Chapter 2

It will be well to commence the detailed discussion of the subject by the particular branch of it to which the course of our observations has led us: the conditions which the laws of this and all other countries annex to the marriage contract. Marriage being the destination appointed by society for women, the prospect they are brought up to, and the object which it is intended should be sought by all of them, except those who are too little attractive to be chosen by any man as his companion; one might have supposed that everything would have been done to make this condition as eligible to them as possible, that they might have no cause to regret being denied the option of any other. Society, however, both in this, and, at first, in all other cases, has preferred to attain its object by foul rather than fair means: but this is the only case in which it has substantially persisted in them even to the present day. Originally women were taken by force, or regularly sold by their father to the husband. Until a late period in European history, the father had the power to dispose of his daughter in marriage at his own will and pleasure, without any regard to hers. The Church, indeed, was so far faithful to a better morality as to require a formal “yes” from the woman at the marriage ceremony; but there was nothing to shew that the consent was other than compulsory; and it was practically impossible for the girl to refuse compliance if the father persevered, except perhaps when she might obtain the protection of religion by a determined resolution to take monastic vows. After marriage, the man had anciently (but this was anterior to Christianity) the power of life and death over his wife. She could invoke no law against him; he was her sole tribunal and law. For a long time he could repudiate her, but she had no corresponding power in regard to him. By the old laws of England, the husband was called the lord of the wife; he was literally regarded as her sovereign, inasmuch that the murder of a man by his wife was called treason (petty as distinguished from high treason), and was more cruelly avenged than was usually the case with high treason, for the penalty was burning to death. Because these various enormities have fallen into disuse (for most of them were never formally abolished, or not until they had long ceased to be practised) men suppose that all is now as it should be in regard to the marriage contract; and we are continually told that civilization and Christianity have restored to the woman her just rights. Meanwhile the wife is the actual bond-servant of her husband: no less so, as far as legal obligation goes, than slaves commonly so called. She vows a lifelong obedience to him at the altar, and is held to it all through her life by law. Casuists may say that the obligation of obedience stops short of participation in crime, but it certainly extends to everything else. She can do no act whatever but by his permission, at least tacit. She can acquire no property but for him; the instant it becomes hers, even if by inheritance, it becomes ipso facto his. In this respect the wife's position under the common law of England is worse than that of slaves in the laws of many countries: by the Roman law, for example, a slave might have his peculium, which to a certain extent the law guaranteed to him for his exclusive use. The higher classes in this country have given an analogous advantage to their women, through special contracts setting aside the law, by conditions of pin-money, &c.: since parental feeling being stronger with fathers than the class feeling of their own sex, a father generally prefers his own daughter to a son-in-law who is a stranger to him. By means of settlements, the rich usually contrive to withdraw the whole or part of the inherited property of the wife from the absolute control of the husband: but they do not succeed in keeping it under her own control; the utmost they can do only prevents the husband from squandering it, at the same time debarring the rightful owner from its use. The property itself is out of the reach of both; and as to the income derived from it, the form of settlement most favourable to the wife (that called “to her separate use”) only precludes the husband from receiving it instead of her: it must pass through her hands, but if he takes it from her by personal violence as soon as she receives it, he can neither be punished, nor compelled to restitution. This is the amount of the protection which, under the laws of this country, the most powerful nobleman can give to his own daughter as respects her husband. In the immense majority of cases there is no settlement: and the absorption of all rights, all property, as well as all freedom of action, is complete. The two are called “one person in law,” for the purpose of inferring that whatever is hers is his, but the parallel inference is never drawn that whatever is his is hers; the maxim is not applied against the man, except to make him responsible to third parties for her acts, as a master is for the acts of his slaves or of his cattle. I am far from pretending that wives are in general no better treated than slaves; but no slave is a slave to the same lengths, and in so full a sense of the word, as a wife is. Hardly any slave, except one immediately attached to the master's person, is a slave at all hours and all minutes; in general he has, like a soldier, his fixed task, and when it is done, or when he is off duty, he disposes, within certain limits, of his own time, and has a family life into which the master rarely intrudes. “Uncle Tom” under his first master had his own life in his “cabin,” almost as much as any man whose work takes him away from home, is able to have in his own family. But it cannot be so with the wife. Above all, a female slave has (in Christian countries) an admitted right, and is considered under a moral obligation, to refuse to her master the last familiarity. Not so the wife: however brutal a tyrant she may unfortunately be chained to—though she may know that he hates her, though it may be his daily pleasure to torture her, and though she may feel it impossible not to loathe him—he can claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her inclinations. While she is held in this worst description of slavery as to her own person, what is her position in regard to the children in whom she and her master have a joint interest? They are by law his children. He alone has any legal rights over them. Not one act can she do towards or in relation to them, except by delegation from him. Even after he is dead she is not their legal guardian, unless he by will has made her so. He could even send them away from her, and deprive her of the means of seeing or corresponding with them, until this power was in some degree restricted by Serjeant Talfourd's Act. This is her legal state. And from this state she has no means of withdrawing herself. If she leaves her husband, she can take nothing with her, neither her children nor anything which is rightfully her own. If he chooses, he can compel her to return, by law, or by physical force; or he may content himself with seizing for his own use anything which she may earn, or which may be given to her by her relations. It is only legal separation by a decree of a court of justice, which entitles her to live apart, without being forced back into the custody of an exasperated jailer—or which empowers her to apply any earnings to her own use, without fear that a man whom perhaps she has not seen for twenty years will pounce upon her some day and carry all off. This legal separation, until lately, the courts of justice would only give at an expense which made it inaccessible to any one out of the higher ranks. Even now it is only given in cases of desertion, or of the extreme of cruelty; and yet complaints are made every day that it is granted too easily. Surely, if a woman is denied any lot in life but that of being the personal body-servant of a despot, and is dependent for everything upon the chance of finding one who may be disposed to make a favourite of her instead of merely a drudge, it is a very cruel aggravation of her fate that she should be allowed to try this chance only once. The natural sequel and corollary from this state of things would be, that since her all in life depends upon obtaining a good master, she should be allowed to change again and again until she finds one. I am not saying that she ought to be allowed this privilege. That is a totally different consideration. The question of divorce, in the sense involving liberty of remarriage, is one into which it is foreign to my purpose to enter. All I now say is, that to those to whom nothing but servitude is allowed, the free choice of servitude is the only, though a most insufficient, alleviation. Its refusal completes the assimilation of the wife to the slave—and the slave under not the mildest form of slavery: for in some slave codes the slave could, under certain circumstances of ill usage, legally compel the master to sell him. But no amount of ill usage, without adultery superadded, will in England free a wife from her tormentor.

We should begin our detailed discussion with the part of the subject our observations have led us to consider: the conditions attached to marriage by the laws of this country and every other. Society assigns marriage as women’s destiny. Women are raised to expect marriage and are meant to pursue it. The only exceptions are women considered too unattractive for any man to choose as a companion. One might therefore suppose that everything had been done to make marriage as desirable as possible for women. They would then have no reason to regret being denied every other option. Yet here, as originally in all other cases, society has preferred to achieve its aim by foul means rather than fair. Marriage, however, is the only case where society has largely persisted in those means to the present day. Originally, women were taken by force or routinely sold by their fathers to their husbands. Until relatively late in European history, a father could marry off his daughter entirely as he pleased, regardless of her wishes. The Church did uphold a better morality far enough to require the woman’s formal “yes” at the marriage ceremony. But nothing showed that her consent was freely given rather than forced. If her father insisted, refusal was practically impossible for the girl. Perhaps her only escape was to seek religious protection by firmly resolving to take monastic vows. In ancient times, before Christianity, a husband had the power of life and death over his wife. She could appeal to no law against him. He alone was her court and her law. For a long time, he could dismiss her as his wife, but she had no corresponding power over him. Under the old laws of England, a husband was called his wife’s lord. He was literally regarded as her sovereign. Thus, a wife’s murder of her husband was called treason (petty rather than high treason). The punishment was burning to death, a crueller penalty than was usual even for high treason. These various atrocities have fallen out of use. Most were never formally abolished, or were abolished only long after people had stopped practising them. Because these abuses have disappeared, men suppose that everything about the marriage contract is now as it should be. We are continually told that civilization and Christianity have restored women’s rightful freedoms. Meanwhile, a wife is actually her husband’s bond-servant. In legal obligations, she is no less enslaved than those commonly called slaves. At the altar, she promises lifelong obedience to him, and the law holds her to that promise throughout her life. Moral interpreters may say that her duty to obey stops short of taking part in crime. But her duty certainly extends to everything else. She can do nothing without his permission, even if that permission is merely implied. She can acquire property only for him. The moment property becomes hers, even through inheritance, it becomes automatically his. In this respect, a wife under English common law is worse off than slaves under many countries’ laws. Under Roman law, for example, a slave could have his peculium, property legally protected to some extent for his exclusive use. The upper classes in this country have secured a similar advantage for their women. They use special contracts that override the law, with provisions for pin-money, or personal allowances, and so on. Fathers’ feelings for their children are stronger than their solidarity with other men. A father therefore generally favours his own daughter over a son-in-law who is a stranger to him. Through marriage settlements, the rich usually manage to protect some or all of a wife’s inherited property from her husband’s absolute control. But they do not succeed in keeping the property under her own control. At most, these arrangements prevent the husband from squandering the property while also denying its rightful owner the use of it. Neither spouse can access the property itself. As for its income, even the settlement most favourable to the wife offers only limited protection. Such a settlement, called “to her separate use”, merely prevents the husband from receiving the income in her place. The income must pass through her hands. But suppose he takes the money from her by physical violence as soon as she receives it. He can neither be punished nor forced to repay her. Under this country’s laws, that is all the protection even the most powerful nobleman can give his daughter against her husband. In the vast majority of cases, there is no marriage settlement. The husband’s absorption of all her rights, all her property, and all her freedom of action is complete. Husband and wife are called “one person in law” to support the conclusion that whatever is hers is his. But the corresponding conclusion, that whatever is his is hers, is never drawn. The principle is never applied against the man, except to make him answerable to others for her actions. A master is similarly answerable for the actions of his slaves or cattle. I am certainly not claiming that wives are generally treated no better than slaves. But no slave is enslaved as completely, or in as full a sense, as a wife. Hardly any slave is enslaved every hour and every minute, except one who personally attends the master. Generally, like a soldier, a slave has a fixed task. Once the task is finished, or when off duty, the slave controls his own time within certain limits. He also has a family life into which the master rarely intrudes. Under his first master, “Uncle Tom” had his own life in his “cabin”. He had almost as much family life as any man whose work takes him away from home can have. But a wife cannot have such independence. Above all, a female slave in Christian countries has an acknowledged right to refuse her master sexual intimacy. She is also considered morally obliged to refuse him. A wife has no such right. She may be chained to a brutal tyrant. She may know he hates her, and he may take pleasure in torturing her every day. She may find it impossible not to loathe him. Yet he can demand and enforce the lowest human degradation: making her serve an animal function against her wishes. While she is held in this worst kind of bodily slavery, what is her position concerning their children? She and her master share an interest in those children. Yet legally they are his children. He alone has any legal rights over them. She can do nothing for them or concerning them unless he grants her the authority. Even after his death, she is not their legal guardian unless his will appoints her. He could even send the children away and prevent her from seeing them or corresponding with them. Serjeant Talfourd's Act restricted this power to some extent. Such is her legal position, and she has no means of escaping it. If she leaves her husband, she can take nothing with her, neither her children nor anything rightfully her own. If he chooses, he can force her to return through the law or through physical force. Or he may simply seize for himself anything she earns or receives from her relatives. Only a court-ordered legal separation gives her the right to live apart without being forced back into an enraged jailer’s custody. Only legal separation allows her to use her own earnings without fear of her husband suddenly taking everything. Perhaps she has not seen the man for twenty years, but he can still appear one day and seize it all. Until recently, obtaining a legal separation cost so much that only the upper classes could afford one. Even now, courts grant separation only in cases of desertion or extreme cruelty. Yet every day we hear complaints that separation is granted too easily. Suppose a woman is allowed no place in life except as a despot’s personal servant. Everything depends on her chance of finding a master willing to make her a favourite rather than merely a drudge. Surely her fate is made cruelly worse by allowing her to take that chance only once. The natural consequence of this situation would be to let her change masters repeatedly until she finds a good one. After all, everything in her life depends on finding one. I am not saying she ought to have this privilege. That is an entirely different question. Divorce involving the freedom to remarry is outside the purpose of my discussion. My point is only this: for those allowed nothing but servitude, freely choosing their servitude is the only relief. Even that relief is deeply inadequate. Denying such a choice completes the wife’s reduction to a slave, and not under slavery’s mildest form. Under some slave codes, certain kinds of mistreatment allowed a slave to legally force the master to sell him. But in England, no amount of mistreatment will free a wife from her tormentor unless he also commits adultery.

I have no desire to exaggerate, nor does the case stand in any need of exaggeration. I have described the wife's legal position, not her actual treatment. The laws of most countries are far worse than the people who execute them, and many of them are only able to remain laws by being seldom or never carried into effect. If married life were all that it might be expected to be, looking to the laws alone, society would be a hell upon earth. Happily there are both feelings and interests which in many men exclude, and in most, greatly temper, the impulses and propensities which lead to tyranny: and of those feelings, the tie which connects a man with his wife affords, in a normal state of things, incomparably the strongest example. The only tie which at all approaches to it, that between him and his children, tends, in all save exceptional cases, to strengthen, instead of conflicting with, the first. Because this is true; because men in general do not inflict, nor women suffer, all the misery which could be inflicted and suffered if the full power of tyranny with which the man is legally invested were acted on; the defenders of the existing form of the institution think that all its iniquity is justified, and that any complaint is merely quarrelling with the evil which is the price paid for every great good. But the mitigations in practice, which are compatible with maintaining in full legal force this or any other kind of tyranny, instead of being any apology for despotism, only serve to prove what power human nature possesses of reacting against the vilest institutions, and with what vitality the seeds of good as well as those of evil in human character diffuse and propagate themselves. Not a word can be said for despotism in the family which cannot be said for political despotism. Every absolute king does not sit at his window to enjoy the groans of his tortured subjects, nor strips them of their last rag and turns them out to shiver in the road. The despotism of Louis XVI. was not the despotism of Philippe le Bel, or of Nadir Shah, or of Caligula; but it was bad enough to justify the French Revolution, and to palliate even its horrors. If an appeal be made to the intense attachments which exist between wives and their husbands, exactly as much may be said of domestic slavery. It was quite an ordinary fact in Greece and Rome for slaves to submit to death by torture rather than betray their masters. In the proscriptions of the Roman civil wars it was remarked that wives and slaves were heroically faithful, sons very commonly treacherous. Yet we know how cruelly many Romans treated their slaves. But in truth these intense individual feelings nowhere rise to such a luxuriant height as under the most atrocious institutions. It is part of the irony of life, that the strongest feelings of devoted gratitude of which human nature seems to be susceptible, are called forth in human beings towards those who, having the power entirely to crush their earthly existence, voluntarily refrain from using that power. How great a place in most men this sentiment fills, even in religious devotion, it would be cruel to inquire. We daily see how much their gratitude to Heaven appears to be stimulated by the contemplation of fellow-creatures to whom God has not been so merciful as he has to themselves.

I have no wish to exaggerate, and the case needs no exaggeration. I have described a wife’s legal position, not her actual treatment. In most countries, the laws are far worse than the people who enforce them. Many laws survive only because they are seldom or never enforced. If married life were what the laws alone would lead us to expect, society would be hell on earth. Fortunately, feelings and interests prevent tyrannical impulses in many men and greatly restrain those impulses in most men. Under normal circumstances, the bond between a man and his wife is by far the strongest example of such feelings. Only the bond between a man and his children comes anywhere close. Except in unusual cases, his bond with his children strengthens his bond with his wife rather than conflicting with it. Because these bonds exist, men generally do not inflict all the misery their legal power allows. Nor do women generally suffer all the misery they could suffer if men fully exercised that tyrannical power. Defenders of marriage in its present form therefore believe that all its injustice is justified. They dismiss any complaint as objecting to the evil that must be accepted as the price of every great good. But milder treatment in practice can coexist with the full legal power of this or any other tyranny. Such restraint does not excuse absolute power. Instead, it shows how powerfully human nature can resist the worst institutions. It shows how vigorously the seeds of goodness, as well as evil, spread and reproduce in human character. Not a word can be said for absolute rule within the family that cannot also defend absolute political rule. Not every absolute king sits at his window enjoying the groans of his tortured subjects. Nor does every king strip his subjects of their last rag and leave them shivering in the road. The absolute rule of Louis XVI was not that of Philippe le Bel, Nadir Shah, or Caligula. But it was bad enough to justify the French Revolution and even make its horrors more excusable. If anyone appeals to the intense affection between wives and husbands, exactly the same argument can defend household slavery. In Greece and Rome, slaves quite commonly accepted death by torture rather than betray their masters. During the Roman civil wars, people marked for death were betrayed or protected by those closest to them. Observers noted that wives and slaves were heroically loyal, while sons were very often treacherous. Yet we know how cruelly many Romans treated their slaves. In truth, nowhere do these intense personal feelings flourish more abundantly than under the most atrocious institutions. Here is one of life’s ironies. People seem capable of no deeper, more devoted gratitude than they feel toward those who could utterly ruin their lives but freely choose not to. It would be cruel to ask how large a place this gratitude holds in most men, even in religious devotion. Every day, we see how much their gratitude to Heaven seems to grow when they consider other people. God has not been as merciful to those people as he has been to them.

Whether the institution to be defended is slavery, political absolutism, or the absolutism of the head of a family, we are always expected to judge of it from its best instances; and we are presented with pictures of loving exercise of authority on one side, loving submission to it on the other—superior wisdom ordering all things for the greatest good of the dependents, and surrounded by their smiles and benedictions. All this would be very much to the purpose if any one pretended that there are no such things as good men. Who doubts that there may be great goodness, and great happiness, and great affection, under the absolute government of a good man? Meanwhile, laws and institutions require to be adapted, not to good men, but to bad. Marriage is not an institution designed for a select few. Men are not required, as a preliminary to the marriage ceremony, to prove by testimonials that they are fit to be trusted with the exercise of absolute power. The tie of affection and obligation to a wife and children is very strong with those whose general social feelings are strong, and with many who are little sensible to any other social ties; but there are all degrees of sensibility and insensibility to it, as there are all grades of goodness and wickedness in men, down to those whom no ties will bind, and on whom society has no action but through its ultima ratio, the penalties of the law. In every grade of this descending scale are men to whom are committed all the legal powers of a husband. The vilest malefactor has some wretched woman tied to him, against whom he can commit any atrocity except killing her, and, if tolerably cautious, can do that without much danger of the legal penalty. And how many thousands are there among the lowest classes in every country, who, without being in a legal sense malefactors in any other respect, because in every other quarter their aggressions meet with resistance, indulge the utmost habitual excesses of bodily violence towards the unhappy wife, who alone, at least of grown persons, can neither repel nor escape from their brutality; and towards whom the excess of dependence inspires their mean and savage natures, not with a generous forbearance, and a point of honour to behave well to one whose lot in life is trusted entirely to their kindness, but on the contrary with a notion that the law has delivered her to them as their thing, to be used at their pleasure, and that they are not expected to practise the consideration towards her which is required from them towards everybody else. The law, which till lately left even these atrocious extremes of domestic oppression practically unpunished, has within these few years made some feeble attempts to repress them. But its attempts have done little, and cannot be expected to do much, because it is contrary to reason and experience to suppose that there can be any real check to brutality, consistent with leaving the victim still in the power of the executioner. Until a conviction for personal violence, or at all events a repetition of it after a first conviction, entitles the woman ipso facto to a divorce, or at least to a judicial separation, the attempt to repress these “aggravated assaults” by legal penalties will break down for want of a prosecutor, or for want of a witness.

Whether people defend slavery, absolute political rule, or the absolute authority of a family’s head, they always expect the same thing. We must judge the institution by its best examples. We are shown loving authority on one side and loving obedience on the other. A wiser ruler arranges everything for the greatest good of those under his authority. They surround him with smiles and blessings. All this would be very relevant if anyone claimed that good men did not exist. Who doubts that great goodness, happiness, and affection may exist under a good man’s absolute rule? But laws and institutions must be designed to deal with bad men, not good ones. Marriage is not an institution designed for a select few. Before marrying, men are not required to provide references proving they can be trusted with absolute power. Affection and duty toward a wife and children strongly bind men who care deeply about others in general. These bonds also strongly bind many men who feel little connection to anyone else. But men vary in their response to these bonds, just as they vary in goodness and wickedness. At the bottom are men whom no ties can bind. Society can influence such men only through its last resort, the penalties of the law. Men at every level of this descending scale receive all the legal powers of a husband. The vilest criminal has some miserable woman bound to him, against whom he can commit any atrocity except killing her. And if he is reasonably cautious, he can even kill her with little risk of legal punishment. How many thousands of men among the lowest social classes in every country habitually commit extreme violence against their wives? These men are not legally criminals in any other respect, because everywhere else their attacks meet resistance. But their unhappy wives alone, at least among adults, can neither resist nor escape their brutality. A wife’s extreme dependence does not inspire these petty, savage men to show generous restraint. Nor does it make them feel honor-bound to treat someone well whose fate depends entirely on their kindness. On the contrary, her dependence makes them think the law has handed her over as their property. They believe they can use her however they please. They think no one expects them to show her the consideration they must show everyone else. Until recently, the law left even these appalling extremes of domestic oppression practically unpunished. In the past few years, the law has made some weak attempts to curb such abuse. But these attempts have achieved little, and little can be expected of them. Reason and experience show why. Brutality cannot truly be restrained while the victim remains in the power of her tormentor. A conviction for physical violence must automatically entitle the woman to a divorce, or at least a court-ordered separation. Or, at the very least, she must gain that right if the violence happens again after a first conviction. Until then, attempts to curb these “aggravated assaults” through legal penalties will fail. There will be no one to bring charges, or no one to testify.

When we consider how vast is the number of men, in any great country, who are little higher than brutes, and that this never prevents them from being able, through the law of marriage, to obtain a victim, the breadth and depth of human misery caused in this shape alone by the abuse of the institution swells to something appalling. Yet these are only the extreme cases. They are the lowest abysses, but there is a sad succession of depth after depth before reaching them. In domestic as in political tyranny, the case of absolute monsters chiefly illustrates the institution by showing that there is scarcely any horror which may not occur under it if the despot pleases, and thus setting in a strong light what must be the terrible frequency of things only a little less atrocious. Absolute fiends are as rare as angels, perhaps rarer: ferocious savages, with occasional touches of humanity, are however very frequent: and in the wide interval which separates these from any worthy representatives of the human species, how many are the forms and gradations of animalism and selfishness, often under an outward varnish of civilization and even cultivation, living at peace with the law, maintaining a creditable appearance to all who are not under their power, yet sufficient often to make the lives of all who are so, a torment and a burthen to them! It would be tiresome to repeat the commonplaces about the unfitness of men in general for power, which, after the political discussions of centuries, every one knows by heart, were it not that hardly any one thinks of applying these maxims to the case in which above all others they are applicable, that of power, not placed in the hands of a man here and there, but offered to every adult male, down to the basest and most ferocious. It is not because a man is not known to have broken any of the Ten Commandments, or because he maintains a respectable character in his dealings with those whom he cannot compel to have intercourse with him, or because he does not fly out into violent bursts of ill-temper against those who are not obliged to bear with him, that it is possible to surmise of what sort his conduct will be in the unrestraint of home. Even the commonest men reserve the violent, the sulky, the undisguisedly selfish side of their character for those who have no power to withstand it. The relation of superiors to dependents is the nursery of these vices of character, which, wherever else they exist, are an overflowing from that source. A man who is morose or violent to his equals, is sure to be one who has lived among inferiors, whom he could frighten or worry into submission. If the family in its best forms is, as it is often said to be, a school of sympathy, tenderness, and loving forgetfulness of self, it is still oftener, as respects its chief, a school of wilfulness, overbearingness, unbounded self-indulgence, and a double-dyed and idealized selfishness, of which sacrifice itself is only a particular form: the care for the wife and children being only care for them as parts of the man's own interests and belongings, and their individual happiness being immolated in every shape to his smallest preferences. What better is to be looked for under the existing form of the institution? We know that the bad propensities of human nature are only kept within bounds when they are allowed no scope for their indulgence. We know that from impulse and habit, when not from deliberate purpose, almost every one to whom others yield, goes on encroaching upon them, until a point is reached at which they are compelled to resist. Such being the common tendency of human nature; the almost unlimited power which present social institutions give to the man over at least one human being—the one with whom he resides, and whom he has always present—this power seeks out and evokes the latent germs of selfishness in the remotest corners of his nature—fans its faintest sparks and smouldering embers—offers to him a license for the indulgence of those points of his original character which in all other relations he would have found it necessary to repress and conceal, and the repression of which would in time have become a second nature. I know that there is another side to the question. I grant that the wife, if she cannot effectually resist, can at least retaliate; she, too, can make the man's life extremely uncomfortable, and by that power is able to carry many points which she ought, and many which she ought not, to prevail in. But this instrument of self-protection—which may be called the power of the scold, or the shrewish sanction—has the fatal defect, that it avails most against the least tyrannical superiors, and in favour of the least deserving dependents. It is the weapon of irritable and self-willed women; of those who would make the worst use of power if they themselves had it, and who generally turn this power to a bad use. The amiable cannot use such an instrument, the highminded disdain it. And on the other hand, the husbands against whom it is used most effectively are the gentler and more inoffensive; those who cannot be induced, even by provocation, to resort to any very harsh exercise of authority. The wife's power of being disagreeable generally only establishes a counter-tyranny, and makes victims in their turn chiefly of those husbands who are least inclined to be tyrants.

Consider how many men in any great country are barely better than beasts. Yet marriage law still allows these men to obtain a victim. The sheer scale of human misery caused by this abuse of marriage alone is appalling. Yet these are only the extreme cases. They are the deepest pits, but there is a sad succession of depths before we reach them. In domestic tyranny, as in political tyranny, outright monsters mainly reveal what the institution permits. They show that hardly any horror is impossible if the tyrant wishes it. This makes terribly clear how frequent slightly less atrocious acts must be. Absolute devils are as rare as angels, perhaps rarer. But fierce brutes with occasional touches of humanity are very common. Between these brutes and anyone worthy of being called human lies a vast range of brutality and selfishness. How many forms and degrees of these faults exist, often beneath a polished surface of civilization and even culture! Such men live within the law. They appear respectable to everyone outside their power. Yet their faults are often enough to make life a torment and a burden for everyone under their control. Repeating familiar arguments about how unfit men generally are for power would be tiresome. After centuries of political debate, everyone knows these arguments by heart. Yet hardly anyone applies these principles where they apply most of all. Here, power is not given to an occasional man. It is offered to every adult male, down to the lowest and most brutal. A man may never have been known to break any of the Ten Commandments. He may behave respectably toward people he cannot force to deal with him. He may avoid violent outbursts against people who are not obliged to tolerate him. None of these things tells us how he will behave at home, where he faces no restraint. Even the most ordinary men reserve their violence, sulking, and open selfishness for people powerless to resist. Relationships between those in authority and their dependents breed these faults. Wherever else these faults appear, they spill over from that source. A man who is sullen or violent toward his equals has certainly lived among people under his authority. He could frighten or harass those people into submission. The family at its best is often called a school of sympathy, tenderness, and loving selflessness. But for its head, the family is even more often a school of stubbornness, bullying, and unlimited self-indulgence. It teaches a thoroughgoing selfishness dressed up as an ideal, in which even sacrifice is another form of selfishness. The man cares for his wife and children only as parts of his own interests and possessions. Their individual happiness is sacrificed in every way to his slightest preferences. What better result can we expect from marriage in its present form? We know that human nature's bad tendencies stay within bounds only when given no room for indulgence. We know that almost everyone who meets with submission keeps making further demands until others are forced to resist. People do this from impulse and habit, even when they have no deliberate intention. This is the usual tendency of human nature. Yet present social institutions give a man almost unlimited power over at least one other person. That person lives with him and is always present. This power searches out and awakens hidden seeds of selfishness in the furthest corners of his nature. It fans selfishness's faintest sparks and smoldering embers. It gives him permission to indulge traits he would have had to suppress and conceal in every other relationship. In time, suppressing those traits would have become second nature. I know there is another side to the question. I admit that even if a wife cannot effectively resist, she can at least retaliate. She too can make her husband's life extremely uncomfortable. This power lets her get her way on many points where she should prevail, and many where she should not. But this means of self-protection has a fatal flaw. We might call it the scold's power, or punishment through nagging. It works best against the least tyrannical people in authority, and benefits the least deserving dependents. It is the weapon of irritable, stubborn women. These women would make the worst use of power if they held it themselves. They generally put this power to bad use. Kind women cannot use such a weapon, and women of high principles scorn it. Meanwhile, the husbands most vulnerable to this weapon are the gentler and more harmless ones. Even provocation cannot make these husbands exercise their authority very harshly. A wife's power to be unpleasant generally does no more than establish a rival tyranny. Its victims, in turn, are chiefly the husbands least inclined to be tyrants.

What is it, then, which really tempers the corrupting effects of the power, and makes it compatible with such amount of good as we actually see? Mere feminine blandishments, though of great effect in individual instances, have very little effect in modifying the general tendencies of the situation; for their power only lasts while the woman is young and attractive, often only while her charm is new, and not dimmed by familiarity; and on many men they have not much influence at any time. The real mitigating causes are, the personal affection which is the growth of time, in so far as the man's nature is susceptible of it, and the woman's character sufficiently congenial with his to excite it; their common interests as regards the children, and their general community of interest as concerns third persons (to which however there are very great limitations); the real importance of the wife to his daily comforts and enjoyments, and the value he consequently attaches to her on his personal account, which, in a man capable of feeling for others, lays the foundation of caring for her on her own; and lastly, the influence naturally acquired over almost all human beings by those near to their persons (if not actually disagreeable to them): who, both by their direct entreaties, and by the insensible contagion of their feelings and dispositions, are often able, unless counteracted by some equally strong personal influence, to obtain a degree of command over the conduct of the superior, altogether excessive and unreasonable. Through these various means, the wife frequently exercises even too much power over the man; she is able to affect his conduct in things in which she may not be qualified to influence it for good—in which her influence may be not only unenlightened, but employed on the morally wrong side; and in which he would act better if left to his own prompting. But neither in the affairs of families nor in those of states is power a compensation for the loss of freedom. Her power often gives her what she has no right to, but does not enable her to assert her own rights. A Sultan's favourite slave has slaves under her, over whom she tyrannizes; but the desirable thing would be that she should neither have slaves nor be a slave. By entirely sinking her own existence in her husband; by having no will (or persuading him that she has no will) but his, in anything which regards their joint relation, and by making it the business of her life to work upon his sentiments, a wife may gratify herself by influencing, and very probably perverting, his conduct, in those of his external relations which she has never qualified herself to judge of, or in which she is herself wholly influenced by some personal or other partiality or prejudice. Accordingly, as things now are, those who act most kindly to their wives, are quite as often made worse, as better, by the wife's influence, in respect to all interests extending beyond the family. She is taught that she has no business with things out of that sphere; and accordingly she seldom has any honest and conscientious opinion on them; and therefore hardly ever meddles with them for any legitimate purpose, but generally for an interested one. She neither knows nor cares which is the right side in politics, but she knows what will bring in money or invitations, give her husband a title, her son a place, or her daughter a good marriage.

What, then, really softens the corrupting effects of this power and allows it to coexist with the good we actually see? Feminine charm alone, though very effective in individual cases, does little to change the general tendencies of the situation. Its power lasts only while the woman is young and attractive. Often it lasts only while her charm is new and familiarity has not dulled it. And many men are never much influenced by it. The real restraints on this power come from several sources. One is the personal affection that grows over time. This depends on the man's capacity for affection and on whether the woman's character suits his well enough to inspire it. Another is their shared interest in their children and their generally shared interests in dealings with other people. These shared interests, however, have very great limits. The wife also makes a real difference to her husband's daily comfort and enjoyment. He therefore values her for his own sake. In a man capable of feeling for others, this provides a foundation for caring about her for her own sake. Finally, people who live closely with others naturally gain influence over almost all of them, unless they are actually disagreeable companions. They gain this influence through direct appeals and through the unnoticed spread of their feelings and attitudes. Unless another equally strong personal influence works against them, they can often gain control over the more powerful person's conduct. This control can be altogether excessive and unreasonable. Through these various means, a wife frequently exercises even too much power over her husband. She can affect his conduct in matters where she may lack the knowledge or judgment to influence him for good. Her influence may be not only ill-informed but also directed toward morally wrong ends. In these matters, he would act better if left to his own judgment. But power does not compensate for the loss of freedom, either in families or in states. Her power often gives her things she has no right to. Yet it does not enable her to claim her own rights. A Sultan's favorite slave has slaves under her, whom she tyrannizes over. But the desirable outcome would be for her neither to own slaves nor to be a slave. A wife may completely bury her own identity in her husband's. In everything concerning their relationship, she may have no will except his, or persuade him that she has none. She may make influencing his feelings her life's work. By these means, she may satisfy herself by influencing, and very probably corrupting, his conduct outside the family. Yet she has never equipped herself to judge some of these outside dealings. In others, she is wholly guided by some personal or other bias or prejudice. As things stand, then, men who treat their wives most kindly are as often made worse as better by their influence. This applies to all interests beyond the family. A woman is taught that she has no business with anything outside that sphere. As a result, she seldom forms any honest, conscientious opinion about such matters. She therefore hardly ever interferes in them for any legitimate purpose, but generally to serve her own interests. She neither knows nor cares which side in politics is right. But she knows what will bring money or invitations, or gain her husband a title. She knows what will secure her son a position or her daughter a good marriage.

But how, it will be asked, can any society exist without government? In a family, as in a state, some one person must be the ultimate ruler. Who shall decide when married people differ in opinion? Both cannot have their way, yet a decision one way or the other must be come to.

But some will ask, how can any society exist without government? In a family, as in a state, one person must have the final say. Who decides when a married couple disagrees? Both cannot have their way, but a decision must be made one way or the other.

It is not true that in all voluntary association between two people, one of them must be absolute master: still less that the law must determine which of them it shall be. The most frequent case of voluntary association, next to marriage, is partnership in business: and it is not found or thought necessary to enact that in every partnership, one partner shall have entire control over the concern, and the others shall be bound to obey his orders. No one would enter into partnership on terms which would subject him to the responsibilities of a principal, with only the powers and privileges of a clerk or agent. If the law dealt with other contracts as it does with marriage, it would ordain that one partner should administer the common business as if it was his private concern; that the others should have only delegated powers; and that this one should be designated by some general presumption of law, for example as being the eldest. The law never does this: nor does experience show it to be necessary that any theoretical inequality of power should exist between the partners, or that the partnership should have any other conditions than what they may themselves appoint by their articles of agreement. Yet it might seem that the exclusive power might be conceded with less danger to the rights and interests of the inferior, in the case of partnership than in that of marriage, since he is free to cancel the power by withdrawing from the connexion. The wife has no such power, and even if she had, it is almost always desirable that she should try all measures before resorting to it.

It is not true that whenever two people freely join together, one must have absolute authority over the other. Still less is it true that the law must decide who has that authority. After marriage, the most common voluntary association is a business partnership. Yet no one finds it necessary, or thinks it necessary, to give one partner complete control by law. Nor must the other partners be legally bound to obey that partner’s orders. No one would enter a partnership with an owner’s responsibilities but only a clerk’s or agent’s powers and privileges. If the law treated other contracts as it treats marriage, one partner would run the shared business as his own. The other partners would have only whatever powers he gave them. The law would choose the controlling partner by some general rule, such as giving authority to the eldest. The law never does this. Nor does experience show that partners need unequal authority under the terms of their partnership. Nor does experience show that partnerships need any terms beyond those the partners set in their own agreement. Yet giving one partner sole authority might seem less dangerous to the subordinate partner’s rights and interests than in marriage. The subordinate business partner, after all, can end that authority by leaving the partnership. A wife has no such power. Even if she did, it would almost always be desirable for her to try every other measure before leaving.

It is quite true that things which have to be decided every day, and cannot adjust themselves gradually, or wait for a compromise, ought to depend on one will: one person must have their sole control. But it does not follow that this should always be the same person. The natural arrangement is a division of powers between the two; each being absolute in the executive branch of their own department, and any change of system and principle requiring the consent of both. The division neither can nor should be pre-established by the law, since it must depend on individual capacities and suitabilities. If the two persons chose, they might pre-appoint it by the marriage contract, as pecuniary arrangements are now often pre-appointed. There would seldom be any difficulty in deciding such things by mutual consent, unless the marriage was one of those unhappy ones in which all other things, as well as this, become subjects of bickering and dispute. The division of rights would naturally follow the division of duties and functions; and that is already made by consent, or at all events not by law, but by general custom, modified and modifiable at the pleasure of the persons concerned.

It is quite true that daily decisions must rest with one person when gradual adjustment or compromise cannot wait. One person must have sole control over such decisions. But the person in control need not always be the same. The natural arrangement is to divide authority between the two spouses. Each would have full control over carrying out decisions in their own area. Any change in the system or its principles would require both spouses’ consent. The law cannot and should not set this division in advance. The division must depend on each person’s abilities and suitability. If the spouses wished, they could agree on the division in their marriage contract, as financial arrangements are often agreed on today. There would seldom be any difficulty in settling these matters by mutual consent, except in an unhappy marriage. In such marriages, these matters, like everything else, become subjects of bickering and dispute. The division of rights would naturally follow the division of duties and responsibilities. Couples already divide these duties by agreement, or at least not by law. Instead, general custom guides the division, with changes that the people concerned make, and can make, as they please.

The real practical decision of affairs, to whichever may be given the legal authority, will greatly depend, as it even now does, upon comparative qualifications. The mere fact that he is usually the eldest, will in most cases give the preponderance to the man; at least until they both attain a time of life at which the difference in their years is of no importance. There will naturally also be a more potential voice on the side, whichever it is, that brings the means of support. Inequality from this source does not depend on the law of marriage, but on the general conditions of human society, as now constituted. The influence of mental superiority, either general or special, and of superior decision of character, will necessarily tell for much. It always does so at present. And this fact shows how little foundation there is for the apprehension that the powers and responsibilities of partners in life (as of partners in business), cannot be satisfactorily apportioned by agreement between themselves. They always are so apportioned, except in cases in which the marriage institution is a failure. Things never come to an issue of downright power on one side, and obedience on the other, except where the connexion altogether has been a mistake, and it would be a blessing to both parties to be relieved from it. Some may say that the very thing by which an amicable settlement of differences becomes possible, is the power of legal compulsion known to be in reserve; as people submit to an arbitration because there is a court of law in the background, which they know that they can be forced to obey. But to make the cases parallel, we must suppose that the rule of the court of law was, not to try the cause, but to give judgment always for the same side, suppose the defendant. If so, the amenability to it would be a motive with the plaintiff to agree to almost any arbitration, but it would be just the reverse with the defendant. The despotic power which the law gives to the husband may be a reason to make the wife assent to any compromise by which power is practically shared between the two, but it cannot be the reason why the husband does. That there is always among decently conducted people a practical compromise, though one of them at least is under no physical or moral necessity of making it, shows that the natural motives which lead to a voluntary adjustment of the united life of two persons in a manner acceptable to both, do on the whole, except in unfavourable cases, prevail. The matter is certainly not improved by laying down as an ordinance of law, that the superstructure of free government shall be raised upon a legal basis of despotism on one side and subjection on the other, and that every concession which the despot makes may, at his mere pleasure, and without any warning, be recalled. Besides that no freedom is worth much when held on so precarious a tenure, its conditions are not likely to be the most equitable when the law throws so prodigious a weight into one scale; when the adjustment rests between two persons one of whom is declared to be entitled to everything, the other not only entitled to nothing except during the good pleasure of the first, but under the strongest moral and religious obligation not to rebel under any excess of oppression.

Whoever has legal authority, practical decisions will depend greatly on the partners’ relative abilities, just as they do now. The man is usually older, and this alone will give him greater influence in most cases. At least, it will until both reach an age when the difference in years no longer matters. Naturally, whichever partner provides the means of support will also have a stronger voice. Inequality arising from financial support does not depend on marriage law, but on the general structure of society today. Greater intelligence, whether general or in a particular area, and greater firmness of character will necessarily carry considerable weight. These qualities always do carry weight now. This fact shows how little reason there is to fear that life partners cannot agree on dividing powers and responsibilities. The same is true of business partners. Life partners always divide powers and responsibilities by agreement, except where the marriage has failed. Only when the marriage itself has been a mistake do matters become a question of outright power and obedience. In such cases, both partners would be better off being freed from the marriage. Some may say that friendly settlements are possible precisely because legal force is known to be available as a backup. People similarly accept arbitration because a court stands behind it, and they know they can be forced to obey. But to make the comparison fair, we must imagine a court that does not examine the case. Instead, the court always rules for the same side, say the defendant. Under that rule, the prospect of court would give the plaintiff a reason to accept almost any arbitration. But the defendant would have precisely the opposite reason. The absolute power that the law gives the husband may make the wife accept any compromise that practically shares power. But that legal power cannot explain why the husband agrees. Among people who behave decently, there is always a practical compromise. Yet at least one partner faces no physical or moral necessity to compromise. This shows that natural motives generally prevail, except in unfavorable cases. These motives lead two people to adjust their shared life voluntarily in ways acceptable to both. The situation is certainly not improved by a law requiring free government to rest on a foundation of absolute rule and subjection. Under such a law, the absolute ruler may withdraw every concession whenever he pleases, without warning. Freedom is worth little when held on such uncertain terms. Nor are its terms likely to be very fair when the law puts such enormous weight on one side. The agreement is between two people, one declared entitled to everything, the other entitled to nothing except at the first’s pleasure. The second is also placed under the strongest moral and religious obligation not to rebel, however extreme the oppression.

A pertinacious adversary, pushed to extremities, may say, that husbands indeed are willing to be reasonable, and to make fair concessions to their partners without being compelled to it, but that wives are not: that if allowed any rights of their own, they will acknowledge no rights at all in any one else, and never will yield in anything, unless they can be compelled, by the man's mere authority, to yield in everything. This would have been said by many persons some generations ago, when satires on women were in vogue, and men thought it a clever thing to insult women for being what men made them. But it will be said by no one now who is worth replying to. It is not the doctrine of the present day that women are less susceptible of good feeling, and consideration for those with whom they are united by the strongest ties, than men are. On the contrary, we are perpetually told that women are better than men, by those who are totally opposed to treating them as if they were as good; so that the saying has passed into a piece of tiresome cant, intended to put a complimentary face upon an injury, and resembling those celebrations of royal clemency which, according to Gulliver, the king of Lilliput always prefixed to his most sanguinary decrees. If women are better than men in anything, it surely is in individual self-sacrifice for those of their own family. But I lay little stress on this, so long as they are universally taught that they are born and created for self-sacrifice. I believe that equality of rights would abate the exaggerated self-abnegation which is the present artificial ideal of feminine character, and that a good woman would not be more self-sacrificing than the best man: but on the other hand, men would be much more unselfish and self-sacrificing than at present, because they would no longer be taught to worship their own will as such a grand thing that it is actually the law for another rational being. There is nothing which men so easily learn as this self-worship: all privileged persons, and all privileged classes, have had it. The more we descend in the scale of humanity, the intenser it is; and most of all in those who are not, and can never expect to be, raised above any one except an unfortunate wife and children. The honourable exceptions are proportionally fewer than in the case of almost any other human infirmity. Philosophy and religion, instead of keeping it in check, are generally suborned to defend it; and nothing controls it but that practical feeling of the equality of human beings, which is the theory of Christianity, but which Christianity will never practically teach, while it sanctions institutions grounded on an arbitrary preference of one human being over another.

A stubborn opponent, driven into a corner, may make this argument: husbands are indeed willing to be reasonable. They will make fair concessions to their wives without being forced, but wives will not do the same. If wives are allowed any rights of their own, they will recognize no rights in anyone else. They will never give way on anything unless a man's authority alone can force them to give way on everything. Many people would have said this some generations ago, when satires mocking women were fashionable. Men then thought themselves clever for insulting women for being what men had made them. But no one worth answering would say this now. People today do not claim that women have less capacity than men for kindness and consideration toward their closest relations. On the contrary, we are constantly told that women are better than men. Those who say so are completely opposed to treating women as if they were as good as men. So this praise has become tiresome, empty talk, meant to make an injustice look like a compliment. It resembles those celebrations of royal mercy that, according to Gulliver, the king of Lilliput placed before his bloodiest decrees. If women are better than men in anything, surely it is in personal sacrifice for their own families. But I place little weight on this while women are universally taught that they were born and created for self-sacrifice. I believe equal rights would reduce the excessive self-denial that now serves as an artificial ideal of womanhood. A good woman would be no more self-sacrificing than the best man. On the other hand, men would be much more unselfish and self-sacrificing than they are now. They would no longer be taught to worship their own will as something so grand that another rational being must obey it as law. Nothing is easier for men to learn than this self-worship. All privileged people and all privileged classes have shown it. The lower we go on the scale of humanity, the more intense this self-worship becomes. It is strongest among men who rank above no one except an unfortunate wife and children, and never expect to. The honorable exceptions are proportionally fewer than for almost any other human failing. Instead of restraining this self-worship, philosophy and religion are generally enlisted to defend it. Nothing controls it except a practical sense that human beings are equal. Christianity teaches this equality in theory. But Christianity will never teach equality in practice while approving institutions based on arbitrarily favoring one human being over another.

There are, no doubt, women, as there are men, whom equality of consideration will not satisfy; with whom there is no peace while any will or wish is regarded but their own. Such persons are a proper subject for the law of divorce. They are only fit to live alone, and no human beings ought to be compelled to associate their lives with them. But the legal subordination tends to make such characters among women more, rather than less, frequent. If the man exerts his whole power, the woman is of course crushed: but if she is treated with indulgence, and permitted to assume power, there is no rule to set limits to her encroachments. The law, not determining her rights, but theoretically allowing her none at all, practically declares that the measure of what she has a right to, is what she can contrive to get.

Some women, like some men, are undoubtedly not satisfied with equal consideration. Such people allow no peace as long as anyone’s wishes or will besides their own receive any consideration. Divorce laws should provide for cases involving such people. They are fit only to live alone, and no one should be forced to share a life with them. But women’s legal subordination tends to make such characters more common among women, not less. If the man uses his full power, the woman is, of course, crushed. But if he indulges her and allows her to take power, no rule limits how far she can overstep. The law does not define her rights. Instead, in theory, it gives her no rights at all. In practice, the law therefore declares that she has a right to whatever she can manage to get.

The equality of married persons before the law, is not only the sole mode in which that particular relation can be made consistent with justice to both sides, and conducive to the happiness of both, but it is the only means of rendering the daily life of mankind, in any high sense, a school of moral cultivation. Though the truth may not be felt or generally acknowledged for generations to come, the only school of genuine moral sentiment is society between equals. The moral education of mankind has hitherto emanated chiefly from the law of force, and is adapted almost solely to the relations which force creates. In the less advanced states of society, people hardly recognise any relation with their equals. To be an equal is to be an enemy. Society, from its highest place to its lowest, is one long chain, or rather ladder, where every individual is either above or below his nearest neighbour, and wherever he does not command he must obey. Existing moralities, accordingly, are mainly fitted to a relation of command and obedience. Yet command and obedience are but unfortunate necessities of human life: society in equality is its normal state. Already in modern life, and more and more as it progressively improves, command and obedience become exceptional facts in life, equal association its general rule. The morality of the first ages rested on the obligation to submit to power; that of the ages next following, on the right of the weak to the forbearance and protection of the strong. How much longer is one form of society and life to content itself with the morality made for another? We have had the morality of submission, and the morality of chivalry and generosity; the time is now come for the morality of justice. Whenever, in former ages, any approach has been made to society in equality, Justice has asserted its claims as the foundation of virtue. It was thus in the free republics of antiquity. But even in the best of these, the equals were limited to the free male citizens; slaves, women, and the unenfranchised residents were under the law of force. The joint influence of Roman civilization and of Christianity obliterated these distinctions, and in theory (if only partially in practice) declared the claims of the human being, as such, to be paramount to those of sex, class, or social position. The barriers which had begun to be levelled were raised again by the northern conquests; and the whole of modern history consists of the slow process by which they have since been wearing away. We are entering into an order of things in which justice will again be the primary virtue; grounded as before on equal, but now also on sympathetic association; having its root no longer in the instinct of equals for self-protection, but in a cultivated sympathy between them; and no one being now left out, but an equal measure being extended to all. It is no novelty that mankind do not distinctly foresee their own changes, and that their sentiments are adapted to past, not to coming ages. To see the futurity of the species has always been the privilege of the intellectual élite, or of those who have learnt from them; to have the feelings of that futurity has been the distinction, and usually the martyrdom, of a still rarer élite. Institutions, books, education, society, all go on training human beings for the old, long after the new has come; much more when it is only coming. But the true virtue of human beings is fitness to live together as equals; claiming nothing for themselves but what they as freely concede to every one else; regarding command of any kind as an exceptional necessity, and in all cases a temporary one; and preferring, whenever possible, the society of those with whom leading and following can be alternate and reciprocal. To these virtues, nothing in life as at present constituted gives cultivation by exercise. The family is a school of despotism, in which the virtues of despotism, but also its vices, are largely nourished. Citizenship, in free countries, is partly a school of society in equality; but citizenship fills only a small place in modern life, and does not come near the daily habits or inmost sentiments. The family, justly constituted, would be the real school of the virtues of freedom. It is sure to be a sufficient one of everything else. It will always be a school of obedience for the children, of command for the parents. What is needed is, that it should be a school of sympathy in equality, of living together in love, without power on one side or obedience on the other. This it ought to be between the parents. It would then be an exercise of those virtues which each requires to fit them for all other association, and a model to the children of the feelings and conduct which their temporary training by means of obedience is designed to render habitual, and therefore natural, to them. The moral training of mankind will never be adapted to the conditions of the life for which all other human progress is a preparation, until they practise in the family the same moral rule which is adapted to the normal constitution of human society. Any sentiment of freedom which can exist in a man whose nearest and dearest intimacies are with those of whom he is absolute master, is not the genuine or Christian love of freedom, but, what the love of freedom generally was in the ancients and in the middle ages—an intense feeling of the dignity and importance of his own personality; making him disdain a yoke for himself, of which he has no abhorrence whatever in the abstract, but which he is abundantly ready to impose on others for his own interest or glorification.

Legal equality between married people is the only way to make marriage fair to both and promote both partners’ happiness. It is also the only way to make daily life a place of deep moral learning. Generations may pass before people feel or widely accept this truth. Yet relationships between equals are the only school for genuine moral feeling. Until now, humanity’s moral education has come chiefly from the rule of force. It has prepared people almost entirely for relationships created by force. In less advanced societies, people hardly recognize any relationship with equals. To be an equal is to be an enemy. From top to bottom, society forms one long chain, or rather a ladder. Each person stands above or below their nearest neighbor. Wherever a person does not command, that person must obey. Existing moral codes are therefore designed mainly for relationships of command and obedience. Yet command and obedience are only unfortunate necessities of human life. Relationships between equals are society’s normal state. Already in modern life, command and obedience are becoming exceptions, while equal partnership is becoming the general rule. This change grows as modern life improves. The morality of the earliest ages rested on the duty to submit to power. The morality of the ages that followed rested on the weak person’s right to restraint and protection from the strong. How much longer must one form of society and life remain content with a morality made for another? We have had the morality of submission and the morality of chivalry and generosity. The time has now come for the morality of justice. Whenever past societies have approached equality, justice has asserted its claim to be the foundation of virtue. This happened in the free republics of antiquity. But even in the best of those republics, equality was limited to free male citizens. Slaves, women, and residents without political rights remained under the rule of force. Together, Roman civilization and Christianity erased these distinctions. In theory, though only partly in practice, they declared that people’s claims as human beings came first. Those claims outweighed any claims based on sex, class, or social position. Conquests by northern peoples rebuilt the barriers that had begun to come down. The whole of modern history is the slow process by which those barriers have since been wearing away. We are entering a social order in which justice will again be the primary virtue. As before, justice will rest on relationships between equals, but now those relationships will also involve sympathy. Justice will no longer be rooted in equals’ instinct to protect themselves, but in their cultivated sympathy for one another. No one will be left out, and everyone will receive equal treatment. Humanity’s failure to foresee its own changes clearly is nothing new. Nor is the tendency for people’s feelings to suit past ages rather than those to come. Only the intellectual elite, or those who have learned from them, have been able to foresee humanity’s future. An even rarer few have felt as people will feel in that future. Those feelings have distinguished them and usually made them martyrs. Institutions, books, education, and society keep preparing people for the old order long after the new order has arrived. They do so even more when the new order is only approaching. But true human virtue means being fit to live together as equals. It means claiming nothing for ourselves that we do not just as freely grant everyone else. It means treating every kind of command as an exceptional necessity, and always a temporary one. It means preferring, whenever possible, relationships in which people can take turns leading and following. Nothing in life as it is now organized develops these virtues through practice. The family is a school of despotism. It strongly encourages the virtues of absolute rule, but also its vices. In free countries, citizenship offers some education in living as equals. But citizenship occupies only a small part of modern life. It scarcely touches daily habits or the deepest feelings. A family organized justly would be the true school for the virtues of freedom. The family is sure to provide enough training in everything else. It will always teach children to obey and parents to command. What is needed is a family that teaches sympathy between equals and how to live together in love. Neither side should hold power over the other or owe the other obedience. This is how the parents’ relationship ought to work. Their relationship would then give each parent practice in the virtues needed for all other relationships. It would also give children a model of feeling and behavior. Their temporary training in obedience is meant to make those feelings and behaviors habitual, and therefore natural, to them. All other human progress prepares us for a particular way of life. Our moral training will never suit that life until families practice the moral rule suited to human society’s normal structure. A man may feel some love of freedom while being absolute master over those nearest and dearest to him. But that feeling is not a genuine or Christian love of freedom. Instead, it is what love of freedom generally meant in antiquity and the Middle Ages. It is an intense sense of his own dignity and importance. That feeling makes him scorn subjection for himself, though he has no objection to subjection in principle. He is entirely ready to impose it on others for his own benefit or glory.

I readily admit (and it is the very foundation of my hopes) that numbers of married people even under the present law, (in the higher classes of England probably a great majority,) live in the spirit of a just law of equality. Laws never would be improved, if there were not numerous persons whose moral sentiments are better than the existing laws. Such persons ought to support the principles here advocated; of which the only object is to make all other married couples similar to what these are now. But persons even of considerable moral worth, unless they are also thinkers, are very ready to believe that laws or practices, the evils of which they have not personally experienced, do not produce any evils, but (if seeming to be generally approved of) probably do good, and that it is wrong to object to them. It would, however, be a great mistake in such married people to suppose, because the legal conditions of the tie which unites them do not occur to their thoughts once in a twelvemonth, and because they live and feel in all respects as if they were legally equals, that the same is the case with all other married couples, wherever the husband is not a notorious ruffian. To suppose this, would be to show equal ignorance of human nature and of fact. The less fit a man is for the possession of power—the less likely to be allowed to exercise it over any person with that person's voluntary consent—the more does he hug himself in the consciousness of the power the law gives him, exact its legal rights to the utmost point which custom (the custom of men like himself) will tolerate, and take pleasure in using the power, merely to enliven the agreeable sense of possessing it. What is more; in the most naturally brutal and morally uneducated part of the lower classes, the legal slavery of the woman, and something in the merely physical subjection to their will as an instrument, causes them to feel a sort of disrespect and contempt towards their own wife which they do not feel towards any other woman, or any other human being, with whom they come in contact; and which makes her seem to them an appropriate subject for any kind of indignity. Let an acute observer of the signs of feeling, who has the requisite opportunities, judge for himself whether this is not the case: and if he finds that it is, let him not wonder at any amount of disgust and indignation that can be felt against institutions which lead naturally to this depraved state of the human mind.

I readily admit that many married people, even under the present law, live in the spirit of a fair law of equality. Indeed, this is the very basis of my hopes. Among the upper classes in England, these couples probably form a large majority. Laws would never improve unless many people had moral standards better than the existing laws. Such people should support the principles advocated here. Their only purpose is to make all other married couples like these couples now are. But even people of considerable moral worth readily accept laws or practices unless they are also thoughtful people. If they have not personally suffered from those laws or practices, they readily believe that no one suffers from them. If those laws or practices seem widely approved, they believe they probably do good, and that opposing them is wrong. Such married people may not think about the legal terms of their marriage even once a year. They may live and feel in every way as if they were legally equal. But they would be greatly mistaken to suppose all other married couples live this way whenever the husband is not a notorious brute. That assumption would show equal ignorance of human nature and the facts. The less fit a man is to hold power, the more he delights in knowing the law gives him power. Such a man is less likely to be allowed power over anyone with that person's willing consent. He presses his legal rights to the furthest point that custom allows, meaning the customs of men like himself. He enjoys exercising his power simply to renew the pleasure of knowing he possesses it. There is more. Consider the most naturally brutal and morally uneducated men among the lower classes. Their wives' legal slavery, together with something about their wives' physical submission as instruments of their will, breeds disrespect and contempt. These men feel this contempt toward their own wives, but not toward any other woman or person they encounter. This contempt makes their wives seem fitting targets for any kind of humiliation. Let anyone skilled at reading people's feelings, with the necessary opportunities to observe, judge whether this is so. If such an observer finds it is, let that observer not be surprised by any degree of disgust and outrage. Such feelings are directed against institutions that naturally lead to this corrupt state of mind.

We shall be told, perhaps, that religion imposes the duty of obedience; as every established fact which is too bad to admit of any other defence, is always presented to us as an injunction of religion. The Church, it is very true, enjoins it in her formularies, but it would be difficult to derive any such injunction from Christianity. We are told that St. Paul said, “Wives, obey your husbands:” but he also said, “Slaves, obey your masters.” It was not St. Paul's business, nor was it consistent with his object, the propagation of Christianity, to incite any one to rebellion against existing laws. The apostle's acceptance of all social institutions as he found them, is no more to be construed as a disapproval of attempts to improve them at the proper time, than his declaration, “The powers that be are ordained of God,” gives his sanction to military despotism, and to that alone, as the Christian form of political government, or commands passive obedience to it. To pretend that Christianity was intended to stereotype existing forms of government and society, and protect them against change, is to reduce it to the level of Islamism or of Brahminism. It is precisely because Christianity has not done this, that it has been the religion of the progressive portion of mankind, and Islamism, Brahminism, &c., have been those of the stationary portions; or rather (for there is no such thing as a really stationary society) of the declining portions. There have been abundance of people, in all ages of Christianity, who tried to make it something of the same kind; to convert us into a sort of Christian Mussulmans, with the Bible for a Koran, prohibiting all improvement: and great has been their power, and many have had to sacrifice their lives in resisting them. But they have been resisted, and the resistance has made us what we are, and will yet make us what we are to be.

Perhaps we will be told that religion requires obedience. Every established practice too bad to defend in any other way is always presented as a religious command. The Church does indeed require wives to obey their husbands in its formal statements. But such a command would be difficult to draw from Christianity. We are told that St. Paul said, “Wives, obey your husbands:” but he also said, “Slaves, obey your masters.” St. Paul's task was not to encourage anyone to rebel against existing laws. Nor would doing so have served his purpose of spreading Christianity. The apostle accepted all social institutions as he found them. His acceptance no more implies opposition to efforts to improve those institutions at the proper time than another statement does. He declared, “The powers that be are ordained of God,” but this does not endorse military dictatorship. Nor does it make military dictatorship the only Christian form of government, or command unquestioning obedience to such rule. To claim that Christianity was meant to freeze existing forms of government and society is to misrepresent it. To claim that Christianity protects those forms against change reduces it to the level of Islamism or Brahminism. Christianity has been the religion of the progressive part of humanity precisely because it has not opposed change in this way. Islamism, Brahminism, and other such religions have been the religions of those parts of humanity that stand still. Or rather, since no society truly stands still, they have been the religions of those parts that are declining. Throughout Christianity's history, many people have tried to turn it into something similar. They have tried to make us a kind of Christian Mussulmans, with the Bible as a Koran, forbidding all improvement. These people have held great power, and many have had to sacrifice their lives to resist them. But they have been resisted. That resistance has made us what we are, and will yet make us what we are to become.

After what has been said respecting the obligation of obedience, it is almost superfluous to say anything concerning the more special point included in the general one—a woman's right to her own property; for I need not hope that this treatise can make any impression upon those who need anything to convince them that a woman's inheritance or gains ought to be as much her own after marriage as before. The rule is simple: whatever would be the husband's or wife's if they were not married, should be under their exclusive control during marriage; which need not interfere with the power to tie up property by settlement, in order to preserve it for children. Some people are sentimentally shocked at the idea of a separate interest in money matters, as inconsistent with the ideal fusion of two lives into one. For my own part, I am one of the strongest supporters of community of goods, when resulting from an entire unity of feeling in the owners, which makes all things common between them. But I have no relish for a community of goods resting on the doctrine, that what is mine is yours but what is yours is not mine; and I should prefer to decline entering into such a compact with any one, though I were myself the person to profit by it.

After what I have said about the duty to obey, there is almost no need to discuss a woman's property rights. Those rights are a specific part of the broader issue. I cannot hope this book will influence anyone who needs convincing on the following point. A woman's inheritance or earnings should belong to her as fully after marriage as before. The rule is simple: whatever either spouse would own if unmarried should remain under that spouse's exclusive control during marriage. This need not prevent legal arrangements that set property aside to preserve it for children. Some people find the idea of separate financial interests emotionally shocking. They see it as incompatible with the ideal of two lives becoming one. For my part, I am among the strongest supporters of shared ownership when it grows from complete unity of feeling. Such unity makes everything common to both owners. But I have no liking for shared ownership based on the principle that whatever is mine is yours, but whatever is yours is not mine. I would rather refuse such an agreement with anyone, even if I were the one who would benefit.

This particular injustice and oppression to women, which is, to common apprehensions, more obvious than all the rest, admits of remedy without interfering with any other mischiefs: and there can be little doubt that it will be one of the earliest remedied. Already, in many of the new and several of the old States of the American Confederation, provisions have been inserted even in the written Constitutions, securing to women equality of rights in this respect: and thereby improving materially the position, in the marriage relation, of those women at least who have property, by leaving them one instrument of power which they have not signed away; and preventing also the scandalous abuse of the marriage institution, which is perpetrated when a man entraps a girl into marrying him without a settlement, for the sole purpose of getting possession of her money. When the support of the family depends, not on property, but on earnings, the common arrangement, by which the man earns the income and the wife superintends the domestic expenditure, seems to me in general the most suitable division of labour between the two persons. If, in addition to the physical suffering of bearing children, and the whole responsibility of their care and education in early years, the wife undertakes the careful and economical application of the husband's earnings to the general comfort of the family; she takes not only her fair share, but usually the larger share, of the bodily and mental exertion required by their joint existence. If she undertakes any additional portion, it seldom relieves her from this, but only prevents her from performing it properly. The care which she is herself disabled from taking of the children and the household, nobody else takes; those of the children who do not die, grow up as they best can, and the management of the household is likely to be so bad, as even in point of economy to be a great drawback from the value of the wife's earnings. In an otherwise just state of things, it is not, therefore, I think, a desirable custom, that the wife should contribute by her labour to the income of the family. In an unjust state of things, her doing so may be useful to her, by making her of more value in the eyes of the man who is legally her master; but, on the other hand, it enables him still farther to abuse his power, by forcing her to work, and leaving the support of the family to her exertions, while he spends most of his time in drinking and idleness. The power of earning is essential to the dignity of a woman, if she has not independent property. But if marriage were an equal contract, not implying the obligation of obedience; if the connexion were no longer enforced to the oppression of those to whom it is purely a mischief, but a separation, on just terms (I do not now speak of a divorce), could be obtained by any woman who was morally entitled to it; and if she would then find all honourable employments as freely open to her as to men; it would not be necessary for her protection, that during marriage she should make this particular use of her faculties. Like a man when he chooses a profession, so, when a woman marries, it may in general be understood that she makes choice of the management of a household, and the bringing up of a family, as the first call upon her exertions, during as many years of her life as may be required for the purpose; and that she renounces, not all other objects and occupations, but all which are not consistent with the requirements of this. The actual exercise, in a habitual or systematic manner, of outdoor occupations, or such as cannot be carried on at home, would by this principle be practically interdicted to the greater number of married women. But the utmost latitude ought to exist for the adaptation of general rules to individual suitabilities; and there ought to be nothing to prevent faculties exceptionally adapted to any other pursuit, from obeying their vocation notwithstanding marriage: due provision being made for supplying otherwise any falling-short which might become inevitable, in her full performance of the ordinary functions of mistress of a family. These things, if once opinion were rightly directed on the subject, might with perfect safety be left to be regulated by opinion, without any interference of law.

This particular injustice and oppression against women seems more obvious to most people than all the others. It can be corrected without addressing any of the other wrongs. There can be little doubt that it will be among the first corrected. Already, many new States and several old States of the American Confederation have guaranteed women equal rights in this respect. They have even included these guarantees in their written Constitutions. These guarantees greatly improve the position within marriage of at least those women who own property. They leave these women one source of power that they have not signed away. They also prevent a scandalous abuse of marriage. This abuse occurs when a man tricks a girl into marrying him without a settlement protecting her property. His sole purpose is to gain possession of her money. When a family depends on earnings rather than property, the usual arrangement generally seems to me the most suitable. The man earns the income, and the wife manages household spending. The wife already bears the physical suffering of childbirth and full responsibility for the children's early care and education. Suppose she also undertakes to use her husband's earnings carefully and economically for the whole family's comfort. She then contributes not merely her fair share, but usually the greater share, of their shared physical and mental effort. If she takes on additional work, she is seldom relieved of these duties. Instead, the additional work only prevents her from performing them properly. Nobody else provides the care she can no longer give the children and household. Those children who do not die grow up as best they can. Household management is likely to become so poor that even financially, it greatly reduces the value of the wife's earnings. In an otherwise just society, therefore, I do not think wives should generally contribute to family income through paid work. Under unjust conditions, such work may help a wife by increasing her value to the man legally her master. But her working also allows him to abuse his power still further. He can force her to work and leave her to support the family while he spends most of his time drinking and idle. The power to earn is essential to a woman's dignity if she has no independent property. But suppose marriage were an equal contract that required no obedience. Suppose women were no longer forced to remain in marriages that brought them nothing but harm. Instead, any woman morally entitled to a separation could obtain one on fair terms. I am not speaking here of divorce. And suppose all respectable occupations were then as freely open to her as to men. Under these conditions, she would not need to earn money during marriage for her own protection. A man chooses a profession. Similarly, when a woman marries, she may generally be understood to choose household management and raising a family. These duties would have the first claim on her efforts for as many years as they required. She would give up not all other goals and occupations, but all those incompatible with these duties. In practice, this principle would rule out regular or systematic work outside the home for most married women. The same would apply to work that could not be done at home. But there should be the greatest possible freedom to adapt general rules to individual abilities and circumstances. Nothing should prevent a woman with exceptional ability for another pursuit from following her calling despite being married. Proper arrangements must be made to cover any unavoidable shortfall in her usual duties as the manager of a household. Once public opinion took the right view of these matters, public opinion could safely regulate them without any legal interference.