THE greatest trust, between man and man, is the trust of giving counsel. For in other confidences, men commit the parts of life; their lands, their goods, their children, their credit, some particular affair; but to such as they make their counsellors, they commit the whole: by how much the more, they are obliged to all faith and integrity. The wisest princes need not think it any diminution to their greatness, or derogation to their sufficiency, to rely upon counsel. God himself is not without, but hath made it one of the great names of his blessed Son: The Counsellor. Solomon hath pronounced, that in counsel is stability. Things will have their first, or second agitation: if they be not tossed upon the arguments of counsel, they will be tossed upon the waves of fortune; and be full of inconstancy, doing and undoing, like the reeling of a drunken man. Solomon's son found the force of counsel, as his father saw the necessity of it. For the beloved kingdom of God, was first rent, and broken, by ill counsel; upon which counsel, there are set for our instruction, the two marks whereby bad counsel is for ever best discerned; that it was young counsel, for the person; and violent counsel, for the matter.
The greatest trust between people is the trust placed in someone who gives advice. In other matters of trust, people put only parts of their lives in another’s hands. These may be their land, possessions, children, reputation, or some particular business. But they entrust their whole lives to those they choose as advisers. Advisers therefore have an even greater duty to act with complete loyalty and integrity. The wisest rulers need not think that relying on advice lessens their greatness or calls their ability into question. God himself does not lack counsel. Indeed, he has made “The Counsellor” one of the great titles of his blessed Son. Solomon declared that counsel brings stability. Matters will be tossed about one way or another. If they are not debated through careful advice, they will be tossed on the waves of fortune. They will be full of uncertainty, with actions taken and reversed, like a drunken man staggering about. Solomon’s son felt the power of counsel, just as his father understood its necessity. For God’s beloved kingdom was first torn apart by bad advice. That advice offers us two lasting signs by which bad counsel can best be recognized. It came from young advisers, and it urged violent action.
The ancient times, do set forth in figure, both the incorporation, and inseparable conjunction, of counsel with kings, and the wise and politic use of counsel by kings: the one, in that they say Jupiter did marry Metis, which signifieth counsel; whereby they intend that Sovereignty, is married to Counsel: the other in that which followeth, which was thus: They say, after Jupiter was married to Metis, she conceived by him, and was with child, but Jupiter suffered her not to stay, till she brought forth, but eat her up; whereby he became himself with child, and was delivered of Pallas armed, out of his head. Which monstrous fable containeth a secret of empire; how kings are to make use of their counsel of state. That first, they ought to refer matters unto them, which is the first begetting, or impregnation; but when they are elaborate, moulded, and shaped in the womb of their counsel, and grow ripe, and ready to be brought forth, that then they suffer not their counsel to go through with the resolution and direction, as if it depended on them; but take the matter back into their own hands, and make it appear to the world, that the decrees and final directions (which, because they come forth, with prudence and power, are resembled to Pallas armed) proceeded from themselves; and not only from their authority, but (the more to add reputation to themselves) from their head and device.
Ancient myths illustrate the inseparable union of kings and counsel, and the wise, skillful use kings should make of counsel. The first idea appears in the story that Jupiter married Metis, whose name means counsel. This signifies that sovereignty is married to counsel. The second idea appears in what follows. After Jupiter married Metis, they say, she conceived his child. But Jupiter did not let her give birth. Instead, he swallowed her. He then became pregnant himself and gave birth to Pallas, fully armed, from his head. This strange fable contains a secret of government, showing how kings should use their councils of state. First, they should refer matters to their councils. This is the first conception, or impregnation. These matters are then developed, molded, and shaped in the womb of the council until ready to emerge. At that point, kings should not let their councils make the final decisions and issue instructions as though authority rested with them. Instead, kings should take matters back into their own hands. They should make it appear that the decrees and final instructions came from themselves. These resemble Pallas armed because they emerge with wisdom and power. Kings should present them not merely as issued by their authority, but as products of their own thinking and invention. This adds further to their reputation.
Let us now speak of the inconveniences of counsel, and of the remedies. The inconveniences that have been noted, in calling and using counsel, are three. First, the revealing of affairs, whereby they become less secret. Secondly, the weakening of the authority of princes, as if they were less of themselves. Thirdly, the danger of being unfaithfully counselled, and more for the good of them that counsel, than of him that is counselled. For which inconveniences, the doctrine of Italy, and practice of France, in some kings' times, hath introduced cabinet counsels; a remedy worse than the disease.
Let us now discuss the drawbacks of seeking advice and how to remedy them. Three drawbacks have been noted in seeking and using advice. First, sharing affairs with advisers makes them less secret. Second, it weakens rulers’ authority, making them seem less capable in their own right. Third, advisers may give dishonest advice, serving their own interests rather than those of the person they advise. To address these problems, Italian political teaching and French practice under some kings introduced small, private councils. This remedy is worse than the disease.
As to secrecy; princes are not bound to communicate all matters, with all counsellors; but may extract and select. Neither is it necessary, that he that consulteth what he should do, should declare what he will do. But let princes beware, that the unsecreting of their affairs, comes not from themselves. And as for cabinet counsels, it may be their motto, plenus rimarum sum: one futile person, that maketh it his glory to tell, will do more hurt than many, that know it their duty to conceal. It is true there be some affairs, which require extreme secrecy, which will hardly go beyond one or two persons, besides the king: neither are those counsels unprosperous; for, besides the secrecy, they commonly go on constantly, in one spirit of direction, without distraction. But then it must be a prudent king, such as is able to grind with a handmill; and those inward counsellors had need also be wise men, and especially true and trusty to the king's ends; as it was with King Henry the Seventh of England, who, in his great business, imparted himself to none, except it were to Morton and Fox.
As for secrecy, rulers need not share every matter with all their advisers. They may choose what to share and with whom. Nor must someone seeking advice about what to do reveal what he intends to do. But rulers should beware of revealing their own secrets. As for councils of close advisers, their motto might be, “I am full of cracks.” One foolish person who takes pride in telling secrets will do more harm than many who know their duty to conceal them. Some affairs do require extreme secrecy. Knowledge of them can hardly extend beyond one or two people besides the king. Such councils are not unsuccessful. Besides keeping secrets, they usually proceed steadily, with a single direction and without divided purposes. But this requires a wise king, capable of doing the work himself, like someone grinding grain with a handmill. His closest advisers must also be wise, and especially loyal and faithful to the king’s aims. This was the case with King Henry VII of England. In his most important affairs, he confided in no one except Morton and Fox.
For weakening of authority; the fable showeth the remedy. Nay, the majesty of kings, is rather exalted than diminished, when they are in the chair of counsel; neither was there ever prince, bereaved of his dependences, by his counsel, except where there hath been, either an over-greatness in one counsellor, or an over-strict combination in divers; which are things soon found, and holpen.
As for weakening authority, the fable shows the remedy. Indeed, kings gain rather than lose majesty when they preside over their councils. No prince has ever lost his followers’ loyalty because of his council, except in two cases. Either one adviser became too powerful, or several formed too close an alliance. Such problems are soon discovered and corrected.
For the last inconvenience, that men will counsel, with an eye to themselves; certainly, non inveniet fidem super terram is meant, of the nature of times, and not of all particular persons. There be, that are in nature faithful, and sincere, and plain, and direct; not crafty and involved; let princes, above all, draw to themselves such natures. Besides, counsellors are not commonly so united, but that one counsellor, keepeth sentinel over another; so that if any do counsel out of faction or private ends, it commonly comes to the king's ear. But the best remedy is, if princes know their counsellors, as well as their counsellors know them:
The last drawback is that people may give advice with their own interests in mind. Certainly, “he will not find faith on earth” refers to the character of the times, not to every individual. Some people are naturally loyal, sincere, plainspoken, and direct, rather than cunning and evasive. Above all, rulers should surround themselves with such people. Besides, advisers are rarely so united that they do not keep watch over one another. So if anyone gives advice to serve a faction or private interests, the king usually hears of it. But the best remedy is for rulers to know their advisers as well as their advisers know them:
Principis est virtus maxima nosse suos.
A ruler’s greatest virtue is knowing his own people.
And on the other side, counsellors should not be too speculative into their sovereign's person. The true composition of a counsellor, is rather to be skilful in their master's business, than in his nature; for then he is like to advise him, and not feed his humor. It is of singular use to princes, if they take the opinions of their counsel, both separately and together. For private opinion is more free; but opinion before others, is more reverent. In private, men are more bold in their own humors; and in consort, men are more obnoxious to others' humors; therefore it is good to take both; and of the inferior sort, rather in private, to preserve freedom; of the greater, rather in consort, to preserve respect. It is in vain for princes, to take counsel concerning matters, if they take no counsel likewise concerning persons; for all matters are as dead images; and the life of the execution of affairs, resteth in the good choice of persons. Neither is it enough, to consult concerning persons secundum genera, as in an idea, or mathematical description, what the kind and character of the person should be; for the greatest errors are committed, and the most judgment is shown, in the choice of individuals. It was truly said, optimi consiliarii mortui: books will speak plain, when counsellors blanch. Therefore it is good to be conversant in them, specially the books of such as themselves have been actors upon the stage.
On the other hand, advisers should not focus too closely on their sovereign’s personality. A good adviser should understand his ruler’s business better than his character. Then he is more likely to give sound advice rather than indulge the ruler’s whims. Rulers benefit greatly from hearing their advisers’ opinions both separately and together. Opinions given privately are freer, while those given before others are more respectful. In private, people express their own inclinations more boldly. In a group, they are more subject to the inclinations of others. It is therefore good to hear both kinds of advice. Lower-ranking advisers should preferably be heard privately, to preserve their freedom to speak. Higher-ranking advisers should preferably be heard together, to preserve respect. Rulers gain nothing by seeking advice about affairs unless they also seek advice about people. All affairs are like lifeless images. What brings plans to life is choosing the right people to carry them out. Nor is it enough to discuss people only in general terms. An abstract or precise description of the kind of person needed is not enough. The greatest mistakes are made, and the greatest judgment shown, in choosing individuals. It was rightly said that the best advisers are the dead. Books speak plainly when advisers avoid the truth. Rulers should therefore read widely, especially books by those who have themselves played an active part in public affairs.
The counsels at this day, in most places, are but familiar meetings, where matters are rather talked on, than debated. And they run too swift, to the order, or act, of counsel. It were better that in causes of weight, the matter were propounded one day, and not spoken to till the next day; in nocte consilium. So was it done in the Commission of Union, between England and Scotland; which was a grave and orderly assembly. I commend set days for petitions; for both it gives the suitors more certainty for their attendance, and it frees the meetings for matters of estate, that they may hoc agere. In choice of committees; for ripening business for the counsel, it is better to choose indifferent persons, than to make an indifferency, by putting in those, that are strong on both sides. I commend also standing commissions; as for trade, for treasure, for war, for suits, for some provinces; for where there be divers particular counsels, and but one counsel of estate (as it is in Spain), they are, in effect, no more than standing commissions: save that they have greater authority. Let such as are to inform counsels, out of their particular professions (as lawyers, seamen, mintmen, and the like) be first heard before committees; and then, as occasion serves, before the counsel. And let them not come in multitudes, or in a tribunitious manner; for that is to clamor counsels, not to inform them. A long table and a square table, or seats about the walls, seem things of form, but are things of substance; for at a long table a few at the upper end, in effect, sway all the business; but in the other form, there is more use of the counsellors' opinions, that sit lower. A king, when he presides in counsel, let him beware how he opens his own inclination too much, in that which he propoundeth; for else counsellors will but take the wind of him, and instead of giving free counsel, sing him a song of placebo.
Today, in most places, councils are little more than informal gatherings, where matters are discussed rather than debated. They move too quickly to decisions or action. In important cases, it would be better to present the matter one day and discuss it the next. Take a night to consider it. This was the practice in the Commission of Union between England and Scotland, a serious and orderly assembly. I recommend setting aside particular days for petitions. This gives petitioners greater certainty about when to attend. It also leaves council meetings free to concentrate on affairs of state. When choosing committees to prepare business for the council, it is better to select impartial people. Do not try to achieve balance by including strong supporters of both sides. I also recommend standing commissions for trade, finance, war, petitions, and particular provinces. Where several specialized councils exist alongside a single council of state, as in Spain, they are effectively standing commissions. The only difference is their greater authority. Specialists advising councils, such as lawyers, sailors, and mint officials, should first be heard by committees. Then, as needed, they should appear before the council itself. They should not appear in large numbers or behave like agitators. That is shouting at councils, not informing them. A long table, a square table, or seats around the walls may seem merely matters of arrangement. But they have real importance. At a long table, the few at the head effectively control all the business. Other arrangements make better use of the opinions of councillors seated in less prominent positions. When a king presides over his council, he should avoid revealing his own preference too clearly when presenting a matter. Otherwise, his councillors will simply follow his lead. Instead of offering frank advice, they will tell him what he wants to hear.