Land Ownership

Each member of the community gives himself to it, at the moment of its foundation, just as he is, with all the resources at his command, including the goods he possesses. This act does not make possession, in changing hands, change its nature, and becomes property in the hands of the Sovereign; but, as the forces of the city are incomparably greater than those of an individual, public possession is also, in fact, stronger and more irrevocable, without being any more legitimate, at any rate from the point of view of foreigners. For the State, in relation to its members, is master of all their goods by the social contract, which, within the State, is the basis of all rights; but, in relation to other powers, it is so only by the right of the first occupier, which it holds from its members.

When the community is founded, each member gives himself to the community just as he is. He gives all the resources at his command, including the goods he owns. This transfer does not change the nature of possession or turn possession into property in the Sovereign’s hands. But the community’s power is incomparably greater than an individual’s. Public possession is therefore, in practice, more secure and harder to overturn. Yet public possession is no more legitimate, at least from the perspective of foreigners. In relation to its members, the State controls all their goods under the social contract. Within the State, this contract is the basis of all rights. But in relation to other powers, the State controls those goods only through the right of the first occupier. The State receives this right from its members.

The right of the first occupier, though more real than the right of the strongest, becomes a real right only when the right of property has already been established. Every man has naturally a right to everything he needs; but the positive act which makes him proprietor of one thing excludes him from everything else. Having his share, he ought to keep to it, and can have no further right against the community. This is why the right of the first occupier, which in the state of nature is so weak, claims the respect of every man in civil society. In this right we are respecting not so much what belongs to another as what does not belong to ourselves.

The right of the first person to occupy something has more basis than the right of the strongest. But it becomes a genuine right only once property rights have been established. Everyone has a natural right to everything they need. But the specific act that makes someone the owner of one thing excludes them from everything else. Once someone has their share, they should keep to it and can claim no further right against the community. This is why everyone in civil society must respect the first occupier’s right, though it is so weak in nature. In respecting this right, we respect not so much what belongs to others as what does not belong to us.

In general, to establish the right of the first occupier over a plot of ground, the following conditions are necessary: first, the land must not yet be inhabited; secondly, a man must occupy only the amount he needs for his subsistence; and, in the third place, possession must be taken, not by an empty ceremony, but by labour and cultivation, the only sign of proprietorship that should be respected by others, in default of a legal title.

In general, a person claiming land as its first occupant must meet the following conditions. First, the land must not already be inhabited. Second, a man must occupy only as much land as he needs to support himself. Third, he must take possession by working and cultivating the land, not through an empty ceremony. Without a legal title, work and cultivation are the only signs of ownership that others should respect.

In granting the right of first occupancy to necessity and labour, are we not really stretching it as far as it can go? Is it possible to leave such a right unlimited? Is it to be enough to set foot on a plot of common ground, in order to be able to call yourself at once the master of it? Is it to be enough that a man has the strength to expel others for a moment, in order to establish his right to prevent them from ever returning? How can a man or a people seize an immense territory and keep it from the rest of the world except by a punishable usurpation, since all others are being robbed, by such an act, of the place of habitation and the means of subsistence which nature gave them in common? When Nuñez Balbao, standing on the sea-shore, took possession of the South Seas and the whole of South America in the name of the crown of Castille, was that enough to dispossess all their actual inhabitants, and to shut out from them all the princes of the world? On such a showing, these ceremonies are idly multiplied, and the Catholic King need only take possession all at once, from his apartment, of the whole universe, merely making a subsequent reservation about what was already in the possession of other princes.

By recognizing a right of first occupancy based on necessity and labor, aren’t we already stretching that right to its limit? Can we leave such a right unlimited? Is simply setting foot on common ground enough to make you its owner at once? Is a man’s strength to drive others away for a moment enough to give him the right to exclude them forever? How can a man or a people seize a vast territory and exclude the rest of the world? Isn’t such a seizure an unlawful takeover deserving punishment? After all, it robs everyone else of living space and the means of survival that nature gave everyone in common. Nuñez Balbao stood on the shore and claimed the South Seas and all of South America for the crown of Castille. Was that enough to strip all the actual inhabitants of their land and exclude all the world’s princes? By that logic, there is no point in repeating these ceremonies. The Catholic King need only claim the whole universe at once, without leaving his room. He could simply add a reservation afterward for whatever other princes already possessed.

We can imagine how the lands of individuals, where they were contiguous and came to be united, became the public territory, and how the right of Sovereignty, extending from the subjects over the lands they held, became at once real and personal. The possessors were thus made more dependent, and the forces at their command used to guarantee their fidelity. The advantage of this does not seem to have been felt by ancient monarchs, who called themselves King of the Persians, Scythians, or Macedonians, and seemed to regard themselves more as rulers of men than as masters of a country. Those of the present day more cleverly call themselves Kings of France, Spain, England, etc.: thus holding the land, they are quite confident of holding the inhabitants.

We can imagine how neighboring plots of privately owned land, once joined together, became public territory. We can also imagine how Sovereignty extended from the subjects to their lands, becoming authority over both people and property. Landowners thus became more dependent, and the resources under their control were used to ensure their loyalty. Ancient monarchs do not seem to have recognized this advantage. They called themselves King of the Persians, Scythians, or Macedonians. They seemed to see themselves more as rulers of people than as masters of a country. Today's monarchs more cleverly call themselves Kings of France, Spain, England, and so on. By holding the land, these monarchs are quite confident of holding its inhabitants.

The peculiar fact about this alienation is that, in taking over the goods of individuals, the community, so far from despoiling them, only assures them legitimate possession, and changes usurpation into a true right and enjoyment into proprietorship. Thus the possessors, being regarded as depositaries of the public good, and having their rights, respected by all the members of the State and maintained against foreign aggression by all its forces, have, by a cession which benefits both the public and still more themselves, acquired, so to speak, all that they gave up. This paradox may easily be explained by the distinction between the rights which the Sovereign and the proprietor have over the same estate, as we shall see later on. It may also happen that men begin to unite one with another before they possess anything, and that, subsequently occupying a tract of country which is enough for all, they enjoy it in common, or share it out among themselves, either equally or according to a scale fixed by they Sovereign. However the acquisition be made, the right which each individual has to his own estate is always subordinate to the right which the community has over all: without this, there would be neither stability in the social tie, nor real force in the exercise of Sovereignty.

This transfer has a distinctive feature: by taking over individuals’ property, the community does not rob them of it. Instead, the community secures their lawful possession, turning seizure into a genuine right and use into ownership. The possessors are thus regarded as trustees of the public good. All members of the State respect their rights, and all its forces defend those rights against foreign aggression. By surrendering their property, the possessors benefit both the public and, even more, themselves. In a sense, they have gained everything they gave up. This paradox is easily explained by distinguishing the Sovereign’s rights over an estate from the owner’s rights over that same estate. We will examine this distinction later. People may also begin to unite before they own anything. They may then occupy a stretch of land large enough for everyone. They may use the land together or divide it among themselves, either equally or according to proportions the Sovereign sets. However property is acquired, each individual’s right to an estate always remains subject to the community’s right over all property. Without this priority, the social bond would lack stability, and the exercise of Sovereignty would have no real force.

I shall end this chapter and this book by remarking on a fact on which the whole social system should rest: i.e. that, instead of destroying natural inequality, the fundamental compact substitutes, for such physical inequality as nature may have set up between men, an equality that is moral and legitimate, and that men, who may be unequal in strength or intelligence, become every one equal by convention and legal right.¹

I will end this chapter and this book with a fact that should support the whole social system. That is, the basic social agreement does not destroy natural inequality. Instead, it replaces the physical inequalities nature may have created between people with a moral and legitimate equality. People may be unequal in strength or intelligence, but agreement and legal rights make every person equal.¹