IT IS a miserable state of mind, to have few things to desire, and many things to fear; and yet that commonly is the case of kings; who, being at the highest, want matter of desire, which makes their minds more languishing; and have many representations of perils and shadows, which makes their minds the less clear. And this is one reason also, of that effect which the Scripture speaketh of, That the king's heart is inscrutable. For multitude of jealousies, and lack of some predominant desire, that should marshal and put in order all the rest, maketh any man's heart, hard to find or sound. Hence it comes likewise, that princes many times make themselves desires, and set their hearts upon toys; sometimes upon a building; sometimes upon erecting of an order; sometimes upon the advancing of a person; sometimes upon obtaining excellency in some art, or feat of the hand; as Nero for playing on the harp, Domitian for certainty of the hand with the arrow, Commodus for playing at fence, Caracalla for driving chariots, and the like. This seemeth incredible, unto those that know not the principle, that the mind of man, is more cheered and refreshed by profiting in small things, than by standing at a stay, in great. We see also that kings that have been fortunate conquerors, in their first years, it being not possible for them to go forward infinitely, but that they must have some check, or arrest in their fortunes, turn in their latter years to be superstitious, and melancholy; as did Alexander the Great; Diocletian; and in our memory, Charles the Fifth; and others: for he that is used to go forward, and findeth a stop, falleth out of his own favor, and is not the thing he was.
It is a miserable state of mind to have little to desire and much to fear. Yet this is commonly the condition of kings. Having reached the highest position, they lack things to desire, which leaves their minds listless. They also see many dangers, both real and imagined, which cloud their minds. This also helps explain what Scripture says, that the king’s heart cannot be understood. Many suspicions, and no ruling desire to organize and direct all the others, make anyone’s heart hard to understand. This is also why rulers often invent desires for themselves and set their hearts on trifles. Sometimes it is a building, sometimes the founding of an order, sometimes the promotion of a person. Sometimes they seek excellence in an art or physical skill. Nero sought it in playing the harp, Domitian in accuracy with a bow, Commodus in fencing, and Caracalla in chariot racing. This seems incredible to those who do not understand a principle of the human mind. Progress in small things cheers and refreshes us more than standing still in great ones. We also see kings who enjoyed success as conquerors in their early years become superstitious and melancholy in later life. They cannot advance forever, and their fortunes must meet some setback or halt. So it was with Alexander the Great, Diocletian, and, within living memory, Charles the Fifth, among others. Someone accustomed to advancing loses his own good opinion when he is stopped. He is no longer what he once was.
To speak now of the true temper of empire, it is a thing rare and hard to keep; for both temper, and distemper, consist of contraries. But it is one thing, to mingle contraries, another to interchange them. The answer of Apollonius to Vespasian, is full of excellent instruction. Vespasian asked him, What was Nero's overthrow? He answered, Nero could touch and tune the harp well; but in government, sometimes he used to wind the pins too high, sometimes to let them down too low. And certain it is, that nothing destroyeth authority so much, as the unequal and untimely interchange of power pressed too far, and relaxed too much.
The right balance in governing is rare and hard to maintain. Both balance and imbalance involve opposing forces. But blending opposites is one thing, and alternating between them is another. Apollonius’s answer to Vespasian offers an excellent lesson. Vespasian asked him, “What caused Nero’s downfall?” He answered, “Nero could play and tune the harp well. But in government, he sometimes tightened the strings too much and sometimes loosened them too far.” Certainly, nothing destroys authority more than an erratic and ill-timed alternation between excessive force and excessive leniency.
This is true, that the wisdom of all these latter times, in princes' affairs, is rather fine deliveries, and shiftings of dangers and mischiefs, when they are near, than solid and grounded courses to keep them aloof. But this is but to try masteries with fortune. And let men beware, how they neglect and suffer matter of trouble to be prepared; for no man can forbid the spark, nor tell whence it may come. The difficulties in princes' business are many and great; but the greatest difficulty, is often in their own mind. For it is common with princes (saith Tacitus) to will contradictories, Sunt plerumque regum voluntates vehementes, et inter se contrariae. For it is the solecism of power, to think to command the end, and yet not to endure the mean.
It is true that all recent wisdom in rulers’ affairs favors clever escapes and ways of deflecting approaching dangers. It favors these over sound, well-founded policies that keep dangers at a distance. But this is merely a contest with fortune. People should beware of neglecting problems and allowing the conditions for trouble to develop. No one can prevent the spark or tell where it may come from. The difficulties in rulers’ affairs are many and great. But the greatest difficulty is often in their own minds. As Tacitus says, rulers commonly want contradictory things. Their desires are usually intense and at odds with one another. For the great error of power is to think it can command the outcome while refusing to accept the means.
Kings have to deal with their neighbors, their wives, their children, their prelates or clergy, their nobles, their second-nobles or gentlemen, their merchants, their commons, and their men of war; and from all these arise dangers, if care and circumspection be not used.
Kings must deal with neighboring rulers, their wives, their children, their bishops or clergy, and their nobles. They must also deal with lesser nobles or gentlemen, merchants, common people, and soldiers. All these groups pose dangers unless kings act carefully and cautiously.
First for their neighbors; there can no general rule be given (for occasions are so variable), save one, which ever holdeth, which is, that princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do ever grow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like), as they become more able to annoy them, than they were. And this is generally the work of standing counsels, to foresee and to hinder it. During that triumvirate of kings, King Henry the Eighth of England, Francis the First King of France, and Charles the Fifth Emperor, there was such a watch kept, that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other two would straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war; and would not in any wise take up peace at interest. And the like was done by that league (which Guicciardini saith was the security of Italy) made between Ferdinando King of Naples, Lorenzius Medici, and Ludovicus Sforza, potentates, the one of Florence, the other of Milan. Neither is the opinion of some of the Schoolmen, to be received, that a war cannot justly be made, but upon a precedent injury or provocation. For there is no question, but a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of a war.
First, concerning their neighbors, no general rule can be given, because circumstances vary so much. But one rule always holds. Rulers must keep careful watch so that none of their neighbors becomes more capable of harming them than before. This may happen through territorial expansion, control of trade, closer access, or similar means. Foreseeing and preventing this is generally the work of permanent councils. Such a watch was kept during the time of three powerful rulers. These were Henry VIII of England, Francis I of France, and Emperor Charles V. None could gain a hand’s breadth of territory without the other two immediately acting to restore the balance. They did this through alliances or, if necessary, war. They would never secure present peace at the cost of greater danger later. The same was done by the alliance that Guicciardini called Italy’s safeguard. It joined Ferdinand, King of Naples, Lorenzo de’ Medici, ruler of Florence, and Ludovico Sforza, ruler of Milan. Nor should we accept the opinion of some Scholastic theologians that only a prior injury or provocation justifies war. There is no doubt that well-founded fear of imminent danger is a lawful cause for war, even before any attack.
For their wives; there are cruel examples of them. Livia is infamed, for the poisoning of her husband; Roxalana, Solyman's wife, was the destruction of that renowned prince, Sultan Mustapha, and otherwise troubled his house and succession; Edward the Second of England, his queen, had the principal hand in the deposing and murder of her husband. This kind of danger, is then to be feared chiefly, when the wives have plots, for the raising of their own children; or else that they be advoutresses.
As for their wives, there are examples of their cruelty. Livia is notorious for poisoning her husband. Roxalana, Solyman’s wife, brought about the destruction of the renowned prince Sultan Mustapha. She also caused other troubles for Solyman’s household and the succession to his throne. The queen of Edward II of England played a leading role in deposing and murdering her husband. This danger is especially to be feared when wives plot to advance their own children, or when they commit adultery.
For their children; the tragedies likewise of dangers from them, have been many. And generally, the entering of fathers into suspicion of their children, hath been ever unfortunate. The destruction of Mustapha (that we named before) was so fatal to Solyman's line, as the succession of the Turks, from Solyman until this day, is suspected to be untrue, and of strange blood; for that Selymus the Second, was thought to be suppositious. The destruction of Crispus, a young prince of rare towardness, by Constantinus the Great, his father, was in like manner fatal to his house; for both Constantinus and Constance, his sons, died violent deaths; and Constantius, his other son, did little better; who died indeed of sickness, but after that Julianus had taken arms against him. The destruction of Demetrius, son to Philip the Second of Macedon, turned upon the father, who died of repentance. And many like examples there are; but few or none, where the fathers had good by such distrust; except it were, where the sons were up in open arms against them; as was Selymus the First against Bajazet; and the three sons of Henry the Second, King of England.
As for their children, there have likewise been many tragedies involving dangers from them. In general, fathers who begin to suspect their children have always met with misfortune. The killing of Mustapha, mentioned earlier, was so disastrous for Suleiman’s family that it cast doubt on the Turkish succession. From Suleiman’s time until today, the dynasty is suspected of descending from outsiders rather than his own blood. Selim II was thought to have been passed off as Suleiman’s son. Constantine the Great’s killing of his son Crispus, a remarkably promising young prince, was similarly disastrous for his family. His sons Constantine and Constans both died violent deaths. His other son, Constantius, fared little better. He died of illness, but only after Julian had taken up arms against him. The killing of Demetrius, son of Philip II of Macedon, brought ruin on his father, who died of remorse. There are many similar examples. Yet there are few or none in which fathers benefited from such distrust, except when their sons openly rebelled. Such was the case with Selim I against Bayezid, and with the three sons of Henry II, King of England.
For their prelates; when they are proud and great, there is also danger from them; as it was in the times of Anselmus, and Thomas Becket, Archbishops of Canterbury; who, with their croziers, did almost try it with the king's sword; and yet they had to deal with stout and haughty kings, William Rufus, Henry the First, and Henry the Second. The danger is not from that state, but where it hath a dependence of foreign authority; or where the churchmen come in and are elected, not by the collation of the king, or particular patrons, but by the people.
As for their bishops, they too pose a danger when they are proud and powerful. This happened in the days of Anselm and Thomas Becket, Archbishops of Canterbury. With their bishops’ staffs, they nearly challenged the king’s sword. Yet they faced strong and haughty kings, William Rufus, Henry I, and Henry II. The danger comes not from the clergy’s position itself, but from their dependence on foreign authority. It also arises when the people elect churchmen, rather than the king or individual patrons appointing them.
For their nobles; to keep them at a distance, it is not amiss; but to depress them, may make a king more absolute, but less safe; and less able to perform, any thing that he desires. I have noted it, in my History of King Henry the Seventh of England, who depressed his nobility; whereupon it came to pass, that his times were full of difficulties and troubles; for the nobility, though they continued loyal unto him, yet did they not co-operate with him in his business. So that in effect, he was fain to do all things himself.
As for their nobles, it is reasonable for kings to keep them at a distance. But weakening them may make a king more powerful, yet less secure and less able to achieve anything he wants. I noted this in my History of King Henry the Seventh of England, who weakened his nobility. As a result, his reign was full of difficulties and troubles. Though the nobles remained loyal to him, they did not help him carry out his plans. In effect, he had to do everything himself.
For their second-nobles; there is not much danger from them, being a body dispersed. They may sometimes discourse high, but that doth little hurt; besides, they are a counterpoise to the higher nobility, that they grow not too potent; and, lastly, being the most immediate in authority, with the common people, they do best temper popular commotions.
As for the lesser nobility, they pose little danger because they are widely scattered. They may sometimes speak boldly, but that does little harm. Besides, they balance the higher nobility and keep them from becoming too powerful. Finally, their authority is closest to the common people, so they are best able to calm popular unrest.
For their merchants; they are vena porta; and if they flourish not, a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty veins, and nourish little. Taxes and imposts upon them, do seldom good to the king's revenue; for that that he wins in the hundred, he leeseth in the shire; the particular rates being increased, but the total bulk of trading, rather decreased.
As for merchants, they are the kingdom’s portal vein, carrying nourishment through its body. If they do not prosper, a kingdom may have strong limbs but empty veins and little nourishment. Taxes and duties on merchants seldom benefit the king’s revenue. What he gains from higher rates, he loses through reduced trade. The individual tax rates rise, but the total volume of trade tends to fall.
For their commons; there is little danger from them, except it be, where they have great and potent heads; or where you meddle with the point of religion, or their customs, or means of life.
As for the common people, they pose little danger unless they have powerful leaders. They may also pose a danger if you interfere with their religion, customs, or livelihoods.
For their men of war; it is a dangerous state, where they live and remain in a body, and are used to donatives; whereof we see examples in the janizaries, and pretorian bands of Rome; but trainings of men, and arming them in several places, and under several commanders, and without donatives, are things of defence, and no danger.
As for soldiers, it is dangerous when they live together as one body and become accustomed to special cash gifts. We see examples in the Janissaries and the Praetorian Guard of Rome. But training and arming men in different places, under different commanders, and without such gifts provides defense without danger.
Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times; and which have much veneration, but no rest. All precepts concerning kings, are in effect comprehended in those two remembrances: memento quod es homo; and memento quod es Deus, or vice Dei; the one bridleth their power, and the other their will.
Rulers are like heavenly bodies, which bring good or bad times. They are greatly revered, but have no rest. All advice for kings comes down to two reminders. Remember that you are human. And remember that you are God, or God’s representative. The first restrains their power, and the second their will.