The Sovereign

This formula shows us that the act of association comprises a mutual undertaking between the public and the individuals, and that each individual, in making a contract, as we may say, with himself, is bound in a double capacity; as a member of the Sovereign he is bound to the individuals, and as a member of the State to the Sovereign. But the maxim of civil right, that no one is bound by undertakings made to himself, does not apply in this case; for there is a great difference between incurring an obligation to yourself and incurring one to a whole of which you form a part.

This formula shows that joining together involves a mutual commitment between the public and individuals. Each individual, in a sense, makes a contract with himself and takes on obligations in two roles. As a member of the Sovereign, he has obligations to individuals. As a member of the State, he has obligations to the Sovereign. But a rule of civil law does not apply here: no one is bound by commitments made to himself. There is a great difference between taking on an obligation to yourself and taking one on to a whole you belong to.

Attention must further be called to the fact that public deliberation, while competent to bind all the subjects to the Sovereign, because of the two different capacities in which each of them may be regarded, cannot, for the opposite reason, bind the Sovereign to itself; and that it is consequently against the nature of the body politic for the Sovereign to impose on itself a law which it cannot infringe. Being able to regard itself in only one capacity, it is in the position of an individual who makes a contract with himself; and this makes it clear that there neither is nor can be any kind of fundamental law binding on the body of the people—not even the social contract itself. This does not mean that the body politic cannot enter into undertakings with others, provided the contract is not infringed by them; for in relation to what is external to it, it becomes a simple being, an individual.

We must also note that public decisions can bind all subjects to the Sovereign. This is because each subject can be viewed in two different roles. But for the opposite reason, public decisions cannot bind the Sovereign to itself. So the Sovereign cannot impose a law on itself that it cannot break without contradicting the nature of the body politic. The Sovereign can view itself in only one role, like an individual making a contract with himself. This shows that no fundamental law binds, or can bind, the people as a whole, not even the social contract itself. But the body politic can still make commitments to others, provided those commitments do not violate the social contract. In its dealings with anyone outside itself, the body politic acts as a single entity, an individual.

But the body politic or the Sovereign, drawing its being wholly from the sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to an outsider, to do anything derogatory to the original act, for instance, to alienate any part of itself, or to submit to another Sovereign. Violation of the act by which it exists would be self-annihilation; and that which is itself nothing can create nothing.

But the body politic, or the Sovereign, owes its existence entirely to the sacredness of the contract. So it can never commit itself, even to an outsider, to anything that undermines the original agreement. For example, it cannot give away any part of itself or submit to another Sovereign. To violate the agreement that gives it existence would be to destroy itself. And what does not exist can create nothing.

As soon as this multitude is so united in one body, it is impossible to offend against one of the members without attacking the body, and still more to offend against the body without the members resenting it. Duty and interest therefore equally oblige the two contracting parties to give each other help; and the same men should seek to combine, in their double capacity, all the advantages dependent upon that capacity.

Once these people unite as one body, no member can be harmed without the whole body being attacked. Still less can the body be harmed without its members resenting the harm. Duty and self-interest therefore both require the two parties to the agreement to help each other. And the same people, in their two roles, should seek to combine all the advantages those roles offer.

Again, the Sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and consequently the sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it is impossible for the body to wish to hurt all its members. We shall also see later on that It cannot hurt any in particular. The Sovereign, merely by virtue of what it is, is is always what it should be.

Again, the Sovereign is made up entirely of its individual members. So the Sovereign has no interests opposed to theirs, nor can it have any. As a result, the sovereign power need not give its subjects any guarantees. This is because the body cannot wish to harm all its members. We will also see later that the Sovereign cannot harm any individual member. Simply by being what it is, the Sovereign is always what it should be.

This, however, is not the case with the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign, which, despite the common interest, would have no security that they would fulfil their undertakings, unless it found means to assure itself of their fidelity.

But the relationship between subjects and the Sovereign is different. Despite their shared interest, the Sovereign would have no guarantee that subjects would keep their promises. The Sovereign would need a way to ensure their loyalty.

In fact, each individual, as a man, may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar to the general will which he has as a citizen. His particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest: his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him look upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will do less harm to others than the payment of it is burdensome to himself; and, regarding the moral person which constitutes the State as a persona ficta, because not a man, he may wish to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfil the duties of a subject. The continuance of such an injustice could not but prove the undoing of the body politic.

In fact, each individual, as a person, may have a private will different from or opposed to his general will as a citizen. His private interest may speak to him very differently from the common interest. His complete and naturally independent existence may lead him to see what he owes the common cause as a gift. He may think that withholding his contribution harms others less than paying it burdens him. And he may regard the collective person that makes up the State as a persona ficta, a fictional person, because the State is not a human being. He may therefore want to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being willing to fulfill his duties as a subject. If such an injustice continued, it would inevitably destroy the political community.

In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, secures him against all personal dependence. In this lies the key to the working of the political machine; this alone legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most frightful abuses.

To keep the social compact from being an empty formula, it includes an unspoken commitment. This commitment alone gives force to the rest: whoever refuses to obey the general will must be compelled by the whole community. This means nothing less than being forced to be free. For by giving each citizen to his country, this condition protects him from dependence on any individual. This condition is the key to how the political system works. It alone makes civil commitments legitimate. Without it, those commitments would be absurd, tyrannical, and open to the most terrible abuses.