Democracy

He who makes the law knows better than any one else how it should be executed and interpreted. It seems then impossible to have a better constitution than that in which the executive and legislative powers are united; but this very fact renders the government in certain respects inadequate, because things which should be distinguished are confounded, and the prince and the Sovereign, being the same person, form, so to speak, no more than a government without government.

Whoever makes the law knows better than anyone else how to enforce and interpret it. So it seems no constitution could be better than one that unites executive and legislative powers. But uniting these powers makes the government inadequate in certain respects, because roles that should remain distinct are mixed together. The prince and the Sovereign are the same person, forming, so to speak, nothing more than a government without government.

It is not good for him who makes the laws to execute them, or for the body of the people to turn its attention away from a general standpoint and devote it to particular objects. Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public affairs, and the abuse of the laws by the government is a less evil than the corruption of the legislator, which is the inevitable sequel to a particular standpoint. In such a case, the State being altered in substance, all reformation becomes impossible. A people that would never misuse governmental powers would never misuse independence; a people that would always govern well would not need to be governed.

Those who make the laws should not also enforce them. Nor should the people as a whole turn away from general concerns to focus on particular matters. Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public affairs. Government abuse of the laws is a lesser evil than corruption among lawmakers. Such corruption inevitably follows when lawmakers focus on particular interests. In that case, the State changes in its very nature, making all reform impossible. A people who would never misuse government powers would never misuse independence. A people who would always govern well would not need to be governed.

If we take the term in the strict sense, there never has been a real democracy, and there never will be. It is against the natural order for the many to govern and the few to be governed. It is unimaginable that the people should remain continually assembled to devote their time to public affairs, and it is clear that they cannot set up commissions for that purpose without the form of administration being changed.

If we use the word strictly, there has never been a true democracy, and there never will be. It goes against the natural order for the many to govern and the few to be governed. We cannot imagine the people staying permanently assembled to spend their time on public affairs. And clearly, the people cannot set up committees for that purpose without changing the form of government.

In fact, I can confidently lay down as a principle that, when the functions of government are shared by several tribunals, the less numerous sooner or later acquire the greatest authority, if only because they are in a position to expedite affairs, and power thus naturally comes into their hands.

In fact, I can confidently state this principle: when several governing bodies share government duties, the smaller bodies eventually gain the most authority. This happens if only because smaller bodies can get things done faster, so power naturally falls into their hands.

Besides, how many conditions that are difficult to unite does such a government presuppose! First, a very small State, where the people can readily be got together and where each citizen can with ease know all the rest; secondly, great simplicity of manners, to prevent business from multiplying and raising thorny problems; next, a large measure of equality in rank and fortune, without which equality of rights and authority cannot long subsist; lastly, little or no luxury—for luxury either comes of riches or makes them necessary; it corrupts at once rich and poor, the rich by possession and the poor by covetousness; it sells the country to softness and vanity, and takes away from the State all its citizens, to make them slaves one to another, and one and all to public opinion.

Besides, such a government requires so many conditions that are hard to bring together! First, the State must be very small, so the people can easily gather and every citizen can know everyone else. Second, ways of life must be very simple, to keep public business from multiplying and creating difficult problems. Next, there must be a high degree of equality in social standing and wealth. Without that equality, equal rights and authority cannot last long. Finally, there must be little or no luxury, because luxury either comes from wealth or makes wealth necessary. Luxury corrupts both rich and poor, the rich through possession and the poor through envy. It sells the country into softness and vanity. It robs the State of all its citizens by making them slaves to one another and all to public opinion.

This is why a famous writer has made virtue the fundamental principle of Republics; for all these conditions could not exist without virtue. But, for want of the necessary distinctions, that great thinker was often inexact, and sometimes obscure, and did not see that, the sovereign authority being everywhere the same, the same principle should be found in every well-constituted State, in a greater or less degree, it is true, according to the form of the government.

This is why a famous writer made virtue the basic principle of republics. For all these conditions could not exist without virtue. But that great thinker failed to make the necessary distinctions, so he was often inaccurate and sometimes unclear. He did not see that sovereign authority is the same everywhere. So the same principle should exist in every well-organized state. The degree would vary, it is true, depending on the form of government.

It may be added that there is no government so subject to civil wars and intestine agitations as democratic or popular government, because there is none which has so strong and continual a tendency to change to another form, or which demands more vigilance and courage for its maintenance as it is. Under such a constitution above all, the citizen should arm himself with strength and constancy, and say, every day of his life, what a virtuous Count Palatine¹ said in the Diet of Poland: Malo periculosam libertatem quam quietum servitium.

It may also be added that no government is as prone to civil wars and internal unrest as democratic or popular government. This is because no other government has such a strong and constant tendency to change into another form. Nor does any other government require more vigilance and courage to preserve its existing form. Above all, under such a constitution, citizens should prepare themselves with strength and resolve. Every day of their lives, they should repeat what a virtuous Count Palatine¹ said in the Diet of Poland: I prefer dangerous freedom to peaceful slavery.

Were there a people of gods, their government would be democratic. So perfect a government is not for men.

If there were a society of gods, their government would be democratic. Such a perfect government is not for humans.