The Encheiridion, or Manual

32 min

I

1

Of things some are in our power, and others are not. In our power are opinion (ὑπόληψις), movement towards a thing (ὁρμή), desire, aversion (ἔκκλισις, turning from a thing); and in a word, whatever are our own acts: not in our power are the body, property, reputation, offices (magisterial power), and in a word, whatever are not our own acts. And the things in our power are by nature free, not subject to restraint nor hindrance: but the things not in our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the power of others. Remember then that if you think the things which are by nature slavish to be free, and the things which are in the power of others to be your own, you will be hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will blame both gods and men: but if you think that only which is your own to be your own, and if you think that what is another's, as it really is, belongs to another, no man will ever compel you, no man will hinder you, you will never blame any man, you will accuse no man, you will do nothing involuntarily (against your will), no man will harm you, you will have no enemy, for you will not suffer any harm.

Some things are in our power, and others are not. In our power are opinion (ὑπόληψις), the impulse to act (ὁρμή), desire, and aversion (ἔκκλισις, turning away from something). In short, whatever we do is in our power. Our bodies, property, reputation, and public offices (the power of a magistrate) are not in our power. In short, whatever we do not do ourselves is not in our power. Things in our power are naturally free and cannot be restrained or hindered. But things not in our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, and in the power of others. Remember this: you may think that things naturally slavish are free, and that things in others’ power are your own. If you do, you will be hindered, you will grieve, and you will be disturbed. You will blame both gods and people. But suppose you regard only what is your own as your own. And suppose you regard what belongs to another as belonging to another, as it really does. Then no one will ever compel or hinder you. You will never blame or accuse anyone. You will do nothing against your will. No one will harm you, and you will have no enemy, because you will suffer no harm.

In Schweighaeuser’s edition, the title is ‘Ἐπικτήτου ἐγχειρίδιον. Epicteti Manuale ex recensione et interpretatione Joannis Uptoni. Notabiliorem Lectonis varietatem adjecit Joh. Schweighaeuser.’ The edition also contains notes by Upton and some by Schweighaeuser.

If then you desire (aim at) such great things, remember that you must not (attempt to) lay hold of them with a small effort; but you must leave alone some things entirely, and postpone others for the present. But if you wish for these things also (such great things), and power (office) and wealth, perhaps you will not gain even these very things (power and wealth) because you aim also at those former things (such great things): certainly you will fail in those things through which alone happiness and freedom are secured. Straightway then practise saying to every harsh appearance, You are an appearance, and in no manner what you appear to be. Then examine it by the rules which you possess, and by this first and chiefly, whether it relates to the things which are in our power or to the things which are not in our power: and if it relates to any thing which is not in our power, be ready to say, that it does not concern you.

If you aim for such great things, remember that you cannot achieve them with little effort. You must give up some things entirely and put others off for now. But if you want power and wealth as well, perhaps you will not gain even those, because you also aim for those great things. You will certainly fail to gain the things that alone secure happiness and freedom. So start practicing at once. Say to every troubling appearance, “You are an appearance, and not at all what you seem to be.” Then examine it using the rules you have. First and foremost, ask whether it concerns things within your power or things outside your power. If it concerns anything outside your power, be ready to say that it does not concern you.

This passage is hard to understand in the original without careful study. I have followed the explanation of Simplicius, iv. (i. 4.)

Appearances are called 'harsh' or 'rough' when they are 'contrary to reason and overexciting and in fact make life rough (uneven) by the want of symmetry and by inequality in the movements,' Simplicius, v. (i. 5.)

II

2

Remember that desire contains in it the profession (hope) of obtaining that which you desire; and the profession (hope) in aversion (turning from a thing) is that you will not fall into that which you attempt to avoid: and he who fails in his desire is unfortunate; and he who falls into that which he would avoid, is unhappy. If then you attempt to avoid only the things contrary to nature which are within your power, you will not be involved in any of the things which you would avoid. But if you attempt to avoid disease or death or poverty, you will be unhappy. Take away then aversion from all things which are not in our power, and transfer it to the things contrary to nature which are in our power. But destroy desire completely for the present. For if you desire anything which is not in our power, you must be unfortunate: but of the things in our power, and which it would be good to desire, nothing yet is before you. But employ only the power of moving towards an object and retiring from it; and these powers indeed only slightly and with exceptions and with remission.

Remember that when you desire something, you hope to obtain it. When you want to avoid something, you hope not to encounter it. Anyone who fails to get what they desire is unfortunate. Anyone who encounters what they want to avoid is unhappy. If you try to avoid only things contrary to nature that are within your power, you will encounter none of them. But if you try to avoid disease, death, or poverty, you will be unhappy. So stop trying to avoid things that are not within your power. Instead, avoid things contrary to nature that are within your power. But for now, give up desire completely. If you desire anything that is not within your power, you must be unfortunate. Some things within your power would be good to desire, but none of them is yet before you. For now, only move toward or away from things. Even then, do so gently, with exceptions and without straining.

See the notes in Schweig.'s edition.

III

3

In every thing which pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is loved, remember to add this to the (description, notion); what is the nature of each thing, beginning from the smallest? If you love an earthen vessel, say it is an earthen vessel which you love; for when it has been broken, you will not be disturbed. If you are kissing your child or wife, say that it is a human being whom you are kissing, for when the wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed.

For everything that pleases your soul, meets a need, or is loved, remember to ask what kind of thing it is. Start with the smallest things. If you love a clay pot, say that it is a clay pot you love. Then, when it breaks, you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your child or wife, say that you are kissing a human being. Then, when your wife or child dies, you will not be disturbed.

IV

4

When you are going to take in hand any act, remind yourself what kind of an act it is. If you are going to bathe, place before yourself what happens in the bath: some splashing the water, others pushing against one another, others abusing one another, and some stealing: and thus with more safety you will undertake the matter, if you say to yourself, I now intend to bathe, and to maintain my will in a manner conformable to nature. And so you will do in every act: for thus if any hindrance to bathing shall happen, let this thought be ready: it was not this only that I intended, but I intended also to maintain my will in a way conformable to nature; but I shall not maintain it so, if I am vexed at what happens.

Before you begin any activity, remind yourself what it involves. If you are going to bathe, picture what happens at the bath. Some people splash water, others push or insult one another, and some steal. You will approach bathing more safely if you say to yourself: I intend to bathe and to keep my will in harmony with nature. Do the same with every activity. Then, if anything prevents you from bathing, you will be ready to think: Bathing was not my only aim. I also intended to keep my will in harmony with nature. But I will not do that if I am upset by what happens.

V

5

Men are disturbed not by the things which happen, but by the opinions about the things: for example, death is nothing terrible, for if it were, it would have seemed so to Socrates; for the opinion about death, that it is terrible, is the terrible thing. When then we are impeded or disturbed or grieved, let us never blame others, but ourselves, that is, our opinions. It is the act of an ill-instructed man to blame others for his own bad condition; it is the act of one who has begun to be instructed, to lay the blame on himself; and of one whose instruction is completed, neither to blame another, nor himself.

People are disturbed not by what happens, but by their opinions about it. For example, death is not terrible. If it were, Socrates would have thought it terrible. The terrible thing is the opinion that death is terrible. So when we are blocked, disturbed, or grieved, we should never blame others. We should blame ourselves, that is, our own opinions. An uneducated person blames others for their own troubles. Someone who has begun to learn blames themselves. Someone whose education is complete blames neither others nor themselves.

VI

6

Be not elated at any advantage (excellence), which belongs to another. If a horse when he is elated should say, I am beautiful, one might endure it. But when you are elated, and say, I have a beautiful horse, you must know that you are elated at having a good horse. What then is your own? The use of appearances. Consequently when in the use of appearances you are conformable to nature, then you will be elated, for then you will be elated at something good which is your own.

Do not take pride in an advantage (excellence) that belongs to someone else. If a horse proudly said, I am beautiful, one could put up with it. But when you proudly say, I have a beautiful horse, you are proud of having a good horse. What, then, is your own? Your use of appearances. So when you use appearances in accordance with nature, you can be proud. Then you will be proud of something good that is your own.

Upton suggests reading ἐφ' ἱπποῦ ἀγαθῷ instead of ἐπὶ ἵππῳ ἀγαθῷ. The meaning would then be 'elated at something good which is in the horse.' I think he is right.

VII

7

As on a voyage when the vessel has reached a port, if you go out to get water, it is an amusement by the way to pick up a shell fish or some bulb, but your thoughts ought to be directed to the ship, and you ought to be constantly watching if the captain should call, and then you must throw away all those things, that you may not be bound and pitched into the ship like sheep: so in life also, if there be given to you instead of a little bulb and a shell a wife and child, there will be nothing to prevent (you from taking them). But if the captain should call, run to the ship, and leave all those things without regard to them. But if you are old, do not even go far from the ship, lest when you are called you make default.

On a voyage, suppose your ship reaches a port and you go ashore to get water. Along the way, you might amuse yourself by picking up a shellfish or a bulb. But you should keep your thoughts on the ship and watch for the captain’s call. When he calls, you must throw those things away. Otherwise, you may be tied up and thrown into the ship like a sheep. Life is the same. If you are given a wife and child instead of a little bulb and a shell, nothing prevents you from accepting them. But if the captain calls, run to the ship and leave them behind without a thought. And if you are old, do not even go far from the ship. Otherwise, you may fail to answer when you are called.

VIII

8

Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish; but wish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have a tranquil flow of life.

Do not expect things that happen to happen as you wish. Instead, wish for them to happen as they do, and your life will flow peacefully.

The text has τὰ γενόμενα, but it should read τὰ γινόμενα. See Upton's note.

IX

9

Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless the will itself chooses. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the will. And add this reflection on the occasion of every thing that happens; for you will find it an impediment to something else, but not to yourself.

Disease is an obstacle to the body, but not to the will, unless the will itself chooses otherwise. Lameness is an obstacle to the leg, but not to the will. Remember this whenever anything happens. You will find that it is an obstacle to something else, but not to yourself.

X

10

On the occasion of every accident (event) that befals you, remember to turn to yourself and inquire what power you have for turning it to use. If you see a fair man or a fair woman, you will find that the power to resist is temperance (continence). If labour (pain) be presented to you, you will find that it is endurance. If it be abusive words, you will find it to be patience. And if you have been thus formed to the (proper) habit, the appearances will not carry you along with them.

Whenever something happens to you, look within yourself and ask what ability you have to make use of it. If you see a beautiful man or woman, you will find that self-control gives you the power to resist. If you face hard work or pain, you will find the power of endurance. If someone insults you, you will find the power of patience. If you develop this habit, appearances will not carry you away.

XI

11

Never say about any thing, I have lost it, but say I have restored it. Is your child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has been restored. Has your estate been taken from you? Has not then this also been restored? But he who has taken it from me is a bad man. But what is it to you, by whose hands the giver demanded it back? So long as he may allow you, take care of it as a thing which belongs to another, as travellers do with their inn.

Never say about anything, I have lost it. Say instead, I have returned it. Has your child died? Your child has been returned. Has your wife died? She has been returned. Has your estate been taken from you? Hasn't your estate been returned too? But the man who took it from me is a bad man. What does it matter to you who the giver used to take it back? As long as the giver allows you to keep it, care for it as something belonging to another, just as travelers care for an inn.

XII

12

If you intend to improve, throw away such thoughts as these: if I neglect my affairs, I shall not have the means of living: unless I chastise my slave, he will be bad. For it is better to die of hunger and so to be released from grief and fear than to live in abundance with perturbation; and it is better for your slave to be bad than for you to be unhappy. Begin then from little things. Is the oil spilled? Is a little wine stolen? Say on the occasion, at such price is sold freedom from perturbation; at such price is sold tranquillity, but nothing is got for nothing. And when you call your slave, consider that it is possible that he does not hear; and if he does hear, that he will do nothing which you wish. But matters are not so well with him, but altogether well with you, that it should be in his power for you to be not disturbed.

If you intend to improve, put aside thoughts like these: If I neglect my affairs, I will have no means of living. If I do not punish my slave, he will behave badly. It is better to die of hunger, free from grief and fear, than to live in abundance and distress. And it is better for your slave to behave badly than for you to be unhappy. Start with small things. Has the oil been spilled? Has a little wine been stolen? When this happens, say: This is the price of freedom from distress. This is the price of peace of mind. Nothing comes for free. And when you call your slave, remember that he may not hear you. Even if he hears you, he may do nothing you ask. But he is not so fortunate, nor are you so fortunate, that he should have the power to disturb your peace of mind.

He means: Do not punish your slave while you are angry. While trying to correct him, you may fall into vice, a man's great and only calamity. And it is very doubtful that you will succeed in correcting him. Schweig.

The passage seems to mean that your slave cannot disturb you because you have the power to remain undisturbed. See Upton's note on the text.

XIII

13

If you would improve, submit to be considered without sense and foolish with respect to externals. Wish to be considered to know nothing: and if you shall seem to some to be a person of importance, distrust yourself. For you should know that it is not easy both to keep your will in a condition conformable to nature and (to secure) external things: but if a man is careful about the one, it is an absolute necessity that he will neglect the other.

If you want to improve, accept being thought senseless and foolish about external things. Be willing to be thought ignorant. And if some people think you are important, be wary of yourself. For you should know that it is not easy to keep your will in harmony with nature while securing external things. If you devote your attention to one, you must neglect the other.

XIV

14

If you would have your children and your wife and your friends to live for ever, you are silly; for you would have the things which are not in your power to be in your power, and the things which belong to others to be yours. So if you would have your slave to be free from faults, you are a fool; for you would have badness not to be badness, but something else. But if you wish not to fail in your desires, you are able to do that. Practise then this which you are able to do. He is the master of every man who has the power over the things, which another person wishes or does not wish, the power to confer them on him or to take them away. Whoever then wishes to be free, let him neither wish for any thing nor avoid anything which depends on others: if he does not observe this rule, he must be a slave.

If you want your children, your wife, and your friends to live forever, you are silly. You want things beyond your control to be under your control. You want what belongs to others to belong to you. Likewise, if you want your slave to be free from faults, you are a fool. You want badness to be something other than badness. But you can avoid failing to get what you desire. So practice what you can do. A person is master over anyone whose desires or aversions he can control. He has the power to give that person the things he desires or fears, or to take them away. So anyone who wants to be free should neither desire nor avoid anything that depends on others. If he does not follow this rule, he must be a slave.

Θέλειν is used here, as it often is among the Stoics, to mean 'wish absolutely,' or 'to will.' When Epictetus says 'you would have badness not to be badness,' he means that 'badness' lies in the will of the person who has it. You are a fool to wish to bring that badness under your own will. Your responsibility is to improve the slave as much as you can. You may wish to do that. His responsibility is to obey your instruction. That is what he ought to wish to do. But whether he wills himself to do it depends on him, not on you. Schweig.

XV

15

Remember that in life you ought to behave as at a banquet. Suppose that something is carried round and is opposite to you. Stretch out your hand and take a portion with decency. Suppose that it passes by you. Do not detain it. Suppose that it is not yet come to you. Do not send your desire forward to it, but wait till it is opposite to you. Do so with respect to children, so with respect to a wife, so with respect to magisterial offices, so with respect to wealth, and you will be some time a worthy partner of the banquets of the gods. But if you take none of the things which are set before you, and even despise them, then you will be not only a fellow banqueter with the gods, but also a partner with them in power. For by acting thus Diogenes and Heracleitus and those like them were deservedly divine, and were so called.

Remember to behave in life as you would at a banquet. Suppose a dish is being passed around and comes to you. Reach out and take a portion politely. If it passes you by, do not hold it back. If it has not yet come to you, do not long for it in advance. Wait until it reaches you. Do the same with children, a wife, public office, and wealth. Then, one day, you will be worthy to share in the banquets of the gods. But suppose you take none of the things offered to you and even look down on them. Then you will not only feast with the gods, but also share their power. For by acting this way, Diogenes, Heracleitus, and others like them deserved to be called divine, and they were.

XVI

16

When you see a person weeping in sorrow either when a child goes abroad or when he is dead, or when the man has lost his property, take care that the appearance do not hurry you away with it, as if he were suffering in external things. But straightway make a distinction in your own mind, and be in readiness to say, it is not that which has happened that afflicts this man, for it does not afflict another, but it is the opinion about this thing which afflicts the man. So far as words then do not be unwilling to show him sympathy, and even if it happens so, to lament with him. But take care that you do not lament internally also.

When you see someone weeping because a child has gone abroad or died, or because the person has lost property, be careful. Do not let appearances carry you away into thinking that external events are causing the person’s suffering. Instead, make a distinction in your mind. Be ready to say that it is not what happened that causes the person distress. After all, the same event does not distress someone else. Rather, it is the person’s opinion about what happened that causes the distress. So do not hesitate to express sympathy in words, or even to grieve with the person if the occasion calls for it. But be careful not to grieve inwardly as well.

This is unclear. 'It is true that the man is wretched, not because of the things external which have happened to him, but through the fact that he allows himself to be affected so much by external things which are placed out of his power.' Schweig.

Some have criticized Epictetus for showing no sympathy for those who grieve. But here he tells you to show sympathy, which comforts most people. Still, it would go against his teaching to tell you to share another person's mental suffering.

XVII

17

Remember that thou art an actor in a play, of such a kind as the teacher (author) may choose; if short, of a short one; if long, of a long one: if he wishes you to act the part of a poor man, see that you act the part naturally; if the part of a lame man, of a magistrate, of a private person, (do the same). For this is your duty, to act well the part that is given to you; but to select the part, belongs to another.

Remember that you are an actor in a play, of whatever kind the teacher (author) chooses. If he chooses a short play, it is short. If he chooses a long one, it is long. If he wants you to play a poor man, make sure you play the part naturally. Do the same if he gives you the part of a lame man, a magistrate, or a private citizen. Your duty is to play the part given to you well. But someone else chooses the part.

Compare Antoninus, xi. 6, xii. 36.

Note, ed. Schweig.

XVIII

18

When a raven has croaked inauspiciously, let not the appearance hurry you away with it; but straightway make a distinction in your mind and say, None of these things is signified to me, but either to my poor body, or to my small property, or to my reputation, or to my children or to my wife: but to me all significations are auspicious if I choose. For whatever of these things results, it is in my power to derive benefit from it.

When a raven croaks as a bad omen, do not let the impression carry you away. Instead, make a distinction in your mind and say: None of these signs applies to me. They apply to my poor body, my small property, my reputation, my children, or my wife. But for me, all signs are favorable if I choose. For whatever happens to any of these things, I can benefit from it.

XIX

19

You can be invincible, if you enter into no contest in which it is not in your power to conquer. Take care then when you observe a man honoured before others or possessed of great power or highly esteemed for any reason, not to suppose him happy, and be not carried away by the appearance. For if the nature of the good is in our power, neither envy nor jealousy will have a place in us. But you yourself will not wish to be a general or senator (πρύτανις) or consul, but a free man: and there is only one way to this, to despise (care not for) the things which are not in our power.

You can be invincible if you enter only contests that you have the power to win. So take care when you see a man honored above others, holding great power, or highly regarded for any reason. Do not assume he is happy, and do not be carried away by appearances. For if what is good is within our power, envy and jealousy will have no place in us. You will not wish to be a general, senator (πρύτανις), or consul, but a free man. There is only one way to be free: care nothing for what is not in your power.

XX

20

Remember that it is not he who reviles you or strikes you, who insults you, but it is your opinion about these things as being insulting. When then a man irritates you, you must know that it is your own opinion which has irritated you. Therefore especially try not to be carried away by the appearance. For if you once gain time and delay, you will more easily master yourself.

Remember that a person who insults or strikes you does not offend you. Your judgment that these things are offensive is what offends you. So when someone irritates you, know that your own judgment has irritated you. Above all, try not to be carried away by how things appear. If you take time and pause, you will find it easier to master yourself.

XXI

21

Let death and exile and every other thing which appears dreadful be daily before your eyes; but most of all death: and you will never think of any thing mean nor will you desire any thing extravagantly.

Keep death, exile, and everything else that seems dreadful before your eyes every day, especially death. Then you will never think of anything unworthy or desire anything extravagantly.

XXII

22

If you desire philosophy, prepare yourself from the beginning to be ridiculed, to expect that many will sneer at you, and say, He has all at once returned to us as a philosopher; and whence does he get this supercilious look for us? Do you not show a supercilious look; but hold on to the things which seem to you best as one appointed by God to this station. And remember that if you abide in the same principles, these men who first ridiculed will afterwards admire you: but if you shall have been overpowered by them, you will bring on yourself double ridicule.

If you want to pursue philosophy, prepare from the start to be ridiculed. Expect many people to sneer at you and say, Here he is, suddenly back among us as a philosopher. Where did he get that superior look he gives us? Do not put on a superior look. But hold fast to what seems best to you, as someone appointed by God to this position. Remember that if you stick to the same principles, those who first ridiculed you will later admire you. But if you let them overcome you, you will bring twice as much ridicule on yourself.

XXIII

23

If it should ever happen to you to be turned to externals in order to please some person, you must know that you have lost your purpose in life. Be satisfied then in every thing with being a philosopher; and if you wish to seem also to any person to be a philosopher, appear so to yourself, and you will be able to do this.

If you ever turn your attention to external things to please someone, know that you have lost your purpose in life. So be content to be a philosopher in everything you do. If you also want someone else to see you as a philosopher, see yourself as one, and you will be able to do so.

'If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ.' Gal. i. 10. Mrs. Carter.

XXIV

24

Let not these thoughts afflict you, I shall live unhonoured and be nobody nowhere. For if want of honour (ἀτιμία) is an evil, you cannot be in evil through the means (fault) of another any more than you can be involved in any thing base. Is it then your business to obtain the rank of a magistrate, or to be received at a banquet? By no means. How then can this be want of honor (dishonor)? And how will you be nobody nowhere, when you ought to be somebody in those things only which are in your power, in which indeed it is permitted to you to be a man of the greatest worth? But your friends will be without assistance! What do you mean by being without assistance? They will not receive money from you, nor will you make them Roman citizens. Who then told you that these are among the things which are in our power, and not in the power of others? And who can give to another what he has not himself? Acquire money then, your friends say, that we also may have something. If I can acquire money and also keep myself modest, and faithful and magnanimous, point out the way, and I will acquire it. But if you ask me to lose the things which are good and my own, in order that you may gain the things which are not good, see how unfair and silly you are. Besides, which would you rather have, money or a faithful and modest friend? For this end then rather help me to be such a man, and do not ask me to do this by which I shall lose that character. But my country, you say, as far as it depends on me, will be without my help. I ask again, what help do you mean? It will not have porticoes or baths through you. And what does this mean? For it is not furnished with shoes by means of a smith, nor with arms by means of a shoemaker. But it is enough if every man fully discharges the work that is his own: and if you provided it with another citizen faithful and modest, would you not be useful to it? Yes. Then you also cannot be useless to it. What place then, you say, shall I hold in the city? Whatever you can, if you maintain at the same time your fidelity and modesty. But if when you wish to be useful to the state, you shall lose these qualities, what profit could you be to it, if you were made shameless and faithless?

Do not let these thoughts trouble you: “I will live without honor and be nobody, nowhere.” If lack of honor (ἀτιμία) is an evil, no one else can bring that evil upon you. They can no more do that than involve you in anything shameful. Is it your job to become a magistrate or be invited to a banquet? Not at all. So how can missing out on these things be a lack of honor? And how can you be nobody, nowhere? You should seek to be somebody only in the things within your power. In those things, you can indeed be a person of the greatest worth. But your friends will be left without help! What do you mean by that? They will not receive money from you, and you will not make them Roman citizens. Who told you that these things are in our power, rather than in the power of others? And who can give someone else what he does not have himself? “Then make money,” your friends say, “so that we can have some too.” If I can make money while remaining modest, faithful, and generous in spirit, show me how. I will make it. But perhaps you ask me to lose what is good and truly mine. You want me to do this so that you can gain things that are not good. See how unfair and foolish you are. Besides, which would you rather have, money or a faithful and modest friend? Help me become such a man instead. Do not ask me to do what would make me lose that character. “But my country,” you say, “will get no help from me.” Again, what help do you mean? Your country will not have porticoes or baths because of you. But what does that matter? A blacksmith does not provide it with shoes, nor does a shoemaker provide it with weapons. It is enough if everyone fully does his own work. If you gave your country another faithful and modest citizen, would you not be useful to it? Yes. Then you, too, cannot be useless to it. “What position, then,” you ask, “shall I hold in the city?” Whatever position you can hold while remaining faithful and modest. But suppose you lose these qualities in trying to serve the state. What good could you do it if you became shameless and unfaithful?

See the text.

XXV

25

Has any man been preferred before you at a banquet, or in being saluted, or in being invited to a consultation? If these things are good, you ought to rejoice that he has obtained them: but if bad, be not grieved because you have not obtained them; and remember that you cannot, if you do not the same things in order to obtain what is not in our own power, be considered worthy of the same (equal) things. For how can a man obtain an equal share with another when he does not visit a man's doors as that other man does, when he does not attend him when he goes abroad, as the other man does; when he does not praise (flatter) him as another does? You will be unjust then and insatiable, if you do not part with the price, in return for which those things are sold, and if you wish to obtain them for nothing. Well, what is the price of lettuces? An obolus perhaps. If then a man gives up the obolus, and receives the lettuces, and if you do not give up the obolus and do not obtain the lettuces, do not suppose that you receive less than he who has got the lettuces; for as he has the lettuces, so you have the obolus which you did not give. In the same way then in the other matter also you have not been invited to a man's feast, for you did not give to the host the price at which the supper is sold; but he sells it for praise (flattery), he sells it for personal attention. Give then the price, if it is for your interest, for which it is sold. But if you wish both not to give the price and to obtain the things, you are insatiable and silly. Have you nothing then in place of the supper? You have indeed, you have the not flattering of him, whom you did not choose to flatter; you have the not enduring of the man when he enters the room.

Has someone been given preference over you at a banquet, in being greeted, or in being invited to a consultation? If these things are good, you should be glad he has received them. But if they are bad, do not be upset that you have not received them. Remember that you cannot expect an equal share of things outside your control if you do not do the same things to obtain them. How can you receive an equal share if you do not call at a man's door as the other man does? Or if you do not accompany him when he goes out, or flatter him, as the other man does? You would be unfair and greedy to want these things for nothing, without paying the price they are sold for. What is the price of lettuce? Perhaps an obolus. Suppose a man gives up an obolus and receives the lettuce. You do not give up an obolus, so you do not get the lettuce. Do not suppose you have received less than the man with the lettuce. He has the lettuce, and you have the obolus you did not give up. It is the same with the other matter. You were not invited to a man's feast because you did not pay the host's price for the meal. He sells it for flattery and personal attention. So pay the price if it is in your interest to do so. But if you want to get the meal without paying the price, you are greedy and foolish. Have you received nothing in place of the meal? Indeed, you have. You have not flattered the man you chose not to flatter. And you have not had to put up with him when he enters the room.

One sixth of a drachma.

'Price' here is τὸ διαφέρον.

See Schweig.'s note.

XXVI

26

We may learn the wish (will) of nature from the things in which we do not differ from one another: for instance, when your neighbour's slave has broken his cup, or any thing else, we are ready to say forthwith, that it is one of the things which happen. You must know then that when your cup also is broken, you ought to think as you did when your neighbour's cup was broken. Transfer this reflection to greater things also. Is another man's child or wife dead? There is no one who would not say, this is an event incident to man. But when a man's own child or wife is dead, forthwith he calls out, Wo to me, how wretched I am. But we ought to remember how we feel when we hear that it has happened to others.

We can learn what nature wills from the things about which we all agree. For example, suppose your neighbor's slave breaks his cup or something else. We are quick to say that such things happen. So when your own cup is broken, you should think as you did when your neighbor's cup was broken. Apply the same thought to greater things too. Has another man's child or wife died? Everyone would say that such things happen to people. But when a man's own child or wife dies, he immediately cries out, “Woe is me! How miserable I am!” Yet we should remember how we feel when we hear that this has happened to others.

XXVII

27

As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the world.

Just as a target is not set up to be missed, evil does not exist as a force in the world.

Simplicius explains this passage in his commentary (xxxiv., in Schweig.'s ed. xxvii. p. 264), and Schweighaeuser agrees with his explanation. Nothing in the universe can exist or happen that is truly bad in itself or by nature. Everything exists and happens through God’s wisdom and will, and for the purpose he intended. But to miss a mark is to fail in an intention. A person does not set up a mark or form a purpose in order to miss it. Likewise, it is absurd to say that God has a purpose or design and intended anything inherently bad. Simplicius’s commentary is worth reading. But how many will read it? Perhaps one in a million.

XXVIII

28

If any person was intending to put your body in the power of any man whom you fell in with on the way, you would be vexed: but that you put your understanding in the power of any man whom you meet, so that if he should revile you, it is disturbed and troubled, are you not ashamed at this?

If someone intended to put your body under the control of anyone you met on the road, you would be upset. Yet you put your mind under the control of anyone you meet. If he insults you, your mind becomes disturbed and troubled. Aren't you ashamed of that?

XXIX.

XXIX.

'Compare iii. 15, from which all this passage has been transferred to the Encheiridion by the copyists.' Upton. Schweighaeuser comments, 'Why should we not say by Arrian, who composed the Encheiridion from the Discourses of Epictetus?' See the notes of Upton and Schweig. on differences between some readings in iii. 15 and those in this passage.

In every act observe the things which come first, and those which follow it; and so proceed to the act. If you do not, at first you will approach it with alacrity, without having thought of the things which will follow; but afterwards, when certain base (ugly) things have shewn themselves, you will be ashamed. A man wishes to conquer at the Olympic games. I also wish indeed, for it is a fine thing. But observe both the things which come first, and the things which follow; and then begin the act. You must do every thing according to rule, eat according to strict orders, abstain from delicacies, exercise yourself as you are bid at appointed times, in heat, in cold, you must not drink cold water, nor wine as you choose; in a word, you must deliver yourself up to the exercise master as you do to the physician, and then proceed to the contest. And sometimes you will strain the hand, put the ankle out of joint, swallow much dust, sometimes be flogged, and after all this be defeated. When you have considered all this, if you still choose, go to the contest: if you do not, you will behave like children, who at one time play at wrestlers, another time as flute players, again as gladiators, then as trumpeters, then as tragic actors: so you also will be at one time an athlete, at another a gladiator, then a rhetorician, then a philosopher, but with your whole soul you will be nothing at all; but like an ape you imitate every thing that you see, and one thing after another pleases you. For you have not undertaken any thing with consideration, nor have you surveyed it well; but carelessly and with cold desire. Thus some who have seen a philosopher and having heard one speak, as Euphrates speaks,—and who can speak as he does?—they wish to be philosophers themselves also. My man, first of all consider what kind of thing it is: and then examine your own nature, if you are able to sustain the character. Do you wish to be a pentathlete or a wrestler? Look at your arms, your thighs, examine your loins. For different men are formed by nature for different things. Do you think that if you do these things, you can eat in the same manner, drink in the same manner, and in the same manner loathe certain things? You must pass sleepless nights, endure toil, go away from your kinsmen, be despised by a slave, in every thing have the inferior part, in honour, in office, in the courts of justice, in every little matter. Consider these things, if you would exchange for them, freedom from passions, liberty, tranquillity. If not, take care that, like little children, you be not now a philosopher, then a servant of the publicani, then a rhetorician, then a procurator (manager) for Caesar. These things are not consistent. You must be one man, either good or bad. You must either cultivate your own ruling faculty, or external things; you must either exercise your skill on internal things or on external things; that is you must either maintain the position of a philosopher or that of a common person.

In everything you do, consider what comes before and what follows. Only then should you act. Otherwise, you will begin eagerly, without thinking about the consequences. Later, when some unpleasant things come to light, you will be ashamed. A man wants to win at the Olympic games. I want to win too, of course, because it is a fine thing. But consider what comes before and what follows, and only then begin. You must follow every rule, eat according to strict orders, and give up delicacies. You must train as instructed, at appointed times, in heat and cold. You must not drink cold water or drink wine whenever you please. In short, you must put yourself in the hands of your trainer, as you would a physician. Only then can you enter the contest. Sometimes you will strain your hand, dislocate your ankle, or swallow a great deal of dust. Sometimes you will be flogged. And after all this, you may be defeated. If you have considered all this and still choose to compete, then enter the contest. Otherwise, you will behave like children. They play at being wrestlers one moment, flute players the next, then gladiators, trumpeters, and tragic actors. In the same way, you will be an athlete one moment, a gladiator the next, then a rhetorician, then a philosopher. But you will be nothing with your whole soul. Like an ape, you will imitate everything you see, and one thing after another will appeal to you. You have not undertaken anything thoughtfully or examined it carefully. Instead, you have acted carelessly, with only a halfhearted desire. So it is with some people who have seen a philosopher and heard him speak as Euphrates does. And who can speak as he does? They want to be philosophers themselves. My friend, first consider what being a philosopher involves. Then examine your own nature and ask whether you can live up to it. Do you want to be a pentathlete or a wrestler? Look at your arms and thighs, and examine your loins. Different men are naturally suited to different things. Do you think that if you become a philosopher, you can eat and drink as before, and dislike the same things? You must spend sleepless nights, endure hard work, and leave your family. You must be despised by a slave and take the lesser place in everything. You must do so in honors, public office, the courts, and every little matter. Consider whether you would accept all this in exchange for freedom from passions, liberty, and tranquility. If not, take care. Otherwise, like little children, you will be a philosopher one moment, then a servant of the publicani, then a rhetorician, then a manager for Caesar. These roles are not consistent with one another. You must be one person, either good or bad. You must cultivate either your own ruling faculty or external things. You must apply your skill either to what is within you or to what is outside you. In other words, you must live either as a philosopher or as a common person.

XXX

30

Duties are universally measured by relations (ταῖς σχέσεσι). Is a man a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him in all things, to submit when he is reproachful, when he inflicts blows. But suppose that he is a bad father. Were you then by nature made akin to a good father? No; but to a father. Does a brother wrong you? Maintain then your own position towards him, and do not examine what he is doing, but what you must do that your will shall be conformable to nature. For another will not damage you, unless you choose: but you will be damaged then when you shall think that you are damaged. In this way then you will discover your duty from the relation of a neighbour, from that of a citizen, from that of a general, if you are accustomed to contemplate the relations.

Duties are always determined by relationships (ταῖς σχέσεσι). Is a man your father? Then you should care for him, give way to him in everything, and submit when he scolds or strikes you. But suppose he is a bad father. Did nature make you related to a good father? No, it made you related to a father. Does your brother wrong you? Then maintain your own relationship with him. Do not focus on what he is doing. Instead, focus on what you must do to bring your will into harmony with nature. For another person cannot harm you unless you choose to be harmed. You will be harmed when you think you are harmed. In the same way, you can discover your duty to a neighbor, a fellow citizen, or a general. You can do this if you make a habit of considering your relationships.

XXXI

31

As to piety towards the Gods you must know that this is the chief thing, to have right opinions about them, to think that they exist, and that they administer the All well and justly; and you must fix yourself in this principle (duty), to obey them, and to yield to them in every thing which happens, and voluntarily to follow it as being accomplished by the wisest intelligence. For if you do so, you will never either blame the Gods, nor will you accuse them of neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be done in any other way than by withdrawing from the things which are not in our power, and by placing the good and the evil only in those things which are in our power. For if you think that any of the things which are not in our power is good or bad, it is absolutely necessary that, when you do not obtain what you wish, and when you fall into those things which you do not wish, you will find fault and hate those who are the cause of them; for every animal is formed by nature to this, to fly from and to turn from the things which appear harmful and the things which are the cause of the harm, but to follow and admire the things which are useful and the causes of the useful. It is impossible then for a person who thinks that he is harmed to be delighted with that which he thinks to be the cause of the harm, as it is also impossible to be pleased with the harm itself. For this reason also a father is reviled by his son, when he gives no part to his son of the things which are considered to be good: and it was this which made Polynices and Eteocles enemies, the opinion that royal power was a good. It is for this reason that the cultivator of the earth reviles the Gods, for this reason the sailor does, and the merchant, and for this reason those who lose their wives and their children. For where the useful (your interest) is, there also piety is. Consequently he who takes care to desire as he ought and to avoid (ἐκκλίνειν) as he ought, at the same time also cares after piety. But to make libations and to sacrifice and to offer first fruits according to the custom of our fathers, purely and not meanly nor carelessly nor scantily nor above our ability, is a thing which belongs to all to do.

As for piety toward the Gods, you must know that the most important thing is to have the right beliefs about them. Believe that they exist and govern the universe well and justly. Make it your duty to obey them and accept everything that happens. Follow events willingly, knowing that the wisest intelligence brings them about. If you do this, you will never blame the Gods or accuse them of neglecting you. The only way to do this is to turn away from things outside our control. Place good and evil only in the things within our control. Suppose you think that something outside our control is good or bad. Then, when you fail to get what you want or encounter what you do not want, you will inevitably blame and hate those who cause it. For every animal is naturally made to flee and avoid whatever seems harmful, along with whatever causes that harm. Animals are also made to seek and admire whatever is useful, along with whatever produces it. So if you think you have been harmed, you cannot be pleased with what you believe caused the harm. Nor can you be pleased with the harm itself. That is why a son curses his father when his father gives him none of the things considered good. It was the belief that royal power was good that made Polynices and Eteocles enemies. For the same reason, farmers, sailors, and merchants curse the Gods. So do those who lose their wives and children. For wherever your interest lies, there too lies your piety. So anyone who takes care to desire and avoid (ἐκκλίνειν) as they should also takes care to be pious. But everyone should make libations, offer sacrifices, and offer first fruits according to the customs of our fathers. They should do so with purity, not stingily, carelessly, or inadequately, and not beyond their means.

See Discourses, ii. 22, 13, iv. 5, 9.

'It is plain enough that the philosopher does not say this, that the reckoning of our private advantage ought to be the sole origin and foundation of piety towards God.' Schweig. He then explains the sentence, which at first seems rather obscure. Perhaps Arrian means that piety goes hand in hand with the idea of what is useful or profitable. A person who takes care to desire and avoid things as he should also cares for piety. In doing so, he will secure his own interest, or what is profitable, and will not be discontented.

XXXII

32

When you have recourse to divination, remember that you do not know how it will turn out, but that you are come to inquire from the diviner. But of what kind it is, you know when you come, if indeed you are a philosopher. For if it is any of the things which are not in our power, it is absolutely necessary that it must be neither good nor bad. Do not then bring to the diviner desire or aversion (ἔκκλισιν): if you do, you will approach him with fear. But having determined in your mind that every thing which shall turn out (result) is indifferent, and does not concern you, and whatever it may be, for it will be in your power to use it well, and no man will hinder this, come then with confidence to the Gods as your advisers. And then when any advice shall have been given, remember whom you have taken as advisers, and whom you will have neglected, if you do not obey them. And go to divination, as Socrates said that you ought, about those matters in which all the inquiry has reference to the result, and in which means are not given either by reason nor by any other art for knowing the thing which is the subject of the inquiry. Wherefore when we ought to share a friend's danger or that of our country, you must not consult the diviner whether you ought to share it. For even if the diviner shall tell you that the signs of the victims are unlucky, it is plain that this is a token of death or mutilation of part of the body or of exile. But reason prevails that even with these risks we should share the dangers of our friend and of our country. Therefore attend to the greater diviner, the Pythian God, who ejected from the temple him who did not assist his friend when he was being murdered.

When you consult a diviner, remember that you do not know how things will turn out. You have come to ask the diviner. But if you are a philosopher, you already know what kind of thing the outcome is. If it is beyond your control, it must be neither good nor bad. So do not approach the diviner with desire or aversion (ἔκκλισιν). If you do, you will approach with fear. Instead, be certain that whatever happens is indifferent and does not concern you. Whatever the outcome, you can make good use of it, and no one can prevent you from doing so. Then approach the Gods confidently as your advisers. Once they have given you advice, remember whom you have consulted. Remember whom you will have disregarded if you do not follow their advice. As Socrates said, consult a diviner only about matters where the whole question concerns the outcome. These are matters that neither reason nor any other skill gives us the means to resolve. So, when we ought to share a friend's danger or our country's danger, do not ask the diviner whether to do so. The diviner may tell you that the signs from the sacrificial victims are unlucky. Clearly, this points to death, loss of a limb, or exile. But reason tells us that we should share the dangers of our friend and our country, even with these risks. So listen to the greater diviner, the Pythian God. He drove from the temple the man who did not help his friend while he was being murdered.

The story is told by Aelian (iii. c. 44) and by Simplicius in his commentary on the Encheiridion (p. 411, ed. Schweig.). Upton.

XXXIII

33

Immediately prescribe some character and some form to yourself, which you shall observe both when you are alone and when you meet with men.

Decide now on a character and way of behaving for yourself. Follow them both when you are alone and when you are with others.

And let silence be the general rule, or let only what is necessary be said, and in few words. And rarely and when the occasion calls we shall say something; but about none of the common subjects, not about gladiators, nor horse races, nor about athletes, nor about eating or drinking, which are the usual subjects; and especially not about men, as blaming them or praising them, or comparing them. If then you are able, bring over by your conversation the conversation of your associates to that which is proper; but if you should happen to be confined to the company of strangers, be silent.

As a rule, stay silent, or say only what is necessary, in a few words. Speak only rarely, when the occasion calls for it. Do not talk about common subjects, such as gladiators, horse races, athletes, eating, or drinking. Above all, do not talk about people by blaming, praising, or comparing them. If you can, steer your companions' conversation toward appropriate subjects. But if you find yourself among strangers, stay silent.

Let not your laughter be much, nor on many occasions, nor excessive.

Do not laugh too often, on too many occasions, or too much.

Refuse altogether to take an oath, if it is possible: if it is not, refuse as far as you are able.

If possible, refuse to take any oath. If that is not possible, refuse as much as you can.

Avoid banquets which are given by strangers and by ignorant persons. But if ever there is occasion to join in them, let your attention be carefully fixed, that you slip not into the manners of the vulgar (the uninstructed). For you must know, that if your companion be impure, he also who keeps company with him must become impure, though he should happen to be pure.

Avoid banquets given by strangers and ignorant people. But if you ever have occasion to attend one, pay close attention. Take care not to adopt the manners of ordinary people (the uninstructed). For you must know that if your companion is impure, you too will become impure by keeping company with him, even if you happen to be pure.

'Convivia cum hominibus extraneis et rudibus, disciplina non imbutis' is the Latin version.

Take (apply) the things which relate to the body as far as the bare use, as food, drink, clothing, house, and slaves: but exclude every thing which is for show or luxury.

Use things for the body only as needed, such as food, drink, clothing, a house, and slaves. But avoid everything meant for show or luxury.

As to pleasure with women, abstain as far as you can before marriage: but if you do indulge in it, do it in the way which is conformable to custom. Do not however be disagreeable to those who indulge in these pleasures, or reprove them; and do not often boast that you do not indulge in them yourself.

As far as you can, avoid sex with women before marriage. But if you do have sex, do so in a way that conforms to custom. However, do not be unpleasant to those who have sex, or criticize them. And do not often boast that you do not have sex yourself.

The text reads ὡς νόμιμον. The Latin explanation is 'qua fas est uti; qua uti absque flagitio licet.'

If a man has reported to you, that a certain person speaks ill of you, do not make any defence (answer) to what has been told you: but reply, The man did not know the rest of my faults, for he would not have mentioned these only.

If someone tells you that a person has spoken badly of you, do not defend yourself against what was said. Instead, reply: The man did not know my other faults, or he would not have mentioned only these.

It is not necessary to go to the theatres often: but if there is ever a proper occasion for going, do not show yourself as being a partisan of any man except yourself, that is, desire only that to be done which is done, and for him only to gain the prize who gains the prize; for in this way you will meet with no hindrance. But abstain entirely from shouts and laughter at any (thing or person), or violent emotions. And when you are come away, do not talk much about what has passed on the stage, except about that which may lead to your own improvement. For it is plain, if you do talk much that you admired the spectacle (more than you ought).

You do not need to go to the theater often. But if the occasion is right, do not take anyone’s side but your own. That is, wish only for what happens to happen, and for the winner to win. This way, nothing will stand in your way. But avoid shouting, laughing at anything or anyone, or showing violent emotions. After you leave, do not talk much about what happened on stage, except where it may help you improve yourself. If you talk about it a lot, you clearly admired the spectacle more than you should have.

To admire (θαυμάζειν) goes against Epictetus’s teaching. See i. 29, ii. 6, iii. 20. Upton.

Do not go to the hearing of certain persons' recitations nor visit them readily. But if you do attend, observe gravity and sedateness, and also avoid making yourself disagreeable.

Do not readily attend certain people’s recitations or visit them. But if you do attend, be serious and calm, without making yourself unpleasant.

Such readings were common in Rome, where authors invited people to hear their works. They are often mentioned in the letters of the younger Pliny. See Epictetus, iii. 23.

When you are going to meet with any person, and particularly one of those who are considered to be in a superior condition, place before yourself what Socrates or Zeno would have done in such circumstances, and you will have no difficulty in making a proper use of the occasion.

When you are about to meet someone, especially someone considered above you in status, imagine what Socrates or Zeno would do. Then you will have no difficulty making good use of the occasion.

When you are going to any of those who are in great power, place before yourself that you will not find the man at home, that you will be excluded, that the door will not be opened to you, that the man will not care about you. And if with all this it is your duty to visit him, bear what happens, and never say to yourself that it was not worth the trouble. For this is silly, and marks the character of a man who is offended by externals.

When you go to visit a powerful person, prepare yourself for the possibility that he will not be home. You may be turned away, the door may not be opened, or he may not care about you. Even so, if it is your duty to visit him, accept whatever happens. Never tell yourself that the visit was not worth the trouble. That is foolish and shows that you are upset by things outside your control.

In company take care not to speak much and excessively about your own acts or dangers: for as it is pleasant to you to make mention of your own dangers, it is not so pleasant to others to hear what has happened to you. Take care also not to provoke laughter; for this is a slippery way towards vulgar habits, and is also adapted to diminish the respect of your neighbours. It is a dangerous habit also to approach obscene talk. When then any thing of this kind happens, if there is a good opportunity, rebuke the man who has proceeded to this talk: but if there is not an opportunity, by your silence at least, and blushing and expression of dissatisfaction by your countenance, show plainly that you are displeased at such talk.

When you are with others, be careful not to talk too much about your own deeds or dangers. You may enjoy mentioning the dangers you have faced, but others do not enjoy hearing what happened to you as much. Also, be careful not to try to make people laugh. This can easily lead to vulgar habits and make others respect you less. It is also dangerous to get close to obscene talk. If someone begins talking this way, rebuke them if you have a good opportunity. But if you do not, at least show your displeasure through your silence, your blushes, and the disapproval on your face.

XXXIV

34

If you have received the impression (φαντασίαν) of any pleasure, guard yourself against being carried away by it; but let the thing wait for you, and allow yourself a certain delay on your own part. Then think of both times, of the time when you will enjoy the pleasure, and of the time after the enjoyment of the pleasure when you will repent and will reproach yourself. And set against these things how you will rejoice if you have abstained from the pleasure, and how you will commend yourself. But if it seem to you seasonable to undertake (do) the thing, take care that the charm of it, and the pleasure, and the attraction of it shall not conquer you: but set on the other side the consideration how much better it is to be conscious that you have gained this victory.

If the thought (φαντασίαν) of a pleasure comes to you, guard against being carried away by it. Let the pleasure wait, and give yourself time to pause. Then think of both moments: when you will enjoy the pleasure, and afterward, when you will regret it and blame yourself. Set against these thoughts how glad you will be if you resist the pleasure, and how you will praise yourself. But if it seems like the right time to enjoy it, take care not to be overcome by its charm, pleasure, and attraction. Instead, consider how much better it is to know that you have won this victory.

XXXV

35

When you have decided that a thing ought to be done and are doing it, never avoid being seen doing it, though the many shall form an unfavourable opinion about it. For if it is not right to do it, avoid doing the thing; but if it is right, why are you afraid of those who shall find fault wrongly?

When you have decided that something should be done and are doing it, never avoid being seen doing it. Do not avoid being seen even if most people will disapprove. For if it is wrong, do not do it. But if it is right, why fear those who are wrong to criticize you?

XXXVI

36

As the proposition it is either day or it is night is of great importance for the disjunctive argument, but for the conjunctive is of no value, so in a symposium (entertainment) to select the larger share is of great value for the body, but for the maintenance of the social feeling is worth nothing. When then you are eating with another, remember to look not only to the value for the body of the things set before you, but also to the value of the behaviour towards the host which ought to be observed.

The statement “It is either day or night” is very important in a disjunctive argument, but useless in a conjunctive one. Similarly, at a symposium (a social gathering), choosing the larger share is very valuable to the body. But it does nothing to maintain social feeling. So when you eat with someone else, remember to consider more than the food’s value to your body. Also consider the value of behaving properly toward your host.

Compare i. 25, 11, etc.

See Schweig.'s note on xxxvi.

XXXVII

37

If you have assumed a character above your strength, you have both acted in this matter in an unbecoming way, and you have neglected that which you might have fulfilled.

If you take on a role beyond your abilities, you act improperly and neglect a role you could have fulfilled.

XXXVIII

38

In walking about as you take care not to step on a nail or to sprain your foot, so take care not to damage your own ruling faculty: and if we observe this rule in every act, we shall undertake the act with more security.

When you walk, you take care not to step on a nail or sprain your foot. In the same way, take care not to damage your ability to govern yourself. If we follow this rule in everything we do, we will act more safely.

XXXIX

39

The measure of possession (property) is to every man the body, as the foot is of the shoe. If then you stand on this rule (the demands of the body), you will maintain the measure: but if you pass beyond it, you must then of necessity be hurried as it were down a precipice. As also in the matter of the shoe, if you go beyond the (necessities of the) foot, the shoe is gilded, then of a purple colour, then embroidered: for there is no limit to that which has once passed the true measure.

For each person, the body sets the measure of property, just as the foot sets the measure of a shoe. If you follow this rule (the body's needs), you will keep to the proper measure. But if you go beyond it, you must inevitably be swept along, as if down a cliff. It is the same with a shoe. If you go beyond what the foot needs, the shoe is gilded, then dyed purple, then embroidered. For once anything has passed its proper measure, there is no limit to it.

The word is κεντητόν, 'acu pictum,' decorated with needlework.

XL

40

Women forthwith from the age of fourteen are called by the men mistresses (κυρίαι, dominae). Therefore since they see that there is nothing else that they can obtain, but only the power of lying with men, they begin to decorate themselves, and to place all their hopes in this.

From the age of fourteen, women are called mistresses (κυρίαι, dominae) by men. They see that they can gain nothing else but the power to sleep with men. So they begin to adorn themselves and place all their hopes in that power.

Roman males were considered to reach puberty at fourteen, and females at twelve (Justin. Inst. I. tit. 22). Compare Gaius, i. 196.

It is worth our while then to take care that they may know that they are valued (by men) for nothing else than appearing (being) decent and modest and discreet.

So it is worth making sure they know that men value them only for appearing (being) decent, modest, and discreet.

XLI

41

It is a mark of a mean capacity to spend much time on the things which concern the body, such as much exercise, much eating, much drinking, much easing of the body, much copulation. But these things should be done as subordinate things: and let all your care be directed to the mind.

It is a sign of limited intelligence to spend too much time on bodily matters. These include excessive exercise, eating, drinking, relieving yourself, and sex. But these things should be secondary. Direct all your care to your mind.

XLII.

XLII.

See Mrs. C.'s note, in which she says 'Epictetus seems to be in part mistaken here,' etc. I think he is.

When any person treats you ill or speaks ill of you, remember that he does this or says this because he thinks that it is his duty. It is not possible then for him to follow that which seems right to you, but that which seems right to himself. Accordingly if he is wrong in his opinion, he is the person who is hurt, for he is the person who has been deceived; for if a man shall suppose the true conjunction to be false, it is not the conjunction which is hindered, but the man who has been deceived about it. If you proceed, then, from these opinions, you will be mild in temper to him who reviles you: for say on each occasion, It seemed so to him.

When someone treats you badly or speaks badly of you, remember that he does so because he thinks it is his duty. He cannot follow what seems right to you, only what seems right to him. So if his opinion is wrong, he is the one who is hurt, because he is the one who has been deceived. If a man believes a true conjunction is false, the conjunction is not harmed. The man who is mistaken about it is harmed. If you keep these ideas in mind, you will be gentle with the person who insults you. Each time, say to yourself: It seemed right to him.

τὸ ἀληθὲς συμπεπλεγμένον is translated into Latin as 'verum conjunctum.' Mrs. Carter translates it as 'a true proposition,' which I think is the meaning.

XLIII

43

Every thing has two handles, the one by which it may be borne, the other by which it may not. If your brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold of the act by that handle wherein he acts unjustly, for this is the handle which cannot be borne: but lay hold of the other, that he is your brother, that he was nurtured with you, and you will lay hold of the thing by that handle by which it can be borne.

Everything has two handles: one by which it can be carried, and another by which it cannot. If your brother treats you unjustly, do not take hold of his action by the handle of his injustice. That handle cannot be carried. Instead, take hold of the other handle: he is your brother, and he was raised with you. Then you will have taken hold of the matter by the handle that can be carried.

XLIV

44

These reasonings do not cohere: I am richer than you, therefore I am better than you; I am more eloquent than you, therefore I am better than you. On the contrary these rather cohere, I am richer than you, therefore my possessions are greater than yours: I am more eloquent than you, therefore my speech is superior to yours. But you are neither possession nor speech.

These arguments do not make sense: I am richer than you, so I am better than you. I speak more eloquently than you, so I am better than you. Instead, these arguments make sense: I am richer than you, so I have more possessions than you. I speak more eloquently than you, so my speech is better than yours. But you are neither your possessions nor your speech.

XLV

45

Does a man bathe quickly (early)? do not say that he bathes badly, but that he bathes quickly. Does a man drink much wine? do not say that he does this badly, but say that he drinks much. For before you shall have determined the opinion, how do you know whether he is acting wrong? Thus it will not happen to you to comprehend some appearances which are capable of being comprehended, but to assent to others.

Does a man bathe quickly (or early)? Do not say that he bathes badly. Say that he bathes quickly. Does a man drink much wine? Do not say that he does so badly. Say that he drinks much. Before you know his judgment, how can you know whether he is acting wrongly? This way, you will not grasp some impressions accurately but give your assent to different ones.

Mrs. Carter translates this as, "Unless you perfectly understand the principle [from which anyone acts]."

XLVI

46

On no occasion call yourself a philosopher, and do not speak much among the uninstructed about theorems (philosophical rules, precepts): but do that which follows from them. For example at a banquet do not say how a man ought to eat, but eat as you ought to eat. For remember that in this way Socrates also altogether avoided ostentation: persons used to come to him and ask to be recommended by him to philosophers, and he used to take them to philosophers: so easily did he submit to being overlooked. Accordingly if any conversation should arise among uninstructed persons about any theorem, generally be silent; for there is great danger that you will immediately vomit up what you have not digested. And when a man shall say to you, that you know nothing, and you are not vexed, then be sure that you have begun the work (of philosophy). For even sheep do not vomit up their grass and show to the shepherds how much they have eaten; but when they have internally digested the pasture, they produce externally wool and milk. Do you also show not your theorems to the uninstructed, but show the acts which come from their digestion.

Never call yourself a philosopher, and do not talk much about philosophical principles among those who have not studied them. Instead, act on those principles. For example, at a banquet, do not say how a person should eat. Eat as you should. Remember that Socrates also avoided showing off in this way. People would come to him and ask him to recommend them to philosophers, and he would take them to philosophers. He was so willing to be overlooked. So if people who have not studied philosophy start discussing a principle, generally stay silent. There is a great danger that you will immediately vomit up what you have not digested. When someone tells you that you know nothing and you are not upset, you can be sure you have begun the work of philosophy. Sheep do not vomit up their grass to show their shepherds how much they have eaten. Instead, they digest the grass and produce wool and milk. In the same way, do not show your principles to those who have not studied them. Show them the actions that come from digesting those principles.

See iii. 23, 22; iv. 8, 2.

XLVII

47

When at a small cost you are supplied with every thing for the body, do not be proud of this; nor, if you drink water, say on every occasion, I drink water. But consider first how much more frugal the poor are than we, and how much more enduring of labour. And if you ever wish to exercise yourself in labour and endurance, do it for yourself, and not for others: do not embrace statues. But if you are ever very thirsty, take a draught of cold water, and spit it out, and tell no man.

When you can supply all your bodily needs at little cost, do not be proud of it. And if you drink water, do not say at every opportunity, I drink water. First consider how much more frugal poor people are than we are, and how much better they endure hard work. If you ever want to train yourself to work hard and endure hardship, do it for yourself, not for others. Do not embrace statues. But if you are ever very thirsty, take a drink of cold water, spit it out, and tell no one.

See iii. 12.

XLVIII

48

The condition and characteristic of an uninstructed person is this: he never expects from himself profit (advantage) nor harm, but from externals. The condition and characteristic of a philosopher is this: he expects all advantage and all harm from himself. The signs (marks) of one who is making progress are these: he censures no man, he praises no man, he blames no man, he accuses no man, he says nothing about himself as if he were somebody or knew something; when he is impeded at all or hindered, he blames himself: if a man praises him, he ridicules the praiser to himself: if a man censures him, he makes no defence: he goes about like weak persons, being careful not to move any of the things which are placed, before they are firmly fixed: he removes all desire from himself, and he transfers aversion (ἔκκλισιν) to those things only of the things within our power which are contrary to nature: he employs a moderate movement towards every thing: whether he is considered foolish or ignorant, he cares not: and in a word he watches himself as if he were an enemy and lying in ambush.

An untrained person expects neither benefit nor harm from himself, but only from external things. A philosopher expects all benefit and all harm to come from himself. The signs of someone making progress are these: He criticizes no one, praises no one, blames no one, and accuses no one. He does not speak of himself as if he were somebody or knew something. When anything obstructs or hinders him, he blames himself. If someone praises him, he silently mocks the person. If someone criticizes him, he does not defend himself. He moves like a weak person, careful not to disturb anything in place before it is firmly fixed. He gives up all desire. He directs his aversion (ἔκκλισιν) only toward things within his power that are contrary to nature. He approaches everything with moderation. He does not care whether he is thought foolish or ignorant. In short, he watches himself as if he were an enemy lying in ambush.

XLIX

49

When a man is proud because he can understand and explain the writings of Chrysippus, say to yourself, If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing to be proud of. But what is it that I wish? To understand Nature and to follow it. I inquire therefore who is the interpreter: and when I have heard that it is Chrysippus, I come to him (the interpreter). But I do not understand what is written, and therefore I seek the interpreter. And so far there is yet nothing to be proud of. But when I shall have found the interpreter, the thing that remains is to use the precepts (the lessons). This itself is the only thing to be proud of. But if I shall admire the exposition, what else have I been made unless a grammarian instead of a philosopher? except in one thing, that I am explaining Chrysippus instead of Homer. When then any man says to me, Read Chrysippus to me. I rather blush, when I cannot show my acts like to and consistent with his words.

When a man is proud that he can understand and explain Chrysippus’s writings, say to yourself: If Chrysippus had not written so obscurely, this man would have nothing to be proud of. But what do I want? To understand Nature and follow it. So I ask who can explain Nature. When I hear that Chrysippus can, I turn to him for an explanation. But I do not understand what he has written, so I look for someone to explain it. So far, there is still nothing to be proud of. But once I have found someone to explain Chrysippus, what remains is to put his lessons into practice. That alone is worth being proud of. But if I admire the explanation, what have I become but a grammarian instead of a philosopher? The only difference is that I am explaining Chrysippus instead of Homer. So when someone says to me, Read Chrysippus to me, I would rather blush if I cannot show that my actions match his words.

L

50

Whatever things (rules) are proposed to you [for the conduct of life] abide by them, as if they were laws, as if you would be guilty of impiety if you transgressed any of them. And whatever any man shall say about you, do not attend to it: for this is no affair of yours. How long will you then still defer thinking yourself worthy of the best things, and in no matter transgressing the distinctive reason? Have you accepted the theorems (rules), which it was your duty to agree to, and have you agreed to them? what teacher then do you still expect that you defer to him the correction of yourself? You are no longer a youth, but already a full-grown man. If then you are negligent and slothful, and are continually making procrastination after procrastination, and proposal (intention) after proposal, and fixing day after day, after which you will attend to yourself, you will not know that you are not making improvement, but you will continue ignorant (uninstructed) both while you live and till you die. Immediately then think it right to live as a full-grown man, and one who is making proficiency, and let every thing which appears to you to be the best be to you a law which must not be transgressed. And if any thing laborious, or pleasant or glorious or inglorious be presented to you, remember that now is the contest, now are the Olympic games, and they cannot be deferred; and that it depends on one defeat and one giving way that progress is either lost or maintained. Socrates in this way became perfect, in all things improving himself, attending to nothing except to reason. But you, though you are not yet a Socrates, ought to live as one who wishes to be a Socrates.

Follow whatever rules are set out for you (for how to live) as if they were laws. Treat breaking any of them as an offense against the gods. And pay no attention to what anyone says about you, because that is none of your concern. How long will you put off thinking yourself worthy of the best things and following reason in every matter? Have you accepted the principles you ought to accept and agreed to them? What teacher are you still waiting for before you begin to correct yourself? You are no longer young. You are a grown man. So if you are careless and lazy, always putting things off, making one resolution after another, and setting a new day to work on yourself, you will fail to notice that you are making no progress. You will remain ignorant throughout your life and until you die. So decide now to live as a grown man who is making progress. Let whatever seems best to you be a law you must not break. And whenever you face something difficult, pleasant, glorious, or shameful, remember that the contest is now. The Olympic games are here, and they cannot be postponed. Your progress depends on a single defeat, a single moment of giving way. It can either be lost or maintained. This is how Socrates became perfect. He improved himself in everything, paying attention to nothing but reason. Though you are not yet a Socrates, you should live as someone who wishes to be a Socrates.

This may mean 'what is proposed to you by philosophers,' especially in this little book. Schweighaeuser thinks it may mean 'what you have proposed to yourself:' but he favors the simpler meaning, 'what is proposed above, or taught above.'

The reasoning that distinguishes between things. 'Eam partitionem rationis intelligo, qua initio dixit, Quaedam in potestate nostra esse, quaedam non esse.' Wolf.

LI

51

The first and most necessary place (part, τόπος) in philosophy is the use of theorems (precepts, θεωρήματα), for instance, that we must not lie: the second part is that of demonstrations, for instance, How is it proved that we ought not to lie: the third is that which is confirmatory of these two and explanatory, for example, How is this a demonstration? For what is demonstration, what is consequence, what is contradiction, what is truth, what is falsehood? The third part (topic) is necessary on account of the second, and the second on account of the first; but the most necessary and that on which we ought to rest is the first. But we do the contrary. For we spend our time on the third topic, and all our earnestness is about it: but we entirely neglect the first. Therefore we lie; but the demonstration that we ought not to lie we have ready to hand.

The first and most necessary part of philosophy is putting principles into practice. For example, we must not lie. The second part is proving those principles. For example, how can we prove that we ought not to lie? The third part supports and explains the other two. For example, how do we know that a proof is a proof? What is proof? What is a conclusion? What is a contradiction? What is truth, and what is falsehood? The third part is necessary because of the second, and the second because of the first. But the first is the most necessary, and we should focus on it. Instead, we do the opposite. We spend our time on the third part and devote all our effort to it. But we completely neglect the first. So we lie, while keeping the proof that we ought not to lie ready at hand.

LII

52

In every thing (circumstance) we should hold these maxims ready to hand:

In every situation, we should keep these principles at hand:

Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny, The way that I am bid by you to go: To follow I am ready. If I choose not, I make myself a wretch, and still must follow.

Lead me, Zeus, and you, Destiny, Along the path you have chosen for me. I am ready to follow. If I refuse, I make myself miserable and still must follow.

The first four verses are by the Stoic Cleanthes, a pupil of Zeno and teacher of Chrysippus. Cleanthes was from Assus in Mysia. Simplicius wrote his commentary on the Encheiridion in the sixth century, A.D. Even then, he saw a beautiful statue of Cleanthes in Assus. It had been erected by a decree of the Roman senate to honor this excellent man. (Simplicius, ed. Schweig. p. 522.)

But whoso nobly yields unto necessity, We hold him wise, and skill'd in things divine.

But whoever nobly accepts necessity, We regard as wise and knowledgeable about divine things.

The second two verses are from a play by Euripides. More verses have been quoted from him than from any other ancient tragedian.

And the third also: O Crito, if so it pleases the Gods, so let it be; Anytus and Melitus are able indeed to kill me, but they cannot harm me.

And the third saying: Crito, if this is what the gods want, let it be so. Anytus and Melitus can kill me, but they cannot harm me.

The third quotation is from Plato's Criton. Socrates is speaking. The last part is from Plato's Apology, where Socrates is also speaking. Schweighaeuser says that the words 'and the third also' were added from Simplicius's commentary.