Book 4, Chapter 7
Freedom from Fear
What makes the tyrant formidable? The guards, you say, and their swords, and the men of the bedchamber and those who exclude them who would enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to the tyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid; or is it because the child does not understand these things? If then any man does understand what guards are and that they have swords, and comes to the tyrant for this very purpose because he wishes to die on account of some circumstance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is he afraid of the guards? No, for he wishes for the thing which makes the guards formidable. If then any man neither wishing to die nor to live by all means, but only as it may be permitted, approaches the tyrant, what hinders him from approaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing. If then a man has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I have instanced has about his body; and also about his children and his wife, and in a word is so affected by some madness or despair that he cares not whether he possesses them or not, but like children who are playing with shells care (quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble themselves about the shells, so he too has set no value on the materials (things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and the occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him or what guards or what swords?
What makes the tyrant frightening? His guards, you say, and their swords, his attendants, and the men who keep people from entering. But bring a child to the tyrant while he is with his guards. Why is the child not afraid? Is it because the child does not understand what these things mean? Now suppose a man understands what guards are and knows they have swords. He comes to the tyrant for the very purpose of dying. Some circumstance has made him want to die, and he seeks an easy death at another’s hands. Is he afraid of the guards? No, because he wants the very thing that makes them frightening. But suppose a man comes to the tyrant who neither wants to die nor insists on living at all costs. He wishes to live only as circumstances permit. What prevents him from approaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing. Now suppose a man feels the same way about his property as the man I described feels about his body. He feels the same way about his children and his wife. In short, some madness or despair has made him indifferent to whether he has them or not. He is like children playing with shells. They care about the game and quarrel over it, but they do not concern themselves with the shells. So too, he places no value on the things themselves. He values only the pleasure and activity they give him. What tyrant, what guards, or what swords can frighten him then?
Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through habit, and is it possible that no man can learn from reason and from demonstration that God has made all the things in the universe and the universe itself completely free from hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use of the whole? All other animals indeed are incapable of comprehending the administration of it; but the rational animal man has faculties for the consideration of all these things, and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate to the whole. And besides this being naturally noble, magnanimous and free, man sees that of the things which surround him some are free from hindrance and in his power, and the other things are subject to hindrance and in the power of others; that the things which are free from hindrance are in the power of the will; and those which are subject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good and his interest be in these things only which are free from hindrance and in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, magnanimous, pious, thankful to God for all things; in no matter finding fault with any of the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them. But if he thinks that his good and his interest are in externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a slave to those who have the power over the things which he admires (desires) and fears; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him; and he must of necessity be abject and mean.
Can madness make a man take this attitude toward these things, and can habit make the Galilaeans do so, yet no one can learn the same attitude through reason and proof? Can no one learn that God has made the universe and everything in it perfect and entirely free from hindrance? Can no one learn that he made the parts for the use of the whole? All other animals are incapable of understanding how the universe is governed. But man, a rational animal, can consider all these things. He can understand that he is a part of the universe, what kind of part he is, and that the parts should be subordinate to the whole. Besides being naturally noble, generous in spirit, and free, man sees that some things around him cannot be hindered and are in his power. Other things can be hindered and are in the power of others. The things that cannot be hindered are within the power of his will. Those that can be hindered are not within its power. For this reason, if he believes that his good and his interest lie only in what cannot be hindered and is in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, happy, safe from harm, generous in spirit, and pious. He will be thankful to God for all things. He will find no fault with anything outside his power, nor will he blame any of those things. But if he believes that his good and his interest lie in external things, outside the power of his will, he will inevitably be hindered and obstructed. He will be a slave to those who have power over the things he desires and fears. He will inevitably be impious because he believes that God harms him. He will be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him. And he will inevitably be abject and petty.
See Schweig.'s note on the text. By the Galilaeans, Epictetus probably means the Christians. Antoninus also mentions their stubbornness (xi. 3). Epictetus, a contemporary of St. Paul, knew little about the Christians. He knew only some examples of their stubborn adherence to the new faith and the fanatical behavior of some converts. Reliable evidence proves that there were wild fanatics among the early Christians. It also proves that there have always been such fanatics, and that there are still such people today. But the misuse of doctrines or religious opinions is no argument against them. Experience shows that even the best things can be distorted, misunderstood, and misused.
'This agrees with Eph. v. 20: "Giving thanks always for all things to God."' Mrs. Carter. The wording is the same in both, except that the Apostle uses εὐχαριστοῦντες and Epictetus uses χάριν ἔχον.
See Schweig.'s note.
What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (comprehended) these things, from living with a light heart and bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting every thing which can happen, and enduring that which has already happened? Would you have me to bear poverty? Come and you will know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well the part of a poor man. Would you have me to possess power? Let me have power, and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment? Wherever I shall go, there it will be well with me; for here also where I am, it was not because of the place that it was well with me, but because of my opinions which I shall carry off with me: for neither can any man deprive me of them; but my opinions alone are mine and they cannot be taken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wherever I may be and whatever I am doing. But now it is time to die. Why do you say to die? Make no tragedy show of the thing, but speak of it as it is: it is now time for the matter (of the body) to be resolved into the things out of which it was composed. And what is the formidable thing here? what is going to perish of the things which are in the universe? what new thing or wondrous is going to happen? Is it for this reason that a tyrant is formidable? Is it for this reason that the guards appear to have swords which are large and sharp? Say this to others; but I have considered about all these things; no man has power over me. I have been made free; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a slave. I have a proper person to assert my freedom; I have proper judges. (I say) are you not the master of my body? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my property? What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my exile or of my chains? Well, from all these things and all the poor body itself I depart at your bidding, when you please. Make trial of your power, and you will know how far it reaches.
What prevents someone who clearly understands these distinctions from living lightheartedly and bearing the reins easily? Why not calmly await whatever may happen and endure whatever has already happened? Would you have me bear poverty? Come, and you will see what poverty is like when it finds someone who can play the poor man well. Would you have me hold power? Let me have power, along with the trouble it brings. What about exile? Wherever I go, I will be well off. Even here, it was not the place that made me well off. It was my opinions, which I will take with me. No one can take them from me. My opinions alone are mine, and they cannot be taken away. As long as I have them, I am content, wherever I am and whatever I do. But now it is time to die. Why call it dying? Do not make a tragedy of it. Speak of it as it is: the body's matter must now return to the elements that made it up. What is so frightening about that? What part of the universe is going to perish? What new or wondrous thing is going to happen? Is that why a tyrant is frightening? Is that why his guards seem to carry large, sharp swords? Tell that to others. I have thought about all these things, and no one has power over me. I have been set free. I know the tyrant's commands, and no one can lead me as a slave now. I have someone qualified to assert my freedom, and I have qualified judges. I say: are you not master of my body? What does that matter to me? Are you not master of my property? What does that matter to me? Are you not master of my exile or my chains? Well, at your command, whenever you please, I leave all these things behind, even this poor body itself. Test your power, and you will learn how far it reaches.
He says the body will break down into the things that make it up. None of them will perish. As he has said elsewhere, the soul will return to him who gave it (iii. 13. note 4). But I do not think he means that the soul will continue to have a separate consciousness.
καρπιστήν, see iv. 1. 113.
Whom then can I still fear? Those who are over the bedchamber? Lest they should do, what? Shut me out? If they find that I wish to enter, let them shut me out. Why then do you go to the doors? Because I think it befits me, while the play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are you not shut out? Because unless some one allows me to go in, I do not choose to go in, but am always content with that which happens; for I think that what God chooses is better than what I choose. I will attach myself as a minister and follower to him; I have the same movements (pursuits) as he has, I have the same desires; in a word, I have the same will (συνθέλω). There is no shutting out for me, but for those who would force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in? Because I know that nothing good is distributed within to those who enter. But when I hear any man called fortunate because he is honoured by Caesar, I say, what does he happen to get? A province (the government of a province). Does he also obtain an opinion such as he ought? The office of a Prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office well? Why do I still strive to enter (Caesar's chamber)? A man scatters dried figs and nuts: the children seize them, and fight with one another; men do not, for they think them to be a small matter. But if a man should throw about shells, even the children do not seize them. Provinces are distributed: let children look to that. Money is distributed: let children look to that. Praetorships, consulships are distributed: let children scramble for them, let them be shut out, beaten, kiss the hands of the giver, of the slaves: but to me these are only dried figs and nuts. What then? If you fail to get them, while Caesar is scattering them about, do not be troubled: if a dried fig come into your lap, take it and eat it; for so far you may value even a fig. But if I shall stoop down and turn another over, or be turned over by another, and shall flatter those who have got into (Caesar's) chamber, neither is a dried fig worth the trouble, nor any thing else of the things which are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me not to think good.
Who can I still fear, then? The men in charge of Caesar’s bedchamber? What could they do? Shut me out? If they find that I want to enter, let them shut me out. Why, then, do I go to the doors? Because I think it is right to take part in the game while it lasts. How, then, am I not shut out? Because I do not choose to enter unless someone lets me in. I am always content with what happens, because I think what God chooses is better than what I choose. I will devote myself to him as his servant and follower. I pursue what he pursues, and I desire what he desires. In short, I share his will (συνθέλω). I cannot be shut out. Only those who would force their way in can be shut out. Why, then, don’t I force my way in? Because I know that nothing good is handed out inside to those who enter. When I hear someone called fortunate because Caesar honors him, I ask, what does he actually get? The governorship of a province. Does he also gain the right judgment? The office of a Prefect. Does he also gain the ability to use his office well? Why should I still struggle to enter Caesar’s chamber? A man scatters dried figs and nuts. Children grab them and fight over them. Grown men do not, because they think the prizes are trivial. But if a man scatters shells, even children do not grab them. Governorships are handed out: let children attend to them. Money is handed out: let children attend to it. Praetorships and consulships are handed out: let children scramble for them. Let them be shut out and beaten. Let them kiss the hands of the giver and of the slaves. But to me these are only dried figs and nuts. What follows? If Caesar is scattering these things and you fail to get them, do not be troubled. If a dried fig lands in your lap, take it and eat it. You may value even a fig that much. But suppose I must stoop down and knock someone else over, or be knocked over myself. Suppose I must flatter those who have entered Caesar’s chamber. No dried fig is worth that trouble. Nor is anything else that is not good, which the philosophers have persuaded me not to regard as good.
See i. 19. note 6.
'Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt,' Matthew xxvi. 39. Mrs. Carter. 'Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be perfect, when our will is lost and resolved up into his; when we rest in his will as our end, as being itself most just and right and good.' Bp. Butler, Sermon on the Love of God.
Show me the swords of the guards. See how big they are, and how sharp. What then do these big and sharp swords do? They kill. And what does a fever do? Nothing else. And what else a (falling) tile? Nothing else. Would you then have me to wonder at these things and worship them, and go about as the slave of all of them? I hope that this will not happen: but when I have once learned that every thing which has come into existence must also go out of it, that the universe may not stand still nor be impeded, I no longer consider it any difference whether a fever shall do it or a tile, or a soldier. But if a man must make a comparison between these things, I know that the soldier will do it with less trouble (to me), and quicker. When then I neither fear any thing which a tyrant can do to me, nor desire any thing which he can give, why do I still look on with wonder (admiration)? Why am I still confounded? Why do I fear the guards? Why am I pleased if he speaks to me in a friendly way, and receives me, and why do I tell others how he spoke to me? Is he a Socrates, is he a Diogenes that his praise should be a proof of what I am? Have I been eager to imitate his morals? But I keep up the play and go to him, and serve him so long as he does not bid me to do any thing foolish or unreasonable. But if he says to me, Go and bring Leon of Salamis, I say to him, Seek another, for I am no longer playing. (The tyrant says): Lead him away (to prison). I follow; that is part of the play. But your head will be taken off—Does the tyrant's head always remain where it is, and the heads of you who obey him?—But you will be cast out unburied?—If the corpse is I, I shall be cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more properly according as the fact is, and do not think of frightening me. These things are formidable to children and fools. But if any man has once entered a philosopher's school and knows not what he is, he deserves to be full of fear and to flatter those whom afterwards he used to flatter; (and) if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh nor bones nor sinews (νεῦρα), but he is that which makes use of these parts of the body and governs them and follows (understands) the appearances of things.
Show me the guards' swords. Look how big and sharp they are. What do these big, sharp swords do? They kill. And what does a fever do? Nothing else. And what does a falling tile do? Nothing else. Would you have me marvel at these things, worship them, and go about as a slave to them all? I hope not. I have learned that everything that comes into existence must also pass out of existence. Otherwise, the universe would stand still or be held back. So I no longer see any difference between being killed by a fever, a tile, or a soldier. But if I must compare them, I know the soldier will kill me more quickly and with less trouble. I fear nothing a tyrant can do to me, and I desire nothing he can give me. So why do I still look at him with admiration? Why am I still flustered? Why do I fear the guards? Why am I pleased if he speaks to me in a friendly way and receives me? And why do I tell others how he spoke to me? Is he a Socrates or a Diogenes, so that his praise proves what I am? Have I been eager to imitate his morals? But I keep playing my part. I go to the tyrant and serve him as long as he does not order me to do anything foolish or unreasonable. But if he says to me, Go and bring Leon of Salamis, I say, Find someone else. I am no longer playing. The tyrant says, Lead him away to prison. I follow. That is part of the play. But your head will be cut off. Does the tyrant's head always stay where it is? Do the heads of those who obey him? But you will be thrown out unburied. If the corpse is me, I will be thrown out. But if I am not the corpse, speak more accurately and don't imagine you can frighten me. These things frighten children and fools. But suppose a man has entered a philosopher's school and still does not know what he is. He deserves to be full of fear and to flatter those whom he later used to flatter. He also deserves this if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh, bones, or sinews (νεῦρα). Rather, he is what uses and governs these parts of the body and understands how things appear.
See iv. 1. note 59.
I do not understand the meaning of ὕστερον. It may perhaps mean 'after leaving the school.' See Schweig.'s note.
Here Epictetus acknowledges that there is some power in a person that uses, directs, and governs the body. He does not say what this power is or what he believes it to be. "Upon the whole then our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move with." Butler's Analogy, chap. i.
Yes, but this talk makes us despise the laws—And what kind of talk makes men more obedient to the laws who employ such talk? And the things which are in the power of a fool are not law. And yet see how this talk makes us disposed as we ought to be even to these men (fools); since it teaches us to claim in opposition to them none of the things in which they are able to surpass us. This talk teaches us as to the body to give it up, as to property to give that up also, as to children, parents, brothers, to retire from these, to give up all; it only makes an exception of the opinions, which even Zeus has willed to be the select property of every man. What transgression of the laws is there here, what folly? Where you are superior and stronger, there I gave way to you on the other hand, where I am superior, do you yield to me; for I have studied (cared for) this, and you have not. It is your study to live in houses with floors formed of various stones, how your slaves and dependents shall serve you, how you shall wear fine clothing, have many hunting men, lute players, and tragic actors. Do I claim any of these? have you made any study of opinions, and of your own rational faculty? Do you know of what parts it is composed, how they are brought together, how they are connected, what powers it has, and of what kind? Why then are you vexed, if another who has made it his study, has the advantage over you in these things? But these things are the greatest. And who hinders you from being employed about these things and looking after them? And who has a better stock of books, of leisure, of persons to aid you? Only turn your mind at last to these things, attend, if it be only a short time, to your own ruling faculty (ἡγεμονικόν): consider what this is that you possess, and whence it came, this which uses all other (faculties), and tries them, and selects and rejects. But so long as you employ yourself about externals you will possess them (externals) as no man else does; but you will have this (the ruling faculty) such as you choose to have it, sordid and neglected.
Yes, but this teaching makes us despise the laws. What teaching makes those who use it more obedient to the laws? And the things a fool controls are not law. Yet see how this teaching makes us behave as we should, even toward fools. It teaches us not to claim anything in which they can surpass us. It teaches us to give up our bodies and our property. It teaches us to withdraw from our children, parents, and brothers, and give up everything. It makes an exception only for our opinions, which even Zeus has willed to be each person’s exclusive property. What violation of the laws is there in this? What folly? Where you are superior and stronger, I give way to you. In turn, where I am superior, you should give way to me. For I have studied these matters, and you have not. You concern yourself with living in houses with floors made of different stones. You concern yourself with how your slaves and dependents serve you, and how to wear fine clothing. You want many hunters, lute players, and tragic actors. Do I claim any of these? Have you studied opinions and your own rational faculty? Do you know what parts it has, how they are joined and connected, and what powers it has? Do you know what kind of powers they are? Why, then, are you annoyed if someone who has studied these things has an advantage over you in them? But these things are the greatest. Who prevents you from working on them and caring for them? And who has a better supply of books, more leisure, or more people to help you? At last, turn your mind to these things. Pay attention, if only for a short time, to your own ruling faculty (ἡγεμονικόν). Consider what this faculty is and where it came from. It uses all your other faculties, tests them, and selects or rejects them. But as long as you devote yourself to external things, you will possess them as no one else does. Yet your ruling faculty will be just as you choose to make it, sordid and neglected.
He says that a fool's will does not make law. Unfortunately, it does, if we use the word law in its strict sense. In that sense, a law is a general command from a person, such as an absolute king. That person has the power to enforce the command on those to whom it is addressed. If not, the person has the power to punish them for disobeying it. In this strict sense, a command can be law whether it is wise or foolish, good or bad. But Epictetus does not use the word 'law' in this strict sense.
The word λιφοστρώτοις means what we call Mosaic floors or pavements. The word λιφόστρωτον appears in John xix. 13 and is translated as 'pavement' in our version.
Epictetus often uses this term (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), as does M. Antoninus (i. 26. 15. etc). Here Epictetus defines or describes it as the faculty by which we reflect, judge, and decide. No other animal has this faculty. Many men neglect it, and it is weak because they neglect it. But it should still be what its nature makes it: a faculty that "plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification" (Bp. Butler, Preface to his Sermons). Cicero (De Fin. ix. ii. 11) expresses the words in the text (ἐκλεγόμενον, ἀπεκλεγόμενον, selection and rejection) as 'eligere' and 'rejicere.'