Against Those Who Complain About Being Pitied

I am grieved, a man says, at being pitied. Whether then is the fact of your being pitied a thing which concerns you or those who pity you? Well, is it in your power to stop this pity?—It is in my power, if I show them that I do not require pity.—And whether then are you in the condition of not deserving (requiring) pity, or are you not in that condition?—I think that I am not: but these persons do not pity me, for the things for which, if they ought to pity me, it would be proper, I mean, for my faults; but they pity me for my poverty, for not possessing honourable offices, for diseases and deaths and other such things—Whether then are you prepared to convince the many, that not one of these things is an evil, but that it is possible for a man who is poor and has no office (ἀνάρχοντι) and enjoys no honour to be happy; or to shew yourself to them as rich and in power? For the second of these things belong to a man who is boastful, silly and good for nothing. And consider by what means the pre tence must be supported. It will be necessary for you to hire slaves and to possess a few silver vessels, and to exhibit them in public, if it is possible, though they are often the same, and to attempt to conceal the fact that they are the same, and to have splendid garments, and all other things for display, and to show that you are a man honoured by the great, and to try to sup at their houses, or to be supposed to sup there, and as to your person to employ some mean arts, that you may appear to be more handsome and nobler than you are. These things you must contrive, if you choose to go by the second path in order not to be pitied. But the first way is both impracticable and long, to attempt the very thing which Zeus has not been able to do, to convince all men what things are good and bad.⁷³³ Is this power given to you? This only is given to you, to convince yourself; and you have not convinced yourself. Then I ask you, do you attempt to persuade other men? and who has lived so long with you as you with yourself? and who has so much power of convincing you as you have of convincing yourself; and who is better disposed and nearer to you than you are to yourself? How then have you not yet convinced yourself in order to learn? At present are not things upside down? Is this what you have been earnest about doing,⁷³⁴ to learn to be free from grief and free from disturbance, and not to be humbled (abject), and to be free? Have you not heard then that there is only one way which leads to this end, to give up (dismiss) the things which do not depend on the will, to withdraw from them, and to admit that they belong to others? For another man then to have an opinion about you, of what kind is it?—It is a thing independent of the will―Then is it nothing to you?—It is nothing—When then you are still vexed at this and disturbed, do you think that you are convinced about good and evil?

“I am upset at being pitied,” someone says. Does being pitied concern you, or the people who pity you? Can you stop them from pitying you? “I can, if I show them that I do not need pity.” And do you need pity, or not? “I think I do. But these people do not pity me for my faults, which would be the proper reason to pity me. Instead, they pity me for my poverty, for holding no honored office, for illnesses and deaths, and other such things.” Then are you prepared to convince everyone that none of these things is an evil? Can you convince them that a person can be happy while poor, holding no office (ἀνάρχοντι), and receiving no honor? Or are you prepared to make yourself appear rich and powerful? The second course is for someone who is boastful, foolish, and good for nothing. Consider what it would take to maintain that pretense. You would have to hire slaves and acquire a few silver vessels. If possible, you would have to display the vessels in public. Though they would often be the same ones, you would have to try to hide that fact. You would also need splendid clothes and everything else for show. You would have to show that powerful people honor you. You would have to try to dine at their houses, or make people think you dine there. You would also have to use some cheap tricks to look more handsome and noble than you are. You must arrange all this if you choose the second way to avoid being pitied. But the first way is both impractical and long. You would be trying to do what even Zeus has not been able to do: convince everyone what is good and bad.⁷³³ Have you been given that power? You have only been given the power to convince yourself, and you have not done even that. So I ask you, are you trying to persuade other people? Who has lived with you as long as you have lived with yourself? Who has as much power to convince you as you have to convince yourself? And who is more kindly disposed toward you, or closer to you, than you are to yourself? So why have you not yet convinced yourself, so that you may learn? Is everything not upside down now? Is this what you have worked so hard⁷³⁴ to learn: how to be free from grief and disturbance, not to be abject, and to be free? Have you not heard that there is only one way to reach this goal? You must give up things that do not depend on your will, withdraw from them, and admit that they belong to others. What kind of thing is another person’s opinion of you? “It does not depend on my will.” Then is it nothing to you? “It is nothing.” If you are still upset and disturbed by another person’s opinion, do you think you are convinced about good and evil?

Will you not then letting others alone be to yourself both scholar and teacher?—The rest of mankind will look after this, whether it is to their interest to be and to pass their lives in a state contrary to nature: but to me no man is nearer than myself. What then is the meaning of this, that I have listened to the words of the philosophers and I assent to them, but in fact I am no way made easier (more content)? Am I so stupid? And yet in all other things such as I have chosen, I have not been found very stupid; but I learned letters quickly, and to wrestle, and geometry, and to resolve syllogisms. Has not then reason convinced me? and indeed no other things have I from the beginning so approved and chosen (as the things which are rational): and now I read about these things, hear about them, write about them; I have so far discovered no reason stronger than this (living according to nature). In what then am I deficient? Have the contrary opinions not been eradicated from me? Have the notions (opinions) themselves not been exercised nor used to be applied to action, but as armour are laid aside and rusted and cannot fit me? And yet neither in the exercises of the palaestra, nor in writing or reading am I satisfied with learning, but I turn up and down the syllogisms which are proposed, and I make others, and sophistical syllogisms also.⁷³⁵ But the necessary theorems by proceeding from which a man can become free from grief, fear, passions (affects), hindrance, and a free man, these I do not exercise myself in nor do I practise in these the proper practice (study). Then I care about what others will say of me, whether I shall appear to them worth notice, whether I shall appear happy.—

Will you not leave others alone and be both student and teacher to yourself? Other people can decide for themselves whether it is in their interest to live contrary to nature. But no one is closer to me than I am to myself. Why, then, have I listened to the philosophers and agreed with them, yet become no more content? Am I so stupid? In everything else I chose to learn, I was not found very stupid. I quickly learned reading and writing, wrestling, geometry, and how to solve syllogisms. Has reason not convinced me, then? In fact, from the beginning I have approved and chosen nothing more than what is rational. Even now, I read, hear, and write about these things. So far, I have found no principle stronger than living according to nature. What, then, am I lacking? Have my contrary opinions not been rooted out? Have I failed to exercise these principles and put them into practice? Have I instead laid them aside like armor, leaving them to rust until they no longer fit me? Yet in wrestling, writing, and reading, I am not satisfied with merely learning. I examine the syllogisms presented to me from every angle. I also make up others, including sophistical syllogisms.⁷³⁵ But I do not exercise myself in the essential principles or practice them as I should. By following these principles, a person can become free from grief, fear, passions, and obstacles. He can become a free man. Instead, I care what others will say about me. I wonder whether they will think me worth noticing and whether I will appear happy to them.

Wretched man, will you not see what you are saying about yourself? What do you appear to yourself to be? in your opinions, in your desires, in your aversions from things (ἐν τῷ ἐκκλίνειν), in your movements (purposes, ἐν ὁρμῇ) in your preparation (for anything), in your de signs (plans), and in other acts suitable to a man? But do you trouble yourself about this, whether others pity you?—Yes, but I am pitied not as I ought to be.—Are you then pained at this? and is he who is pained, an object of pity?—Yes—How then are you pitied not as you ought to be? For by the very act that you feel (suffer) about being pitied, you make yourself deserving of pity. What then says Antisthenes? Have you not heard? 'It is a royal thing, O Cyrus, to do right (well) and to be ill spoken of.'⁷³⁶ My head is sound, and all think that I have the head ache. What do I care for that? I am free from fever, and people sympathize with me as if I had a fever, (and say), Poor man, for so long a time you have not ceased to have fever. I also say with a sorrowful countenance, In truth it is now a long time that I have been ill. What will happen then? As God may please: and at the same time I secretly laugh at those who are pitying me. What then hinders the same being done in this case also? I am poor, but I have a right opinion about poverty. Why then do I care if they pity me for my poverty? I am not in power (not a magistrate); but others are: and I have the opinion which I ought to have about having and not having power. Let them look to it who pity me;⁷³⁷ but I am neither hungry nor thirsty nor do I suffer cold; but because they are hungry or thirsty they think that I too am. What then shall I do for them? Shall I go about and proclaim and say, Be not mistaken, men, I am very well, I do not trouble myself about poverty, nor want of power, nor in a word about anything else than right opinions. These I have free from restraint, I care for nothing at all.—What foolish talk is this? How do I possess right opinions when I am not content with being what I am, but am uneasy about what I am supposed to be?

You poor man, can’t you see what you are saying about yourself? What do you think you are like? Consider your opinions, desires, aversions (ἐν τῷ ἐκκλίνειν), purposes (ἐν ὁρμῇ), preparations, plans, and other actions proper to a human being. Yet you worry about whether others pity you? “Yes, but they don’t pity me as they should.” Does that upset you, then? And is someone who is upset deserving of pity? “Yes.” How, then, do they fail to pity you as they should? By being upset about their pity, you make yourself deserving of it. What does Antisthenes say? Haven’t you heard? “It is a royal thing, O Cyrus, to do right and be spoken of badly.”⁷³⁶ My head is fine, but everyone thinks I have a headache. Why should I care? I have no fever, but people sympathize with me as if I did. They say, “Poor man, you’ve had a fever for so long.” I put on a sad face and say, “It’s true, I’ve been ill a long time now.” What will happen next? Whatever God pleases. Meanwhile, I secretly laugh at the people who pity me. What prevents me from doing the same in this case? I am poor, but I have the right opinion about poverty. Why should I care if people pity me for being poor? I have no public office, but others do. And I have the right opinion about having or not having power. Let those who pity me worry about it.⁷³⁷ I am not hungry or thirsty or cold. But because they are hungry or thirsty, they think I am too. What should I do for them? Should I go around announcing, “Don’t be mistaken, everyone. I’m very well. I don’t worry about poverty or lack of power. In short, I don’t worry about anything except having the right opinions. I hold those opinions without restraint, and I care about nothing else”? What foolish talk! How can I have the right opinions if I’m not content to be what I am, but worry about what people think I am?

But you say, others will get more and be preferred to me.—What then is more reasonable than for those who have laboured about any thing to have more in that thing in which they have laboured? They have laboured for power, you have laboured about opinions; and they have laboured for wealth, you for the proper use of appearances. See if they have more than you in this about which you have laboured, and which they neglect; if they assent better than you with respect to the natural rules (measures) of things; if they are less disappointed than you in their desires; if they fall less into things which they would avoid than you do; if in their intentions, if in the things which they propose to themselves, if in their purposes, if in their motions towards an object they take a better aim; if they better observe a proper behaviour, as men, as sons, as parents, and so on as to the other names by which we express the relations of life. But if they exercise power, and you do not, will you not choose to tell yourself the truth, that you do nothing for the sake of this (power), and they do all? But it is most unreasonable that he who looks after anything should obtain less than he who does not look after it.

But you say, others will get more and be favored over me. What could be more reasonable than this? Those who have worked for something should get more of what they have worked for. They have worked for power, while you have worked on your judgments. They have worked for wealth, while you have worked on making proper use of appearances. See whether they have more than you in what you have worked on and they neglect. Do they judge things better than you, according to the standards set by nature? Are they less often disappointed in their desires? Do they encounter fewer things they wish to avoid? Do they aim better in their intentions, their goals, their purposes, and their efforts to reach an object? Do they behave more appropriately as human beings, as sons, as parents, and in their other roles in life? But if they exercise power and you do not, why not tell yourself the truth? You do nothing for the sake of power, while they do everything for it. It would be most unreasonable for someone who pursues something to get less of it than someone who does not.

Not so: but since I care about right opinions, it is more reasonable for me to have power.—Yes in the matter about which you do care, in opinions. But in a matter in which they have cared more than you, give way to them. The case is just the same as if because you have right opinions, you thought that in using the bow you should hit the mark better than an archer, and in working in metal you should succeed better than a smith. Give up then your earnestness about opinions and employ yourself about the things which you wish to acquire; and then lament, if you do not succeed; for you deserve to lament. But now you say that you are occupied with other things, that you are looking after other things; but the many say this truly, that one act has no community with another.⁷³⁸ He who has risen in the morning seeks whom (of the house of Caesar) he shall salute, to whom he shall say something agreeable, to whom he shall send a present, how he shall please the dancing man, how by bad behaviour to one he may please another. When he prays, he prays about these things; when he sacrifices, he sacrifices for these things: the saying of Pythagoras

No, because I care about having the right opinions, it makes more sense for me to have power. Yes, in the matter you care about, opinions. But when others have cared more than you about something, give way to them. It is as if you thought your right opinions made you better at hitting a target than an archer. Or as if you thought they made you better at metalwork than a smith. So stop putting so much effort into your opinions and devote yourself to the things you want to acquire. Then, if you do not succeed, complain. You will deserve to. But as it is, you say you are occupied with other things and looking after them. Yet most people rightly say that one activity has nothing in common with another.⁷³⁸ A man gets up in the morning and looks for someone in Caesar’s household to greet. He thinks about whom to flatter and whom to send a gift. He thinks about how to please the dancer, and how to please one person by treating another badly. When he prays, he prays for these things. When he sacrifices, he sacrifices for these things: the saying of Pythagoras

Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes⁷³⁹

Do not let sleep come to your tired eyes⁷³⁹

he transfers to these things. Where have I failed in the matters pertaining to flattery? What have I done? Any thing like a free man, any thing like a noble minded man? And if he finds any thing of the kind, he blames and accuses himself: "Why did you say this? Was it not in your power to lie? Even the philosophers say that nothing hinders us from telling a lie." But do you, if indeed you have cared about nothing else except the proper use of appearances, as soon as you have risen in the morning reflect, "What do I want in order to be free from passion (affects), and free from perturbation? What am I? Am I a poor body, a piece of property, a thing of which something is said? I am none of these. But what am I? I am a rational animal. What then is required of me?" Reflect on your acts. Where have I omitted the things which conduce to happiness (εὔροιαν)? What have I done which is either unfriendly or unsocial? what have I not done as to these things which I ought to have done?

he applies this to these matters. Where have I failed to flatter? What have I done? Have I acted like a free person, or like someone noble-minded? If he finds that he has, he blames and accuses himself: "Why did you say this? Couldn't you have lied? Even the philosophers say that nothing prevents us from telling a lie." But suppose you have cared about nothing except the proper use of appearances. As soon as you rise in the morning, ask yourself, "What do I need to be free from passion (affects) and disturbance? What am I? Am I just a body, a piece of property, or something people talk about? I am none of these. But what am I? I am a rational animal. What, then, is required of me?" Reflect on your actions. Where have I neglected what leads to happiness (εὔροιαν)? What have I done that was unfriendly or unsociable? What friendly or sociable things should I have done but failed to do?

So great then being the difference in desires, actions, wishes, would you still have the same share with others in those things about which you have not laboured, and they have laboured? Then are you surprised if they pity you, and are you vexed? But they are not vexed if you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced that they have that which is good, and you are not convinced. For this reason you are not satisfied with your own, but you desire that which they have: but they are satisfied with their own, and do not desire what you have: since if you were really convinced, that with respect to what is good, it is you who are the possessor of it and that they have missed it, you would not even have thought of what they say about you.

Your desires, actions, and wishes are so different from theirs. Yet do you still expect an equal share of things they have worked for and you have not? Are you surprised and upset when they pity you? But they are not upset when you pity them. Why? Because they are convinced that they have what is good, and you are not. That is why you are not satisfied with what you have and want what they have. But they are satisfied with what they have and do not want what you have. If you were truly convinced that you possessed what is good and they had missed it, you would not even think about what they say about you.