I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.
I will not discuss republics, since I have written about them at length elsewhere. I will focus only on principalities. I will follow the order outlined above and discuss how these principalities should be governed and maintained.
I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it.
I will say at once that hereditary states are easier to hold than new ones. This is especially true of states long accustomed to the rule of their prince’s family. A prince of average ability need only respect his ancestors’ customs and respond wisely to circumstances as they arise. This will be enough to keep him in power, unless an extraordinarily powerful force drives him out. If that happens, he will regain his state whenever the usurper suffers a setback.
We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius in ’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another.
In Italy, for example, we have the Duke of Ferrara. He could not have withstood the Venetians’ attacks in 1484 or Pope Julius’s attacks in 1510 without his long-established rule. A hereditary prince has less reason and less need to offend his subjects, so they will love him more. Unless extraordinary vices make him hated, it is reasonable to expect his subjects to be naturally well disposed toward him. As his rule continues over generations, the memories and motives that encourage change fade away. For one change always lays the groundwork for another.