How to Curb Government Overreach

What we have just said confirms Chapter XVI, and makes it clear that the institution of government is not a contract, but a law; that the depositaries of the executive power are not the people's masters, but its officers; that it can set them up and pull them down when it likes; that for them there is no question of contract, but of obedience; and that in taking charge of the functions the State imposes on them they are doing no more than fulfilling their duty as citizens, without having the remotest right to argue about the conditions.

What we have just said confirms Chapter XVI and makes the following points clear. Government is established by a law, not a contract. Those entrusted with executive power are not the people's masters, but their officials. The people can appoint and remove these officials whenever they like. For these officials, the issue is not a contract, but obedience. By taking on the duties the State assigns them, these officials are simply fulfilling their duty as citizens. They have no right whatsoever to dispute the terms.

When therefore the people sets up an hereditary government, whether it be monarchical and confined to one family, or aristocratic and confined to a class, what it enters into is not an undertaking; the administration is given a provisional form, until the people chooses to order it otherwise.

So when the people establish a hereditary government, they do not make a binding commitment. The government may be a monarchy limited to one family or an aristocracy limited to one class. The arrangement is temporary, until the people choose to organize the government differently.

It is true that such changes are always dangerous, and that the established government should never be touched except when it comes to be incompatible with the public good; but the circumspection this involves is a maxim of policy and not a rule of right, and the State is no more bound to leave civil authority in the hands of its rulers than military authority in the hands of its generals.

It is true that such changes are always dangerous. The established government should never be changed unless it becomes incompatible with the public good. But this need for caution is a matter of practical policy, not a legal obligation. The State is no more bound to leave civil authority with its rulers than military authority with its generals.

It is also true that it is impossible to be too careful to observe, in such cases, all the formalities necessary to distinguish a regular and legitimate act from a seditious tumult, and the will of a whole people from the clamour of a faction. Here above all no further concession should be made to the untoward possibility than cannot, in the strictest logic, be refused it. From this obligation the prince derives a great advantage in preserving his power despite the people, without it being possible to say he has usurped it; for, seeming to avail himself only of his rights, he finds it very easy to extend them, and to prevent, under the pretext of keeping the peace, assemblies that are destined to the re-establishment of order; with the result that he takes advantage of a silence he does not allow to be broken, or of irregularities he causes to be committed, to assume that he has the support of those whom fear prevents from speaking, and to punish those who dare to speak. Thus it was that the decemvirs, first elected for one year and then kept on in office for a second, tried to perpetuate their power by forbidding the comitia to assemble; and by this easy method every government in the world, once clothed with the public power, sooner or later usurps the sovereign authority.

It is also true that, in such cases, every necessary formality must be observed with the greatest possible care. These formalities distinguish a lawful, legitimate act from a rebellious disturbance, and the whole people's will from a faction's shouting. Above all, this dangerous possibility must be conceded no more than the strictest logic requires. This requirement gives the prince a great advantage in keeping power against the people's wishes. Yet no one can say he has seized power unlawfully. By appearing merely to exercise his rights, he finds it very easy to expand them. Under the pretext of keeping the peace, he prevents assemblies intended to restore order. He then exploits either a silence he forbids anyone to break or procedural violations he himself causes. He treats that silence as support from those whom fear keeps from speaking, and punishes those who dare to speak. This was how the decemvirs tried to make their power permanent. First elected for one year, then kept in office for a second, they forbade the comitia, the people's assemblies, to meet. By this simple method, every government in the world, once given public power, sooner or later seizes sovereign authority.

The periodical assemblies of which I have already spoken are designed to prevent or postpone this calamity, above all when they need no formal summoning; for in that case, the prince cannot stop them without openly declaring himself a law-breaker and an enemy of the State.

The regular assemblies I mentioned earlier are meant to prevent or delay this disaster, especially when no formal summons is needed. For in that case, the prince cannot stop the assemblies without openly declaring himself a lawbreaker and an enemy of the State.

The opening of these assemblies, whose sole object is the maintenance of the social treaty, should always take the form of putting two propositions that may not be suppressed, which should be voted on separately.

These assemblies exist only to maintain the social contract. They should always open with two proposals, neither of which may be left out. Each proposal should be voted on separately.

The first is: "Does it please the Sovereign to preserve the present form of government?"

The first is: "Does the Sovereign want to keep the current form of government?"

The second is: "Does it please the people to leave its administration in the hands of those who are actually in charge of it?"

The second is: "Do the people want to leave their administration in the hands of those currently in charge?"

I am here assuming what I think I have shown; that there is in the State no fundamental law that cannot be revoked, not excluding the social compact itself; for if all the citizens assembled of one accord to break the compact, it is impossible to doubt that it would be very legitimately broken. Grotius even thinks that each man can renounce his membership of his own State, and recover his natural liberty and his goods on leaving the country.¹ It would be indeed absurd if all the citizens in assembly could not do what each can do by himself.

I am assuming here what I believe I have shown: every fundamental law in the State can be repealed. Even the social compact itself can be revoked. For if all citizens gathered and unanimously agreed to end the compact, its ending would unquestionably be legitimate. Grotius even thinks each man can give up his membership in his own State by leaving the country. In doing so, he can regain his natural freedom and his possessions.¹ It would indeed be absurd if all citizens together could not do what each can do alone.