MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon his new acquisition.

But difficulties arise in a new principality. First, consider one that is not entirely new, but has been added to an existing state. The whole can be called a composite state. Here, changes arise chiefly from a difficulty inherent in all new principalities. People willingly change rulers, hoping to improve their lives. This hope leads them to take up arms against their ruler. But they are mistaken, as experience later shows them that they have gone from bad to worse. This also follows from another natural and common necessity. A new prince must always burden those who have submitted to him with his troops. He must also impose countless other hardships on his newly acquired territory.

In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives.

In this way, you make enemies of all those you harmed in seizing that principality. You cannot keep the friendship of those who helped put you in power. You cannot satisfy them as they expected, and you feel too indebted to them to take harsh measures against them. For even with a very strong army, you always need the goodwill of the local people when entering a province.

For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only needed Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico¹ to raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above mentioned.

For these reasons, Louis XII, King of France, quickly occupied Milan and lost it just as quickly. The first time, Lodovico’s own forces were enough to drive him out. Those who had opened the gates to Louis found their hopes of future benefits disappointed. They would not put up with the new ruler’s mistreatment. It is certainly true that rebellious provinces are harder to lose after they have been conquered a second time. The ruler has little hesitation in using the rebellion as an opportunity to punish offenders and remove anyone under suspicion. He also strengthens his hold at the weakest points. Thus, the first time, Duke Lodovico¹ only needed to stir up rebellions along the borders to make France lose Milan. The second time, the whole world had to unite against Louis. His armies had to be defeated and driven out of Italy. This happened for the reasons mentioned above.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.

Nevertheless, France lost Milan both the first and the second time. The general reasons for the first loss have already been discussed. It remains to explain the reasons for the second and examine what resources the king had. We must also consider what resources anyone in his position would have had. Could those resources have secured his newly acquired territory more firmly than the King of France did?

Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body with the old principality.

I now say that territories added to a ruler’s existing state either share its country and language or do not. When they do, they are easier to hold, especially if they are not used to governing themselves. To hold them securely, it is enough to destroy the family of their former ruler. The two peoples will live peacefully together if their other old arrangements remain unchanged and their customs are similar. We have seen this in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been joined to France for so long. Although their languages may differ somewhat, their customs are alike, and the people can easily get along with one another. A ruler who has annexed these territories needs to remember only two things if he wishes to keep them. First, the family of their former ruler must be wiped out. Second, neither their laws nor their taxes must be changed. In a very short time, they will then become fully united with the ruler’s original state.

But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty.

But when you acquire states in a country with a different language, customs, or laws, you face difficulties. You need good fortune and great energy to hold them. One of the greatest and most practical advantages is for the new ruler to go and live there. This would make his position more secure and lasting, as it did for the Turkish ruler in Greece. Despite all his other measures to hold that state, he could not have kept it without settling there. When you are there, you see unrest as it begins and can quickly deal with it. When you are absent, you hear of it only once it has grown serious. By then, you can no longer put it right. Besides, your officials do not plunder the country. Your subjects are satisfied because they can appeal directly to the prince and receive a prompt response. Those who wish to behave well have more reason to love him. Those who wish to do otherwise have more reason to fear him. Anyone seeking to attack that state from outside must act with the utmost caution. As long as the prince lives there, taking it from him is extremely difficult.

The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.

The other and better course is to establish colonies in one or two places that control access to the state. Otherwise, a prince must keep large numbers of cavalry and infantry there. Colonies cost a prince little. He can establish and maintain them at little or no expense. He harms only the minority whose land and houses he takes to give to the new settlers. Those he harms are left poor and scattered, so they can never hurt him. The rest are unharmed and easily kept quiet. They are also careful not to offend him, fearing the same fate as those stripped of their property. In short, these colonies cost little, are more loyal, and cause less harm. Those harmed, as I have said, are poor and scattered, so they cannot hurt him. This leads to an observation: people must either be treated well or crushed. They can take revenge for lesser injuries, but they cannot avenge more serious ones. So any injury inflicted on someone must be severe enough that there is no need to fear revenge.

But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is useful.

But keeping troops there instead of establishing colonies costs much more. The garrison consumes all the state’s income, turning the conquest into a loss. It also angers many more people, because the whole state suffers. As the garrison moves from place to place, everyone experiences hardship, and everyone becomes hostile. Though defeated on their own ground, these enemies can still cause harm. For every reason, then, such garrisons are as useless as colonies are useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were brought into Greece by the Ætolians; and in every other country where they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles.

Again, a prince ruling a country that differs in the ways described above should lead and defend his weaker neighbors. He should weaken the stronger ones. He must ensure that no foreign power as strong as himself gains a foothold there, whatever the circumstances. Discontented people will always invite such a power in, either from excessive ambition or fear, as we have already seen. The Aetolians brought the Romans into Greece. In every other country where the Romans gained a foothold, the inhabitants brought them in. Usually, as soon as a powerful foreign ruler enters a country, all its subject states are drawn to him. They are driven by hatred of the ruling power. He therefore needs to make no effort to win these subject states over. All of them quickly rally around the territory he has acquired there. He only needs to ensure that they do not gain too much power or authority. Then, with his own forces and their goodwill, he can easily hold down the stronger states among them. In this way, he can remain the country's undisputed master. Anyone who fails to manage this properly will soon lose what he has gained. As long as he holds it, he will face endless difficulties and troubles.

The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with² the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and Ætolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and Ætolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy the benefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.

The Romans closely followed these policies in the countries they annexed. They established colonies and maintained friendly relations with² the smaller powers, without making them stronger. They weakened the greater powers and kept strong foreign powers from gaining authority. Greece provides a sufficient example. They kept the Achaeans and Aetolians friendly, humbled the kingdom of Macedonia, and drove Antiochus out. Yet the services of the Achaeans and Aetolians never earned them permission to increase their power. Nor could Philip persuade the Romans to become his friends without first submitting to them. Nor did Antiochus’s influence persuade them to let him retain any rule over the country. In these cases, the Romans did what all prudent rulers ought to do. They considered not only present troubles but also future ones, preparing for them with every effort. Troubles are easy to remedy when they are foreseen. But if you wait until they are close, treatment comes too late because the disease has become incurable. Doctors say the same is true of hectic fever, a disease marked by recurring fever and wasting. At first, it is easy to cure but difficult to detect. If it is neither detected nor treated early, it eventually becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. The same happens in affairs of state. When developing troubles are foreseen, something only a wise person can do, they can be quickly corrected. But if they go unforeseen and grow until everyone can see them, there is no longer a remedy. The Romans therefore dealt with troubles as soon as they foresaw them. They would not let them reach a crisis, even to avoid a war. They knew that war cannot be avoided, only postponed to someone else’s advantage. They also wanted to fight Philip and Antiochus in Greece so they would not have to fight them in Italy. They could have avoided both wars, but they chose not to. Nor did they ever favor the saying constantly repeated by the supposedly wise people of our time: Let us enjoy the benefits of time. Instead, they preferred the benefits of their own courage and sound judgment. Time drives everything before it and can bring good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.

But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the things mentioned. I will speak of Louis³ (and not of Charles)⁴ as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed of divers elements.

But let us turn to France and ask whether it has done any of the things mentioned. I will discuss Louis³, not Charles⁴, because his conduct deserves closer attention. He held possession of Italy for the longest time. You will see that he did the opposite of what is needed to keep a state made up of diverse parts.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a foothold in Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced to accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, the Sienese—everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

The Venetians’ ambition brought King Louis into Italy. They wanted his help to gain half of Lombardy. I will not blame the king’s decision. He wanted a foothold in Italy but had no friends there. Charles’s conduct had closed every door to him, so he had to accept whatever friendships he could find. He would have achieved his goal very quickly if he had not made mistakes in other matters. Once the king had taken Lombardy, he immediately regained the authority Charles had lost. Genoa submitted, and the Florentines became his friends. The Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, and the Lady of Forlì all sought his friendship. So did the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino, and the people of Lucca, Pisa, and Siena. Everyone approached him to become his friend. Only then could the Venetians see how reckless they had been. To secure two towns in Lombardy, they had made the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy.

Consider how easily the king could have held his position in Italy if he had followed the rules given above. He needed only to keep all his friends safe and protected. Though numerous, they were weak and timid. Some feared the Church, others the Venetians, so they would always have been forced to remain on his side. With their help, he could easily have secured himself against the powers that remained strong. But as soon as he entered Milan, he did the opposite by helping Pope Alexander take over the Romagna. He never realized that this action weakened him. It deprived him of friends and of those who had placed themselves under his protection. At the same time, he strengthened the Church by adding considerable worldly power to its spiritual power, increasing its authority. Having made this first mistake, he was forced to make others. To curb Alexander’s ambition and prevent him from becoming master of Tuscany, the king himself had to return to Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn.

As if strengthening the Church and losing his friends were not enough, he also wanted the kingdom of Naples. So he divided it with the King of Spain. He had been the leading power in Italy, but now he brought in a partner. This gave ambitious Italians and dissatisfied subjects of his own a place to turn for support. He could have left a king there who depended on his financial support. Instead, he drove that king out and replaced him with someone capable of driving Louis himself out in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity.

The desire to acquire more is truly natural and common, and men always do so when they can. For this, they deserve praise, not blame. But when they cannot acquire more, yet still seek to do so by any means, they deserve blame for their foolishness. So if France could have attacked Naples with its own forces, it should have done so. If it could not, it should not have divided Naples. France’s division of Lombardy with the Venetians was justified because it gave France a foothold in Italy. But this other division deserved blame, because no such necessity excused it.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the courage.

Louis therefore made five mistakes. He destroyed the smaller powers. He strengthened one of Italy’s greater powers. He brought in a foreign power. He did not settle in the country. He did not establish colonies. Had he lived, these mistakes would not have been enough to harm him without a sixth. He took the Venetians’ territories from them. Had he neither strengthened the Church nor brought Spain into Italy, weakening Venice would have been reasonable and necessary. But after taking those first steps, he should never have agreed to Venice’s ruin. A powerful Venice would always have deterred others from trying to seize Lombardy. The Venetians would never have accepted such plans unless they themselves became its rulers. Nor would the other powers have wanted to take Lombardy from France only to give it to Venice. And they would not have dared to oppose both France and Venice.

And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons given above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage⁵ and for the cap to Rouen,⁶ to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.

Someone might say: “King Louis gave Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war.” For the reasons given above, I answer that you should never make a blunder to avoid war. War cannot be avoided, only postponed to your disadvantage. Someone else might point to the king’s promise to help the Pope in his undertaking. In return, the Pope would annul the king’s marriage⁵ and give the cardinal’s hat to Rouen.⁶ My reply is what I will write later about promises made by princes and how they should keep them.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him who has been raised to power.

King Louis thus lost Lombardy because he followed none of the rules observed by those who conquer countries and intend to keep them. There is nothing surprising about this. It is entirely reasonable and natural. I discussed these matters at Nantes with Cardinal Rouen while Valentino occupied the Romagna. Valentino was the usual name for Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander. Cardinal Rouen remarked that the Italians did not understand war. I replied that the French did not understand statecraft. I meant that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to become so powerful. In fact, France made both the Church and Spain powerful in Italy, and they can be blamed for France’s ruin. From this comes a general rule that never or rarely fails: whoever makes another powerful brings about his own ruin. He has created that power either through cunning or force. Both make the person raised to power distrust him.