New Principalities Acquired Through Others’ Armies or Luck

Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated them—two most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and faithful.

Those who rise from private citizens to princes through good fortune alone gain power easily but struggle to keep it. They face no difficulties on the way up because they fly to the top. But once there, they face many. These include those given a state either for money or as a favor from the person granting it. This happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and the Hellespont. Darius made them princes so they would hold those cities for his security and glory. The same was true of emperors who rose from private citizens to imperial power by bribing soldiers. Such rulers depend entirely on the goodwill and good fortune of whoever raised them to power. Both are extremely changeable and unstable. Nor do they have the knowledge their position requires. Unless they have great merit and ability, they cannot reasonably be expected to know how to command. They have, after all, always lived as private citizens. Nor can they hold power, because they have no troops they can keep loyal and faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and correspondencies⁸ fixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid before they became princes, they must lay afterwards.

States that rise unexpectedly resemble all other things in nature that are born and grow rapidly. Their foundations and connections⁸ cannot become secure enough to withstand the first storm. The exception, as noted, is when those who suddenly become princes have exceptional ability. They must know to prepare immediately to hold on to what fortune has dropped into their laps. They must lay afterwards the foundations that others laid before becoming princes.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and these are Francesco Sforza⁹ and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

There are two ways to become a prince: through ability or fortune. I want to give two examples from living memory, Francesco Sforza⁹ and Cesare Borgia. Francesco rose from private citizen to Duke of Milan through proper means and great ability. He gained his position with immense difficulty but kept it with little trouble. Cesare Borgia, on the other hand, was known to the people as Duke Valentino. He acquired his state while his father was powerful and lost it when his father’s power declined. This happened despite his taking every measure and doing all that a wise and capable man should do. He had worked to establish firm roots in the states that others’ armies and fortunes had given him.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions; and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.

As stated above, someone who has not laid foundations at the start may manage it later through great ability. But this will cause trouble for the architect and put the building at risk. If we consider all the duke’s actions, we see that he laid solid foundations for his future power. I do not consider it unnecessary to discuss them. I know of no better advice to give a new prince than the example of his actions. If his plans came to nothing, it was not his fault. It was due to the extraordinary and extreme cruelty of fortune.

Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of their states. This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others.

Alexander VI faced many immediate and future difficulties in trying to increase the power of his son, the duke. First, he saw no way to give him a state unless it belonged to the Church. Even if he were willing to rob the Church, the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not allow it. Faenza and Rimini were already under Venetian protection. He also saw that Italy’s armies, especially those that might help him, were controlled by men who feared his growing power. These were the Orsini, the Colonna, and their followers. He therefore needed to disrupt the existing balance and draw these powers into conflict. This would allow him to gain secure control over part of their territories. This was easy for him because the Venetians, for other reasons, wanted to bring the French back into Italy. He would not oppose this. Instead, he would help by annulling King Louis’s previous marriage. The king therefore entered Italy with Venetian help and Alexander’s consent. As soon as he reached Milan, the Pope obtained troops from him to attack the Romagna. The region surrendered because of the king’s reputation. The duke had now acquired the Romagna and defeated the Colonna. He wanted to hold his gains and advance further, but two things stood in his way. One was the doubtful loyalty of his troops. The other was his dependence on France’s goodwill. He feared that the Orsini troops he employed would not stand by him. They might not only prevent further conquests but also seize what he had already won. He feared the king might do the same. He received a warning about the Orsini after taking Faenza, when he attacked Bologna. He saw how unwillingly they joined that attack. He learned the king’s intentions after taking the Duchy of Urbino and attacking Tuscany. The king forced him to abandon that campaign. The duke therefore decided to stop depending on the armies and good fortune of others.

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and turned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the duke did not fail to secure with all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses—the Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power at Sinigalia.¹⁰ Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.

First, he weakened the Orsini and Colonna factions in Rome by winning over all their followers who were gentlemen. He took them into his own service and paid them well. He also honored them with offices and commands suited to their rank. Within a few months, all their loyalty to the factions had shifted entirely to the duke. Having scattered the Colonna family’s followers, he then waited for a chance to crush the Orsini. The opportunity soon came, and he used it well. The Orsini finally realized that the growing power of the duke and the Church meant their own ruin. They called a meeting at Magione, near Perugia. This led to the rebellion in Urbino and unrest in Romagna, exposing the duke to endless dangers. He overcame all of them with French help. Once he had restored his authority, he refused to risk it by relying on the French or other outside forces. Instead, he turned to deception. He concealed his intentions so well that the Orsini agreed to reconcile with him through Signor Pagolo’s mediation. The duke had made sure to win Pagolo over with every kind of attention, giving him money, clothing, and horses. The Orsini’s gullibility thus brought them into his power at Sinigalia.¹⁰ After killing the leaders and turning their followers into his friends, the duke had laid solid enough foundations for his power. He now controlled all of Romagna and the Duchy of Urbino. As the people began to appreciate their prosperity, he won them all over. This point deserves attention and should be imitated by others, so I do not want to leave it out.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer Ramiro d’Orco,¹¹ a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.

When the duke occupied the Romagna, he found it ruled by weak masters who plundered their subjects rather than governed them. They gave the people more reasons for division than unity. As a result, the country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence. The duke wanted to restore peace and obedience to authority, so he considered a good governor necessary. He appointed Messer Ramiro d’Orco,¹¹ a man who acted swiftly and cruelly, and gave him full power. In a short time, Ramiro restored peace and unity with great success. Afterwards, the duke decided that leaving such excessive power in Ramiro’s hands was unwise. He had no doubt that Ramiro would become hated. So he established a court under an excellent chief judge, where all the cities had representatives. He also knew that the earlier harsh measures had caused some hatred toward himself. He wanted to clear his name in the people’s minds and win their complete loyalty. He therefore wanted to show that any cruelty had come from his minister’s harsh nature, not from him. On this pretext, he seized Ramiro and, one morning, had him executed. His body was left in the square at Cesena, with the execution block and a bloody knife beside it. The brutality of this sight left the people both satisfied and horrified.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France, for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. And from this time he began to seek new alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she was making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.

But let us return to where we began. I say that the duke now found himself powerful enough and partly protected from immediate dangers. He had achieved this by building up his own armed forces. He had also largely crushed nearby forces that could threaten him if he chose to continue his conquests. He next had to consider France. He knew the king had recognized his mistake too late and would not support him. From this point, he began seeking new alliances and playing for time with France. France was then advancing toward the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards besieging Gaeta. He intended to protect himself against the French. He would have accomplished this quickly if Alexander had lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability.

That was how he handled current affairs. But looking ahead, his first concern was that the next pope might be hostile to him. The new pope might try to take away what Alexander had given him. So he decided to act in four ways. First, he would wipe out the families of the lords whose lands he had seized. This would deny the pope that pretext for acting against him. Second, he would win over all the gentlemen of Rome. With their help, he could keep the pope in check, as already noted. Third, he would gain more support in the College of Cardinals. Fourth, he would build enough power before the pope died to withstand the first blow through his own resources. By Alexander’s death, he had achieved three of these four goals. He had killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could get hold of, and few had escaped. He had won over the Roman gentlemen and had the largest faction in the College of Cardinals. As for further conquests, he intended to take control of Tuscany. He already held Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his protection. He no longer needed to worry about France. The Spanish had already driven the French out of the Kingdom of Naples. As a result, both sides had to buy his goodwill. So he moved swiftly against Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena gave way at once, partly from hatred and partly from fear of the Florentines. The Florentines would have had no way to stop him if his success had continued. He was still prospering in the year Alexander died. He had gained so much power and prestige that he would have been able to stand on his own. He would no longer have depended on other people’s luck and forces, but solely on his own power and ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death of Alexander,¹² everything would have been different to him. On the day that Julius the Second¹³ was elected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to die.

But Alexander died five years after he first took up arms. He left the duke with his rule secure only in Romagna. Everything else remained uncertain. The duke was caught between two extremely powerful enemy armies and was close to death from illness. Yet he had such courage and ability, and understood so well how to win people over or lose their support. The foundations he had laid in so little time were also so firm. Without those armies threatening him, or if he had been healthy, he would have overcome all difficulties. The strength of his foundations was clear, since Romagna waited for him for more than a month. In Rome, though barely alive, he remained secure. The Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini could come to Rome, but they could accomplish nothing against him. He might not have been able to secure the election of the pope he wanted. But at least he could have prevented the election of one he opposed. If he had been healthy when Alexander died,¹² everything would have turned out differently for him. On the day Julius II¹³ was elected, the duke told me he had considered everything that might happen when his father died. He had prepared a solution for every possibility except one. He had never expected that, when his father died, he himself would also be close to death.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this man.

When I consider all the duke’s actions, I can find no reason to blame him. Instead, as I have said, I should hold him up as a model for others. This applies to all who rise to power through good fortune or the armies of others. His bold spirit and far-reaching ambitions left him no other way to act. Only Alexander’s short life and the duke’s own illness ruined his plans. Consider a ruler who believes he must secure his new principality. He must win friends and overcome enemies by force or deceit. He must make the people both love and fear him, and make his soldiers follow and respect him. He must wipe out those who have the power or a reason to harm him. He must replace the old order with a new one. He must be harsh yet gracious, noble-minded and generous. He must destroy disloyal troops and raise new ones. He must maintain friendships with kings and princes so they must help him eagerly and be cautious about offending him. A ruler who considers all this necessary can find no clearer example than this man’s actions.

Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio.¹⁴ The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

He can be blamed only for the election of Julius II, which was a bad choice. As noted, he could not secure the election of a pope he wanted, but he could block anyone else’s election. He should never have agreed to elect a cardinal he had harmed or who would fear him after becoming pope. For men harm others out of either fear or hatred. Among those he had harmed were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio.¹⁴ The others would have had reason to fear him as pope, except Rouen and the Spaniards. The Spaniards were bound to him by family ties and obligations. Rouen had no reason to fear him because of his influence and the kingdom of France’s ties to him. Above all, then, the duke should have secured the election of a Spaniard as pope. Failing that, he should have supported Rouen, not San Pietro ad Vincula. Anyone who believes new favors will make powerful men forget old injuries is mistaken. The duke therefore made the wrong choice, and it caused his ultimate ruin.