Civil Society

The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice, for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right of appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself, find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations. Although, in this state, he deprives himself of some advantages which he got from nature, he gains in return others so great, his faculties are so stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted, that, did not the abuses of this new condition often degrade him below that which he left, he would be bound to bless continually the happy moment which took him from it for ever, and, instead of a stupid and unimaginative animal, made him an intelligent being and a man.

The move from the state of nature to civil society brings a remarkable change in man. Justice replaces instinct as the guide to his behavior, and his actions gain the moral character they previously lacked. Only then does the voice of duty replace physical impulses, and right replace appetite. Only then does man, who until now has considered only himself, find he must act on different principles. He must consult his reason before following his desires. Although he gives up some advantages nature gave him, he gains others so great in return. His abilities are so stimulated and developed, his ideas so broadened, his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted. If abuses of civil society did not often lower him beneath his former condition, he would owe that change endless gratitude. He would continually bless the happy moment that took him forever out of the state of nature. Instead of a dull, unimaginative animal, that moment made him an intelligent being and a man.

Let us draw up the whole account in terms easily commensurable. What man loses by the social contract in his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses. If we are to avoid mistake in weighing one against the other, we must clearly distinguish natural liberty, which is bounded only by the strength of the individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and possession, which is merely the effect of force or the right of the first occupier, from property, which can be founded only on a positive title.

Let us weigh the whole exchange in terms we can easily compare. Through the social contract, a person loses natural liberty and the unlimited right to whatever they can obtain. In return, they gain civil liberty and ownership of everything they possess. If we are to avoid mistakes in weighing these losses and gains, we must make two clear distinctions. Natural liberty is limited only by the individual's strength, while civil liberty is limited by the general will. We must also distinguish possession from property. Possession comes merely from force or the right of the first occupier. Property, by contrast, can rest only on a legally recognized title.

We might, over and above all this, add, to what man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty. But I have already said too much on this head, and the philosophical meaning of the word liberty does not now concern us.

Beyond all these gains, we might add moral liberty to what a person gains in civil society. Moral liberty alone makes a person truly their own master. For following nothing but our appetites is slavery, while obeying a law we set for ourselves is liberty. But I have already said too much on this subject. The philosophical meaning of liberty is not our concern here.