Aristocracy

We have here two quite distinct moral persons, the government and the Sovereign, and in consequence two general wills, one general in relation to all the citizens, the other only for the members of the administration. Thus, although the government may regulate its internal policy as it pleases, it can never speak to the people save in the name of the Sovereign, that is, of the people itself, a fact which must not be forgotten.

Here we have two clearly distinct collective persons: the government and the Sovereign. As a result, there are two general wills. One applies to all citizens, the other only to members of the administration. So, although the government may manage its internal affairs as it pleases, it can speak to the people only in the Sovereign’s name. The Sovereign is the people itself, a fact that must not be forgotten.

The first societies governed themselves aristocratically. The heads of families took counsel together on public affairs. The young bowed without question to the authority of experience. Hence such names as priests, elders, senate, and gerontes. The savages of North America govern themselves in this way even now, and their government is admirable.

The first societies had aristocratic governments. The heads of families met to discuss public affairs. Young people accepted the authority of experience without question. This gave rise to names such as priests, elders, senate, and gerontes. The Indigenous peoples of North America still govern themselves this way, and their government is admirable.

But, in proportion as artificial inequality produced by institutions became predominant over natural inequality, riches or power¹ were put before age, and aristocracy became elective. Finally, the transmission of the father's power along with his goods to his children, by creating patrician families, made government hereditary, and there came to be senators of twenty.

But as inequality created by institutions increasingly outweighed natural inequality, wealth or power¹ took priority over age. And aristocratic rulers came to be chosen by election. Finally, fathers passed their power down to their children along with their property, creating patrician families. This made government hereditary, and there were senators as young as twenty.

There are then three sorts of aristocracy—natural, elective and hereditary. The first is only for simple peoples; the third is the worst of all governments; the second is the best, and is aristocracy properly so called.

There are, then, three types of aristocracy: natural, elective, and hereditary. Natural aristocracy is suited only to simple societies. Hereditary aristocracy is the worst of all governments. Elective aristocracy is the best and is aristocracy in the true sense of the word.

Besides the advantage that lies in the distinction between the two powers, it presents that of its members being chosen; for, in popular government, all the citizens are born magistrates; but here magistracy is confined to a few, who become such only by election.² By this means uprightness, understanding, experience and all other claims to pre-eminence and public esteem become so many further guarantees of wise government.

Besides the advantage of separating the two powers, it offers another advantage: its members are elected. In popular government, all citizens are born magistrates. But here, only a few become magistrates, and only through election.² In this way, honesty, understanding, experience, and all other qualities that earn distinction and public respect provide further guarantees of wise government.

Moreover, assemblies are more easily held, affairs better discussed and carried out with more order and diligence, and the credit of the State is better sustained abroad by venerable senators than by a multitude that is unknown or despised.

Moreover, assemblies are easier to hold, and public affairs are better discussed and managed with greater order and care. Respected senators also maintain the State’s reputation abroad better than a crowd whose members are unknown or despised.

In a word, it is the best and most natural arrangement that the wisest should govern the many, when it is assured that they will govern for its profit, and not for their own. There is no need to multiply instruments, or get twenty thousand men to do what a hundred picked men can do even better, but it must not be forgotten that corporate interest here begins to direct the public power less under the regulation of the general will, and that a further inevitable propensity takes away from the laws part of the executive power.

In short, the best and most natural arrangement is for the wisest to govern the many. But this is true only when the wisest are certain to govern for the people's benefit, not their own. There is no need to multiply the means of governing. Nor is there any need for twenty thousand men to do what a hundred carefully chosen men can do better. But we must remember that the governing group's own interests then begin to guide public power. As a result, the general will has less control over that power. And another inevitable tendency removes some executive power from the control of the laws.

If we are to speak of what is individually desirable, neither should the State be so small, nor a people so simple and upright, that the execution of the laws follows immediately from the public will, as it does in a good democracy. Nor should the nation be so great that the rulers have to scatter in order to govern it and are able to play the Sovereign each in his own department, and, beginning by making themselves independent, end by becoming masters.

If we consider what is desirable in itself, the State should not be too small. Nor should the people be so simple and honest that the public will leads directly to laws being enforced. That is what happens in a good democracy. Nor should the nation be so large that its rulers must spread out to govern it. Otherwise, each ruler could act as the Sovereign in his own district. The rulers would begin by making themselves independent and end by becoming masters.

But if aristocracy does not demand all the virtues needed by popular government, it demands others which are peculiar to itself; for instance, moderation on the side of the rich and contentment on that of the poor; for it seems that thorough-going equality would be out of place, as it was not found even at Sparta.

But although aristocracy does not require all the virtues needed in popular government, it requires other virtues of its own. For example, the rich must show moderation, and the poor must be content. For complete equality seems out of place, since such equality did not exist even in Sparta.

Furthermore, if this form of government carries with it a certain inequality of fortune, this is justifiable in order that as a rule the administration of public affairs may be entrusted to those who are most able to give them their whole time, but not, as Aristotle maintains, in order that the rich may always be put first. On the contrary, it is of importance that an opposite choice should occasionally teach the people that the deserts of men offer claims to pre-eminence more important than those of riches.

Furthermore, if this form of government involves some inequality of wealth, that inequality is justified for a particular purpose. As a rule, public affairs may then be entrusted to those best able to devote their full time to them. But the purpose is not, as Aristotle argues, to ensure that the rich always come first. On the contrary, it is important to choose someone less wealthy occasionally. Such choices should teach the people that merit gives people a stronger claim to leading positions than wealth does.