Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain, for his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive.
Auxiliary troops are the other useless kind of army. A ruler uses them when he calls in another prince and his forces to help and defend him. Pope Julius did this recently. During his campaign against Ferrara, his mercenaries had performed poorly, so he turned to auxiliary troops. He made an agreement with Ferdinand, King of Spain, for help with men and weapons. These troops may be capable and effective in themselves, but they are always a disadvantage to whoever calls them in. If they lose, he is ruined. If they win, he is their captive.
Ferdinand V was also Ferdinand II of Aragon and Sicily and Ferdinand III of Naples. Known as “The Catholic,” he was born in 1452 and died in 1516.
And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.
Although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not want to leave out this recent one. It concerns Pope Julius II, and its danger is plain to see. Wanting to seize Ferrara, he placed himself entirely in foreign hands. But good fortune brought about a third outcome, sparing him the consequences of his rash choice. His foreign auxiliary troops were defeated at Ravenna. Then the Swiss rose up and drove out the victors, against all expectations, both his own and everyone else’s. As a result, he became a prisoner neither of his enemies nor of his auxiliaries. His enemies had fled, and he had won using troops other than his auxiliaries.
The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other time of their troubles.
The Florentines had no armed forces of their own, so they sent ten thousand French soldiers to capture Pisa. This put them in greater danger than at any other time during their troubles.
The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppose his neighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to the infidels.
The Emperor of Constantinople, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece to fight his neighbours. When the war ended, they refused to leave. This marked the beginning of Greece’s subjugation to the infidels.
Joannes Cantacuzenus was born in 1300 and died in 1383.
Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made their head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.
Therefore, anyone who has no desire to conquer should use these auxiliary troops, for they are far more dangerous than mercenaries. With them, your ruin is already prepared. They are all united, and all obey someone else. Mercenaries, however, need more time and better opportunities to harm you after they have won. They do not all come from one community, and you recruit and pay them. The commander you appoint cannot immediately gain enough authority to harm you. In short, cowardice is the greatest danger with mercenaries, and courage is the greatest danger with auxiliary troops. A wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these forces and relied on his own. He has preferred losing with his own troops to winning with others. He does not consider a victory won with someone else’s troops a true victory.
I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces.
I will never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. The duke entered the Romagna with troops supplied by another ruler, bringing only French soldiers. With them, he captured Imola and Forli. But he later judged these troops unreliable and turned to mercenaries, seeing less danger in them. He hired the Orsini and Vitelli. After working with them, he found them unreliable, disloyal, and dangerous. He destroyed them and turned to his own troops. The difference between these forces is clear if we compare the duke’s reputation at each stage. First he had the French, then the Orsini and Vitelli, and finally his own soldiers. He could always count on his own soldiers’ loyalty, and his reputation continued to grow. He was never held in higher regard than when everyone saw that he fully controlled his own forces.
I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens.
I intended to use only recent examples from Italy. But I do not want to leave out Hiero of Syracuse, whom I mentioned above. As I said, the Syracusans put him in command of their army. He soon discovered that mercenary troops, organized like our Italian condottieri, were useless. He saw that he could neither keep them nor dismiss them, so he had them all cut to pieces. After that, he fought wars with his own forces, not foreigners.
I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you fast.
I also want to recall an example from the Old Testament that applies to this subject. David volunteered to fight Goliath, the Philistine champion, for Saul. To give him courage, Saul equipped him with his own weapons and armor. But David rejected them as soon as he put them on, saying he could not use them. He wanted to face the enemy with his sling and knife. In short, other people’s arms either fall off your back, weigh you down, or hold you fast.
Charles the Seventh, the father of King Louis the Eleventh, having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off well against others. The armies of the French have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one’s own forces. And this example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.
Charles VII, the father of King Louis XI, freed France from the English through good fortune and courage. He recognized the need for armed forces of his own. He established regulations for men-at-arms and infantry in his kingdom. Later, his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began hiring Swiss soldiers. This mistake, followed by others, now clearly endangers the kingdom. By raising the Swiss soldiers’ reputation, he has completely undermined the strength of his own forces. He destroyed the infantry altogether and made his men-at-arms dependent on others. They have become so accustomed to fighting alongside Swiss soldiers that they now seem unable to win without them. As a result, the French cannot hold their ground against the Swiss. Without the Swiss, they fare poorly against other enemies. The French armies have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national. Together, these forces are much better than mercenaries alone or troops borrowed from another ruler alone. But they are much inferior to forces entirely of one’s own. This example proves the point. France would be unconquerable if Charles’s military system had been expanded or maintained.
Charles VII of France, known as “The Victorious,” was born in 1403 and died in 1461.
Louis XI, son of the man mentioned above, was born in 1423 and died in 1483.
But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first disaster to the Roman Empire should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that valour which had raised it passed away to others.
But human wisdom is limited. When people enter into something that looks promising at first, they cannot see the poison hidden within it. This is like the wasting fevers I discussed above. A ruler who cannot recognize dangers until they are upon him is not truly wise. Few have this insight. If we examine the first disaster to strike the Roman Empire, we find it began only with recruiting the Goths. From that point, the Roman Empire’s strength began to decline. All the courage that had raised it to greatness passed to others.
“Many speakers in the House the other night seemed to show a deeply regrettable ignorance during the debate on reducing armaments. They seemed unaware of the conditions that allow the British Empire to survive. Mr Balfour answered claims that the Roman Empire collapsed under the burden of its military commitments. He called this ‘wholly unhistorical.’ He could well have added that Roman power peaked when every citizen accepted his duty to fight for the state. It began to decline as soon as this duty was no longer recognised.” Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906.
I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength. And one’s own forces are those which are composed either of subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one’s own forces will be easily found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself.
I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without its own armed forces. Without them, it depends entirely on good fortune, lacking the courage and strength to defend itself in adversity. Wise men have always judged that nothing is more uncertain or unstable than reputation or power not grounded in its own strength. A ruler’s own forces consist of his subjects, citizens, or dependents. All other troops are mercenaries or forces supplied by another ruler. How to prepare one’s own forces will become clear by reflecting on the rules I have suggested. One should also consider how Philip, Alexander the Great’s father, and many republics and princes armed and organized their forces. I fully endorse the rules they followed.