others. For to the foot I shall say it is according to Nature that it be clean; but if you take it as a foot, and not as a solitary thing, it shall beseem it to go into the mud, and to tread on thorns, and perchance to be cut off, for the sake of the whole; otherwise it is no longer a foot.

3. But how can we say these external things are in harmony with Nature, or contrary to Nature? That is speaking as if we were alone and separate from others. Consider a foot on its own, and I would say that being clean is in harmony with Nature. But consider it as a foot, not as something separate. Then it is fitting for it to walk through mud, step on thorns, and perhaps be cut off. All this is for the sake of the whole body. Otherwise, it is no longer a foot.

External activities, such as providing for one’s family or serving the state, do not directly concern our spiritual well-being.

4. And some such thing we should suppose about ourselves also. What art thou? A man. Look at thyself as a solitary creature, and it is according to Nature to live to old age, to grow rich, to keep good health. But if thou look at thyself as a man, and as a part of a certain Whole, for the sake of that Whole it may become thee now to have sickness, now to sail the seas and run into peril, now to suffer need, and perchance to die before thy time.

4. We should think of ourselves in much the same way. What are you? A human being. Consider yourself alone, and living to old age, becoming rich, and staying healthy are in keeping with nature. But consider yourself as a human being who is part of a larger whole. For the sake of that whole, it may be right for you to fall ill at times. At other times, you may need to sail the seas and face danger, or suffer hardship. Perhaps you may even need to die before your time.

5. Why, then, dost thou bear it hard? Knowest thou not, that as the foot alone is not a foot, so thou alone art not a man? For what is a man? A part of a polity, first of that which is made up of Gods and men; then of that which is said to be next to the other, which is a small copy of the Universal Polity.

5. Why, then, do you take it so hard? Don’t you know that a foot is not truly a foot on its own? In the same way, you are not fully human on your own. For what is a human being? A member of a community, first of the community of gods and humans. Then, of the community considered next to it, a small copy of the universal community.

6. Then must I now be brought to trial, and now must another have a fever, and another sail the seas, another die, another be sentenced? Yea, for with such a body, in the bounds of such a universe, in such a throng of inhabitants, it cannot be but that different things of this nature should fall on different persons. This is thy task, then, having come into the world, to speak what thou shouldst, and to order these things as it is fitting.

6. Must I now stand trial, while someone else has a fever, another sails the seas, another dies, and another is sentenced? Yes, given bodies like ours, a universe like this, and so many inhabitants, such things must happen to different people. This, then, is your task now that you have come into the world. Say what you should, and handle these things as you ought.

7. Then some one saith, I charge you with wrong-doing. Much good may it do thee! I have done my part—look to it thyself if thou have done thine, for of this too there is some danger, lest it escape thee.

7. Then someone says, I accuse you of wrongdoing. May it do you much good! I have done my part. See for yourself whether you have done yours, for there is a danger you may overlook this too.