I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates.
I do not want to leave out an important part of this subject. It concerns a danger that princes struggle to avoid unless they are very careful and discerning. That danger is flattery, and courts are full of flatterers. People are so pleased with how they handle their own affairs, and so mistaken about them, that they struggle to escape this plague. Yet when they try to defend themselves against it, they risk being held in contempt. The only defense against flatterers is to make people understand that telling you the truth does not offend you. But when everyone is free to tell you the truth, respect for you declines.
Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt.
Therefore, a wise prince should take a third course by choosing wise men from his state as advisers. He should allow only these men to speak the truth to him, and only about matters he asks about. But he should question them about everything, listen to their opinions, and then reach his own conclusions. He should treat these advisers, individually and together, so each knows that speaking more freely will earn him greater favor. He should listen to no one else, carry out what he has decided, and remain firm in his decisions. Anyone who acts otherwise is either brought down by flatterers or changes course so often with shifting opinions that he earns contempt.
I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of affairs to Maximilian, the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything. This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man—he does not communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.
I want to give a modern example of this. Fra Luca, an adviser to Maximilian, the current emperor, said of his majesty: He consulted no one, yet never got his own way in anything. This happened because he followed a practice opposite to the one described above. The emperor is secretive. He shares his plans with no one and seeks no opinions about them. But when he puts them into action, they become known. The men around him immediately block them, and he gives in easily and abandons his plans. As a result, what he does one day he undoes the next. No one ever understands what he wants or intends to do, and no one can rely on his decisions.
Maximilian I (1459–1519) was Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. He first married Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold. After her death, he married Bianca Sforza, becoming involved in Italian politics.
A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.
A prince should therefore always seek advice, but only when he wants it, not when others want to give it. He should discourage everyone from offering advice unless he asks for it. Still, he should ask questions regularly and then listen patiently to the answers. If he learns that anyone has withheld the truth for any reason, he should make his anger felt.
And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long, because such a governor would in a short time take away his state from him.
Some think a prince seems wise not because of his own ability, but because he has good advisers. They are certainly mistaken, because this rule never fails: a prince who lacks wisdom himself will never accept good advice. The only exception is if he happens to entrust all his affairs to one person who is very wise. In that case, he may indeed be well governed, but not for long. Such a man would soon take the prince’s state away from him.
But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels.
But if an experienced prince takes advice from more than one person, he will never receive consistent advice. Nor will he know how to reconcile their views. Each adviser will think of his own interests. The prince will not know how to control them or see through them. Advisers cannot be otherwise, because men will always be disloyal to you unless forced to stay honest. We must therefore conclude that good advice, wherever it comes from, grows out of the prince’s wisdom. The prince’s wisdom does not grow out of good advice.