Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from their own ambitions.
Given the difficulties rulers face in holding newly acquired states, some might wonder how Alexander the Great’s successors held on. Alexander became master of Asia in just a few years and died before his rule was firmly established. It might therefore seem reasonable to expect the whole empire to rebel. Yet his successors maintained their rule. They faced no difficulty except the conflicts their own ambitions caused among them.
I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular affection.
My answer is that all principalities on record are governed in one of two ways. One is by a prince with servants who help govern as ministers through his favor and permission. The other is by a prince and barons whose rank comes from ancient family lineage, not the prince’s favor. These barons have their own territories and subjects, who recognize them as lords and feel a natural affection for them. In states governed by a prince and his servants, the people hold their prince in greater regard. Throughout the country, no one is recognized as above him. If the people obey anyone else, they do so only because he is the prince’s minister or official. They feel no particular affection for him.
The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.
Two examples of these forms of government in our time are the Ottoman sultan and the King of France. The sultan’s entire kingdom is governed by one ruler, and all the others are his servants. He divides his kingdom into districts called sanjaks. He sends different administrators to govern them and moves or replaces them as he chooses. The King of France, however, stands among a long-established body of nobles. Their own subjects recognize their authority and love them. These nobles have their own special rights, which the king cannot take away without endangering himself. Anyone comparing these two states will therefore see that the sultan’s kingdom is very difficult to conquer. Once conquered, however, it is very easy to hold. The difficulty in conquering the sultan’s kingdom comes from two things. No princes within the kingdom can invite an invader in. Nor can he hope that revolts among the ruler’s officials will help his plans. This follows from the reasons already given. His ministers are all slaves and servants in bondage, so they are very difficult to win over through corruption. Even when they have been won over, little can be gained from them. For the reasons already explained, they cannot bring the people over to their side. Anyone attacking the sultan must therefore expect to find his kingdom united. He must rely more on his own strength than on revolts by others. But suppose the sultan has been conquered and defeated so thoroughly in battle that he cannot rebuild his armies. Then the conqueror has nothing to fear except the ruler’s family. Once that family has been wiped out, no one remains to fear. The others have no influence with the people. The conqueror did not depend on them before his victory, and he need not fear them afterward.
The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity.
The opposite happens in kingdoms governed like France. You can easily invade by winning over one of the kingdom’s barons. There are always dissatisfied men who want change. For the reasons already given, these men can open the way into the state and make victory easy. But if you want to keep it afterward, you face endless difficulties. These come both from those who helped you and from those you crushed. Nor is it enough to have wiped out the ruler’s family. The remaining lords become leaders of new uprisings against you. You can neither satisfy them nor wipe them out. So you lose that state whenever time provides an opportunity.
Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.
Now consider how Darius’s government worked. You will find it similar to the Ottoman Empire. Alexander therefore needed only to defeat Darius in battle and then take his country from him. After this victory and Darius’s death, Alexander’s control of the state remained secure for the reasons already given. If his successors had stayed united, they would have ruled it securely and easily. There were no uprisings in the kingdom except those they themselves provoked.
But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were acknowledged.
But states organized like France cannot be held so peacefully. This explains the frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece. These lands had contained many principalities. As long as people remembered them, Roman control remained insecure. But the empire’s power and long rule erased those memories, and Roman control then became secure. Later, when the Romans fought among themselves, each leader could secure the support of the regions where he held authority. With the former ruling family wiped out, the people recognized no rulers except the Romans.
When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.
Keeping these points in mind, no one will be surprised that Alexander held the Empire of Asia so easily. Nor will anyone be surprised that Pyrrhus and many others struggled to hold on to conquered territory. This is not because the conqueror has more or less ability. It is because conquered states differ in how they are organized.