The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom.
If carefully followed, the advice above will make a new prince seem firmly established. It will immediately make his rule more secure and stable than if he had held power for many years. A new prince’s actions are watched more closely than those of a hereditary ruler. When his actions show ability, they win more supporters and bind them more closely than an ancient royal bloodline can. People care more about the present than the past. When the present is good, they enjoy it and seek nothing more. They will also defend a prince with all their strength, provided he does not fail them in other ways. He will therefore earn double glory by founding a new principality and improving and strengthening it. He does this through good laws, good armies, good allies, and his own good example. Likewise, a prince born to power suffers double disgrace if he loses his state through a lack of wisdom.
And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.
Consider the rulers who have lost their states in Italy in our time. These include the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others. First, they all shared a military weakness, for the reasons discussed at length earlier. Next, each either faced a hostile population or, if the people supported him, failed to secure the nobles’ loyalty. Without these weaknesses, states powerful enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.
Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the kingdom.
Philip of Macedon was not Alexander the Great’s father, but the king defeated by Titus Quintius. His territory was small compared with the power of the Romans and Greeks who attacked him. Yet he was a skilled warrior who knew how to win popular support and keep the nobles loyal. He fought his enemies for many years. Although he eventually lost control of some cities, he kept his kingdom.
Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their principalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their own sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and your valour.
So our princes should not blame fortune for losing states they had ruled for so many years. They should blame their own laziness. In peaceful times, they never imagined that things could change. People commonly fail to prepare for storms while the weather is calm. When hard times came, they thought of fleeing rather than defending themselves. They hoped the people, disgusted by the conquerors’ arrogance, would call them back. This approach may be useful when all others fail. But neglecting every other option and relying on this alone is a very bad choice. You would never willingly fall because you trusted that someone would later restore you to power. Either this restoration never happens, or, if it does, it will not make you secure. Rescue that does not depend on your own efforts is no use. Only ways of saving yourself that depend on your own efforts and courage are reliable, certain, and lasting.