Chapter 3

On the other point which is involved in the just equality of women, their admissibility to all the functions and occupations hitherto retained as the monopoly of the stronger sex, I should anticipate no difficulty in convincing any one who has gone with me on the subject of the equality of women in the family. I believe that their disabilities elsewhere are only clung to in order to maintain their subordination in domestic life; because the generality of the male sex cannot yet tolerate the idea of living with an equal. Were it not for that, I think that almost every one, in the existing state of opinion in politics and political economy, would admit the injustice of excluding half the human race from the greater number of lucrative occupations, and from almost all high social functions; ordaining from their birth either that they are not, and cannot by any possibility become, fit for employments which are legally open to the stupidest and basest of the other sex, or else that however fit they may be, those employments shall be interdicted to them, in order to be preserved for the exclusive benefit of males. In the last two centuries, when (which was seldom the case) any reason beyond the mere existence of the fact was thought to be required to justify the disabilities of women, people seldom assigned as a reason their inferior mental capacity; which, in times when there was a real trial of personal faculties (from which all women were not excluded) in the struggles of public life, no one really believed in. The reason given in those days was not women's unfitness, but the interest of society, by which was meant the interest of men: just as the raison d'état, meaning the convenience of the government, and the support of existing authority, was deemed a sufficient explanation and excuse for the most flagitious crimes. In the present day, power holds a smoother language, and whomsoever it oppresses, always pretends to do so for their own good: accordingly, when anything is forbidden to women, it is thought necessary to say, and desirable to believe, that they are incapable of doing it, and that they depart from their real path of success and happiness when they aspire to it. But to make this reason plausible (I do not say valid), those by whom it is urged must be prepared to carry it to a much greater length than any one ventures to do in the face of present experience. It is not sufficient to maintain that women on the average are less gifted than men on the average, with certain of the higher mental faculties, or that a smaller number of women than of men are fit for occupations and functions of the highest intellectual character. It is necessary to maintain that no women at all are fit for them, and that the most eminent women are inferior in mental faculties to the most mediocre of the men on whom those functions at present devolve. For if the performance of the function is decided either by competition, or by any mode of choice which secures regard to the public interest, there needs be no apprehension that any important employments will fall into the hands of women inferior to average men, or to the average of their male competitors. The only result would be that there would be fewer women than men in such employments; a result certain to happen in any ease, if only from the preference always likely to be felt by the majority of women for the one vocation in which there is nobody to compete with them. Now, the most determined depreciator of women will not venture to deny, that when we add the experience of recent times to that of ages past, women, and not a few merely, but many women, have proved themselves capable of everything, perhaps without a single exception, which is done by men, and of doing it successfully and creditably. The utmost that can be said is, that there are many things which none of them have succeeded in doing as well as they have been done by some men—many in which they have not reached the very highest rank. But there are extremely few, dependent only on mental faculties, in which they have not attained the rank next to the highest. Is not this enough, and much more than enough, to make it a tyranny to them, and a detriment to society, that they should not be allowed to compete with men for the exercise of these functions? Is it not a mere truism to say, that such functions are often filled by men far less fit for them than numbers of women, and who would be beaten by women in any fair field of competition? What difference does it make that there may be men somewhere, fully employed about other things, who may be still better qualified for the things in question than these women? Does not this take place in all competitions? Is there so great a superfluity of men fit for high duties, that society can afford to reject the service of any competent person? Are we so certain of always finding a man made to our hands for any duty or function of social importance which falls vacant, that we lose nothing by putting a ban upon one-half of mankind, and refusing beforehand to make their faculties available, however distinguished they may be? And even if we could do without them, would it be consistent with justice to refuse to them their fair share of honour and distinction, or to deny to them the equal moral right of all human beings to choose their occupation (short of injury to others) according to their own preferences, at their own risk? Nor is the injustice confined to them: it is shared by those who are in a position to benefit by their services. To ordain that any kind of persons shall not be physicians, or shall not be advocates, or shall not be members of parliament, is to injure not them only, but all who employ physicians or advocates, or elect members of parliament, and who are deprived of the stimulating effect of greater competition on the exertions of the competitors, as well as restricted to a narrower range of individual choice.

The other part of women’s rightful equality is their access to every role and occupation so far reserved for the stronger sex. I expect little difficulty convincing anyone who agrees with me about women’s equality within the family. I believe restrictions on women elsewhere are maintained only to keep them subordinate at home. Most men still cannot tolerate the idea of living with an equal. Without that resistance, I think almost everyone would recognize the injustice, given current views on politics and economics. Half the human race is excluded from most well-paid occupations and almost all high positions in society. From birth, women are declared unfit for jobs legally open to the stupidest and most contemptible men. They are declared incapable of ever becoming qualified. Or, however qualified women may be, those jobs are forbidden to them to preserve the jobs exclusively for men. Over the last two centuries, people rarely thought women’s exclusion needed any justification beyond the fact that it existed. When they did offer reasons, they seldom claimed that women had inferior mental abilities. Public struggles then provided a real test of individual abilities, and not all women were excluded from those struggles. Under those circumstances, no one really believed women were intellectually inferior. The reason given then was not women’s lack of ability, but society’s interests, meaning men’s interests. In just the same way, raison d'état was considered enough to explain and excuse the most outrageous crimes. That phrase meant the government’s convenience and the support of existing authority. Today, power uses gentler language. Whoever it oppresses, power always claims to act for the victims’ own good. So whenever women are forbidden to do something, people think they must say women cannot do it. People also think it desirable to believe that claim. They claim that pursuing such work takes women away from their true path to success and happiness. But making this argument plausible, let alone valid, requires going much further than anyone dares, given present experience. Claiming that women, on average, have less of certain higher mental abilities than men, on average, is not enough. Nor is claiming that fewer women than men qualify for work requiring the highest intellectual abilities. The argument requires claiming that no women at all qualify. It requires claiming that the most outstanding women have less mental ability than the most mediocre men currently doing that work. Suppose appointments are decided by competition or by any selection process that ensures attention to the public interest. Then there is no reason to fear that important jobs will go to women less capable than average men. Nor need anyone fear that the women appointed will be less capable than their average male competitors. The only result would be fewer women than men in those jobs. That result would certainly occur anyway, if only because most women will probably prefer the one occupation with no competitors. Now, even the harshest critic of women will not dare deny what recent experience, added to past experience, shows. Not just a few women, but many, have proved capable of everything men do, perhaps without a single exception. They have also proved capable of doing those things successfully and creditably. At most, critics can say that women have not matched some men’s achievements in many fields. In many fields, women have not reached the very highest rank. But in extremely few fields depending only on mental abilities have women failed to reach the rank just below the highest. Is that not enough, and far more than enough, to show the wrong of excluding women from competing for these roles? Is such exclusion not tyranny toward women and harmful to society? Is it not obvious that men often hold these positions despite being far less qualified than many women? Would those men not lose to women in any fair competition? Perhaps somewhere there are men even better qualified than these women, but fully occupied with other work. What difference does that make? Does the same thing not happen in every competition? Is there such an oversupply of men fit for important responsibilities that society can afford to reject any competent person’s services? Can we be so sure of always finding a ready-made man for every important public role that becomes vacant? Are we so sure that nothing is lost by excluding half the human race? Can we refuse in advance to use women’s abilities, however outstanding those abilities may be, without losing anything? Even if we could do without women’s services, would denying women their fair share of honor and distinction be just? Would denying women the equal moral right of all human beings to choose their occupation be just? That right allows people to follow their own preferences, at their own risk, provided they do not harm others. Nor does the injustice affect women alone. It also affects those who could benefit from women’s services. Barring any group from becoming doctors, lawyers, or members of parliament harms more than the excluded people. It also harms everyone who employs doctors or lawyers, or elects members of parliament. Those people lose the benefit of greater competition, which encourages competitors to work harder. Their individual freedom to choose is also narrowed.

It will perhaps be sufficient if I confine myself, in the details of my argument, to functions of a public nature: since, if I am successful as to those, it probably will be readily granted that women should be admissible to all other occupations to which it is at all material whether they are admitted or not. And here let me begin by marking out one function, broadly distinguished from all others, their right to which is entirely independent of any question which can be raised concerning their faculties. I mean the suffrage, both parliamentary and municipal. The right to share in the choice of those who are to exercise a public trust, is altogether a distinct thing from that of competing for the trust itself. If no one could vote for a member of parliament who was not fit to be a candidate, the government would be a narrow oligarchy indeed. To have a voice in choosing those by whom one is to be governed, is a means of self-protection due to every one, though he were to remain for ever excluded from the function of governing: and that women are considered fit to have such a choice, may be presumed from the fact, that the law already gives it to women in the most important of all cases to themselves: for the choice of the man who is to govern a woman to the end of life, is always supposed to be voluntarily made by herself. In the case of election to public trusts, it is the business of constitutional law to surround the right of suffrage with all needful securities and limitations; but whatever securities are sufficient in the case of the male sex, no others need be required in the case of women. Under whatever conditions, and within whatever limits, men are admitted to the suffrage, there is not a shadow of justification for not admitting women under the same. The majority of the women of any class are not likely to differ in political opinion from the majority of the men of the same class, unless the question be one in which the interests of women, as such, are in some way involved; and if they are so, women require the suffrage, as their guarantee of just and equal consideration. This ought to be obvious even to those who coincide in no other of the doctrines for which I contend. Even if every woman were a wife, and if every wife ought to be a slave, all the more would these slaves stand in need of legal protection: and we know what legal protection the slaves have, where the laws are made by their masters.

Perhaps it will be enough to limit the details of my argument to public roles. If I make my case for those roles, the rest will probably be readily accepted. Women should be allowed into all other occupations where their admission makes any real difference. Let me begin with one role that stands apart from all the others. Women’s right to this role is entirely independent of any questions about their abilities. I mean the right to vote in parliamentary and local elections. The right to help choose people for public office is entirely separate from the right to compete for office. Suppose only people fit to stand for parliament could vote for a member of parliament. The government would be run by a very small ruling group indeed. Having a say in choosing those who govern you is a means of self-protection owed to everyone. That remains true even for someone forever excluded from governing. We may presume that women are considered capable of making such a choice. After all, the law already gives women that choice in the case most important to their own lives. A woman is always assumed to choose freely the man who will govern her for the rest of her life. In elections to public office, constitutional law must establish all necessary safeguards and limits on voting rights. But whatever safeguards are sufficient for men, no others need be required for women. Whatever conditions and limits apply to men’s voting rights, there is not the slightest justification for treating women differently. Most women in any class are unlikely to differ politically from most men in the same class. The exception would be a question that somehow involves women’s interests as women. If those interests are involved, women need the vote to guarantee fair and equal consideration. This need ought to be obvious even to people who agree with none of the other principles I defend. Even if every woman were a wife, and every wife ought to be a slave, consider the consequence. Those slaves would have all the more need for legal protection. And we know what legal protection slaves have when their masters make the laws.

With regard to the fitness of women, not only to participate in elections, but themselves to hold offices or practise professions involving important public responsibilities; I have already observed that this consideration is not essential to the practical question in dispute: since any woman, who succeeds in an open profession, proves by that very fact that she is qualified for it. And in the case of public offices, if the political system of the country is such as to exclude unfit men, it will equally exclude unfit women: while if it is not, there is no additional evil in the fact that the unfit persons whom it admits may be either women or men. As long therefore as it is acknowledged that even a few women may be fit for these duties, the laws which shut the door on those exceptions cannot be justified by any opinion which can be held respecting the capacities of women in general. But, though this last consideration is not essential, it is far from being irrelevant. An unprejudiced view of it gives additional strength to the arguments against the disabilities of women, and reinforces them by high considerations of practical utility.

Are women qualified not only to vote, but also to hold office or enter professions carrying important public responsibilities? As I have already noted, this question is not essential to the practical issue under debate. Any woman who succeeds in a profession open to her proves by that very success that she is qualified. And if a country’s political system excludes unfit men from public office, the system will equally exclude unfit women. If the system does not, admitting unfit women as well as unfit men creates no additional harm. So long as we acknowledge that even a few women may be fit for these duties, exclusionary laws are unjustifiable. No opinion about women’s abilities in general can justify laws that bar those exceptional women. But although the question of women’s abilities is not essential, the question is far from irrelevant. An unbiased assessment gives further strength to the arguments against legal restrictions on women. Such an assessment also reinforces those arguments with important considerations of practical benefit.

Let us at first make entire abstraction of all psychological considerations tending to show, that any of the mental differences supposed to exist between women and men are but the natural effect of the differences in their education and circumstances, and indicate no radical difference, far less radical inferiority, of nature. Let us consider women only as they already are, or as they are known to have been; and the capacities which they have already practically shown. What they have done, that at least, if nothing else, it is proved that they can do. When we consider how sedulously they are all trained away from, instead of being trained towards, any of the occupations or objects reserved for men, it is evident that I am taking a very humble ground for them, when I rest their case on what they have actually achieved. For, in this case, negative evidence is worth little, while any positive evidence is conclusive. It cannot be inferred to be impossible that a woman should be a Homer, or an Aristotle, or a Michael Angelo, or a Beethoven, because no woman has yet actually produced works comparable to theirs in any of those lines of excellence. This negative fact at most leaves the question uncertain, and open to psychological discussion. But it is quite certain that a woman can be a Queen Elizabeth, or a Deborah, or a Joan of Arc, since this is not inference, but fact. Now it is a curious consideration, that the only things which the existing law excludes women from doing, are the things which they have proved that they are able to do. There is no law to prevent a woman from having written all the plays of Shakspeare, or composed all the operas of Mozart. But Queen Elizabeth or Queen Victoria, had they not inherited the throne, could not have been intrusted with the smallest of the political duties, of which the former showed herself equal to the greatest.

Let us first set aside all psychological arguments about the supposed mental differences between women and men. These arguments suggest that such differences simply result from differences in education and circumstances. They suggest no fundamental difference in nature, much less any fundamental inferiority. Let us consider women only as they are now, or as they are known to have been. Let us consider the abilities women have already demonstrated in practice. Whatever women have done proves, at least, that they can do those things, if nothing else. Consider how carefully all women are trained away from the occupations and goals reserved for men, rather than toward them. Clearly, I am making a very modest case for women when I base it on their actual achievements. For here, the absence of evidence proves little, while any positive evidence is conclusive. We cannot conclude that a woman could never be a Homer, an Aristotle, a Michael Angelo, or a Beethoven. No woman has yet produced works comparable to theirs in any of those fields, but that does not prove impossibility. At most, that absence leaves the question unsettled and open to psychological debate. But a woman certainly can be a Queen Elizabeth, a Deborah, or a Joan of Arc. We know this not from inference, but from fact. Now consider a curious point. The only things the existing law bars women from doing are the things women have proved they can do. No law prevents a woman from having written all the plays of Shakspeare or composed all the operas of Mozart. But if Queen Elizabeth or Queen Victoria had not inherited the throne, neither could have been entrusted with even the smallest political duty. Yet Queen Elizabeth proved herself capable of the greatest political duties.

If anything conclusive could be inferred from experience, without psychological analysis, it would be that the things which women are not allowed to do are the very ones for which they are peculiarly qualified; since their vocation for government has made its way, and become conspicuous, through the very few opportunities which have been given; while in the lines of distinction which apparently were freely open to them, they have by no means so eminently distinguished themselves. We know how small a number of reigning queens history presents, in comparison with that of kings. Of this smaller number a far larger proportion have shown talents for rule; though many of them have occupied the throne in difficult periods. It is remarkable, too, that they have, in a great number of instances, been distinguished by merits the most opposite to the imaginary and conventional character of women: they have been as much remarked for the firmness and vigour of their rule, as for its intelligence. When, to queens and empresses, we add regents, and viceroys of provinces, the list of women who have been eminent rulers of mankind swells to a great length.¹ This fact is so undeniable, that some one, long ago, tried to retort the argument, and turned the admitted truth into an additional insult, by saying that queens are better than kings, because under kings women govern, but under queens, men.

If experience alone could prove anything, without psychological analysis, it would be this: women are especially suited to the very things they are forbidden to do. Their talent for governing has emerged and become clear despite the very few opportunities they have had. Yet in fields of achievement that seemed freely open to women, they have by no means distinguished themselves as much. We know how few reigning queens history offers compared with kings. Of those fewer queens, a far larger proportion have shown talent for ruling, though many ruled during difficult times. Remarkably, many queens have also excelled in ways completely opposed to the imagined, conventional picture of women. Their rule has been noted as much for firmness and energy as for intelligence. Add regents and provincial viceroys to queens and empresses, and the list of outstanding women rulers becomes very long.¹ This fact is so undeniable that someone long ago tried to turn the argument against women. He turned an accepted truth into another insult by saying that queens are better than kings. His reason was that under kings, women govern, but under queens, men govern.

It may seem a waste of reasoning to argue against a bad joke; but such things do affect people's minds; and I have heard men quote this saying, with an air as if they thought that there was something in it. At any rate, it will serve as well as anything else for a starting point in discussion. I say, then, that it is not true that under kings, women govern. Such cases are entirely exceptional: and weak kings have quite as often governed ill through the influence of male favourites, as of female. When a king is governed by a woman merely through his amatory propensities, good government is not probable, though even then there are exceptions. But French history counts two kings who have voluntarily given the direction of affairs during many years, the one to his mother, the other to his sister: one of them, Charles VIII., was a mere boy, but in doing so he followed the intentions of his father Louis XI., the ablest monarch of his age. The other, Saint Louis, was the best, and one of the most vigorous rulers, since the time of Charlemagne. Both these princesses ruled in a manner hardly equalled by any prince among their contemporaries. The emperor Charles the Fifth, the most politic prince of his time, who had as great a number of able men in his service as a ruler ever had, and was one of the least likely of all sovereigns to sacrifice his interest to personal feelings, made two princesses of his family successively Governors of the Netherlands, and kept one or other of them in that post during his whole life, (they were afterwards succeeded by a third). Both ruled very successfully, and one of them, Margaret of Austria, was one of the ablest politicians of the age. So much for one side of the question. Now as to the other. When it is said that under queens men govern, is the same meaning to be understood as when kings are said to be governed by women? Is it meant that queens choose as their instruments of government, the associates of their personal pleasures? The case is rare even with those who are as unscrupulous on the latter point as Catherine II.: and it is not in these cases that the good government, alleged to arise from male influence, is to be found. If it be true, then, that the administration is in the hands of better men under a queen than under an average king, it must be that queens have a superior capacity for choosing them; and women must be better qualified than men both for the position of sovereign, and for that of chief minister; for the principal business of a prime minister is not to govern in person, but to find the fittest persons to conduct every department of public affairs. The more rapid insight into character, which is one of the admitted points of superiority in women over men, must certainly make them, with anything like parity of qualifications in other respects, more apt than men in that choice of instruments, which is nearly the most important business of every one who has to do with governing mankind. Even the unprincipled Catherine de' Medici could feel the value of a Chancellor de l'Hôpital. But it is also true that most great queens have been great by their own talents for government, and have been well served precisely for that reason. They retained the supreme direction of affairs in their own hands: and if they listened to good advisers, they gave by that fact the strongest proof that their judgment fitted them for dealing with the great questions of government.

Arguing against a bad joke may seem a waste of effort. But such jokes do influence people’s minds. I have heard men repeat this saying as if they thought there was something to it. At any rate, the saying will serve as well as anything else as a starting point for discussion. I say, then, that it is not true that women govern under kings. Such cases are entirely exceptional. Weak kings have governed badly through the influence of male favourites quite as often as through female favourites. When a woman controls a king merely through his sexual desires, good government is unlikely, though even then there are exceptions. But French history records two kings who willingly put women in charge of affairs for many years. One entrusted power to his mother, the other to his sister. One of these kings, Charles VIII., was only a boy. But his decision followed the wishes of his father Louis XI., the ablest monarch of his age. The other, Saint Louis, was the best ruler since Charlemagne, and one of the most vigorous. Both princesses governed in a way hardly equalled by any prince of their time. The emperor Charles the Fifth was the most politically astute prince of his time. He had as many able men in his service as any ruler ever had. Few sovereigns were less likely to sacrifice their interests to personal feelings. Yet he appointed two princesses from his family, one after the other, as Governors of the Netherlands. He kept one or the other in office throughout his life. A third princess later succeeded them. Both governed very successfully. One of them, Margaret of Austria, was among the ablest politicians of the age. So much for one side of the question. Now for the other. When people say that men govern under queens, do they mean what they mean when saying women govern kings? Do they mean that queens choose their sexual partners to carry out the work of government? Such choices are rare, even among queens as unscrupulous in their sexual conduct as Catherine II. Nor do these cases provide examples of the good government supposedly produced by male influence. Suppose, then, that better men run the government under a queen than under an average king. If so, queens must have a superior ability to choose those men. Women must therefore be better qualified than men both as sovereigns and as chief ministers. A prime minister’s main task is not to govern personally. It is to find the best people to manage each department of public affairs. Women are acknowledged to have a quicker insight into character than men. If their other qualifications are anywhere near equal, that insight must certainly make women better at choosing people to serve them. Choosing those people is almost the most important task of anyone responsible for governing others. Even the unprincipled Catherine de' Medici could appreciate the value of a Chancellor de l'Hôpital. But most great queens have also been great because of their own talents for government. And they have been well served precisely because of those talents. They kept ultimate control of affairs in their own hands. If they listened to good advisers, that choice offered the strongest proof of their judgment. It showed that their judgment equipped them to deal with the great questions of government.

Is it reasonable to think that those who are fit for the greater functions of politics, are incapable of qualifying themselves for the less? Is there any reason in the nature of things, that the wives and sisters of princes should, whenever called on, be found as competent as the princes themselves to their business, but that the wives and sisters of statesmen, and administrators, and directors of companies, and managers of public institutions, should be unable to do what is done by their brothers and husbands? The real reason is plain enough; it is that princesses, being more raised above the generality of men by their rank than placed below them by their sex, have never been taught that it was improper for them to concern themselves with politics; but have been allowed to feel the liberal interest natural to any cultivated human being, in the great transactions which took place around them, and in which they might be called on to take a part. The ladies of reigning families are the only women who are allowed the same range of interests and freedom of development as men; and it is precisely in their case that there is not found to be any inferiority. Exactly where and in proportion as women's capacities for government have been tried, in that proportion have they been found adequate.

Is it reasonable to think that people fit for greater political responsibilities cannot prepare themselves for lesser ones? Whenever called upon, the wives and sisters of princes prove as capable as the princes themselves at their work. Is there any natural reason why the same should not hold for the wives and sisters of statesmen and administrators? Or for the wives and sisters of company directors and managers of public institutions? Why should these women be unable to do what their brothers and husbands do? The real reason is clear enough. Princesses are raised above most men by their rank more than they are placed below men by their sex. So princesses have never been taught that taking an interest in politics was improper for them. Instead, princesses have been allowed the broad interests natural to any educated person. These include an interest in the great events unfolding around them, in which they might be called upon to participate. Women in ruling families alone are allowed the same range of interests and freedom to develop as men. And in precisely these women, no inferiority is found. Wherever women's abilities to govern have been tested, those abilities have proved adequate, in proportion to the testing.

This fact is in accordance with the best general conclusions which the world's imperfect experience seems as yet to suggest, concerning the peculiar tendencies and aptitudes characteristic of women, as women have hitherto been. I do not say, as they will continue to be; for, as I have already said more than once, I consider it presumption in any one to pretend to decide what women are or are not, can or cannot be, by natural constitution. They have always hitherto been kept, as far as regards spontaneous development, in so unnatural a state, that their nature cannot but have been greatly distorted and disguised; and no one can safely pronounce that if women's nature were left to choose its direction as freely as men's, and if no artificial bent were attempted to be given to it except that required by the conditions of human society, and given to both sexes alike, there would be any material difference, or perhaps any difference at all, in the character and capacities which would unfold themselves. I shall presently show, that even the least contestable of the differences which now exist, are such as may very well have been produced merely by circumstances, without any difference of natural capacity. But, looking at women as they are known in experience, it may be said of them, with more truth than belongs to most other generalizations on the subject, that the general bent of their talents is towards the practical. This statement is conformable to all the public history of women, in the present and the past. It is no less borne out by common and daily experience. Let us consider the special nature of the mental capacities most characteristic of a woman of talent. They are all of a kind which fits them for practice, and makes them tend towards it. What is meant by a woman's capacity of intuitive perception? It means, a rapid and correct insight into present fact. It has nothing to do with general principles. Nobody ever perceived a scientific law of nature by intuition, nor arrived at a general rule of duty or prudence by it. These are results of slow and careful collection and comparison of experience; and neither the men nor the women of intuition usually shine in this department, unless, indeed, the experience necessary is such as they can acquire by themselves. For what is called their intuitive sagacity makes them peculiarly apt in gathering such general truths as can be collected from their individual means of observation. When, consequently, they chance to be as well provided as men are with the results of other people's experience, by reading and education, (I use the word chance advisedly, for, in respect to the knowledge that tends to fit them for the greater concerns of life, the only educated women are the self-educated) they are better furnished than men in general with the essential requisites of skilful and successful practice. Men who have been much taught, are apt to be deficient in the sense of present fact; they do not see, in the facts which they are called upon to deal with, what is really there, but what they have been taught to expect. This is seldom the case with women of any ability. Their capacity of “intuition” preserves them from it. With equality of experience and of general faculties, a woman usually sees much more than a man of what is immediately before her. Now this sensibility to the present, is the main quality on which the capacity for practice, as distinguished from theory, depends. To discover general principles, belongs to the speculative faculty: to discern and discriminate the particular cases in which they are and are not applicable, constitutes practical talent: and for this, women as they now are have a peculiar aptitude. I admit that there can be no good practice without principles, and that the predominant place which quickness of observation holds among a woman's faculties, makes her particularly apt to build over-hasty generalizations upon her own observation; though at the same time no less ready in rectifying those generalizations, as her observation takes a wider range. But the corrective to this defect, is access to the experience of the human race; general knowledge—exactly the thing which education can best supply. A woman's mistakes are specifically those of a clever self-educated man, who often sees what men trained in routine do not see, but falls into errors for want of knowing things which have long been known. Of course he has acquired much of the pre-existing knowledge, or he could not have got on at all; but what he knows of it he has picked up in fragments and at random, as women do.

This fact agrees with the best general conclusions that the world’s limited experience seems so far to suggest. These conclusions concern the distinctive tendencies and abilities of women as they have been until now. I do not mean women as they will continue to be. As I have said more than once, I consider it presumptuous to claim to know women’s natural limits or possibilities. No one can confidently say what women naturally are or are not, or what they can or cannot become. Until now, women have always been kept in conditions that unnaturally restrict their independent development. Their nature must therefore have been greatly distorted and concealed. Suppose women’s nature were as free as men’s to develop in its own direction. Suppose society tried to shape women only as social life requires, and shaped both sexes alike. No one can safely say that their resulting characters and abilities would differ significantly, or perhaps at all. I will shortly show that even the least disputed differences today may well result entirely from circumstances. They need not reflect any difference in natural ability. But if we consider women as experience presents them, we can make one generalization with more confidence than most others. Their talents generally tend toward practical matters. All the public history of women, past and present, supports this statement. Everyday experience supports it just as strongly. Consider the particular mental abilities most characteristic of a talented woman. All these abilities equip her for practical work and draw her toward it. What do we mean by a woman’s ability to perceive things intuitively? We mean a quick and accurate understanding of the facts before her. This ability has nothing to do with general principles. No one has ever discovered a scientific law of nature through intuition. Nor has anyone intuitively arrived at a general rule of duty or sound judgment. Such discoveries require slowly and carefully gathering and comparing experience. Neither intuitive men nor intuitive women usually excel at this work, unless they can gain the necessary experience themselves. Their so-called intuitive insight makes them especially good at gathering general truths from what they can observe personally. Sometimes, then, reading and education happen to give women as much access as men to the results of others’ experience. I deliberately say “happen to.” In knowledge that prepares women for life’s larger concerns, the only educated women are those who educate themselves. When women have this access, they are generally better equipped than men for skilled and successful practical work. Men who have received extensive instruction often lack a clear grasp of the facts before them. When dealing with facts, they see not what is really there, but what they have been taught to expect. This seldom happens with women of any ability. Their capacity for “intuition” protects them from this mistake. Given equal experience and general abilities, a woman usually sees much more than a man of what is immediately before her. This awareness of the present is the main quality underlying practical ability, as distinct from theoretical ability. Discovering general principles requires theoretical thought. Practical talent means recognizing and distinguishing the particular cases where those principles do and do not apply. Women as they are today have a special aptitude for this. I admit that good practice requires principles. I also admit that women’s especially quick observation makes them particularly likely to generalize too hastily from their own observations. At the same time, women are just as quick to correct those generalizations as their observations grow broader. But the remedy for this weakness is access to humanity’s accumulated experience. It is general knowledge, precisely what education can best provide. A woman’s mistakes are specifically those of a clever, self-educated man. Such a man often sees what men trained in routine methods miss. But he makes mistakes because he does not know things that have long been known. Of course, he has acquired much existing knowledge, or he could not have made any progress at all. But he has picked up that knowledge in scattered fragments and by chance, just as women do.

But this gravitation of women's minds to the present, to the real, to actual fact, while in its exclusiveness it is a source of errors, is also a most useful counteractive of the contrary error. The principal and most characteristic aberration of speculative minds as such, consists precisely in the deficiency of this lively perception and ever-present sense of objective fact. For want of this, they often not only overlook the contradiction which outward facts oppose to their theories, but lose sight of the legitimate purpose of speculation altogether, and let their speculative faculties go astray into regions not peopled with real beings, animate or inanimate, even idealized, but with personified shadows created by the illusions of metaphysics or by the mere entanglement of words, and think these shadows the proper objects of the highest, the most transcendant, philosophy. Hardly anything can be of greater value to a man of theory and speculation who employs himself not in collecting materials of knowledge by observation, but in working them up by processes of thought into comprehensive truths of science and laws of conduct, than to carry on his speculations in the companionship, and under the criticism, of a really superior woman. There is nothing comparable to it for keeping his thoughts within the limits of real things, and the actual facts of nature. A woman seldom runs wild after an abstraction. The habitual direction of her mind to dealing with things as individuals rather than in groups, and (what is closely connected with it) her more lively interest in the present feelings of persons, which makes her consider first of all, in anything which claims to be applied to practice, in what manner persons will be affected by it—these two things make her extremely unlikely to put faith in any speculation which loses sight of individuals, and deals with things as if they existed for the benefit of some imaginary entity, some mere creation of the mind, not resolvable into the feelings of living beings. Women's thoughts are thus as useful in giving reality to those of thinking men, as men's thoughts in giving width and largeness to those of women. In depth, as distinguished from breadth, I greatly doubt if even now, women, compared with men, are at any disadvantage.

But women's tendency to focus on the present, the real, and actual facts has two sides. When that focus excludes everything else, it causes errors. Yet it also provides a most useful check on the opposite error. The main and most characteristic failing of theoretical thinkers is precisely their lack of this vivid, constant awareness of objective facts. Without that awareness, they often overlook facts that contradict their theories. They even lose sight of the proper purpose of theoretical thought altogether. Their thinking wanders into realms inhabited by no real beings or things, not even idealized ones. Instead, those realms contain shadows treated as beings, created by metaphysical illusions or simply by tangled words. These thinkers regard such shadows as the proper subjects of the highest, most transcendent philosophy. For a man engaged in theory and abstract thought, hardly anything can be more valuable than a truly exceptional woman's companionship and criticism. This is especially true when his work is not gathering knowledge through observation. Instead, he uses thought to turn that knowledge into broad scientific truths and rules of conduct. Nothing compares with such companionship and criticism for keeping his thoughts grounded in real things and the actual facts of nature. A woman seldom gets carried away by an abstraction. Her mind habitually deals with things individually rather than in groups. Closely connected with that habit is her keener interest in people's present feelings. So, when considering any proposal for practical use, she first asks how people will be affected. These two qualities make her extremely unlikely to trust any theory that loses sight of individuals. Such theories treat things as though they existed for the benefit of some imaginary entity, some mere creation of the mind. That entity cannot be understood in terms of the feelings of living beings. Women's thoughts are thus as useful in grounding thoughtful men's ideas in reality as men's thoughts are in broadening women's ideas. As for depth, rather than breadth, I very much doubt that women are at any disadvantage compared with men, even now.

If the existing mental characteristics of women are thus valuable even in aid of speculation, they are still more important, when speculation has done its work, for carrying out the results of speculation into practice. For the reasons already given, women are comparatively unlikely to fall into the common error of men, that of sticking to their rules in a case whose specialities either take it out of the class to which the rules are applicable, or require a special adaptation of them. Let us now consider another of the admitted superiorities of clever women, greater quickness of apprehension. Is not this pre-eminently a quality which fits a person for practice? In action, everything continually depends upon deciding promptly. In speculation, nothing does. A mere thinker can wait, can take time to consider, can collect additional evidence; he is not obliged to complete his philosophy at once, lest the opportunity should go by. The power of drawing the best conclusion possible from insufficient data is not indeed useless in philosophy; the construction of a provisional hypothesis consistent with all known facts is often the needful basis for further inquiry. But this faculty is rather serviceable in philosophy, than the main qualification for it: and, for the auxiliary as well as for the main operation, the philosopher can allow himself any time he pleases. He is in no need of the capacity of doing rapidly what he does; what he rather needs is patience, to work on slowly until imperfect lights have become perfect, and a conjecture has ripened into a theorem. For those, on the contrary, whose business is with the fugitive and perishable—with individual facts, not kinds of facts—rapidity of thought is a qualification next only in importance to the power of thought itself. He who has not his faculties under immediate command, in the contingencies of action, might as well not have them at all. He may be fit to criticize, but he is not fit to act. Now it is in this that women, and the men who are most like women, confessedly excel. The other sort of man, however pre-eminent may be his faculties, arrives slowly at complete command of them: rapidity of judgment and promptitude of judicious action, even in the things he knows best, are the gradual and late result of strenuous effort grown into habit.

If women’s existing mental qualities are so valuable even in theoretical thinking, they matter still more when theory becomes practice. For the reasons already given, women are less likely than men to make a common mistake: rigidly following rules. They are less likely to do so when a case’s special features make the rules inapplicable or require adjustments. Now consider another widely acknowledged advantage of intelligent women: their quicker grasp of things. Isn’t this an especially useful quality for practical work? In action, everything constantly depends on making quick decisions. In theoretical thinking, nothing does. Someone concerned only with thought can wait, take time to consider, and gather more evidence. He need not finish his philosophy at once for fear of missing an opportunity. The ability to draw the best possible conclusion from insufficient evidence is certainly not useless in philosophy. A tentative hypothesis consistent with all known facts is often the necessary starting point for further inquiry. But this ability is helpful in philosophy rather than its main requirement. And the philosopher can take as much time as he likes, both for this supporting task and his main work. He does not need to work quickly. Instead, he needs patience to work slowly until incomplete understanding becomes complete, and a guess develops into a proven proposition. By contrast, others deal with fleeting circumstances and facts that quickly lose their relevance. Their business concerns individual facts, not categories of facts. For them, speed of thought is second in importance only to the ability to think itself. Anyone unable to call on his abilities immediately when action demands it might as well not have those abilities. He may be fit to criticize, but he is not fit to act. It is precisely this quickness in which women, and men most like women, are acknowledged to excel. The other kind of man, however outstanding his abilities, is slow to gain full command of them. Even in matters he knows best, quick judgment and prompt, sensible action develop gradually and late. They come through strenuous effort that has become habit.

It will be said, perhaps, that the greater nervous susceptibility of women is a disqualification for practice, in anything but domestic life, by rendering them mobile, changeable, too vehemently under the influence of the moment, incapable of dogged perseverance, unequal and uncertain in the power of using their faculties. I think that these phrases sum up the greater part of the objections commonly made to the fitness of women for the higher class of serious business. Much of all this is the mere overflow of nervous energy run to waste, and would cease when the energy was directed to a definite end. Much is also the result of conscious or unconscious cultivation; as we see by the almost total disappearance of “hysterics” and fainting fits, since they have gone out of fashion. Moreover, when people are brought up, like many women of the higher classes (though less so in our own country than in any other) a kind of hot-house plants, shielded from the wholesome vicissitudes of air and temperature, and untrained in any of the occupations and exercises which give stimulus and development to the circulatory and muscular system, while their nervous system, especially in its emotional department, is kept in unnaturally active play; it is no wonder if those of them who do not die of consumption, grow up with constitutions liable to derangement from slight causes, both internal and external, and without stamina to support any task, physical or mental, requiring continuity of effort. But women brought up to work for their livelihood show none of these morbid characteristics, unless indeed they are chained to an excess of sedentary work in confined and unhealthy rooms. Women who in their early years have shared in the healthful physical education and bodily freedom of their brothers, and who obtain a sufficiency of pure air and exercise in after-life, very rarely have any excessive susceptibility of nerves which can disqualify them for active pursuits. There is indeed a certain proportion of persons, in both sexes, in whom an unusual degree of nervous sensibility is constitutional, and of so marked a character as to be the feature of their organization which exercises the greatest influence over the whole character of the vital phenomena. This constitution, like other physical conformations, is hereditary, and is transmitted to sons as well as daughters; but it is possible, and probable, that the nervous temperament (as it is called) is inherited by a greater number of women than of men. We will assume this as a fact: and let me then ask, are men of nervous temperament found to be unfit for the duties and pursuits usually followed by men? If not, why should women of the same temperament be unfit for them? The peculiarities of the temperament are, no doubt, within certain limits, an obstacle to success in some employments, though an aid to it in others. But when the occupation is suitable to the temperament, and sometimes even when it is unsuitable, the most brilliant examples of success are continually given by the men of high nervous sensibility. They are distinguished in their practical manifestations chiefly by this, that being susceptible of a higher degree of excitement than those of another physical constitution, their powers when excited differ more than in the case of other people, from those shown in their ordinary state: they are raised, as it were, above themselves, and do things with ease which they are wholly incapable of at other times. But this lofty excitement is not, except in weak bodily constitutions, a mere flash, which passes away immediately, leaving no permanent traces, and incompatible with persistent and steady pursuit of an object. It is the character of the nervous temperament to be capable of sustained excitement, holding out through long continued efforts. It is what is meant by spirit. It is what makes the high-bred racehorse run without slackening speed till he drops down dead. It is what has enabled so many delicate women to maintain the most sublime constancy not only at the stake, but through a long preliminary succession of mental and bodily tortures. It is evident that people of this temperament are particularly apt for what may be called the executive department of the leadership of mankind. They are the material of great orators, great preachers, impressive diffusers of moral influences. Their constitution might be deemed less favourable to the qualities required from a statesman in the cabinet, or from a judge. It would be so, if the consequence necessarily followed that because people are excitable they must always be in a state of excitement. But this is wholly a question of training. Strong feeling is the instrument and element of strong self-control: but it requires to be cultivated in that direction. When it is, it forms not the heroes of impulse only, but those also of self-conquest. History and experience prove that the most passionate characters are the most fanatically rigid in their feelings of duty, when their passion has been trained to act in that direction. The judge who gives a just decision in a case where his feelings are intensely interested on the other side, derives from that same strength of feeling the determined sense of the obligation of justice, which enables him to achieve this victory over himself. The capability of that lofty enthusiasm which takes the human being out of his every-day character, reacts upon the daily character itself. His aspirations and powers when he is in this exceptional state, become the type with which he compares, and by which he estimates, his sentiments and proceedings at other times: and his habitual purposes assume a character moulded by and assimilated to the moments of lofty excitement, although those, from the physical nature of a human being, can only be transient. Experience of races, as well as of individuals, does not show those of excitable temperament to be less fit, on the average, either for speculation or practice, than the more unexcitable. The French, and the Italians, are undoubtedly by nature more nervously excitable than the Teutonic races, and, compared at least with the English, they have a much greater habitual and daily emotional life: but have they been less great in science, in public business, in legal and judicial eminence, or in war? There is abundant evidence that the Greeks were of old, as their descendants and successors still are, one of the most excitable of the races of mankind. It is superfluous to ask, what among the achievements of men they did not excel in. The Romans, probably, as an equally southern people, had the same original temperament: but the stern character of their national discipline, like that of the Spartans, made them an example of the opposite type of national character; the greater strength of their natural feelings being chiefly apparent in the intensity which the same original temperament made it possible to give to the artificial. If these cases exemplify what a naturally excitable people may be made, the Irish Celts afford one of the aptest examples of what they are when left to themselves; (if those can be said to be left to themselves who have been for centuries under the indirect influence of bad government, and the direct training of a Catholic hierarchy and of a sincere belief in the Catholic religion.) The Irish character must be considered, therefore, as an unfavourable case: yet, whenever the circumstances of the individual have been at all favourable, what people have shown greater capacity for the most varied and multifarious individual eminence? Like the French compared with the English, the Irish with the Swiss, the Greeks or Italians compared with the German races, so women compared with men may be found, on the average, to do the same things with some variety in the particular kind of excellence. But, that they would do them fully as well on the whole, if their education and cultivation were adapted to correcting instead of aggravating the infirmities incident to their temperament, I see not the smallest reason to doubt.

Perhaps some will say that women’s greater nervous sensitivity makes them unfit for practical work outside domestic life. They will say this sensitivity makes women restless, changeable, and too strongly influenced by the moment. Women therefore lack stubborn perseverance and cannot use their abilities steadily or reliably. I think these claims sum up most common objections to women’s fitness for serious work of the highest kind. Much of this behavior is simply an overflow of wasted nervous energy. It would stop if that energy were directed toward a definite goal. Much also results from conscious or unconscious encouragement. We can see this in the almost complete disappearance of “hysterics” and fainting fits since they went out of fashion. Moreover, many upper-class women are raised like plants in a greenhouse, though less so in our country than elsewhere. They are shielded from healthy changes in air and temperature. They receive no training in activities or exercises that stimulate and develop their circulation and muscles. Meanwhile, their nervous systems, especially their emotions, are kept unnaturally active. No wonder, then, that those who escape death from consumption grow up with easily disturbed health. Slight causes, both internal and external, can upset them. They lack the stamina for any physical or mental task requiring sustained effort. But women raised to earn their living show none of these unhealthy traits. The exception is when they are tied to excessive sedentary work in cramped, unhealthy rooms. Some women share their brothers’ healthy physical training and freedom of movement in childhood. If they also get enough fresh air and exercise as adults, excessive nervous sensitivity very rarely prevents active work. There are, indeed, some people of both sexes whose unusually sensitive nerves are part of their physical constitution. Their sensitivity is so marked that it influences their bodily functions more than any other physical trait. This constitution, like other physical traits, is hereditary and passes to sons as well as daughters. But it is possible, and probable, that more women than men inherit what is called a nervous temperament. Let us assume this is a fact. Are men with nervous temperaments found unfit for the duties and occupations men usually undertake? If not, why should women with the same temperament be unfit for them? Within certain limits, the traits of this temperament undoubtedly hinder success in some occupations while helping it in others. But men with highly sensitive nerves continually provide the most brilliant examples of success. They do so when their work suits their temperament, and sometimes even when it does not. In practice, such men stand out chiefly in one respect. They can reach a higher level of excitement than people with other physical constitutions. When excited, their abilities therefore differ more sharply from their ordinary abilities than other people’s do. They rise, so to speak, above themselves. They easily do things they are completely incapable of at other times. But unless their bodies are weak, this heightened excitement is not merely a brief flash. It does not immediately disappear without lasting effects, nor does it rule out steady, persistent pursuit of a goal. The nervous temperament is capable of sustained excitement that lasts through prolonged effort. This is what we mean by spirit. It makes the well-bred racehorse run without slowing until he drops dead. It has enabled so many physically delicate women to show the most extraordinary steadfastness. They have shown it not only at the stake, but throughout the long succession of mental and physical tortures beforehand. Clearly, people with this temperament are especially suited to what we might call the action-oriented side of human leadership. They have the makings of great speakers, great preachers, and powerful spreaders of moral influence. Their constitution might seem less suited to the qualities required of a statesman in the cabinet or a judge. It would be less suited if being easily excited necessarily meant always being excited. But this is entirely a matter of training. Strong feeling is both the tool and the substance of strong self-control. But strong feeling must be developed in that direction. When it is, it produces heroes of self-mastery, not merely heroes of impulse. History and experience show that the most passionate people become the most fanatically strict in their sense of duty. This happens when their passion has been trained in that direction. Consider a judge who gives a just decision despite feeling intensely drawn to the other side. The same strength of feeling gives him a firm sense of his duty to justice. That sense of duty enables him to conquer himself. The capacity for such high enthusiasm lifts a person beyond his everyday character. This capacity also acts back upon his everyday character. His ambitions and abilities in that exceptional state become his standard for judging his feelings and actions at other times. His usual aims become shaped by, and come to resemble, those moments of heightened excitement. Yet human physical nature allows those moments to be only temporary. Experience with peoples, as with individuals, does not show that excitable temperaments are generally less suited to thought or action. The French and the Italians are undoubtedly more nervously excitable by nature than the Teutonic peoples. Compared at least with the English, their ordinary daily lives are much more emotional. But have they been less great in science, public affairs, law, the courts, or war? Abundant evidence shows that the ancient Greeks were among the most excitable peoples in the world. Their descendants and successors still are. It is needless to ask which human achievements the Greeks failed to excel in. The Romans probably had the same original temperament, since they were equally a southern people. But their harsh national discipline, like that of the Spartans, made them examples of the opposite national character. The greater strength of their natural feelings appeared chiefly in the intensity of their acquired character. Their original temperament made that intensity possible. These cases show what a naturally excitable people can be made into. The Irish Celts offer one of the clearest examples of what such people become when left to themselves. But can people be called left to themselves under the conditions the Irish have faced for centuries? They have lived under the indirect influence of bad government. They have also been directly shaped by a Catholic hierarchy and sincere belief in the Catholic religion. The Irish character must therefore be treated as an unfavorable case. Yet whenever an individual Irish person’s circumstances have been at all favorable, what people have shown greater capacity for distinction? They have distinguished themselves in the widest variety of fields. The French differ from the English, the Irish from the Swiss, and the Greeks or Italians from the German peoples. In the same way, women may generally do the same things as men while excelling in somewhat different ways. But suppose women’s education and development aimed to correct their temperament’s weaknesses instead of making those weaknesses worse. I see not the slightest reason to doubt that women would then do these things fully as well overall.

Supposing it, however, to be true that women's minds are by nature more mobile than those of men, less capable of persisting long in the same continuous effort, more fitted for dividing their faculties among many things than for travelling in any one path to the highest point which can be reached by it: this may be true of women as they now are (though not without great and numerous exceptions), and may account for their having remained behind the highest order of men in precisely the things in which this absorption of the whole mind in one set of ideas and occupations may seem to be most requisite. Still, this difference is one which can only affect the kind of excellence, not the excellence itself, or its practical worth: and it remains to be shown whether this exclusive working of a part of the mind, this absorption of the whole thinking faculty in a single subject, and concentration of it on a single work, is the normal and healthful condition of the human faculties, even for speculative uses. I believe that what is gained in special development by this concentration, is lost in the capacity of the mind for the other purposes of life; and even in abstract thought, it is my decided opinion that the mind does more by frequently returning to a difficult problem, than by sticking to it without interruption. For the purposes, at all events, of practice, from its highest to its humblest departments, the capacity of passing promptly from one subject of consideration to another, without letting the active spring of the intellect run down between the two, is a power far more valuable; and this power women pre-eminently possess, by virtue of the very mobility of which they are accused. They perhaps have it from nature, but they certainly have it by training and education; for nearly the whole of the occupations of women consist in the management of small but multitudinous details, on each of which the mind cannot dwell even for a minute, but must pass on to other things, and if anything requires longer thought, must steal time at odd moments for thinking of it. The capacity indeed which women show for doing their thinking in circumstances and at times which almost any man would make an excuse to himself for not attempting it, has often been noticed: and a woman's mind, though it may be occupied only with small things, can hardly ever permit itself to be vacant, as a man's so often is when not engaged in what he chooses to consider the business of his life. The business of a woman's ordinary life is things in general, and can as little cease to go on as the world to go round.

Suppose, however, that women’s minds are naturally quicker to shift their attention than men’s. Suppose women are less able to sustain the same effort for long. Suppose they are better suited to dividing their abilities among many things than reaching the highest possible level in one. These claims may be true of women as they are now, though there are many major exceptions. This may explain why women have fallen behind the most accomplished men in certain fields. These are precisely the fields that seem to demand complete absorption in one set of ideas and activities. Still, this difference can affect only the kind of excellence, not excellence itself or its practical value. And we have yet to establish whether such narrow concentration is the normal, healthy use of human abilities. Is using only one part of the mind healthy, even for theoretical thinking? Is absorbing all our thinking in one subject and concentrating it on one task healthy? I believe that whatever such concentration gains in specialized development, it loses in the mind’s ability to serve life’s other purposes. Even in abstract thought, I firmly believe the mind achieves more by returning frequently to a difficult problem. It achieves less by working on that problem without interruption. For practical purposes, at every level from the highest to the humblest, another ability is far more valuable. This is the ability to move quickly between subjects without losing mental energy in the transition. Women possess this ability to an exceptional degree, thanks to the very mental flexibility they are accused of having. Perhaps they have this ability by nature, but they certainly have it through training and education. Nearly all women’s work involves managing countless small details. The mind cannot spend even a minute on each detail, but must move on to other things. If anything needs longer thought, women must steal time to think about it in spare moments. People have often noticed women’s ability to think in circumstances and at times almost any man would use to excuse himself from trying. And although a woman’s mind may be occupied only with small things, she can hardly ever let it be idle. A man’s mind, by contrast, is often idle when he is not doing what he chooses to consider his life’s work. The business of a woman’s ordinary life is things in general. That business can no more stop than the world can stop turning.

But (it is said) there is anatomical evidence of the superior mental capacity of men compared with women: they have a larger brain. I reply, that in the first place the fact itself is doubtful. It is by no means established that the brain of a woman is smaller than that of a man. If it is inferred merely because a woman's bodily frame generally is of less dimensions than a man's, this criterion would lead to strange consequences. A tall and large-boned man must on this showing be wonderfully superior in intelligence to a small man, and an elephant or a whale must prodigiously excel mankind. The size of the brain in human beings, anatomists say, varies much less than the size of the body, or even of the head, and the one cannot be at all inferred from the other. It is certain that some women have as large a brain as any man. It is within my knowledge that a man who had weighed many human brains, said that the heaviest he knew of, heavier even than Cuvier's (the heaviest previously recorded,) was that of a woman. Next, I must observe that the precise relation which exists between the brain and the intellectual powers is not yet well understood, but is a subject of great dispute. That there is a very close relation we cannot doubt. The brain is certainly the material organ of thought and feeling: and (making abstraction of the great unsettled controversy respecting the appropriation of different parts of the brain to different mental faculties) I admit that it would be an anomaly, and an exception to all we know of the general laws of life and organization, if the size of the organ were wholly indifferent to the function; if no accession of power were derived from the greater magnitude of the instrument. But the exception and the anomaly would be fully as great if the organ exercised influence by its magnitude only. In all the more delicate operations of nature—of which those of the animated creation are the most delicate, and those of the nervous system by far the most delicate of these—differences in the effect depend as much on differences of quality in the physical agents, as on their quantity: and if the quality of an instrument is to be tested by the nicety and delicacy of the work it can do, the indications point to a greater average fineness of quality in the brain and nervous system of women than of men. Dismissing abstract difference of quality, a thing difficult to verify, the efficiency of an organ is known to depend not solely on its size but on its activity: and of this we have an approximate measure in the energy with which the blood circulates through it, both the stimulus and the reparative force being mainly dependent on the circulation. It would not be surprising—it is indeed an hypothesis which accords well with the differences actually observed between the mental operations of the two sexes—if men on the average should have the advantage in the size of the brain, and women in activity of cerebral circulation. The results which conjecture, founded on analogy, would lead us to expect from this difference of organization, would correspond to some of those which we most commonly see. In the first place, the mental operations of men might be expected to be slower. They would neither be so prompt as women in thinking, nor so quick to feel. Large bodies take more time to get into full action. On the other hand, when once got thoroughly into play, men's brain would bear more work. It would be more persistent in the line first taken; it would have more difficulty in changing from one mode of action to another, but, in the one thing it was doing, it could go on longer without loss of power or sense of fatigue. And do we not find that the things in which men most excel women are those which require most plodding and long hammering at a single thought, while women do best what must be done rapidly? A woman's brain is sooner fatigued, sooner exhausted; but given the degree of exhaustion, we should expect to find that it would recover itself sooner. I repeat that this speculation is entirely hypothetical; it pretends to no more than to suggest a line of enquiry. I have before repudiated the notion of its being yet certainly known that there is any natural difference at all in the average strength or direction of the mental capacities of the two sexes, much less what that difference is. Nor is it possible that this should be known, so long as the psychological laws of the formation of character have been so little studied, even in a general way, and in the particular case never scientifically applied at all; so long as the most obvious external causes of difference of character are habitually disregarded—left unnoticed by the observer, and looked down upon with a kind of supercilious contempt by the prevalent schools both of natural history and of mental philosophy: who, whether they look for the source of what mainly distinguishes human beings from one another, in the world of matter or in that of spirit, agree in running down those who prefer to explain these differences by the different relations of human beings to society and life.

But some say anatomy provides evidence that men have greater mental capacity than women: men have larger brains. My first reply is that the fact itself is doubtful. It is by no means established that a woman’s brain is smaller than a man’s. Suppose we infer this merely because women’s bodies are generally smaller than men’s. That standard would lead to strange conclusions. By that reasoning, a tall, large-boned man must be vastly more intelligent than a small man. And an elephant or a whale must be enormously more intelligent than any human. Anatomists say human brains vary much less in size than bodies, or even heads. We cannot infer brain size from either body size or head size. Some women certainly have brains as large as any man’s. I know of a man who had weighed many human brains. He said the heaviest brain he knew of belonged to a woman. It was even heavier than Cuvier’s, previously the heaviest on record. Next, I must point out that the exact relationship between the brain and intellectual powers is still poorly understood. It remains a subject of intense debate. We cannot doubt that the relationship is very close. The brain is certainly the physical organ of thought and feeling. I set aside the major, unresolved debate about whether different brain regions serve different mental abilities. I admit that an organ’s size being entirely irrelevant to its function would be unusual. It would contradict everything we know about the general laws of life and biological organization. We would expect a larger instrument to provide some increase in power. But it would be just as unusual if the organ’s influence depended on its size only. In all nature’s more delicate operations, results depend as much on the quality of physical agents as on their quantity. The operations of living things are the most delicate, and those of the nervous system are by far the most delicate among them. Suppose we judge an instrument’s quality by the precision and delicacy of the work it can do. On that basis, the evidence points to women’s brains and nervous systems being, on average, more finely made than men’s. Let us set aside differences in quality considered on their own, since they are difficult to verify. We know that an organ’s efficiency depends not only on its size but also on its activity. The strength of blood circulation through the organ gives us an approximate measure of that activity. Both the stimulation and the power to repair the organ depend mainly on circulation. It would not be surprising if men, on average, had larger brains, while women had more active circulation through the brain. Indeed, this hypothesis fits well with the differences actually observed between men’s and women’s mental processes. Reasoning by analogy, we would expect this difference in physical organization to produce some of the results we commonly see. First, we might expect men’s mental processes to be slower. Men would neither think as promptly as women nor feel as quickly. Large bodies take more time to become fully active. On the other hand, once fully active, men’s brains would be able to handle more work. A man’s brain would persist longer in its initial course. It would have more difficulty switching from one kind of activity to another. But it could continue longer at the same task without losing power or feeling tired. And do we not find that men most excel women at tasks requiring persistent effort and prolonged concentration on one thought? Women, meanwhile, do best at what must be done quickly. A woman’s brain tires sooner and becomes exhausted sooner. But for the same degree of exhaustion, we should expect a woman’s brain to recover sooner. I repeat that this speculation is entirely hypothetical. It claims only to suggest a direction for research. I have already rejected the idea that any natural difference in men’s and women’s average mental capacities is certainly known. We do not yet know whether any such difference exists in either strength or direction, much less what the difference is. Nor can we know while the psychological laws governing the formation of character remain so little studied, even generally. Those laws have never been scientifically applied to this particular question at all. Nor can we know while people habitually ignore the most obvious external causes of differences in character. Observers leave these causes unnoticed. The dominant schools of both natural history and the philosophy of mind treat these causes with a kind of arrogant contempt. Some seek the main source of human differences in the material world, others in the spiritual world. But both agree in disparaging people who prefer to explain those differences through people’s different relationships with society and life.

To so ridiculous an extent are the notions formed of the nature of women, mere empirical generalizations, framed, without philosophy or analysis, upon the first instances which present themselves, that the popular idea of it is different in different countries, according as the opinions and social circumstances of the country have given to the women living in it any speciality of development or non-development. An Oriental thinks that women are by nature peculiarly voluptuous; see the violent abuse of them on this ground in Hindoo writings. An Englishman usually thinks that they are by nature cold. The sayings about women's fickleness are mostly of French origin; from the famous distich of Francis the First, upward and downward. In England it is a common remark, how much more constant women are than men. Inconstancy has been longer reckoned discreditable to a woman, in England than in France; and Englishwomen are besides, in their inmost nature, much more subdued to opinion. It may be remarked by the way, that Englishmen are in peculiarly unfavourable circumstances for attempting to judge what is or is not natural, not merely to women, but to men, or to human beings altogether, at least if they have only English experience to go upon: because there is no place where human nature shows so little of its original lineaments. Both in a good and a bad sense, the English are farther from a state of nature than any other modern people. They are, more than any other people, a product of civilization and discipline. England is the country in which social discipline has most succeeded, not so much in conquering, as in suppressing, whatever is liable to conflict with it. The English, more than any other people, not only act but feel according to rule. In other countries, the taught opinion, or the requirement of society, may be the stronger power, but the promptings of the individual nature are always visible under it, and often resisting it: rule may be stronger than nature, but nature is still there. In England, rule has to a great degree substituted itself for nature. The greater part of life is carried on, not by following inclination under the control of rule, but by having no inclination but that of following a rule. Now this has its good side doubtless, though it has also a wretchedly bad one; but it must render an Englishman peculiarly ill-qualified to pass a judgment on the original tendencies of human nature from his own experience. The errors to which observers elsewhere are liable on the subject, are of a different character. An Englishman is ignorant respecting human nature, a Frenchman is prejudiced. An Englishman's errors are negative, a Frenchman's positive. An Englishman fancies that things do not exist, because he never sees them; a Frenchman thinks they must always and necessarily exist, because he does see them. An Englishman does not know nature, because he has had no opportunity of observing it; a Frenchman generally knows a great deal of it, but often mistakes it, because he has only seen it sophisticated and distorted. For the artificial state superinduced by society disguises the natural tendencies of the thing which is the subject of observation, in two different ways: by extinguishing the nature, or by transforming it. In the one case there is but a starved residuum of nature remaining to be studied; in the other case there is much, but it may have expanded in any direction rather than that in which it would spontaneously grow.

Ideas about women’s nature are, to a ridiculous extent, mere generalizations drawn from the first examples that happen to appear. They are formed without philosophical thought or analysis. As a result, popular ideas about women’s nature differ from country to country. They reflect the particular ways each country’s opinions and social conditions have developed, or failed to develop, women’s qualities. An Oriental thinks women are naturally especially sensual. Consider the vicious attacks on women for this supposed trait in Hindoo writings. An Englishman usually thinks women are naturally cold. Sayings about women’s fickleness mostly come from France, both before and after the famous two-line verse by Francis the First. In England, people commonly remark on how much more faithful women are than men. Unfaithfulness has been considered shameful in women for longer in England than in France. Englishwomen are also, in their deepest feelings, much more subject to public opinion. It is worth noting, in passing, that Englishmen are especially poorly placed to judge what is natural. This applies not only to women, but also to men and human beings generally. At least, it applies if Englishmen have only English experience to draw on. For nowhere does human nature show so little of its original character. In both a good and a bad sense, the English are further from a natural state than any other modern people. More than any other people, they are products of civilization and discipline. England is where social discipline has been most successful, not so much in overcoming resistance as in suppressing potential conflict. More than any other people, the English not only act according to rules but also feel according to rules. In other countries, accepted opinion or society’s demands may have greater power than individual impulses. But those impulses always remain visible beneath social pressures, and often resist them. Rules may be stronger than nature, but nature is still there. In England, rules have largely replaced nature. Most of life is lived not by following personal inclinations within the limits of rules. Instead, people have no inclination except to follow a rule. This undoubtedly has a good side, though it also has a terribly bad one. But it must make an Englishman especially unfit to judge human nature’s original tendencies from his own experience. Observers elsewhere are liable to make different kinds of mistakes about human nature. An Englishman is ignorant about human nature, while a Frenchman is prejudiced. An Englishman’s errors involve denying what exists, while a Frenchman’s involve asserting what must exist. An Englishman imagines things do not exist because he never sees them. A Frenchman thinks those things must always and necessarily exist because he does see them. An Englishman does not know nature because he has had no chance to observe it. A Frenchman generally knows a great deal about nature, but often misunderstands it. This is because he has seen nature only in an artificial and distorted form. Society imposes an artificial condition that disguises the natural tendencies of whatever is being observed in two different ways. Society either extinguishes those tendencies or transforms them. In the first case, only a starved remnant of nature remains to be studied. In the second, much remains. But that nature may have developed in any direction except the one it would have taken on its own.

I have said that it cannot now be known how much of the existing mental differences between men and women is natural, and how much artificial; whether there are any natural differences at all; or, supposing all artificial causes of difference to be withdrawn, what natural character would be revealed. I am not about to attempt what I have pronounced impossible: but doubt does not forbid conjecture, and where certainty is unattainable, there may yet be the means of arriving at some degree of probability. The first point, the origin of the differences actually observed, is the one most accessible to speculation; and I shall attempt to approach it, by the only path by which it can be reached; by tracing the mental consequences of external influences. We cannot isolate a human being from the circumstances of his condition, so as to ascertain experimentally what he would have been by nature; but we can consider what he is, and what his circumstances have been, and whether the one would have been capable of producing the other.

I have said that we cannot yet know how much of the mental differences between men and women is natural. Nor can we know how much is produced by social conditions, or whether any natural differences exist at all. If all social causes of difference were removed, we cannot know what natural character would emerge. I will not attempt what I have declared impossible. But uncertainty does not rule out speculation. And where certainty is beyond reach, we may still have ways to judge what is likely. The first question, the origin of the differences we actually observe, is the most open to speculation. I will approach that question by the only possible route: tracing how external influences affect the mind. We cannot separate a person from their circumstances to test what they would have been like by nature. But we can consider what the person is like and what their circumstances have been. We can then ask whether those circumstances could have made the person what they are.

Let us take, then, the only marked case which observation affords, of apparent inferiority of women to men, if we except the merely physical one of bodily strength. No production in philosophy, science, or art, entitled to the first rank, has been the work of a woman. Is there any mode of accounting for this, without supposing that women are naturally incapable of producing them?

Let us consider the only clear case we can observe in which women appear inferior to men, apart from physical strength. No woman has produced a work of the highest rank in philosophy, science, or art. Can we explain this lack of top-ranking work without assuming that women are naturally incapable of producing such work?

In the first place, we may fairly question whether experience has afforded sufficient grounds for an induction. It is scarcely three generations since women, saving very rare exceptions, have begun to try their capacity in philosophy, science, or art. It is only in the present generation that their attempts have been at all numerous; and they are even now extremely few, everywhere but in England and France. It is a relevant question, whether a mind possessing the requisites of first-rate eminence in speculation or creative art could have been expected, on the mere calculation of chances, to turn up during that lapse of time, among the women whose tastes and personal position admitted of their devoting themselves to these pursuits. In all things which there has yet been time for—in all but the very highest grades in the scale of excellence, especially in the department in which they have been longest engaged, literature (both prose and poetry)—women have done quite as much, have obtained fully as high prizes and as many of them, as could be expected from the length of time and the number of competitors. If we go back to the earlier period when very few women made the attempt, yet some of those few made it with distinguished success. The Greeks always accounted Sappho among their great poets; and we may well suppose that Myrtis, said to have been the teacher of Pindar, and Corinna, who five times bore away from him the prize of poetry, must at least have had sufficient merit to admit of being compared with that great name. Aspasia did not leave any philosophical writings; but it is an admitted fact that Socrates resorted to her for instruction, and avowed himself to have obtained it.

First, we may reasonably ask whether experience has given us enough evidence to draw a general conclusion. Barely three generations have passed since women began testing their abilities in philosophy, science, or art, with very rare exceptions. Only in the present generation have many women made such attempts. Even now, their numbers remain extremely small everywhere except England and France. We should ask whether, on probability alone, a mind capable of the highest achievement in thought or creative art could have emerged. Could we have expected such a mind in so short a time, among so few women? These were women whose interests and personal circumstances allowed them to devote themselves to these pursuits. In every area where enough time has passed, women have achieved as much as could be expected. They have earned honors just as high, and just as many, given the time available and the number competing. This applies to every level except the very highest. It is especially true in literature, both prose and poetry, where women have been active longest. If we look back to the earlier period, when very few women tried, some achieved remarkable success. The Greeks always ranked Sappho among their great poets. Myrtis is said to have taught Pindar, and Corinna won the poetry prize against him five times. We may reasonably suppose that both women had at least enough merit to be compared with that great poet. Aspasia left no philosophical writings. But it is an accepted fact that Socrates went to her for instruction and acknowledged that he had received it.

If we consider the works of women in modern times, and contrast them with those of men, either in the literary or the artistic department, such inferiority as may be observed resolves itself essentially into one thing: but that is a most material one; deficiency of originality. Not total deficiency; for every production of mind which is of any substantive value, has an originality of its own—is a conception of the mind itself, not a copy of something else. Thoughts original, in the sense of being unborrowed—of being derived from the thinker's own observations or intellectual processes—are abundant in the writings of women. But they have not yet produced any of those great and luminous new ideas which form an era in thought, nor those fundamentally new conceptions in art, which open a vista of possible effects not before thought of, and found a new school. Their compositions are mostly grounded on the existing fund of thought, and their creations do not deviate widely from existing types. This is the sort of inferiority which their works manifest: for in point of execution, in the detailed application of thought, and the perfection of style, there is no inferiority. Our best novelists in point of composition, and of the management of detail, have mostly been women; and there is not in all modern literature a more eloquent vehicle of thought than the style of Madame de Stael, nor, as a specimen of purely artistic excellence, anything superior to the prose of Madame Sand, whose style acts upon the nervous system like a symphony of Haydn or Mozart. High originality of conception is, as I have said, what is chiefly wanting. And now to examine if there is any manner in which this deficiency can be accounted for.

If we compare women’s modern works in literature and art with men’s, any apparent inferiority comes down to one thing. But that one thing is very important: a lack of originality. This lack is not total. Every work of the mind with any real value has an originality of its own. It comes from the mind itself, rather than copying something else. Women’s writings contain many original thoughts, in the sense of thoughts that are not borrowed. These thoughts come from the writer’s own observations or reasoning. But women have not yet produced any of the great, illuminating new ideas that mark an era in thought. Nor have they produced fundamentally new artistic concepts that reveal previously unimagined possibilities and establish a new school. Their works mostly draw on the existing body of thought, and their creations stay fairly close to existing forms. This is the kind of inferiority their works show. There is no inferiority in execution, in the detailed application of thought, or in perfection of style. Most of our best novelists, judged by composition and the handling of detail, have been women. In all modern literature, no style expresses thought more eloquently than Madame de Stael’s. Nor, as an example of purely artistic excellence, is anything superior to the prose of Madame Sand. Her style affects the nervous system like a symphony by Haydn or Mozart. As I have said, what is chiefly lacking is great originality of conception. Now let us examine whether this lack can be explained in any way.

Let us remember, then, so far as regards mere thought, that during all that period in the world's existence, and in the progress of cultivation, in which great and fruitful new truths could be arrived at by mere force of genius, with little previous study and accumulation of knowledge—during all that time women did not concern themselves with speculation at all. From the days of Hypatia to those of the Reformation, the illustrious Heloisa is almost the only woman to whom any such achievement might have been possible; and we know not how great a capacity of speculation in her may have been lost to mankind by the misfortunes of her life. Never since any considerable number of women have begun to cultivate serious thought, has originality been possible on easy terms. Nearly all the thoughts which can be reached by mere strength of original faculties, have long since been arrived at; and originality, in any high sense of the word, is now scarcely ever attained but by minds which have undergone elaborate discipline, and are deeply versed in the results of previous thinking. It is Mr. Maurice, I think, who has remarked on the present age, that its most original thinkers are those who have known most thoroughly what had been thought by their predecessors: and this will always henceforth be the case. Every fresh stone in the edifice has now to be placed on the top of so many others, that a long process of climbing, and of carrying up materials, has to be gone through by whoever aspires to take a share in the present stage of the work. How many women are there who have gone through any such process? Mrs. Somerville, alone perhaps of women, knows as much of mathematics as is now needful for making any considerable mathematical discovery: is it any proof of inferiority in women, that she has not happened to be one of the two or three persons who in her lifetime have associated their names with some striking advancement of the science? Two women, since political economy has been made a science, have known enough of it to write usefully on the subject: of how many of the innumerable men who have written on it during the same time, is it possible with truth to say more? If no woman has hitherto been a great historian, what woman has had the necessary erudition? If no woman is a great philologist, what woman has studied Sanscrit and Slavonic, the Gothic of Ulphila and the Persic of the Zendavesta? Even in practical matters we all know what is the value of the originality of untaught geniuses. It means, inventing over again in its rudimentary form something already invented and improved upon by many successive inventors. When women have had the preparation which all men now require to be eminently original, it will be time enough to begin judging by experience of their capacity for originality.

Let us remember, then, how things stood in the realm of thought. For a whole period of human history and intellectual development, genius alone could discover great and fruitful new truths. Little previous study or accumulated knowledge was needed. Throughout that period, women did not engage in theoretical thinking at all. From the days of Hypatia to the Reformation, the illustrious Heloisa is almost the only woman who might have done so. We do not know how much of her capacity for theoretical thought humanity lost through her personal misfortunes. Since any considerable number of women began pursuing serious thought, originality has never been easy to achieve. Nearly all the ideas reachable through natural intellectual ability alone were discovered long ago. Originality in any higher sense now almost always requires minds trained through rigorous study. Those minds must also have a deep knowledge of earlier thinkers' work. Mr. Maurice, I think, made an observation about our age. Its most original thinkers are those who have understood most thoroughly what their predecessors thought. From now on, this will always be true. Every new stone in the building must now rest on so many others. Anyone hoping to contribute at the present stage must climb a long way and carry materials up. How many women have gone through any such process? Mrs. Somerville, perhaps alone among women, knows enough mathematics to make a significant mathematical discovery today. Does her failure to make such a discovery prove that women are inferior? Only two or three people in her lifetime have attached their names to a striking advance in mathematics. She simply has not happened to be among them. Since political economy became a science, two women have known enough about it to write usefully on the subject. Countless men have written about it during the same period. Of how many of those men can we truthfully say more? If no woman has yet been a great historian, what woman has had the necessary depth of learning? If no woman is a great philologist, what woman has studied Sanscrit and Slavonic? What woman has studied the Gothic of Ulphila and the Persic of the Zendavesta? Even in practical matters, we all know the value of originality in untrained geniuses. Such originality means reinventing, in a crude form, something already invented and improved by many successive inventors. Women must first receive the preparation now required of all men who achieve outstanding originality. Only then will it be time to begin judging women's capacity for originality from experience.

It no doubt often happens that a person, who has not widely and accurately studied the thoughts of others on a subject, has by natural sagacity a happy intuition, which he can suggest, but cannot prove, which yet when matured may be an important addition to knowledge: but even then, no justice can be done to it until some other person, who does possess the previous acquirements, takes it in hand, tests it, gives it a scientific or practical form, and fits it into its place among the existing truths of philosophy or science. Is it supposed that such felicitous thoughts do not occur to women? They occur by hundreds to every woman of intellect. But they are mostly lost, for want of a husband or friend who has the other knowledge which can enable him to estimate them properly and bring them before the world: and even when they are brought before it, they generally appear as his ideas, not their real author's. Who can tell how many of the most original thoughts put forth by male writers, belong to a woman by suggestion, to themselves only by verifying and working out? If I may judge by my own case, a very large proportion indeed.

Someone who has not studied others’ thinking on a subject widely and carefully may still have a valuable insight. Natural intelligence often makes this possible. The person can suggest the idea but cannot prove it. Yet, once developed, the idea may become an important addition to knowledge. Even then, the idea cannot receive proper treatment until someone with the necessary background knowledge takes it up. That person must test the idea, give it a scientific or practical form, and fit it among established philosophical or scientific truths. Does anyone suppose that women do not have such valuable insights? Every intelligent woman has hundreds of them. But most of these insights are lost for lack of a husband or friend with the necessary knowledge. Such knowledge would enable him to judge the insights properly and present them to the world. And even when these ideas reach the public, they generally appear as his ideas, not those of their true author. Who can tell how many highly original ideas published by male writers were first suggested by women? The men’s contribution may have been only to verify and develop those ideas. If I may judge from my own experience, a very large proportion indeed.

If we turn from pure speculation to literature in the narrow sense of the term, and the fine arts, there is a very obvious reason why women's literature is, in its general conception and in its main features, an imitation of men's. Why is the Roman literature, as critics proclaim to satiety, not original, but an imitation of the Greek? Simply because the Greeks came first. If women lived in a different country from men, and had never read any of their writings, they would have had a literature of their own. As it is, they have not created one, because they found a highly advanced literature already created. If there had been no suspension of the knowledge of antiquity, or if the Renaissance had occurred before the Gothic cathedrals were built, they never would have been built. We see that, in France and Italy, imitation of the ancient literature stopped the original development even after it had commenced. All women who write are pupils of the great male writers. A painter's early pictures, even if he be a Raffaelle, are undistinguishable in style from those of his master. Even a Mozart does not display his powerful originality in his earliest pieces. What years are to a gifted individual, generations are to a mass. If women's literature is destined to have a different collective character from that of men, depending on any difference of natural tendencies, much longer time is necessary than has yet elapsed, before it can emancipate itself from the influence of accepted models, and guide itself by its own impulses. But if, as I believe, there will not prove to be any natural tendencies common to women, and distinguishing their genius from that of men, yet every individual writer among them has her individual tendencies, which at present are still subdued by the influence of precedent and example: and it will require generations more, before their individuality is sufficiently developed to make head against that influence.

If we turn from abstract thought to literature in the narrower sense and the fine arts, one reason is obvious. Women’s literature imitates men’s in its overall approach and main features because men’s literature came first. Why is Roman literature not original, but an imitation of Greek literature, as critics repeat endlessly? Simply because the Greeks came first. If women lived in a different country from men and had never read men’s writings, women would have their own literature. As things stand, women have not created their own literature because they found a highly developed literature already in place. If knowledge of antiquity had never been interrupted, Gothic cathedrals would never have been built. Nor would those cathedrals have been built if the Renaissance had occurred before their construction. In France and Italy, imitation of ancient literature stopped an original literary tradition from developing, even after that development had begun. All women who write are pupils of the great male writers. A painter’s early pictures, even those of a Raffaelle, cannot be distinguished in style from his teacher’s. Even a Mozart does not show his powerful originality in his earliest pieces. What years are to a gifted individual, generations are to a group. Women’s literature may eventually have a shared character different from men’s, based on differences in natural tendencies. If so, much more time must pass before women’s literature can escape accepted models and follow its own impulses. But I believe no natural tendencies will prove common to women that distinguish their creative gifts from men’s. Even so, every woman writer has her own individual tendencies. At present, the influence of earlier writers and their examples still holds those tendencies back. More generations will be needed before women writers develop their individuality enough to resist that influence.

It is in the fine arts, properly so called, that the primâ facie evidence of inferior original powers in women at first sight appears the strongest: since opinion (it may be said) does not exclude them from these, but rather encourages them, and their education, instead of passing over this department, is in the affluent classes mainly composed of it. Yet in this line of exertion they have fallen still more short than in many others, of the highest eminence attained by men. This shortcoming, however, needs no other explanation than the familiar fact, more universally true in the fine arts than in anything else; the vast superiority of professional persons over amateurs. Women in the educated classes are almost universally taught more or less of some branch or other of the fine arts, but not that they may gain their living or their social consequence by it. Women artists are all amateurs. The exceptions are only of the kind which confirm the general truth. Women are taught music, but not for the purpose of composing, only of executing it: and accordingly it is only as composers, that men, in music, are superior to women. The only one of the fine arts which women do follow, to any extent, as a profession, and an occupation for life, is the histrionic; and in that they are confessedly equal, if not superior, to men. To make the comparison fair, it should be made between the productions of women in any branch of art, and those of men not following it as a profession. In musical composition, for example, women surely have produced fully as good things as have ever been produced by male amateurs. There are now a few women, a very few, who practise painting as a profession, and these are already beginning to show quite as much talent as could be expected. Even male painters (pace Mr. Ruskin) have not made any very remarkable figure these last centuries, and it will be long before they do so. The reason why the old painters were so greatly superior to the modern, is that a greatly superior class of men applied themselves to the art. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Italian painters were the most accomplished men of their age. The greatest of them were men of encyclopædical acquirements and powers, like the great men of Greece. But in their times fine art was, to men's feelings and conceptions, among the grandest things in which a human being could excel; and by it men were made, what only political or military distinction now makes them, the companions of sovereigns, and the equals of the highest nobility. In the present age, men of anything like similar calibre find something more important to do, for their own fame and the uses of the modern world, than painting: and it is only now and then that a Reynolds or a Turner (of whose relative rank among eminent men I do not pretend to an opinion) applies himself to that art. Music belongs to a different order of things; it does not require the same general powers of mind, but seems more dependant on a natural gift: and it may be thought surprising that no one of the great musical composers has been a woman. But even this natural gift, to be made available for great creations, requires study, and professional devotion to the pursuit. The only countries which have produced first-rate composers, even of the male sex, are Germany and Italy—countries in which, both in point of special and of general cultivation, women have remained far behind France and England, being generally (it may be said without exaggeration) very little educated, and having scarcely cultivated at all any of the higher faculties of mind. And in those countries the men who are acquainted with the principles of musical composition must be counted by hundreds, or more probably by thousands, the women barely by scores: so that here again, on the doctrine of averages, we cannot reasonably expect to see more than one eminent woman to fifty eminent men; and the last three centuries have not produced fifty eminent male composers either in Germany or in Italy.

In the fine arts, strictly understood, the initial evidence of women’s lower natural abilities seems strongest. Public opinion, some may argue, does not shut women out of these arts but instead encourages them. Among the wealthy, women’s education does not neglect the arts but consists mainly of them. Yet in the arts, women have fallen further short of men’s highest achievements than in many other fields. But this gap needs only one familiar explanation: the vast superiority of professionals over amateurs. This superiority is more consistently true in the fine arts than in any other field. Almost all women in the educated classes receive some instruction in one or another of the fine arts. But they are not taught to earn their living or gain social standing through art. Women artists are all amateurs. The exceptions are only the kind that confirm the general rule. Women are taught music, but only to perform it, not to compose it. Accordingly, composing is the only area of music in which men are superior to women. Acting is the only fine art that women pursue in any numbers as a profession and a lifelong occupation. And in acting, women are acknowledged to be equal, if not superior, to men. A fair comparison would place women’s work in any art beside the work of men who are not professionals. In musical composition, for example, women have surely produced work fully as good as anything male amateurs have produced. A few women, very few, now paint professionally. These women are already beginning to show quite as much talent as could be expected. Even male painters have achieved little of great distinction over the last few centuries, with due respect to Mr. Ruskin. And it will be a long time before they do. The old painters were so much better than modern painters because men of much greater ability took up the art. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Italian painters were the most accomplished men of their age. The greatest painters had an extraordinary range of knowledge and abilities, like the great men of Greece. But people then regarded fine art as one of the grandest fields in which anyone could excel. Artistic achievement made men companions of sovereigns and equals of the highest nobility. Today, only political or military distinction gives men that standing. In the present age, men of anything like those abilities find something more important to do than painting. Other pursuits offer more for their own fame and for the needs of the modern world. So only now and then does a Reynolds or a Turner devote himself to painting. I do not claim to judge their relative standing among eminent men. Music is different. Music does not require the same broad mental abilities but seems to depend more on a natural gift. And it may seem surprising that none of the great musical composers has been a woman. But even this natural gift requires study and professional dedication before it can produce great works. Germany and Italy are the only countries to have produced first-rate composers, even among men. In these countries, women have remained far behind women in France and England in both specialized training and general education. It is no exaggeration to say that women in Germany and Italy have generally received very little education. Their higher mental abilities have scarcely been developed at all. And in those countries, hundreds, or more probably thousands, of men understand the principles of musical composition. Barely a few dozen women do. So here again, by the law of averages, we cannot reasonably expect more than one eminent woman for every fifty eminent men. And the last three centuries have not produced fifty eminent male composers in either Germany or Italy.

There are other reasons, besides those which we have now given, that help to explain why women remain behind men, even in the pursuits which are open to both. For one thing, very few women have time for them. This may seem a paradox; it is an undoubted social fact. The time and thoughts of every woman have to satisfy great previous demands on them for things practical. There is, first, the superintendence of the family and the domestic expenditure, which occupies at least one woman in every family, generally the one of mature years and acquired experience; unless the family is so rich as to admit of delegating that task to hired agency, and submitting to all the waste and malversation inseparable from that mode of conducting it. The superintendence of a household, even when not in other respects laborious, is extremely onerous to the thoughts; it requires incessant vigilance, an eye which no detail escapes, and presents questions for consideration and solution, foreseen and unforeseen, at every hour of the day, from which the person responsible for them can hardly ever shake herself free. If a woman is of a rank and circumstances which relieve her in a measure from these cares, she has still devolving on her the management for the whole family of its intercourse with others—of what is called society, and the less the call made on her by the former duty, the greater is always the development of the latter: the dinner parties, concerts, evening parties, morning visits, letter writing, and all that goes with them. All this is over and above the engrossing duty which society imposes exclusively on women, of making themselves charming. A clever woman of the higher ranks finds nearly a sufficient employment of her talents in cultivating the graces of manner and the arts of conversation. To look only at the outward side of the subject: the great and continual exercise of thought which all women who attach any value to dressing well (I do not mean expensively, but with taste, and perception of natural and of artificial convenance) must bestow upon their own dress, perhaps also upon that of their daughters, would alone go a great way towards achieving respectable results in art, or science, or literature, and does actually exhaust much of the time and mental power they might have to spare for either.² If it were possible that all this number of little practical interests (which are made great to them) should leave them either much leisure, or much energy and freedom of mind, to be devoted to art or speculation, they must have a much greater original supply of active faculty than the vast majority of men. But this is not all. Independently of the regular offices of life which devolve upon a woman, she is expected to have her time and faculties always at the disposal of everybody. If a man has not a profession to exempt him from such demands, still, if he has a pursuit, he offends nobody by devoting his time to it; occupation is received as a valid excuse for his not answering to every casual demand which may be made on him. Are a woman's occupations, especially her chosen and voluntary ones, ever regarded as excusing her from any of what are termed the calls of society? Scarcely are her most necessary and recognised duties allowed as an exemption. It requires an illness in the family, or something else out of the common way, to entitle her to give her own business the precedence over other people's amusement. She must always be at the beck and call of somebody, generally of everybody. If she has a study or a pursuit, she must snatch any short interval which accidentally occurs to be employed in it. A celebrated woman, in a work which I hope will some day be published, remarks truly that everything a woman does is done at odd times. Is it wonderful, then, if she does not attain the highest eminence in things which require consecutive attention, and the concentration on them of the chief interest of life? Such is philosophy, and such, above all, is art, in which, besides the devotion of the thoughts and feelings, the hand also must be kept in constant exercise to attain high skill.

Other reasons, besides those already given, help explain why women lag behind men even in pursuits open to both. For one thing, very few women have time for these pursuits. This may seem a paradox, but it is an undeniable social fact. Practical matters already place great demands on every woman's time and thoughts. First comes managing the family and household spending. This occupies at least one woman in every family, generally a mature woman with experience. The exception is a family rich enough to hire someone for the task. Such a family must accept all the waste and dishonesty inseparable from that arrangement. Even when managing a household involves little other hard work, it places an enormous burden on the mind. It requires constant vigilance and an eye that misses no detail. Every hour brings problems to consider and solve, both expected and unexpected. The woman responsible can hardly ever free her mind from them. If a woman's social position and circumstances partly relieve her of these concerns, she still has another responsibility. She must manage the whole family's relations with others, what is called society. The less household management demands of her, the more these social duties always expand. They include dinner parties, concerts, evening parties, morning visits, letter writing, and everything that goes with them. All this comes on top of the absorbing duty society imposes exclusively on women: making themselves charming. A clever upper-class woman can find almost enough work for her talents in developing graceful manners and conversational skills. Consider only the outward side of this demand. All women who value dressing well must put a great deal of constant thought into their clothes. I do not mean dressing expensively. I mean dressing with taste and a sense of both natural and socially established appropriateness. They may also have to think about their daughters' clothes. That effort alone would go a long way toward producing respectable work in art, science, or literature. It does, in fact, use up much of the time and mental energy they might otherwise spare for those pursuits.² Suppose all these small practical concerns, which are made important for women, could leave them much leisure. Suppose these concerns could also leave them much energy and freedom of mind for art or abstract thought. Women would then need far greater natural reserves of mental energy than the vast majority of men. But this is not all. Beyond a woman's regular duties, she is expected to keep her time and abilities always available to everybody. A man may have no profession to excuse him from such demands. Even so, if he has a pursuit, he offends nobody by devoting his time to it. Being occupied is accepted as a valid excuse for not responding to every casual demand on him. Are a woman's activities, especially those she freely chooses, ever accepted as excuses for missing what are called social obligations? Even her most necessary and recognized duties are scarcely allowed to excuse her. Only an illness in the family, or something equally unusual, entitles her to put her business before other people's amusement. She must always be at someone's beck and call, generally everyone's. If she has a subject to study or an activity to pursue, she must seize whatever brief intervals happen to arise. A celebrated woman rightly observes that everything a woman does is done in odd moments. Her observation appears in a work I hope will someday be published. Is it surprising, then, if a woman does not reach the highest distinction in pursuits requiring sustained attention? Such pursuits must also be the chief interest of her life. Philosophy is one, and art above all is another. Art requires not only devoted thoughts and feelings, but also constant practice of the hand to achieve great skill.

There is another consideration to be added to all these. In the various arts and intellectual occupations, there is a degree of proficiency sufficient for living by it, and there is a higher degree on which depend the great productions which immortalize a name. To the attainment of the former, there are adequate motives in the case of all who follow the pursuit professionally: the other is hardly ever attained where there is not, or where there has not been at some period of life, an ardent desire of celebrity. Nothing less is commonly a sufficient stimulus to undergo the long and patient drudgery, which, in the case even of the greatest natural gifts, is absolutely required for great eminence in pursuits in which we already possess so many splendid memorials of the highest genius. Now, whether the cause be natural or artificial, women seldom have this eagerness for fame. Their ambition is generally confined within narrower bounds. The influence they seek is over those who immediately surround them. Their desire is to be liked, loved, or admired, by those whom they see with their eyes: and the proficiency in knowledge, arts, and accomplishments, which is sufficient for that, almost always contents them. This is a trait of character which cannot be left out of the account in judging of women as they are. I do not at all believe that it is inherent in women. It is only the natural result of their circumstances. The love of fame in men is encouraged by education and opinion: to “scorn delights and live laborious days” for its sake, is accounted the part of “noble minds,” even if spoken of as their “last infirmity,” and is stimulated by the access which fame gives to all objects of ambition, including even the favour of women; while to women themselves all these objects are closed, and the desire of fame itself considered daring and unfeminine. Besides, how could it be that a woman's interests should not be all concentrated upon the impressions made on those who come into her daily life, when society has ordained that all her duties should be to them, and has contrived that all her comforts should depend on them? The natural desire of consideration from our fellow creatures is as strong in a woman as in a man; but society has so ordered things that public consideration is, in all ordinary cases, only attainable by her through the consideration of her husband or of her male relations, while her private consideration is forfeited by making herself individually prominent, or appearing in any other character than that of an appendage to men. Whoever is in the least capable of estimating the influence on the mind of the entire domestic and social position and the whole habit of a life, must easily recognise in that influence a complete explanation of nearly all the apparent differences between women and men, including the whole of those which imply any inferiority.

There is another point to add to all these. In the arts and intellectual professions, one level of skill is enough to earn a living. A higher level produces the great works that make a name live forever. Everyone who pursues such work professionally has enough motivation to reach the first level. But hardly anyone reaches the higher level without a passionate desire for fame, at least at some point in life. Usually, nothing less provides enough motivation for the long, patient grind that outstanding achievement requires. Even the greatest natural gifts cannot remove that need, given the many magnificent works of genius already before us. Now, whether the cause is natural or social, women seldom have this eagerness for fame. Their ambition generally stays within narrower limits. They seek influence over the people immediately around them. They want to be liked, loved, or admired by people they see in person. They are almost always satisfied with enough knowledge, artistic skill, and other accomplishments to achieve that. We cannot ignore this trait when judging women as they are. I do not believe at all that the trait is inherent in women. It is simply the natural result of their circumstances. Education and public opinion encourage men's desire for fame. To “scorn delights and live laborious days” for fame is considered a mark of “noble minds.” This remains true even when the desire for fame is called their “last infirmity.” Fame also encourages ambition by opening the way to everything men aspire to, including women's affection and approval. Yet all these goals are closed to women, and women's desire for fame is itself considered bold and unfeminine. Besides, how could a woman's interests fail to center entirely on the impressions she makes on people in her daily life? Society has decreed that all her duties are toward those people. Society has also arranged for all her comforts to depend on them. The natural desire for other people's respect is as strong in a woman as in a man. But society has arranged things so that, in all ordinary cases, a woman can gain public respect only indirectly. She gains it through the respect given to her husband or male relatives. Meanwhile, she loses respect in private life if she makes herself prominent as an individual. She also loses that respect if she appears in any role other than as an accessory to men. Consider the influence on the mind of a person's entire domestic and social position and lifelong habits. Anyone at all capable of assessing that influence must readily recognize its explanatory power. It fully explains nearly all the apparent differences between women and men, including all those that suggest any inferiority.

As for moral differences, considered as distinguished from intellectual, the distinction commonly drawn is to the advantage of women. They are declared to be better than men; an empty compliment, which must provoke a bitter smile from every woman of spirit, since there is no other situation in life in which it is the established order, and considered quite natural and suitable, that the better should obey the worse. If this piece of idle talk is good for anything, it is only as an admission by men, of the corrupting influence of power; for that is certainly the only truth which the fact, if it be a fact, either proves or illustrates. And it is true that servitude, except when it actually brutalizes, though corrupting to both, is less so to the slaves than to the slave-masters. It is wholesomer for the moral nature to be restrained, even by arbitrary power, than to be allowed to exercise arbitrary power without restraint. Women, it is said, seldomer fall under the penal law—contribute a much smaller number of offenders to the criminal calendar, than men. I doubt not that the same thing may be said, with the same truth, of negro slaves. Those who are under the control of others cannot often commit crimes, unless at the command and for the purposes of their masters. I do not know a more signal instance of the blindness with which the world, including the herd of studious men, ignore and pass over all the influences of social circumstances, than their silly depreciation of the intellectual, and silly panegyrics on the moral, nature of women.

When moral differences are considered separately from intellectual ones, the usual comparison favors women. Women are declared better than men. This empty compliment must bring a bitter smile to every woman with spirit. In no other situation is it accepted as natural and proper that the better should obey the worse. If this idle talk has any value, it is only as men's admission that power corrupts. For that is certainly the only truth women's supposed moral superiority proves or illustrates, if such superiority exists. And it is true that servitude corrupts both slaves and masters, but corrupts slaves less, unless it actually brutalizes them. Being restrained, even by arbitrary power, is healthier for a person's moral character than exercising arbitrary power without restraint. Women, we are told, break criminal laws less often than men. They account for far fewer criminal offenders. I have no doubt that the same could truthfully be said of enslaved Black people. People under others' control cannot often commit crimes, unless ordered to do so to serve their masters' purposes. I know of no more striking example of people's blindness to all the effects of social circumstances. The world, including the crowd of scholars, ignores and overlooks those effects. Instead, people foolishly belittle women's intellectual nature and foolishly praise their moral nature.

The complimentary dictum about women's superior moral goodness may be allowed to pair off with the disparaging one respecting their greater liability to moral bias. Women, we are told, are not capable of resisting their personal partialities: their judgment in grave affairs is warped by their sympathies and antipathies. Assuming it to be so, it is still to be proved that women are oftener misled by their personal feelings than men by their personal interests. The chief difference would seem in that case to be, that men are led from the course of duty and the public interest by their regard for themselves, women (not being allowed to have private interests of their own) by their regard for somebody else. It is also to be considered, that all the education which women receive from society inculcates on them the feeling that the individuals connected with them are the only ones to whom they owe any duty—the only ones whose interest they are called upon to care for; while, as far as education is concerned, they are left strangers even to the elementary ideas which are presupposed in any intelligent regard for larger interests or higher moral objects. The complaint against them resolves itself merely into this, that they fulfil only too faithfully the sole duty which they are taught, and almost the only one which they are permitted to practise.

The flattering claim that women are morally better may be set against the insulting claim that women are more prone to moral bias. We are told that women cannot resist their personal preferences. Their likes and dislikes distort their judgment on serious matters. Even if so, it remains unproven that personal feelings mislead women more often than personal interests mislead men. In that case, the main difference would seem to be whose interests lead each away from duty and the public good. Men are led astray by concern for themselves, women by concern for someone else. Women, after all, are not allowed to have private interests of their own. We must also consider what society teaches women. All the education women receive from society teaches them that they owe duties only to people connected with them. Women are taught to care only about those people's interests. At the same time, their education leaves them unfamiliar even with the basic ideas needed to understand broader interests or higher moral aims. The complaint against women therefore amounts only to this: women carry out too faithfully the only duty they are taught. That duty is also almost the only one they are allowed to practice.

The concessions of the privileged to the unprivileged are so seldom brought about by any better motive than the power of the unprivileged to extort them, that any arguments against the prerogative of sex are likely to be little attended to by the generality, as long as they are able to say to themselves that women do not complain of it. That fact certainly enables men to retain the unjust privilege some time longer; but does not render it less unjust. Exactly the same thing may be said of the women in the harem of an Oriental: they do not complain of not being allowed the freedom of European women. They think our women insufferably bold and unfeminine. How rarely it is that even men complain of the general order of society; and how much rarer still would such complaint be, if they did not know of any different order existing anywhere else. Women do not complain of the general lot of women; or rather they do, for plaintive elegies on it are very common in the writings of women, and were still more so as long as the lamentations could not be suspected of having any practical object. Their complaints are like the complaints which men make of the general unsatisfactoriness of human life; they are not meant to imply blame, or to plead for any change. But though women do not complain of the power of husbands, each complains of her own husband, or of the husbands of her friends. It is the same in all other cases of servitude, at least in the commencement of the emancipatory movement. The serfs did not at first complain of the power of their lords, but only of their tyranny. The Commons began by claiming a few municipal privileges; they next asked an exemption for themselves from being taxed without their own consent; but they would at that time have thought it a great presumption to claim any share in the king's sovereign authority. The case of women is now the only case in which to rebel against established rules is still looked upon with the same eyes as was formerly a subject's claim to the right of rebelling against his king. A woman who joins in any movement which her husband disapproves, makes herself a martyr, without even being able to be an apostle, for the husband can legally put a stop to her apostleship. Women cannot be expected to devote themselves to the emancipation of women, until men in considerable number are prepared to join with them in the undertaking.

Privileged people rarely make concessions to those without privilege for any better reason than being forced to do so. So most people are unlikely to listen to arguments against male privilege while they can tell themselves women do not complain. Women’s lack of complaint certainly allows men to keep their unjust privilege a little longer. But it does not make that privilege any less unjust. Exactly the same can be said of the women in an Eastern man’s harem. They do not complain about being denied the freedom European women enjoy. They think our women are unbearably bold and unfeminine. Even men rarely complain about the general organization of society. How much rarer such complaints would be if men knew of no other way of organizing society anywhere else. Women do not complain about women’s general lot. Or rather, they do, since mournful reflections on that lot are very common in women’s writing. Such laments were even more common when no one could suspect them of seeking any practical change. Their complaints resemble men’s complaints about how unsatisfying human life is in general. They are not intended to blame anyone or call for change. But although women do not complain about husbands’ power, each woman complains about her own husband or her friends’ husbands. The same is true of all other forms of servitude, at least when a movement for freedom begins. Serfs did not at first complain about their lords’ power, but only about their tyranny. The Commons began by demanding a few rights of local self-government. Next, they asked to be exempt from taxation imposed without their consent. But at that time, they would have thought it terribly presumptuous to demand any share of the king’s supreme authority. Women’s situation is now the only one where rebellion against established rules is still viewed as rebellion against a king once was. A woman who joins a movement her husband opposes makes herself a martyr without even being able to spread her cause. Her husband can legally stop her from spreading it. Women cannot be expected to devote themselves to women’s liberation until considerable numbers of men are ready to join them.