Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way.
When newly acquired states have been used to living freely under their own laws, there are three ways to keep them. The first is to destroy them. The second is to live there yourself. The third is to let them keep their own laws while collecting tribute and installing a small ruling group. This group will keep the state friendly to you. Because the prince created this government, it knows it cannot survive without his friendship and support. It therefore does everything it can to support him. So anyone seeking to hold a city used to freedom will find it easier to use its own citizens than any other means.
There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the Florentines.
Take the Spartans and the Romans, for example. The Spartans controlled Athens and Thebes by establishing oligarchies there, governments ruled by a few. Yet they lost both cities. The Romans destroyed Capua, Carthage, and Numantia to keep control of them, and did not lose them. They tried to hold Greece as the Spartans had, leaving it free and allowing it to keep its laws. But they failed. To keep control, they had to destroy many cities there. In truth, there is no safe way to hold such cities except by destroying them. Anyone who takes control of a city accustomed to freedom without destroying it can expect that city to destroy him. When it rebels, it always rallies around the call for liberty and its ancient privileges. Neither time nor good treatment will ever make it forget them. Whatever you do or guard against, its people never forget that call or their privileges unless divided or scattered. At every opportunity, they immediately rally around them again. Pisa did just that after a hundred years under Florentine rule.
But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there.
But when cities or countries are used to living under a prince, things are different if his family is wiped out. They are used to obeying, but their former prince is gone. They cannot agree on choosing a ruler from among themselves, and they do not know how to govern themselves. For this reason, they are very slow to take up arms. A prince can win them over and secure his rule over them much more easily. But republics have more energy, greater hatred, and a stronger desire for revenge. These feelings will never let them forget their former freedom. So the safest course is to destroy them or live there yourself.