Fragments of Epictetus

33 min

These Fragments are entitled "Epicteti Fragmenta maxime ex Ioanne Stobaeo, Antonio, et Maximo collecta" (ed. Schweig.). There are some notes and emendations on the Fragments; and a short dissertation on them by Schweighaeuser.

These Fragments are titled "Epicteti Fragmenta maxime ex Ioanne Stobaeo, Antonio, et Maximo collecta" (ed. Schweig.). They include some notes and corrections, as well as a short study by Schweighaeuser.

Nothing is known of Stobaeus nor of his time, except the fact that he has preserved some extracts of an ethical kind from the New Platonist Hierocles, who lived about the middle of the fifth century A.D.; and it is therefore concluded that Stobaeus lived after Hierocles. The fragments attributed to Epictetus are preserved by Stobaeus in his work entitled Ἀνθολόγιον, or Florilegium or Sermones.

Nothing is known about Stobaeus or when he lived, except that he preserved some ethical extracts from the Neoplatonist Hierocles. Hierocles lived around the middle of the fifth century A.D. It is therefore concluded that Stobaeus lived after Hierocles. Stobaeus preserved the fragments attributed to Epictetus in his work titled Ἀνθολόγιον, also called Florilegium or Sermones.

Antonius Monachus, a Greek monk, also made a Florilegium, entitled Melissa (the bee). His date is uncertain, but it was certainly much later than the time of Stobaeus.

Antonius Monachus, a Greek monk, also made a collection of excerpts called Melissa (the bee). It is unclear when he lived, but it was certainly much later than Stobaeus.

Maximus, also named the monk, and reverenced as a saint, is said to have been a native of Constantinople, and born about A.D. 580.

Maximus, also known as the monk, is revered as a saint. He is said to have been born in Constantinople around A.D. 580.

Some of the Fragments contained in the edition of Schweighaeuser are certainly not from Epictetus. Many of the fragments are obscure; but they are translated as accurately as I can translate them, and the reader must give to them such meaning as he can.

Some of the fragments in Schweighaeuser's edition are certainly not by Epictetus. Many of the fragments are obscure, but I have translated them as accurately as I can. The reader must make what sense of them they can.

I

1

The life which is implicated with fortune (depends on fortune) is like a winter torrent: for it is turbulent, and full of mud, and difficult to cross, and tyrannical, and noisy, and of short duration.

A life that depends on fortune is like a winter torrent. It is turbulent, muddy, hard to cross, tyrannical, noisy, and short-lived.

II

2

A soul which is conversant with virtue is like an ever flowing source, for it is pure and tranquil and potable and sweet and communicative (social), and rich and harmless and free from mischief.

A soul familiar with virtue is like an ever-flowing spring. It is pure, calm, drinkable, and sweet. It is also sociable, abundant, harmless, and free from mischief.

Check the lexicons for this meaning of νόστιμος,

III

3

If you wish to be good, first believe that you are bad.

If you want to be good, first believe that you are bad.

IV

4

It is better to do wrong seldom and to own it, and to act right for the most part, than seldom to admit that you have done wrong and to do wrong often.

It is better to do wrong rarely, admit it, and do right most of the time than to do wrong often and rarely admit it.

V

5

Check (punish) your passions (πάθη), that you may not be punished by them.

Control (punish) your passions (πάθη) so that they do not punish you.

VI

6

Do not so much be ashamed of that (disgrace) which proceeds from men's opinion as fly from that which comes from the truth.

Do not be as ashamed of disgrace in other people's eyes as you are eager to avoid real disgrace.

VII

7

If you wish to be well spoken of, learn to speak well (of others) and when you have learned to speak well of them, try to act well, and so you will reap the fruit of being well spoken of.

If you want others to speak well of you, learn to speak well of them. Once you have learned to do that, try to act well. Then you will be rewarded by having others speak well of you.

VIII

8

Freedom and slavery, the one is the name of virtue, and the other of vice: and both are acts of the will. But where there is no will, neither of them touches (affects) these things. But the soul is accustomed to be master of the body, and the things which belong to the body have no share in the will. For no man is a slave who is free in his will.

Freedom is the name of virtue, and slavery is the name of vice. Both are acts of the will. But where there is no will, neither freedom nor slavery affects anything. The soul is accustomed to ruling the body, and the things belonging to the body have no share in the will. For no man is a slave if his will is free.

See Schweig.'s note.

IX

9

It is an evil chain, fortune (a chain) of the body, and vice of the soul. For he who is loose (free) in the body, but bound in the soul is a slave: but on the contrary he who is bound in the body, but free (unbound) in the soul, is free.

Fortune is an evil chain on the body, and vice is an evil chain on the soul. For someone whose body is free but whose soul is bound is a slave. But someone whose body is bound while his soul is free is free.

X

10

The bond of the body is loosened by nature through death, and by vice through money: but the bond of the soul is loosened by learning, and by experience and by discipline.

Nature loosens the body's bond through death, and vice loosens it through money. But learning, experience, and discipline loosen the soul's bond.

"He does not mean 'that it is bad if a man by money should redeem himself from bonds.' He means that 'even a bad man, if he has money, can redeem himself from the bonds of the body and so secure his liberty.'" Schweig.

XI

11

If you wish to live withont perturbation and with pleasure, try to have all who dwell with you good. And you will have them good, if you instruct the willing, and dismiss those who are unwilling (to be taught): for there will fly away together with those who have fled away both wickedness and slavery; and there will be left with those who remain with you goodness and liberty.

If you want to live peacefully and happily, try to make everyone who lives with you good. You can do this by teaching those who are willing to learn and dismissing those who are unwilling. For wickedness and slavery will depart with those who leave. Goodness and freedom will remain with those who stay.

XII

12

It is a shame for those who sweeten drink with the gifts of the bees, by badness to embitter reason which is the gift of the gods.

It is shameful to sweeten drinks with honey from bees while making reason, a gift from the gods, bitter through badness.

XIII

13

No man who loves money, and loves pleasure, and loves fame, also loves mankind, but only he who loves virtue.

No one who loves money, pleasure, and fame also loves humanity. Only someone who loves virtue loves humanity.

XIV

14

As you would not choose to sail in a large and decorated and gold-laden ship (or ship ornamented with gold), and to be drowned; so do not choose to dwell in a large and costly house and to be disturbed (by cares).

You would not choose to sail in a large, decorated ship adorned with gold, only to drown. Likewise, do not choose to live in a large, expensive house only to be troubled by worries.

XV

15

When we have been invited to a banquet, we take what is set before us: but if a guest should ask the host to set before him fish or sweet cakes, he would be considered to be an unreasonable fellow. But in the world we ask the Gods for what they do not give; and we do this though the things are many which they have given.

When we are invited to a banquet, we take what is offered. But if a guest asked the host for fish or cakes, people would think him unreasonable. Yet in the world, we ask the Gods for things they do not give us, even though they have given us many things.

XVI

16

They are amusing fellows, said he (Epictetus), who are proud of the things which are not in our power. A man says, I am better than you, for I possess much land, and you are wasting with hunger. Another says, I am of consular rank. Another says, I am a Procurator (ἐπίτροπος). Another, I have curly hair. But a horse does not say to a horse, I am superior to you, for I possess much fodder, and much barley, and my bits are of gold and my harness is embroidered: but he says, I am swifter than you. And every animal is better or worse from his own merit (virtue) or his own badness. Is there then no virtue in man only? and must we look to the hair, and our clothes and to our ancestors?

They are amusing fellows, said Epictetus, who take pride in things beyond our control. One man says, I am better than you because I own a lot of land, while you are starving. Another says, I am of consular rank. Another says, I am a Procurator (ἐπίτροπος). Another says, I have curly hair. But one horse does not say to another, I am superior to you because I have plenty of fodder and barley, gold bits, and an embroidered harness. Instead, he says, I am faster than you. Every animal is better or worse because of its own virtue or its own faults. Is man alone without virtue? Must we look instead to our hair, our clothes, and our ancestors?

XVII

17

The sick are vexed with the physician who gives them no advice, and think that he has despaired of them. But why should they not have the same feeling towards the philosopher, and think that he has despaired of their coming to a sound state of mind, if he says nothing at all that is useful to a man?

Sick people are annoyed when a doctor gives them no advice. They think the doctor has given up hope for them. But why shouldn’t they feel the same way about a philosopher who says nothing useful to them? Why shouldn’t they think he has given up hope that they will regain a sound state of mind?

XVIII

18

Those who are well constituted in the body endure both heat and cold: and so those who are well constituted in the soul endure both anger and grief and excessive joy and the other affects.

People with healthy bodies can endure both heat and cold. Likewise, people with healthy souls can endure anger, grief, excessive joy, and other emotions.

XIX

19

Examine yourself whether you wish to be rich or to be happy. If you wish to be rich, you should know that it is neither a good thing nor at all in your power: but if you wish to be happy, you should know that it is both a good thing and in your power, for the one is a temporary loan of fortune, and happiness comes from the will.

Ask yourself whether you want to be rich or happy. If you want to be rich, know that wealth is neither good nor within your control. But if you want to be happy, know that happiness is both good and within your control. For wealth is a temporary loan from fortune, while happiness comes from your will.

XX

20

As when you see a viper or an asp or a scorpion in an ivory or golden box, you do not on account of the costliness of the material love it or think it happy, but because the nature of it is pernicious, you turn away from it and loathe it; so when you shall see vice dwelling in wealth and in the swollen fulness of fortune, be not struck by the splendour of the material, but despise the false character of the morals.

When you see a viper, an asp, or a scorpion in an ivory or gold box, you do not love it or think it happy because the box is valuable. Instead, you turn away from the creature and loathe it because its nature is harmful. In the same way, when you see vice surrounded by wealth and overflowing fortune, do not be dazzled by the splendor. Despise the corrupt character within.

XXI

21

Wealth is not one of the good things; great expenditure is one of the bad; moderation (σωφροσύνη) is one of the good things. And moderation invites to frugality and the acquisition of good things: but wealth invites to great expenditure and draws us away from moderation. It is difficult then for a rich man to be moderate, or for a moderate man to be rich.

Wealth is not a good thing. Spending a lot is bad, while moderation (σωφροσύνη) is good. Moderation encourages us to live frugally and acquire good things. But wealth encourages us to spend a lot and draws us away from moderation. So it is difficult for a rich man to be moderate, or for a moderate man to be rich.

'How hardly shall they that have riches enter the kingdom of God.' Mark x. 23 (Mrs. Carter). This passage in Mark describes the danger of riches. All who observe the world know this danger. In the next verse, the truth is expressed in this form: 'How hard it is for them that trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God.' The Stoics viewed wealth as indifferent, neither good nor bad.

XXII

22

As if you were begotten or born in a ship, you would not be eager to be the master of it (κυβερνήτης), so—. For neither there (in the ship) will the ship naturally be connected with you, nor wealth in the other case; but reason is every where naturally connected with you. As then reason is a thing which naturally belongs to you and is born in you, consider this also as specially your own and take care of it.

If you were conceived or born on a ship, you would not be eager to be its captain (κυβερνήτης). Likewise, so... For the ship is not naturally connected to you, and neither is wealth in the other case. But reason is naturally connected to you everywhere. Since reason naturally belongs to you and is born in you, consider it especially your own and take care of it.

The other part of the comparison was accidentally omitted from the manuscripts. In his Latin version, Wolf guessed at the missing words: 'ita neque in terris divitiae tibi expetendae sunt.' Schweig.

XXIII

23

If you had been born among the Persians, you would not have wished to live in Hellas (Greece), but to have lived in Persia happy: so if you are born in poverty, why do you seek to grow rich, and why do you not remain in poverty and be happy?

If you had been born among the Persians, you would not have wanted to live in Hellas (Greece). You would have wanted to live happily in Persia. So if you are born in poverty, why do you seek to become rich? Why not remain in poverty and be happy?

Some people will not think the comparison fits. Others believe it is better to teach everyone to rise above the condition into which they were born. I disagree. Few people have the talents and character to rise from a low condition. The proper lesson for them is to stay in the condition into which they were born and be content with it. Those who have the ability to rise will do so whether anyone advises them to try or not. Generally, they will not be able to rise without doing something useful for society.

Perhaps only a few people have enough ability to rise from a low condition while harming society. But such people certainly exist. They rise through ability, fraud, and almost countless other bad means. They gain wealth, occupy high positions, and disturb society. They are plagues and pests. Sometimes the world watches with stupid admiration until death removes the dazzling, deceitful image and honest people can breathe freely again.

In the Church of England Catechism, two questions concern our duty to God and our duty to our neighbour. Epictetus would accept both answers, except for a few words that did not apply to his time. The second answer ends with the words 'to learn and labour to get mine own living and to do my duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call me.'

XXIV

24

As it, is better to lie compressed in a narrow bed and be healthy than to be tossed with disease on a broad couch, so also it is better to contract yourself within a small competence and to be happy than to have a great fortune and to be wretched.

It is better to be healthy in a cramped bed than to suffer from illness on a wide couch. In the same way, it is better to live happily on modest means than to be wealthy and miserable.

XXV

25

It is not poverty which produces sorrow, but desire; nor does wealth release from fear, but reason (the power of reasoning, λογισμός). If then you acquire this power of reasoning, you will neither desire wealth nor complain of poverty.

Poverty does not cause sorrow. Desire does. Wealth does not free you from fear. Reason does (the power of reasoning, λογισμός). So if you develop this power of reasoning, you will neither desire wealth nor complain about poverty.

XXVI

26

Neither is a horse elated nor proud of his manger and trappings and coverings, nor a bird of his little shreds of cloth and of his nest but both of them are proud of their swiftness, one proud of the swiftness of the feet, and the other of the wings. Do you also then not be greatly proud of your food and dress and, in short, of any external things, but be proud of your integrity and good deeds (εὐποιΐα).

A horse does not take pride in its feeding trough, harness, or blankets. Nor does a bird take pride in its scraps of cloth or its nest. Instead, both take pride in their speed: the horse in the speed of its feet, the bird in the speed of its wings. You too should not take great pride in your food, clothes, or any other external things. Instead, take pride in your integrity and good deeds (εὐποιΐα).

XXVII

27

To live well differs from living extravagantly: for the first comes from moderation and a sufficiency (αὐταρκείας) and good order and propriety and frugality; but the other comes from intemperance and luxury and want of order and want of propriety. And the end (the consequence) of the one is true praise, but of the other blame. If then you wish to live well, do not seek to be commended for profuse expenditure.

Living well is different from living extravagantly. Living well comes from moderation, self-sufficiency (αὐταρκείας), good order, propriety, and frugality. Extravagant living comes from excess, luxury, disorder, and impropriety. The result of living well is genuine praise, but extravagant living brings blame. So if you wish to live well, do not seek praise for spending lavishly.

XXVIII

28

Let the measure to you of all food and drink be the first satisfying of the desire; and let the food and the pleasure be the desire (appetite) itself: and you will neither take more than is necessary, nor will you want cooks, and you will be satisfied with the drink that comes in the way.

Let your hunger and thirst set the measure for all food and drink. Stop as soon as they are satisfied, and let appetite itself be your food and pleasure. Then you will take no more than you need, you will not need cooks, and you will be satisfied with whatever drink is available.

XXIX

29

Make your manner of eating neither luxurious nor gloomy, but lively and frugal, that the soul may not be perturbed through being deceived by the pleasures of the body, and that it may despise them; and that the soul may not be injured by the enjoyment of present luxury, and the body may not afterwards suffer from disease.

Eat neither lavishly nor gloomily, but cheerfully and simply. This will keep your soul from being deceived and disturbed by bodily pleasures, and help it despise them. It will also keep your soul from being harmed by luxury now, and your body from suffering disease later.

Mrs. Carter says, 'I have not translated this fragment, because I do not understand it.' Schweighaeuser also says he does not understand it. I have given what may be its meaning, but not an exact translation. An exact translation is not possible given the current state of the text.

XXX

30

Take care that the food which you put into the stomach does not fatten (nourish) you, but the cheerfulness of the mind: for the food is changed into excrement, and ejected, and the urine also flows out at the same time; but the cheerfulness, even if the soul be separated, remains always uncorrupted.

Make sure it is cheerfulness of mind, not the food in your stomach, that nourishes you. Food turns into waste and is expelled, and urine flows out at the same time. But cheerfulness remains uncorrupted forever, even if the soul is separated.

This fragment may be more corrupt than XXIX. See Schweig.'s note. I see no sense in ἔπαινος, so I have used οὖρος, a possible reading. The conclusion seems completely unintelligible.

XXXI

31

In banquets remember that you entertain two guests, body and soul: and whatever you shall have given to the body you soon eject: but what you shall have given to the soul, you keep always.

At a banquet, remember that you are entertaining two guests: your body and your soul. Whatever you give your body, you soon pass out. But whatever you give your soul, you keep forever.

XXXII

32

Do not mix anger with profuse expenditure and serve them up to your guests. Profusion which fills the body is quickly gone; but anger sinks into the soul and remains for a long time. Consider then that you be not transported with anger and insult your guests at a great expense; but rather please them with frugality and by gentle behaviour.

Do not serve your guests anger along with an extravagant feast. The food that fills the body is soon gone, but anger sinks into the soul and stays there a long time. So take care not to give in to anger and insult your guests at great expense. Instead, please them with a simple meal and gentle behavior.

See Schweig.'s note.

XXXIII

33

In your banquets (meals) take care that those who serve (your slaves) are not more than those who are served; for it is foolish for many souls (persons) to wait on a few couches (seats).

At your meals, make sure that the slaves serving you do not outnumber the guests. For it is foolish to have many people waiting on a few seats.

XXXIV

34

It is best if even in the preparations for a feast you take a part of the labour, and at the enjoyment of the food, while you are feasting, you share with those who serve the things which are before you. But if such behaviour be unsuitable to the occasion, remember that you are served when you are not labouring by those who are labouring, when you are eating by those who are not eating, when you are drinking by those who are not drinking, while you are talking by those who are silent, while you are at ease by those who are under constraint; and if you remember this, you will neither being heated with anger be guilty of any absurdity yourself, nor by irritating another will you cause any mischief.

It is best to help with the work of preparing a feast. And while you eat, share the food before you with those serving you. But if that would be inappropriate for the occasion, remember that others are working to serve you while you are not. They are not eating while you eat, or drinking while you drink. They are silent while you talk, and they are under constraint while you relax. If you remember this, you will not lose your temper and do anything foolish. Nor will you cause harm by irritating someone else.

I am not sure exactly what the conclusion means. See Schweig.'s note.

XXXV

35

Quarrelling and contention are every where foolish, and particularly in talk over wine they are unbecoming: for a man who is drunk could not teach a man who is sober, nor on the other hand could a drunken man be convinced by a sober man. But where there is not sobriety, it will appear that to no purpose have you laboured for the result of persuasion.

Quarreling and arguing are foolish everywhere, and especially inappropriate when people are drinking wine. A drunk person cannot teach a sober person, and a sober person cannot convince a drunk person. But where there is no sobriety, your efforts to persuade will prove useless.

This is not a translation of the conclusion. Perhaps it comes close to the meaning. See Schweig.'s note.

XXXVI

36

Grasshoppers (cicadae) are musical: snails have no voice. Snails have pleasure in being moist, but grasshoppers in being dry. Next the dew invites forth the snails and for this they crawl out: but on the contrary the sun when he is hot, rouses the grasshoppers and they sing in the sun. Therefore if you wish to be a musical man and to harmonize well with others, when over the cups the soul is bedewed with wine, at that time do not permit the soul to go forth and to be polluted; but when in company (parties) it is fired by reason, then bid her to utter oracular words and to sing the oracles of justice.

Grasshoppers (cicadas) are musical. Snails have no voice. Snails enjoy being moist, but grasshoppers enjoy being dry. Dew draws snails out, and they crawl out for it. By contrast, the hot sun rouses grasshoppers, and they sing in its warmth. So if you want to be a musical person and harmonize well with others, do not let your soul come out and become polluted when wine moistens it as you drink. But when reason fires your soul in company, tell it to speak prophetic words and sing prophecies of justice.

XXXVII

37

Examine in three ways him who is talking with you, as superior, or as inferior, or as equal: and if he is superior, you should listen to him and be convinced by him: but if he is inferior, you should convince him; if he is equal, you should agree with him; and thus you will never be guilty of being quarrelsome.

Consider whether the person speaking with you is your superior, your inferior, or your equal. If they are your superior, listen to them and let them convince you. But if they are your inferior, you should convince them. If they are your equal, you should agree with them. In this way, you will never be quarrelsome.

XXXVIII

38

It is better by assenting to truth to conquer opinion, than by assenting to opinion to be conquered by truth.

It is better to accept the truth and overcome opinion than to accept opinion and be overcome by the truth.

XXXIX

39

If you seek truth, you will not seek by every means to gain a victory; and if you have found truth, you will have the gain of not being defeated.

If you seek the truth, you will not try to win at any cost. And if you have found the truth, you will gain the benefit of not being defeated.

XL

40

Truth conquers with itself; but opinion conquers among those who are external.

Truth wins on its own, but opinion wins among outsiders.

This is not clear.

XLI

41

It is better to live with one free man and to be without fear and free, than to be a slave with many.

It is better to live with one free man, free and without fear, than to be a slave among many.

XLII

42

What you avoid suffering, do not attempt to make others suffer. You avoid slavery: take care that others are not your slaves. For if you endure to have a slave, you appear to be a slave yourself first. For vice has no community with virtue, nor freedom with slavery.

Do not make others suffer what you would avoid suffering yourself. You avoid slavery, so take care that others are not your slaves. For if you can bear to have a slave, you appear to be a slave yourself first. Vice has nothing in common with virtue, and freedom has nothing in common with slavery.

XLIII

43

As he who is in health would not choose to be served (ministered to) by the sick, nor for those who dwell with him to be sick, so neither would a free man endure to be served by slaves, or for those who live with him to be slaves.

A healthy person would not choose to be served by sick people or to live with them. Likewise, a free man would not tolerate being served by slaves or living with them.

XLIV

44

Whoever you are who wish to be not among the number of slaves, release yourself from slavery: and you will be free, if you are released from desire. For neither Aristides nor Epaminondas nor Lycurgus through being rich and served by slaves were named the one just, the other a god, and the third a saviour, but because they were poor and delivered Hellas (Greece) from slavery.

Whoever you are, if you do not want to be a slave, free yourself from slavery. You will be free if you let go of desire. Aristides, Epaminondas, and Lycurgus were called just, a god, and a savior, respectively. They earned these names not because they were rich and served by slaves, but because they were poor and freed Hellas (Greece) from slavery.

Aristides was known as 'just'. The Pythia or Delphic oracle gave Lycurgus the title 'god'. Epaminondas's own citizens called him 'saviour'.

XLV

45

If you wish your house to be well managed, imitate the Spartan Lycurgus. For as he did not fence his city with walls, but fortified the inhabitants by virtue and preserved the city always free; so do you not cast around (your house) a large court and raise high towers, but strengthen the dwellers by good will and fidelity and friendship, and then nothing harmful will enter it, not even if the whole band of wickedness shall array itself against it.

If you want your house to be well managed, follow the example of the Spartan Lycurgus. He did not surround his city with walls. Instead, he strengthened its inhabitants through virtue and kept the city free forever. In the same way, do not surround your house with a large courtyard or build high towers. Instead, strengthen those who live there through goodwill, loyalty, and friendship. Then nothing harmful will enter your house, even if the whole band of wickedness rises against it.

Schweig. quotes Polybius ix. 10, 1, 'a city is not adorned by external things, but by the virtue of those who dwell in it.' Alcaeus says, 22, Bergk, Poetae Lyrici Graeci, 1843:

XLVI

46

Do not hang your house round with tablets and pictures, but decorate it with moderation (σωφροσύνη): for the one is of a foreign (unsuitable) kind, and a temporary deception of the eyes; but the other is a natural and indelible, and perpetual ornament of the house.

Do not cover your house with plaques and pictures. Decorate it with moderation (σωφροσύνη) instead. Plaques and pictures are unsuitable adornments, and they only deceive the eye for a time. Moderation, however, is a natural, lasting ornament that can never be erased from the house.

XLVII

47

Instead of an herd of oxen, endeavour to assemble herds of friends in your house.

Instead of a herd of oxen, try to gather herds of friends in your house.

XLVIII

48

As a wolf resembles a dog, so both a flatterer, and an adulterer and a parasite, resemble a friend. Take care then that instead of watch dogs you do not without knowing it let in mischievous wolves.

Just as a wolf resembles a dog, a flatterer, an adulterer, and a parasite resemble a friend. So take care that you do not unknowingly let in dangerous wolves instead of watchdogs.

XLIX

49

To be eager that your house should be admired by being whitened with gypsum, is the mark of a man who has no taste: but to set off (decorate) our morals by the goodness of our communication (social habits) is the mark of a man who is a lover of beauty and a lover of man.

A man who is eager to have his house admired for its white plaster has no taste. But a man who adorns his character through good social habits loves beauty and humanity.

L

50

If you begin by admiring little things, you will not be thought worthy of great things: but if you despise the little, you will be greatly admired.

If you start by admiring small things, you will not be thought worthy of great things. But if you look down on small things, you will be greatly admired.

Schweig. says that four MSS. omit πρῶτον from the reading ἐὰν θαυμάζῃς τὰ μικρὰ πρῶτον. He says that Schow omitted πρῶτον and that he followed Schow. But πρῶτον appears in Schweig.'s text.

LI

51

Nothing is smaller (meaner) than love of pleasure, and love of gain and pride. Nothing is superior to magnanimity, and gentleness, and love of mankind, and beneficence.

Nothing is more petty than the love of pleasure, the love of gain, and pride. Nothing is greater than generosity of spirit, gentleness, love of humanity, and doing good for others.

LII

52

They bring forward (they name, they mention) the peevish philosophers (the Stoics), whose opinion it is that pleasure is not a thing conformable to nature, but is a thing which is consequent on the things which are conformable to nature, as justice, temperance, freedom. What then? is the soul pleased and made tranquil by the pleasures of the body which are smaller, as Epicurus says; and is it not pleased with its own good things, which are the greatest? And indeed nature has given to me modesty, and I blush much when I think of saying any thing base (indecent). This motion (feeling) does not permit me to make (consider) pleasure the good and the end (purpose) of life.

They bring up the gloomy philosophers, the Stoics. The Stoics believe that pleasure is not in itself natural, but follows from things that are natural, such as justice, self-control, and freedom. What then? As Epicurus says, the soul is pleased and calmed by the lesser pleasures of the body. But is it not also pleased by its own good things, which are the greatest? Nature has given me modesty, and I blush deeply at the thought of saying anything shameful. This feeling does not allow me to regard pleasure as the good and the purpose of life.

See Schweig.'s note.

LIII

53

In Rome the women have in their hands Plato's Polity (the Republic), because it allows (advises) the women to be common, for they attend only to the words of Plato, not to his meaning. Now he does not recommend marriage and one man to cohabit with one woman, and then that the women should be common but he takes away such a marriage, and introduces another kind of marriage. And in fine, men are pleased with finding excuses for their faults. Yet philosophy says that we ought not to stretch out even a finger without a reason.

In Rome, the women carry Plato's Polity (the Republic) because it allows (advises) women to be shared. They pay attention only to Plato's words, not to his meaning. He does not recommend marriage between one man and one woman and then say women should be shared. Instead, he does away with that kind of marriage and introduces another. In short, people are pleased to find excuses for their faults. Yet philosophy says we should not even lift a finger without a reason.

See Schweig.'s note.

LIV

54

Of pleasures those which occur most rarely give the greatest delight.

The pleasures we experience least often give us the greatest delight.

LV

55

If a man should transgress moderation, the things which give the greatest delight would become the things which give the least.

If a person goes beyond moderation, the things that give the most pleasure will give the least.

LVI

56

It is just to commend Agrippinus for this reason, that though he was a man of the highest worth, he never praised himself; but even if another person praised him, he would blush. And he was such a man (Epictetus said) that he would write in praise of any thing disagreeable that befel him; if it was a fever, he would write of a fever; if he was disgraced, he would write of disgrace; if he were banished, of banishment. And on one occasion (he mentioned) when he was going to dine, a messenger brought him news that Nero commanded him to go into banishment; on which Agrippinus said, Well then we will dine at Aricia.

Agrippinus deserves praise for this reason: though he was a man of the highest worth, he never praised himself. Even when someone else praised him, he would blush. Epictetus said that Agrippinus would write in praise of any misfortune that befell him. If he had a fever, he would praise the fever. If he was disgraced, he would praise disgrace. If he was banished, he would praise banishment. Epictetus mentioned one occasion when Agrippinus was about to dine. A messenger brought news that Nero had ordered him into banishment. Agrippinus replied, Well then, we will dine at Aricia.

See i. 1, notes 13 and 14.

LVII

57

Diogenes said that no labour was good, unless the end (purpose) of it was courage and strength (τόνος) of the soul, but not of the body.

Diogenes said that no work was good unless its purpose was courage and strength (τόνος) of the soul, not the body.

LVIII

58

As a true balance is neither corrected by a true balance nor judged by a false balance, so also a just judge is neither corrected by just judges nor is he judged (condemned) by unjust judges.

An accurate scale is not corrected by another accurate scale or judged by an inaccurate one. In the same way, a just judge is not corrected by other just judges or condemned by unjust ones.

LIX

59

As that which is straight does not need that which is straight, so neither does the just need that which is just.

Just as what is straight does not need what is straight, what is just does not need what is just.

Rather unclear, says Schweig. Compare Frag. lviii. and lxvi.

LX

60

Do not give judgment in one court (of justice) before you have been tried yourself before justice.

Do not judge others in a court of law before you have been judged yourself by justice.

Compare lviii. Schweig.

LXI

61

If you wish to make your judgments just, listen not to (regard not) any of those who are parties (to the suit), nor to those who plead in it, but listen to justice itself.

If you want to judge fairly, do not listen to the parties in a case or their advocates. Listen instead to justice itself.

LXII

62

You will fail (stumble) least in your judgments, if you yourself fail (stumble) least in your life.

You will make the fewest mistakes in your judgments if you make the fewest mistakes in your life.

LXIII

63

It is better when you judge justly to be blamed undeservedly by him who has been condemned than when you judge unjustly to be justly blamed by (before) nature.

It is better to judge fairly and be unfairly blamed by the person you condemned than to judge unfairly and be rightly blamed by (before) nature.

See Schweig.'s note.

LXIV

64

As the stone which tests the gold is not at all tested itself by the gold, so it is with him who has the faculty of judging.

Just as a stone tests gold without being tested by it, so it is with someone who has the ability to judge.

Schweig. suggests that ὁ λόγος was omitted before the words ὁ τὸ κριτήριον ἔχων. See Chilo's fragment on the stone used to test gold. Bergk, Poetae Lyrici Graeci, ed. 1, p. 568.

LXV

65

It is shameful for the judge to be judged by others.

It is shameful for a judge to be judged by others.

LXVI

66

As nothing is straighter than that which is straight, so nothing is juster than that which is just.

Just as nothing is straighter than what is straight, nothing is more just than what is just.

LXVII

67

Who among us does not admire the act of Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian? For after he was maimed in one of his eyes by one of the citizens, and the young man was delivered up to him by the people that he might punish him as he chose, Lycurgus spared him and after instructing him and making him a good man he brought him into the theatre. When the Lacedaemonians expressed their surprise, Lycurgus said, I received from you this youth when he was insolent and violent: I restore him to you gentle and a good citizen.

Who among us does not admire what Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian did? One of the citizens injured Lycurgus in one eye. The people handed the young man over to Lycurgus to punish as he chose. But Lycurgus spared him. He taught the young man and made him a good man. Then he brought him into the theatre. When the Lacedaemonians expressed surprise, Lycurgus said, “You gave me this young man when he was insolent and violent. I return him to you gentle and a good citizen.”

See Schweig.'s note.

LXVIII

68

Pittacus after being wronged by a certain person and having the power of punishing him let him go, saying, Forgiveness is better than revenge: for forgiveness is the sign of a gentle nature, but revenge the sign of a savage nature.

After someone wronged Pittacus, he had the power to punish him but let him go. He said, “Forgiveness is better than revenge, because forgiveness is a sign of a gentle nature, while revenge is a sign of a savage nature.”

Pittacus was one of the seven wise men, as they are called. Some sources say he lived in the seventh century B.C. With this maxim, he anticipated one of the Christian doctrines by six centuries.

LXIX

69

But before every thing this is the act of nature to bind together and to fit together the movement towards the appearance of that which is becoming (fit) and useful.

But above all, nature binds and fits together the impulse toward what appears proper and useful.

LXX

70

To suppose that we shall be easily despised by others, if we do not in every way do some damage to those who first show us their hostility, is the mark of very ignoble and foolish men: for (thus) we affirm that the man is considered to be contemptible because of his inability to do damage; but much rather is a man considered to be contemptible because of his inability to do what is good (useful).

It is a sign of a very dishonorable and foolish man to think that others will easily despise us if we do not do everything we can to harm those who first show hostility toward us. By thinking this, we claim that a man is despised because he cannot do harm. But a man is much more likely to be despised because he cannot do good (something useful).

See Mrs. Carter's note. She could translate only part of this fragment. Also see Schweig.'s emendation and note.

LXXI

71

When you are attacking (or going to attack) any person violently and with threats, remember to say to yourself first, that you are (by nature) mild (gentle); and if you do nothing savage, you will continue to live without repentance and without blame.

When you attack someone violently or threaten them, or are about to do so, first remind yourself that you are gentle by nature. If you do nothing savage, you will continue to live without regret or blame.

LXXII

72

A man ought to know that it is not easy for him to have an opinion (or fixed principle), if he does not daily say the same things, and hear the same things, and at the same time apply them to life.

A man should know that it is not easy to hold an opinion (or fixed principle). He must repeat and hear the same ideas every day and apply them to his life.

LXXIII

73

[Nicias was so fond of labour (assiduous) that he often asked his slaves, if he had bathed and if he had dined.]

[Nicias loved work so much that he often asked his slaves whether he had bathed and eaten.]

LXXIII. to LXXV. Schweig. placed these three fragments in [ ]. They are not from Epictetus, but from Plutarch's treatise εἰ πρεσβυτέρῳ πολιτευτέον.

LXXIV

74

[The slaves of Archimedes used to drag him by force from his table of diagrams and anoint him; and Archimedes would then draw his figures on his own body when it had been anointed.]

[Archimedes’ slaves used to drag him away from his table of diagrams and anoint him with oil. Then Archimedes would draw his figures on his own body.]

LXXV

75

[Lampis the shipowner being asked how he acquired his wealth, answered, With no difficulty, my great wealth; but my small wealth (my first gains), with much labour.]

[When Lampis the shipowner was asked how he acquired his wealth, he answered: I acquired my great wealth easily, but my first small gains took much hard work.]

LXXVI

76

Solon having been asked by Periander over their cups (παρὰ πότον), since he happened to say nothing, Whether he was silent for want of words or because he was a fool, replied: No fool is able to be silent over his cups.

While drinking with Solon, Periander noticed that he was saying nothing. He asked whether Solon was silent because he had nothing to say or because he was a fool. Solon replied: No fool can keep silent while drinking.

See Schweig.'s note.

LXXVII

77

Attempt on every occasion to provide for nothing so much as that which is safe: for silence is safer than speaking. And omit speaking whatever is without sense and reason.

On every occasion, make safety your highest priority, because silence is safer than speaking. Do not say anything that lacks sense or reason.

LXXVIII

78

As the fire-lights in harbours by a few pieces of dry-wood raise a great flame and give sufficient help to ships which are wandering on the sea; so also an illustrious man in a state which is tempest-tossed, while he is himself satisfied with a few things does great services to his citizens.

Harbor beacons use a few pieces of dry wood to make a great flame and help ships wandering at sea. In the same way, a distinguished man in a troubled state is content with little, yet does great service to his fellow citizens.

LXXIX

79

As if you attempted to manage a ship, you would certainly learn completely the steersman's art, [so if you would administer a state, learn the art of managing a state]. For it will be in your power, as in the first case to manage the whole ship, so in the second case also to manage the whole state.

If you wanted to manage a ship, you would certainly learn the steersman's art thoroughly. [So if you want to govern a state, learn the art of governing a state.] Just as you would then be able to manage the whole ship, you would also be able to govern the whole state.

See Schweig.'s note. Something has evidently been omitted from the text. The words enclosed in [ ] supply the missing text. Schweig. proposes changing κυβερνᾶν to κυβιστᾶν. See his remark on πᾶσαν . . πόλιν. Perhaps he is right.

LXXX

80

If you propose to adorn your city by the dedication of offerings (monuments), first dedicate to yourself (decorate yourself with) the noblest offering of gentleness, and justice and beneficence.

If you plan to beautify your city by dedicating offerings (monuments), first adorn yourself with the noblest offering: gentleness, justice, and kindness.

LXXXI

81

You will do the greatest services to the state, if you shall raise not the roofs of the houses, but the souls of the citizens: for it is better that great souls should dwell in small houses than for mean slaves to lurk in great houses.

You will do the greatest service to the state if you raise the souls of its citizens, not the roofs of their houses. For it is better for great souls to live in small houses than for base slaves to hide in great houses.

LXXXII

82

Do not decorate the walls of your house with the valuable stones from Euboea and Sparta; but adorn the minds (breasts) of the citizens and of those who administer the state with the instruction which comes from Hellas (Greece). For states are well governed by the wisdom (judgement) of men, but not by stone and wood.

Do not decorate your house’s walls with valuable stones from Euboea and Sparta. Instead, enrich the minds of citizens and those who govern the state with the teachings of Hellas (Greece). For states are well governed by human wisdom, not by stone and wood.

The Romans, and perhaps the Greeks too, used marble from Carystus in Euboea and Taenarum near Sparta for architectural decoration. (Strabo, x. 446, and viii. 367, ed. Cas.) Compare Horace, Carm. ii. 18.

LXXXIII

83

As, if you wished to breed lions, you would not care about the costliness of their dens, but about the habits of the animals; so, if you attempt to preside over your citizens, be not so anxious about the costliness of the buildings as careful about the manly character of those who dwell in them.

If you wanted to breed lions, you would care less about the cost of their dens than about their habits. In the same way, if you seek to govern citizens, care less about costly buildings than about the manly character of those who live in them.

LXXXIV.

LXXXIV.

This fragment offers a lesson in governing a state. Good people must be protected, and bad people must be improved through discipline and punishment.

As a skilful horse-trainer does not feed (only) the good colts and allow to starve those who are disobedient to the rein, but he feeds both alike, and chastises the one more and forces him to be equal to the other: so also a careful man and one who is skilled in political power, attempts to treat well those citizens who have a good character, but does not will that those who are of a contrary character should be ruined at once; and he in no manner grudges both of them their food, but he teaches and urges on with more vehemence him who resists reason and law.

A skilled horse trainer does not feed only the good colts and let those that resist the rein starve. He feeds them all alike. He disciplines the disobedient colt more, making it as good as the others. In the same way, a careful man skilled in governing tries to treat citizens of good character well. But he does not want those of bad character to be ruined at once. He does not begrudge either group their food. Instead, he teaches and urges on more vigorously anyone who resists reason and law.

I am not sure what μέρει means.

LXXXV

85

As a goose is not frightened by cackling nor a sheep by bleating, so let not the clamour of a senseless multitude alarm you.

Just as a goose is not frightened by cackling or a sheep by bleating, don't let the noise of a senseless crowd alarm you.

LXXXVI.

LXXXVI.

See the word δυσωπεῖν in the Index Graecitatis.

As a multitude, when they without reason demand of you any thing of your own, do not disconcert you, so do not be moved from your purpose even by a rabble when they unjustly attempt to move you.

A crowd does not unsettle you when they demand something of yours without reason. Likewise, do not let a mob turn you from your purpose when they try to do so unjustly.

LXXXVII

87

What is due to the state pay as quickly as you can, and you will never be asked for that which is not due.

Pay what you owe the state as quickly as you can, and you will never be asked to pay what you do not owe.

LXXXVIII

88

As the sun does not wait for prayers and incantations to be induced to rise, but immediately shines and is saluted by all so do you also not wait for clappings of hands, and shouts and praise to be induced to do good, but be a doer of good voluntarily, and you will be beloved as much as the sun.

The sun does not wait for prayers or spells before rising. It simply shines, and everyone welcomes it. In the same way, do not wait for applause, cheers, or praise before doing good. Do good willingly, and you will be loved as much as the sun.

LXXXIX

89

Neither should a ship rely on one small anchor, nor should life rest on a single hope.

A ship should not rely on one small anchor, and life should not rest on a single hope.

XC

90

We ought to stretch our legs and stretch our hopes only to that which is possible.

We should stretch our legs and set our hopes only as far as possible.

XCI

91

When Thales was asked what is most universal, he answered, Hope, for hope stays with those who have nothing else.

When Thales was asked what is most universal, he answered, Hope, because hope stays with those who have nothing else.

XCII

92

It is more necessary to heal the soul than the body, for to die is better than to live a bad life.

Healing the soul is more important than healing the body, because it is better to die than to live a bad life.

XCIII

93

Pyrrho used to say that there is no difference between dying and living: and a man said to him, Why then do you not die? Pyrrho replied, Because there is no difference.

Pyrrho used to say that there is no difference between dying and living. A man asked him, “Why don't you die, then?” Pyrrho replied, “Because there is no difference.”

XCIV.

94.

Compare Xenophon, Memorab. i. 4, 17. Here and elsewhere, Epictetus treats the body as an instrument used by something other than the body. Whatever uses the body must be capable of doing so and have the power we call intelligence and consciousness. As Bishop Butler says, our bodies are what we call matter. They differ from other matter only because they are more closely connected to us. From these ideas, it would be easy to conclude that this intelligence and power, commonly called the soul, exists independently of the body. Yet we know the soul only as it acts within the body, on the body, and through the body.

Admirable is nature, and, as Xenophon says, a lover of animated beings. The body then, which is of all things the most unpleasant and the most foul (dirty), we love and take care of; for if we were obliged for five days only to take care of our neighbour's body, we should not be able to endure it. Consider then what a thing it would be to rise in the morning and rub the teeth of another, and after doing some of the necessary offices to wash those parts. In truth it is wonderful that we love a thing to which we perform such services every day. I fill this bag, and then I empty it; what is more troublesome? But I must act as the servant of God. For this reason I remain (here), and I endure to wash this miserable body, to feed it and to clothe it. But when I was younger, God imposed on me also another thing, and I submitted to it. Why then do you not submit, when Nature who has given us this body takes it away? I love the body, you may say. Well, as I said just now, Nature gave you also this love of the body: but Nature says, Leave it now, and have no more trouble (with it).

Nature is admirable and, as Xenophon says, loves living creatures. The body is the most unpleasant and dirty thing of all, yet we love and care for it. If we had to care for our neighbor's body for only five days, we could not bear it. Imagine getting up in the morning and brushing someone else's teeth. Then imagine washing those parts after attending to some bodily needs. It is truly remarkable that we love something we serve in these ways every day. I fill this bag, and then I empty it. What could be more troublesome? But I must serve God. That is why I remain here and put up with washing, feeding, and clothing this miserable body. When I was younger, God also gave me another task, and I submitted to it. So why do you not submit when Nature, who gave us this body, takes it away? You may say, I love the body. Well, as I just said, Nature also gave you this love of the body. But Nature says, Leave it now, and let it trouble you no more.

This bag is the body, or the part of it that holds the food taken in through the mouth.

XCV

95

When a man dies young, he blames the gods. When he is old and does not die, he blames the gods because he suffers when he ought to have already ceased from suffering. And nevertheless, when death approaches, he wishes to live, and sends to the physician and intreats him to omit no care or trouble. Wonderful, he said, are men, who are neither willing to live nor to die.

When a man dies young, he blames the gods. When he is old and does not die, he blames the gods for his suffering. He thinks his suffering should have ended already. Yet when death approaches, he wants to live. He sends for the doctor and begs him to do everything he can. How extraordinary people are, he said. They are willing neither to live nor to die.

See Schweig.'s excellent note on this fragment. The text clearly has a gap, which Schweig.'s note fills.

XCVI

96

To the longer life and the worse, the shorter life, if it is better, ought by all means to be preferred.

A shorter life, if it is better, should always be preferred to a longer, worse life.

XCVII

97

When we are children our parents deliver us to a paedagogue to take care on all occasions that we suffer no harm. But when we are become men, God delivers us to our innate conscience (συνειδήσε) to take care of us. This guardianship then we must in no way despise, for we shall both displease God and be enemies to our own conscience.

When we are children, our parents entrust us to a guardian who makes sure we come to no harm. But when we become adults, God entrusts us to our innate conscience (συνειδήσε) to care for us. We must never disregard this guardianship. If we do, we will displease God and become enemies of our own conscience.

Mrs. Carter suggests replacing ἀπάρεστον in the text with ἀπάρεστοι. Schweig. also uses ἀπάρεστοι.

XCVIII

98

[We ought to use wealth as the material for some act, not for every act alike.]

[We should use wealth as a resource for some actions, but not for every action alike.]

XCIX

99

[Virtue then should be desired by all men more than wealth which is dangerous to the foolish; for the wickedness of men is increased by wealth. And the more a man is without sense, the more violent is he in excess, for he has the means of satisfying his mad desire for pleasures.]

[Virtue, then, is something everyone should desire more than wealth. Wealth is dangerous to foolish people because it makes them more wicked. The less sense a person has, the more violently they indulge in excess. For wealth gives them the means to satisfy their mad desire for pleasure.]

C

C

What we ought not to do, we should not even think of doing.

We should not even think of doing what we should not do.

CI

101

Deliberate much before saying or doing anything, for you will not have the power of recalling what has been said or done.

Think carefully before you say or do anything, because you cannot take it back.

CII

102

Every place is safe to him who lives with justice.

Every place is safe for someone who lives justly.

CIII

103

Crows devour the eyes of the dead, when the dead have no longer need of them. But flatterers destroy the souls of the living and blind their eyes.

Crows eat the eyes of the dead, who no longer need them. But flatterers destroy the souls of the living and blind their eyes.

CIV

104

The anger of an ape and the threats of a flatterer should be considered as the same.

Treat an ape's anger and a flatterer's threats as the same.

CV

105

Listen to those who wish to advise what is useful, but not to those who are eager to flatter on all occasions; for the first really see what is useful, but the second look to that which agrees with the opinion of those who possess power, and imitating the shadows of bodies they assent to what is said by the powerful.

Listen to those who want to give useful advice, not those who are eager to flatter at every opportunity. The first truly see what is useful. But the second look for what agrees with the opinions of those in power. Like shadows following bodies, they agree with whatever the powerful say.

CVI

106

The man who gives advice ought first to have regard to the modesty and character (reputation) of those whom he advises; for those who have lost the capacity of blushing are incorrigible.

Anyone giving advice should first consider the modesty and character (reputation) of the people they advise. For those who can no longer blush cannot be corrected.

CVII

107

To admonish is better than to reproach: for admonition is mild and friendly, but reproach is harsh and insulting; and admonition corrects those who are doing wrong, but reproach only convicts them.

It is better to offer a warning than to scold. A warning is gentle and friendly, but scolding is harsh and insulting. A warning corrects people who are doing wrong, but scolding only points out their wrongdoing.

CVIII

108

Give of what you have to strangers (ξένοις) and to those who have need: for he who gives not to him who wants, will not receive himself when he wants.

Give what you have to strangers (ξένοις) and those in need. For anyone who does not give to someone in need will not receive help when they need it themselves.

CIX

109

A pirate had been cast on the land and was perishing through the tempest. A man took clothing and gave it to him, and brought the pirate into his house, and supplied him with every thing else that was necessary. When the man was reproached by a person for doing kindness to the bad, he replied, I have shown this regard not to the man, but to mankind.

A pirate had washed ashore and was dying in the storm. A man gave him clothing, brought him into his house, and provided everything else he needed. Someone criticized the man for being kind to a bad person. He replied, I have shown this kindness not to the man, but to humanity.

Mrs. Carter often refers to Christian teachings in her notes, but she says nothing here. The fragment is not from Epictetus. But whether the story is true or not, it shows how a wise and good man behaves.

CX

110

A man should choose (pursue) not every pleasure, but the pleasure which leads to the good.

A man should pursue not every pleasure, but only the pleasure that leads to good.

See Schweig.'s interpretation and emendation. I doubt he is right.

CXI

111

It is the part of a wise man to resist pleasures, but of a foolish man to be a slave to them.

A wise man resists pleasures, but a foolish man is a slave to them.

CXII

112

Pleasure, like a kind of bait, is thrown before (in front of) every thing which is really bad, and easily allures greedy souls to the hook of perdition.

Pleasure is set out like bait in front of everything truly bad. It easily lures greedy souls onto the hook of ruin.

CXIII

113

Choose rather to punish your appetites than to be punished through them.

Choose to discipline your desires rather than be punished by them.

CXIV

114

No man is free who is not master of himself.

No one is free unless they have control over themselves.

CXV

115

The vine bears three bunches of grapes: the first is that of pleasure, the second of drunkenness, the third of violence.

The vine bears three bunches of grapes: the first brings pleasure, the second drunkenness, and the third violence.

CXVI

116

Over your wine do not talk much to display your learning; for you will utter bilious stuff.

When drinking wine, don't talk too much to show off your learning, because you'll say bitter things.

χολερὰ γὰρ ἀποφθέγξῃ. See Schweig.'s note.

CXVII

117

He is intoxicated who drinks more than three cups: and if he is not intoxicated, he has exceeded moderation.

Anyone who drinks more than three cups is drunk. And if he is not drunk, he has still exceeded moderation.

CXVIII

118

Let your talk of God be renewed every day, rather than your food.

Renew your talk of God every day, rather than your food.

CXIX

119

Think of God more frequently than you breathe.

Think of God more often than you breathe.

CXX

120

If you always remember that whatever you are doing in the soul or in the body, God stands by as an inspector, you will never err (do wrong) in all your prayers and in all your acts, but you will have God dwelling with you.

Always remember that God is watching whatever you do in soul or body. If you do, you will never do wrong in any of your prayers or actions, but God will dwell with you.

This is the doctrine that God is in man. See the Index.

CXXI

121

As it is pleasant to see the sea from the land, so it is pleasant for him who has escaped from troubles to think of them.

Just as it is pleasant to see the sea from land, it is pleasant to remember troubles you have escaped.

Compare the beginning of Lucretius ii.

CXXII

122

Law intends indeed to do service to human life, but it is not able when men do not choose to accept her services; for it is only in those who are obedient to her that she displays her special virtue.

The law aims to serve human life, but it cannot help people who choose not to accept its help. For the law shows its special virtue only in those who obey it.

CXXIII

123

As to the sick physicians are as saviours, so to those also who are wronged are the laws.

Just as doctors are saviors to the sick, laws are saviors to those who have been wronged.

CXXIV

124

The justest laws are those which are the truest.

The most just laws are the truest.

CXXV

125

To yield to law and to a magistrate and to him who is wiser than yourself, is becoming.

It is proper to obey the law, a magistrate, and anyone wiser than yourself.

CXXVI

126

The things which are done contrary to law are the same as things which are not done.

Things done against the law are the same as things not done.

CXXVII

127

In prosperity it is very easy to find a friend; but in adversity it is most difficult of all things.

When things are going well, it is very easy to find a friend. But when things are going badly, finding a friend is the hardest thing of all.

CXXVIII

128

Time relieves the foolish from sorrow, but reason relieves the wise.

Time eases the sorrow of foolish people, but reason eases the sorrow of the wise.

CXXIX

129

He is a wise man who does not grieve for the things which he has not, but rejoices for those which he has.

A wise man does not grieve for what he lacks, but rejoices in what he has.

CXXX

130

Epictetus being asked how a man should give pain to his enemy answered, By preparing himself to live the best life that he can.

Epictetus was asked how a man could hurt his enemy. He answered, “By preparing himself to live the best life he can.”

Compare M. Antoninus, vi. 6.

CXXXI

131

Let no wise man be averse to undertaking the office of a magistrate (τοῦ ἄρχειν): for it is both impious for a man to withdraw himself from being useful to those who have need of our services, and it is ignoble to give way to the worthless; for it is foolish to prefer being ill-governed to governing well.

No wise man should be unwilling to serve as a magistrate (τοῦ ἄρχειν). It is impious to refuse to help those who need our services. It is also dishonorable to give way to worthless people. For it is foolish to prefer being badly governed to governing well.

CXXXII

132

Nothing is more becoming to him who governs than to despise no man and not show arrogance, but to preside over all with equal care.

Nothing is more fitting for a ruler than to despise no one, show no arrogance, and govern everyone with equal care.

For οὐδὲν, Mrs. Carter prefers οὐδὲν μᾶλλον. Schweig. also prefers οὐδὲν μᾶλλον, or οὐδὲν ἄλλο μᾶλλον.

CXXXIII

133

[In poverty any man lives (can live) happily, but very seldom in wealth and power (ἀρχαῖς). The value of poverty excels so much that no just man (νόμιμος) would exchange poverty for disreputable wealth, unless indeed the richest of the Athenians Themistocles, the son of Neocles, was better than Aristides and Socrates, though he was poor in virtue. But the wealth of Themistocles and Themistocles himself have perished and have left no name. For all things die with death in a bad man, but the good is eternal.]

[Anyone can live happily in poverty, but very few can do so with wealth and power (ἀρχαῖς). Poverty is so much better that no just person (νόμιμος) would exchange it for dishonorable wealth. Unless, of course, Themistocles, son of Neocles and the richest of the Athenians, was better than Aristides and Socrates, even though he was poor in virtue. But Themistocles and his wealth have perished, leaving no name behind. For when a bad person dies, everything dies with him, but goodness is eternal.]

This fragment is not from Epictetus. See Schweig.'s note.

CXXXIV

134

Remember that such was, and is, and will be the nature of the universe, and that it is not possible that the things which come into being can come into being otherwise than they do now; and that not only men have participated in this change and transmutation, and all other living things which are on the earth, but also the things which are divine. And indeed the very four elements are changed and transmuted up and down, and earth becomes water and water becomes air, and the air again is transmuted into other things, and the same manner of transmutation takes place from above to below. If a man attempts to turn his mind towards these thoughts, and to persuade himself to accept with willingness that which is necessary, he will pass through life with complete moderation and harmony.

Remember that this was, is, and always will be the nature of the universe. Things cannot come into being any differently than they do now. This change and transformation affects not only human beings and all other living things on earth, but also divine things. Even the four elements change and transform in both directions. Earth becomes water, water becomes air, and air becomes other things. The same kind of transformation also takes place in the reverse direction. If a person thinks about these things and persuades himself to accept willingly what is necessary, he will live with complete moderation and harmony.

CXXXV

135

He who is dissatisfied with things present and what is given by fortune is an ignorant man (ἰδιώτης) in life: but he who bears them nobly and rationally and the things which proceed from them is worthy of being considered a good man.

A person dissatisfied with present circumstances and what fortune gives him is ignorant (ἰδιώτης) about life. But a person who bears these things and their consequences nobly and rationally deserves to be considered a good man.

CXXXVI

136

All things obey and serve the world (the universe), earth and sea and sun and the rest of the stars, and the plants of earth and animals. And our body obeys it also both in disease and in health when it (the universe) chooses, both in youth and in age, and when it is passing through the other changes. What is reasonable then and in our power is this, for our judgment not to be the only thing which resists it (the universe): for it is strong and superior, and it has determined better about us by administering (governing) us also together with the whole. And besides, this opposition also is unreasonable and does nothing more than cause us to be tormented uselessly and to fall into pain and sorrow.

Everything obeys and serves the universe: the earth and sea, the sun and other stars, and plants and animals. Our bodies obey it too. They experience sickness and health, youth and old age, and other changes whenever the universe chooses. So what is reasonable and within our power is to let our judgment follow the universe too, rather than resist it alone. The universe is stronger and superior to us. In governing us along with everything else, it has made better decisions about us than we could. Besides, resisting the universe is unreasonable. It only torments us needlessly and brings us pain and sorrow.

The fragments which follow are in part assigned to Epictetus, in part to others.

Some of the following fragments are attributed to Epictetus, and others to other people.

CXXXVII

137

Contentment, as it is a short road and pleasant, has great delight and little trouble.

Contentment is a short, pleasant road that brings great joy and little trouble.

CXXXVIII

138

Fortify yourself with contentment, for this is an impregnable fortress.

Strengthen yourself with contentment, because it is a fortress that cannot be conquered.

CXXXIX

139

Let nothing be valued more than truth: not even selection of a friendship which lies without the influence of the affects, by which (affects) justice is both confounded (disturbed) and darkened.

Value nothing more than truth, not even the choice of a friendship free from the influence of emotions. Emotions disturb and obscure justice.

The meaning of the second part is unclear and uncertain. See Schweig.'s note.

CXL

140

Truth is a thing immortal and perpetual, and it gives to us a beauty which fades not away in time nor does it take away the freedom of speech which proceeds from justice; but it gives to us the knowledge of what is just and lawful, separating from them the unjust and refuting them.

Truth is immortal and everlasting. It gives us beauty that never fades with time, and it does not take away the freedom to speak that comes from justice. Instead, it gives us knowledge of what is just and lawful, distinguishing unjust things from them and refuting them.

Mis. Carter proposes reading ἀφαιρετήν instead of ἀφαιρεῖ τὴν.

CXLI

141

We should not have either a blunt knife or a freedom of speech which is ill managed.

We should have neither a dull knife nor poorly managed freedom of speech.

CXLII

142

Nature has given to men one tongue, but two ears, that we may hear from others twice as much as we speak.

Nature has given us one tongue and two ears so that we may listen to others twice as much as we speak.

CXLIII

143

Nothing really pleasant or unpleasant subsists by nature, but all things become so through habit (custom).

Nothing is truly pleasant or unpleasant by nature. All things become pleasant or unpleasant through habit (custom).

See Schweig.'s note.

CXLIV

144

Choose the best life, for custom (habit) will make it pleasant.

Choose the best life, because habit will make it pleasant.

CXLV

145

Be careful to leave your sons well instructed rather than rich, for the hopes of the instructed are better than the wealth of the ignorant.

Make sure your sons are well educated rather than rich. The hopes of the educated are worth more than the wealth of the ignorant.

CXLVI

146

A daughter is a possession to her father which is not his own.

A daughter is a possession her father does not own.

CXLVII

147

The same person advised to leave modesty to children rather than gold.

The same person advised leaving modesty to your children rather than gold.

CXLVIII

148

The reproach of a father is agreeable medicine, for it contains more that is useful than it contains of that which gives pain.

A father’s criticism is pleasant medicine because it does more good than it causes pain.

CXLIX

149

He who has been lucky in a son in law has found a son: but he who has been unlucky, has lost also a daughter.

A man lucky in his son-in-law has gained a son. But a man unlucky in his son-in-law has also lost a daughter.

CL

150

The value of education (knowledge) like that of gold is valued in every place.

Education (knowledge), like gold, is valued everywhere.

CLI

151

He who exercises wisdom exercises the knowledge which. is about God.

Anyone who practices wisdom puts knowledge about God into practice.

CLII

152

Nothing among animals is so beautiful as a man adorned by learning (knowledge).

No animal is as beautiful as a man adorned with learning (knowledge).

See Schweig.'s note.

CLIII

153

We ought to avoid the friendship of the bad and the enmity of the good.

We should avoid being friends with bad people and enemies with good people.

CLIV

154

The necessity of circumstances proves friends and detects enemies.

Difficult circumstances test friends and reveal enemies.

CLV

155

When our friends are present, we ought to treat them well; and when they are absent, to speak of them well.

When our friends are with us, we should treat them well. When they are absent, we should speak well of them.

CLVI

156

Let no man think that he is loved by any man when he loves no man.

No one should think they are loved by anyone if they love no one.

CLVII

157

You ought to choose both physician and friend not the most agreeable, but the most useful.

Choose a doctor and a friend for how useful they are, not for how pleasant they are.

CLVIII

158

If you wish to live a life free from sorrow, think of what is going to happen as if it had already happened.

If you want to live without sorrow, think of what will happen as if it has already happened.

CLIX

159

Be free from grief not through insensibility like the irrational animals, nor through want of thought like the foolish, but like a man of virtue by having reason as the consolation of grief.

Be free from grief, not because you lack feeling like irrational animals or because you fail to think like fools. Instead, be free from grief like a virtuous person, by finding comfort in reason.

CLX

160

Whoever are least disturbed in mind by calamities, and in act struggle most against them, these are the best men in states and in private life.

The best men in public and private life are those who stay calmest in the face of disaster and fight hardest against it.

CLXI

161

Those who have been instructed, like those who have been trained in the palaestra, though they may have fallen, rise again from their misfortune quickly and skilfully. Ss had of

People who have been taught are like those trained in a wrestling school. Though they may fall, they recover from misfortune quickly and skillfully. Ss had of

CLXII

162

We ought to call in reason like a good physician as a help in misfortune.

We should call on reason for help in misfortune, as we would call on a good doctor.

CLXIII

163

A fool having enjoyed good fortune like intoxication to a great amount becomes more foolish.

A fool who enjoys a great deal of good fortune becomes even more foolish, as if drunk.

CLXIV

164

Envy is the antagonist of the fortunate.

Envy is the enemy of those who are fortunate.

CLXV

165

He who bears in mind what man is will never be troubled at any thing which happens.

Anyone who remembers what it means to be human will never be troubled by anything that happens.

CLXVI

166

For making a good voyage a pilot (master) and wind are necessary: and for happiness reason and art.

A successful voyage requires a captain and wind. Happiness requires reason and skill.

CLXVII

167

We should enjoy good fortune while we have it, like the fruits of autumn.

We should enjoy good fortune while we have it, like the fruits of autumn.

CLXVIII

168

He is unreasonable who is grieved (troubled) at the things which happen from the necessity of nature.

Anyone who is upset by what must happen in nature is unreasonable.

Some Fragments of Epictetus omitted by Upton and by Meibomius.

Some Fragments of Epictetus Left Out by Upton and Meibomius.

CLXIX

169

Of the things which are, God has put some of them in our power, and some he has not. In our own power he has placed that which is the best and the most important, that indeed through which he himself is happy, the use of appearances (φαντασιῶν). For when this use is rightly employed, there is freedom, happiness, tranquillity, constancy: and this is also justice and law, and temperance, and every virtue. But all other things he has not placed in our power. Wherefore we also ought to be of one mind with God, and making this division of things, to look after those which are in our power; and of the things not in our power, to intrust them to the Universe (τῷ κόσμῳ), and whether it should require our children, or our country, or our body, or any thing else, willingly to give them up.

God has placed some things within our power and others outside it. He has given us power over the best and most important thing, the very thing that makes him happy: the use of appearances (φαντασιῶν). When we use appearances rightly, we have freedom, happiness, peace of mind, and steadfastness. This right use is also justice, law, self-control, and every virtue. But God has not placed all other things within our power. So we should agree with God and make the same distinction. We should look after the things within our power and entrust the rest to the Universe (τῷ κόσμῳ). If the Universe should require our children, our country, our body, or anything else, we should willingly give them up.

This is a valuable fragment, and I think it is genuinely by Epictetus. There is clearly a gap in the text, which Schweighaeuser has wisely filled.

CLXX

170

When a young man was boasting in the theatre and saying, I am wise, for I have conversed with many wise men; Epictetus said, I also have conversed with many rich men, but I am not rich.

A young man was boasting in the theater. He said, “I am wise because I have talked with many wise men.” Epictetus replied, “I have also talked with many rich men, but I am not rich.”

CLXXI

171

The same person said, It is not good for him who has been well taught to talk among the untaught, as it is not right for him who is sober to talk among those who are drunk.

The same person said that it is not good for a well-taught person to talk among those who have not been taught. Just as it is not right for a sober person to talk among drunk people.

CLXXII

172

Epictetus being asked, What man is rich, answered, He who is content (who has enough).

When asked what man is rich, Epictetus answered, “The man who is content (who has enough).”

CLXXIII

173

Xanthippe was blaming Socrates, because he was making small preparation for receiving his friends: but Socrates said, If they are our friends, they will not care about it; and if they are not, we shall care nothing about them.

Xanthippe blamed Socrates for making so few preparations to welcome his friends. But Socrates said, If they are our friends, they will not care about the preparations. And if they are not, we will not care about them.

CLXXIV

174

When Archelaus was sending for Socrates to make him rich, Socrates told the messengers to return this answer: At Athens four measures (choenices) of meal are sold for one obolus (the sixth of a drachme), and the fountains run with water: if what I have is not enough (sufficient) for me, yet I am sufficient for what I have, and so it becomes sufficient for me. Do you not see that it was with no nobler voice that Polus acted the part of Oedipus as king than of Oedipus as a wanderer and beggar at Colonus? Then shall the good man appear to be inferior to Polus, and unable to act well every character (personage) imposed on him by the Deity? and shall he not imitate Ulysses, who even in rags made no worse figure than in the soft purple robe?

When Archelaus sent for Socrates to make him rich, Socrates told the messengers to take back this answer: In Athens, four measures (choenices) of meal sell for one obolus (a sixth of a drachme), and the fountains flow with water. If what I have is not enough for me, I am enough for what I have. So what I have becomes enough for me. Do you not see that Polus spoke no more nobly when he played Oedipus as king than when he played Oedipus as a wanderer and beggar at Colonus? Then should a good man seem inferior to Polus? Should he be unable to play well every role assigned to him by the Deity? Should he not imitate Ulysses, who looked no worse in rags than in a soft purple robe?

See Schweig.'s note on this fragment, his comment on the words οὐκ εὐφωνότερον οὐδὲν, and his proposed correction.

CLXXV

175

What do I care, he (Epictetus) says, whether all things are composed of atoms (ἀτόμων), or of similar parts (ὁμοιομερῶν) or of fire and earth? for is it not enough to know the nature of the good and the evil, and the measures (μέτρα) of the desires and the aversions (ἐκκλίσεων), and also the movements towards things and from them; and using these as rules to administer the affairs of life, but not to trouble ourselves about the things above us? For these things are perhaps incomprehensible to the human mind and if any man should even suppose them to be in the highest degree comprehensible, what then is the profit of them, if they are comprehended? And must we not say that those men have needless trouble who assign these things as necessary to the philosopher's discourse? Is then also the precept written at Delphi superfluous, which is Know thyself? It is not so, he says. What then is the meaning of it? If a man gave to a choreutes (member of chorus) the precept to know himself, would he not have observed in the precept that he must direct his attention to himself?

What do I care, Epictetus says, whether everything is made of atoms (ἀτόμων), similar parts (ὁμοιομερῶν), or fire and earth? Isn’t it enough to know the nature of good and evil? Isn’t it enough to know the proper limits (μέτρα) of desire and aversion (ἐκκλίσεων), and how to move toward and away from things? We can use these as rules for managing our lives, without troubling ourselves about things beyond us. Such things are perhaps beyond human understanding. But even if someone thought they were entirely understandable, what would we gain by understanding them? Don’t those who say these things are necessary to a philosopher’s discussion take needless trouble? Does that mean the instruction written at Delphi, Know thyself, is also unnecessary? No, he says. What, then, does it mean? If someone told a choreutes (a member of a chorus) to know himself, wouldn’t the chorus member understand that he must pay attention to himself?

See Schweig.'s note and his comment on the last line of the text.

CLXXVI

176

You are a little soul carrying a dead body, as Epictetus said.

You are a little soul carrying a dead body, as Epictetus said.

See M. Antoninus, iv. 41.

CLXXVII

177

He (Epictetus) said that he had discovered an art in giving assent; and in the topic (matter) of the movements he had discovered that we must observe attention, that the movements be subject to exception, (μεθ᾽ ὑπεξαιρέσεως), that they be social, that they be according to the worth of each thing; and that we ought to abstain entirely from desire, and to employ aversion (ἐκκλίσει) to none of the things which are not in our power.

He (Epictetus) said that he had discovered a skill in giving assent. He had also discovered that we must pay attention to our impulses. They must be subject to reservation (μεθ᾽ ὑπεξαιρέσεως), directed toward others, and suited to the value of each thing. We must give up desire entirely and avoid (ἐκκλίσει) none of the things outside our control.

See the translation of M. Antoninus, xi. 37. There, I translated this passage a little differently than I have here. The meaning is the same. I do not know which translation is better.

CLXXVIII

178

About no common thing, he said, the contest (dispute) is, but about being mad or not.

The dispute, he said, is no ordinary matter. It is about whether we are mad or not.

See M. Antoninus, xi. 38.

CLXXIX

179

Aul. Gellius, xvii. 19.

Aulus Gellius, 17.19.

Favorinum ego audivi dicere Epictetum philosophum dixisse, 'plerosque istos qui philosophari videntur, philosophos esse hujuscemodi, ἄνευ τοῦ πράττειν, μέχρι τοῦ λέγειν.' Id significat, factis procul, verbis tenus. Jam illud est vehementius, quod Arrianus solitum eum dictitare in libris, quos de Dissertationibus ejus composuit, scriptum reliquit. Nam, quum,' inquit, 'animadverterat hominem pudore amisso, importuna industria, corruptis moribus, audacem, confidentem lingua, caeteraque omnia praeter animum procurantem; istiusmodi,' inquit, hominem quum viderat studia quoque et disciplinas philosophiae contrectare, et physica adire et meditari dialectica, multaque id genus theoremata suspicari sciscitarique, inclamabat deum atque hominum fidem, ac plerumque, inter clamandum his eum verbis increpabat: Ἄνθρωπε, ποῦ βάλλεις; σκέψαι εἰ κεκάθαρται τὸ ἀγγεῖον. ἂν γὰρ εἰς τὴν οἴησιν βάλλῃς, ἀπώλετο. ἢν σαπῇ, ἢ οὖρον ἢ ὄξος γένοιτ' ἂν, ἢ τι τούτων χεῖρον. Nihil profecto his verbis gravius, nihil verius; quibus declarabat maximus philosophorum, 'literas atque doctrinas Philosophiae, quum in hominem falsum atque degenerem, tamquam in vas spurcum atque pollutum influxissent, verti, mutari, corrumpi, et (quod ipse κυνικώτερον ait) urinam fieri, aut si quid est urina spurcius.' Praeterea idem ille Epictetus, quod ex eodem Favorino audivimus, solitus dicere est: 'duo esse vitia multo omnium gravissima et taeterrima, intolerantiam et incontinentiam, quum aut injurias quae sunt ferendae non toleramus neque ferimus, aut a quibus rebus voluptatibusque nos tenere debemus non tenemus. Itaque,' inquit, 'si quis haec duo verba cordi habeat, eaque sibi imperando atque observando curet, is erit pleraque impeccabilis vitamque vivet tranquillissimam. duo haec dicebat, Ἀνέχου καὶ Ἀπέχου.'

I heard Favorinus say that the philosopher Epictetus once said, "Most of those who seem to practice philosophy are philosophers in this way: they talk, but do not act." This means they stop at words and fall far short of action. Arrian recorded an even stronger saying that Epictetus often repeated, in the books he wrote about his discourses. Arrian says that Epictetus would sometimes notice a man who had lost all shame, was pushily busy, corrupt, bold, and glib. Such a man took care of everything except his character. When Epictetus saw a man like this studying philosophy, investigating nature, practicing logic, and speculating and asking questions about many such theories, he would cry out to gods and men. Often, in the midst of his cries, he would rebuke the man with these words: "Man, where are you putting it? See whether the vessel is clean. For if you put it into your conceit, it is ruined. If it spoils, it will turn into urine or vinegar, or something worse." Surely nothing could be more forceful or more true than these words. With them, the greatest of philosophers showed what happens when philosophical learning and teachings enter a false and corrupt man. They are like something poured into a dirty and contaminated vessel. They change and spoil and, as Epictetus himself put it more bluntly, become urine or something even fouler. I also heard from Favorinus that Epictetus used to say that two faults are by far the worst and most shameful of all: lack of endurance and lack of self-control. These faults arise when we do not bear the injuries we ought to bear, or do not hold back from the things and pleasures we ought to avoid. "Therefore," he said, "if anyone takes these two words to heart and makes sure to obey them, he will be free from most faults and will live a very peaceful life." The two words he meant were "Endure and refrain."

Arrian, Dissert. ii. 19.

CLXXX

180

Aul. Gellius, xix. 1.

Aulus Gellius, 19.1.

Philosophus in disciplina Stoica celebratus . . . . ex sarcinula sua librum protulit Epicteti philosophi quintum Διαλεξέαν: quas ab Arriano digestas congruere scriptis Zenonis et Chrysippi non dubium est. In eo libro Graeca scilicet oratione scriptum ad hanc sententiam legimus: 'Visa animi,' quas φαντασίας philosophi appellant, 'qui bus mens hominis prima statim specie accidentis ad ani mum rei pellitur, non voluntatis sunt, neque arbitraria, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitanda. Probationes autem quas συγκαταθέσεις vocant, quibus eadem visa noscuntur ac dijudicantur, voluntariae sunt fiuntque hominum arbitratu. Propterea quum sonus aliquis aut caelo aut ex ruina aut repentinus [nesciusj pericali nuntius vel quid aliud ejusmodi factum, sapientis quoque animum paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere necessum est, non opinione alicujus mali praecepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis officium mentis atque rationis praevertentibus. Mox tamen ille sapiens ibidem [idem?] τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας, id est, visa istaec animi sui terrifica non approbat: hoc est οὐ συγκατατίθεται οὐδὲ προσεπιδοξάζει, sed abjicit respuitque, nec ei metuendum esse in his quidquam videtur. Atque hoc inter insipientis sapientisque animum differre dicunt, quod insipiens, qualia esse primo animi sui pulsu visa sunt saeva et aspera, talia esse vero putat, et eadem incepta tamquam jure metuenda sint, sua quoque assensione approbat καὶ προσεπιδοξάζει (hoc enim verbo Stoici quum super ista re disserunt utuntur). Sapiens autem quum breviter et strictim colore atque vultu motus est, οὐ συγκατατίθεται, sed statum vigoremque sententiae suae retinet, quam de hujuscemodi visis semper habuit, ut de minime metuendis, sed fronte falsa et formidine inani territantibus.'

A celebrated Stoic philosopher . . . . took the fifth book of the philosopher Epictetus’s Discourses from his small bag. Arrian compiled these discourses, and they undoubtedly agree with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus. In this book, we read the following in Greek: ‘Mental impressions, which philosophers call φαντασίας, strike the mind when a person first encounters something. These impressions are not under our control. They force themselves on us, making us aware of them. But the judgments by which we recognize and assess these impressions are voluntary. These judgments, called συγκαταθέσεις, are up to us. ‘So even a wise person must be briefly shaken, tense, and pale in certain situations. These include a sound from the sky, a crash, sudden news of danger, or anything similar. This happens not because the wise person has already judged that something bad has occurred. Instead, these are quick, unthinking reactions that come before the mind and reason can do their work. ‘Soon afterward, however, the wise person does not approve these frightening mental impressions, τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας. In other words, οὐ συγκατατίθεται οὐδὲ προσεπιδοξάζει. Instead, the wise person rejects and dismisses them, and sees nothing in them to fear. ‘They say that this is the difference between the minds of an unwise person and a wise one. The unwise person believes things really are as dreadful and harsh as they first appear. The unwise person also accepts these initial impressions, as though they were rightly to be feared, καὶ προσεπιδοξάζει. Stoics use this word when discussing this subject. ‘The wise person, however, is briefly affected in color and expression, but οὐ συγκατατίθεται. Instead, the wise person remains firm and confident in the judgment always held about such impressions. They are not at all to be feared, but frighten us with a false appearance and empty terror.’

CLXXXI

181

Arnobius advers. Gentes, in fine libri secundi.

Arnobius, Against the Nations, at the end of Book Two.

Quum de animarum agitur salute ac de respectu nostri; 'aliquid et sine ratione faciendum est,' ut Epictetum dixisse approbat Arrianus.

When the salvation of our souls and our own welfare are at stake, 'some things must be done without reason,' as Arrian approves of Epictetus saying.

'Nempe ubi ratio deficit, ibi sola fiducia in Deum reposita et obsequio voluntati ejus ab ipso declaratae unice subjecto agendum est.' Schweig. See Encheirid. xxxii.

Non ebur neque aureum Mea renidet in domo lacunar, etc.

No ivory or gold shines on the ceiling of my house, etc.

The end