The General Will Cannot Be Destroyed

As long as several men in assembly regard themselves as a single body, they have only a single will which is concerned with their common preservation and general well-being. In this case, all the springs of the State are vigorous and simple and its rules clear and luminous; there are no embroilments or conflicts of interests; the common good is everywhere clearly apparent, and only good sense is needed to perceive it. Peace, unity and equality are the enemies of political subtleties. Men who are upright and simple are difficult to deceive because of their simplicity; lures and ingenious pretexts fail to impose upon them, and they are not even subtle enough to be dupes. When, among the happiest people in the world, bands of peasants are seen regulating affairs of State under an oak, and always acting wisely, can we help scorning the ingenious methods of other nations, which make themselves illustrious and wretched with so much art and mystery?

As long as men gathered in an assembly see themselves as one body, they have only one will. That will is concerned with their shared survival and general well-being. In this case, all the workings of the State are strong and simple, and its rules are clear. There are no complications or conflicts of interest. The common good is clear everywhere, and only common sense is needed to see it. Peace, unity, and equality are enemies of political scheming. Honest, straightforward men are hard to deceive because of their simplicity. Tempting offers and clever excuses cannot fool them. They are not even sophisticated enough to be duped. Among the happiest people in the world, we see groups of peasants managing affairs of State under an oak tree. They always act wisely. When we see this, how can we help scorning the clever methods of other nations? Those nations use so much cunning and secrecy to make themselves both glorious and miserable.

A State so governed needs very few laws; and, as it becomes necessary to issue new ones, the necessity is universally seen. The first man to propose them merely says what all have already felt, and there is no question of factions or intrigues or eloquence in order to secure the passage into law of what every one has already decided to do, as soon as he is sure that the rest will act with him.

A State governed this way needs very few laws. When new laws become necessary, everyone sees the need. The first person to propose them simply puts into words what everyone has already felt. No factions, plots, or persuasive speeches are needed to pass these laws. Everyone has already decided to act, as soon as each person is sure the others will act alongside them.

Theorists are led into error because, seeing only States that have been from the beginning wrongly constituted, they are struck by the impossibility of applying such a policy to them. They make great game of all the absurdities a clever rascal or an insinuating speaker might get the people of Paris or London to believe. They do not know that Cromwell would have been put to "the bells" by the people of Berne, and the Due de Beaufort on the treadmill by the Genevese.

Theorists go wrong because they see only States that were badly organized from the start. They are struck by how impossible it is to apply such a policy to those States. They mock all the absurd things a clever scoundrel or a smooth-talking speaker could persuade the people of Paris or London to believe. These theorists do not realize that the people of Berne would have put Cromwell to "the bells". Nor do they realize that the Genevese would have put the Due de Beaufort on the treadmill.

But when the social bond begins to be relaxed and the State to grow weak, when particular interests begin to make themselves felt and the smaller societies to exercise an influence over the larger, the common interest changes and finds opponents: opinion is no longer unanimous; the general will ceases to be the will of all; contradictory views and debates arise; and the best advice is not taken without question.

But when the social bond starts to weaken and the State grows weak, private interests begin to assert themselves. Smaller groups then begin to influence the larger society, and the common interest changes and meets opposition. People no longer agree unanimously. The general will is no longer the will of all. Conflicting views and debates arise, and even the best advice is questioned.

Finally, when the State, on the eve of ruin, maintains only a vain, illusory and formal existence, when in every heart the social bond is broken, and the meanest interest brazenly lays hold of the sacred name of "public good," the general will becomes mute: all men, guided by secret motives, no more give their views as citizens than if the State had never been; and iniquitous decrees directed solely to private interest get passed under the name of laws.

Finally, when the State is on the brink of collapse and exists only in an empty, illusory, and formal sense, when the social bond is broken in every heart, and the pettiest interests shamelessly claim the sacred name of "public good," the general will falls silent. All people, driven by hidden motives, stop expressing their views as citizens, as if the State had never existed. And unjust decrees serving only private interests are passed under the name of laws.

Does it follow from this that the general will is exterminated or corrupted? Not at all: it is always constant, unalterable and pure; but it is subordinated to other wills which encroach upon its sphere. Each man, in detaching, his interest from the common interest, sees clearly that he cannot entirely separate them; but his share in the public mishaps seems to him negligible beside the exclusive good he aims at making his own. Apart from this particular good, he wills the general good in his own interest, as strongly as any one else. Even in selling his vote for money, he does not extinguish in himself the general will, but only eludes it. The fault he commits is that of changing the state of the question, and answering something different from what he is asked. Instead of saying, by his vote, "It is to the advantage of the State," he says, "It is of advantage to this or that man or party that this or that view should prevail." Thus the law of public order in assemblies is not so much to maintain in them the general will as to secure that the question be always put to it, and the answer always given by it.

Does this mean the general will is destroyed or corrupted? Not at all. The general will is always constant, unchanging, and pure. But other wills take priority over it and intrude on its domain. Each person, in separating his own interest from the common interest, sees clearly that he cannot separate them entirely. But his share of public misfortunes seems negligible compared with the benefit he wants for himself alone. Apart from this personal benefit, he wants the common good for his own sake, as strongly as anyone else. Even when he sells his vote for money, he does not destroy the general will within himself. He only evades it. His mistake is to change the question and answer something other than what he was asked. Instead of saying through his vote, "This benefits the State," he says, "Having this or that view prevail benefits this or that man or party." Thus, the rule for maintaining public order in assemblies is less about preserving the general will within them. It is more about ensuring that the question is always put to the general will and answered by it.

I could here set down many reflections on the simple right of voting in every act of Sovereignty—a right which no-one can take from the citizens—and also on the right of stating views, making proposals, dividing and discussing, which the government is always most careful to leave solely to its members; but this important subject would need a treatise to itself, and it is impossible to say everything in a single work.

I could offer many reflections here on the basic right to vote in every act of Sovereignty. No one can take this right away from citizens. I could also discuss the rights to express views, make proposals, call for votes, and debate. The government is always very careful to reserve these rights for its own members alone. But this important subject would need a book of its own, and it is impossible to cover everything in one work.