Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having considered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of offence and defence which belong to each of them.
I have discussed in detail the characteristics of the principalities I set out to examine at the beginning. I have considered, to some extent, what makes them good or bad. I have shown the methods many have used to acquire and hold them. It now remains to discuss, in general, the means of attack and defense available to each.
We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion and shall speak of the arms.
As we have seen, a prince must build on solid foundations. Otherwise, he will inevitably fall. The main foundations of all states, whether new, old, or made up of combined territories, are good laws and strong armies. There can be no good laws where the state is not well armed. It follows that well-armed states have good laws. I will leave laws aside and discuss military forces.
I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in hand; and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty.
I say, then, that a prince defends his state with his own troops, mercenaries, auxiliaries, or a mixture of these. Auxiliaries are troops supplied by another ruler. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. A prince who relies on them will be neither secure nor safe. They are divided, ambitious, undisciplined, and unfaithful. They are brave among friends but cowardly before enemies. They neither fear God nor remain loyal to anyone. Ruin is delayed only as long as the attack is delayed. In peace they rob you, and in war the enemy does. They have no reason to stay in the field except their meager pay. That is not enough to make them willing to die for you. They are quite ready to be your soldiers while you are not at war. But when war comes, they leave or flee from the enemy. I would have little trouble proving this. Italy’s ruin has come from nothing else but placing all her hopes in mercenaries for many years. They once put on a show of strength and seemed brave when fighting one another. But when foreign armies came, they showed their true nature. This allowed Charles, King of France, to seize Italy with chalk in hand. Whoever told us that our sins caused this spoke the truth. But they were not the sins he meant. They were the sins I have described. And since these were the sins of princes, the princes have also paid the penalty.
“With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This witty remark by Alexander VI refers to how easily Charles VIII seized Italy. It suggests he only needed to send quartermasters ahead to mark his soldiers’ lodgings with chalk to conquer the country. See “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “King Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy without resistance: so that it was true what Pope Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, rather than with swords to fight.”
I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the usual way.
I want to show further why relying on mercenary forces ends badly. Mercenary captains are either capable or incapable. If they are capable, you cannot trust them, because they always seek greatness for themselves. They do this either by oppressing you, their employer, or by oppressing others against your wishes. But if the captain lacks skill, you are ruined in the usual way.
And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely armed and quite free.
Some may argue that anyone with weapons will act the same way, whether a mercenary or not. I reply that when a prince must take up arms, he should go in person and command the army. A republic must send its own citizens. If the citizen it sends proves unsatisfactory, it should recall him. If he proves worthy, it should use its laws to keep him in command. Experience shows that princes and republics relying on their own forces have made the greatest progress. Mercenaries have done nothing but harm. A republic armed with its own forces is harder for one of its citizens to dominate than one using foreign forces. Rome and Sparta remained armed and free for many centuries. The Swiss are fully armed and entirely free.
Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their liberty.
The Carthaginians offer an ancient example of the dangers of mercenaries. After their first war with Rome, their mercenary soldiers oppressed them, even though Carthaginian citizens commanded those troops. After the death of Epaminondas, the Thebans put Philip of Macedon in command of their soldiers. After winning, he took away their freedom.
Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio, allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna of Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them, I reply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto, and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under Carmignuola, they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano, and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila, where in one battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.
After Duke Filippo died, the Milanese hired Francesco Sforza to fight the Venetians. He defeated the enemy at Caravaggio, then allied with them to crush the Milanese, who had hired him. His father, Sforza, had been hired by Queen Johanna of Naples but left her unprotected. To save her kingdom, she was forced to seek the protection of the King of Aragon. Some may object that the Venetians and Florentines once expanded their territories using these troops. Their captains defended them instead of making themselves princes. My answer is that chance favored the Florentines in this matter. Among the capable captains they might have feared, some failed to conquer, some faced opposition, and others pursued ambitions elsewhere. Giovanni Acuto was one who failed to conquer. Since he did not conquer, his loyalty cannot be proved. But everyone will acknowledge that victory would have left the Florentines at his mercy. Sforza always faced the Bracceschi, so they kept each other in check. Francesco directed his ambitions toward Lombardy. Braccio directed his against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us turn to something that happened recently. The Florentines appointed Pagolo Vitelli as their captain. He was a very shrewd man who had risen from private life to great fame. Had he taken Pisa, no one can deny that the Florentines would have needed to stay on good terms with him. If he had entered their enemies’ service, they would have had no means of resisting him. If they had kept him, they would have had to obey him. Consider the Venetians’ achievements. They acted safely and gloriously as long as they sent their own men to war. Their armed nobles and commoners fought bravely. This was before they began campaigns on land. Once they began fighting on land, they abandoned this strength and followed the Italian custom. At first, their mainland territory was small and their reputation great, so they had little to fear from their captains. But as they expanded, they tasted the consequences of this mistake, as under Carmignuola. They had found him very capable in battle, defeating the Duke of Milan under his leadership. Yet they also knew how little enthusiasm he showed for the war. They feared they would win no more victories under him. For this reason, they were neither willing nor able to dismiss him. To protect themselves and avoid losing what they had gained, they were forced to murder him. Their later captains included Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the Count of Pitigliano, and others like them. Under these men, they had to expect losses rather than gains. This happened later at Vaila, where one battle cost them everything they had acquired with such difficulty over eight hundred years. With troops like these, conquests come slowly, after long delays, and amount to little. But losses come suddenly and are disastrous.
Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.
Johanna II of Naples was the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.
Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose real name was Sir John Hawkwood. He fought in England’s wars in France and was knighted by Edward III. He later gathered a force of troops and went to Italy. These troops became the famous “White Company.” He fought in many wars and died in Florence in 1394. He was born around 1320 in Sible Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti.
Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone was born in Carmagnola around 1390. He was executed in Venice on 5th May 1432.
Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo died in 1457. Roberto of San Severino died in 1487 fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria. Machiavelli called him “Primo capitano in Italia.” Nicolo Orsini, Count of Pitigliano, was born in 1442 and died in 1510.
The Battle of Vaila in 1509.
And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both commenced to enlist foreigners.
These examples bring me to Italy, which mercenaries have ruled for many years. I want to examine them more closely. Understanding their rise and growth will help us resist them. You must understand that Italy has recently rejected imperial authority. The Pope has gained more worldly power, and Italy has split into more states. This happened because many great cities took up arms against their nobles. These nobles, once supported by the emperor, had been oppressing them. Meanwhile, the Church supported the cities to increase its own worldly power. In many other cities, citizens became princes. As a result, Italy fell partly under the control of the Church and partly under that of republics. The Church consisted of priests, and the republics consisted of citizens unaccustomed to warfare. Both began hiring foreign soldiers.
The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio, the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a moderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt.
The first to make these soldiers famous was Alberigo da Conio, from Romagna. Among those trained in his school were Braccio and Sforza, who in their day decided Italy’s fate. They were followed by all the other captains who have commanded Italy’s armies up to now. The result of all their courage has been that Charles overran Italy, Louis robbed it, and Ferdinand ravaged it. The Swiss have humiliated it. Their guiding principle was first to reduce the prestige of infantry so they could increase their own. They did this because they lived on their pay and held no territory. They could not support many soldiers, and a small infantry force gave them no authority. So they turned to cavalry, since a modest force of mounted soldiers could provide them with income and honor. Things reached the point where an army of twenty thousand contained fewer than two thousand foot soldiers. They also used every possible means to reduce hardship and danger for themselves and their soldiers. Instead of killing in battle, they took prisoners and released them without ransom. They did not attack towns at night, nor did town garrisons attack their camps at night. They did not surround their camps with either stockades or ditches, and they did not campaign in winter. Their military rules allowed all these practices. They devised them, as I have said, to avoid both hardship and danger. In this way, they have brought Italy into slavery and contempt.
Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in Romagna. He led the famous “Company of St George,” made up entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409.