Book 4, Chapter 5

Against Quarrelsome and Fierce People

8 min

The wise and good man neither himself fights with any person, nor does he allow another, so far as he can prevent it. And an example of this as well as of all other things is proposed to us in the life of Socrates, who not only himself on all occasions avoided fights (quarrels), but would not allow even others to quarrel. See in Xenophon's Symposium how many quarrels he settled, how further he endured Thrasymachus and Polus and Callicles; how he tolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son who attempted to confute him and to cavil with him. For he remembered well that no man has in his power another man's ruling principle. He wished therefore for nothing else than that which was his own. And what is this? Not that this or that man may act according to nature; for that is a thing which belongs to another; but that while others are doing their own acts, as they choose, he may never the less be in a condition conformable to nature and live in it, only doing what is his own to the end that others also may be in a state conformable to nature. For this is the object always set before him by the wise and good man. Is it to be commander (a praetor) of an army? No: but if it is permitted him, his object is in this matter to maintain his own ruling principle. Is it to marry? No; but if marriage is allowed to him, in this matter his object is to maintain himself in a condition conformable to nature. But if he would have his son not to do wrong or his wife, he would have what belongs to another not to belong to another: and to be instructed is this, to learn what things are a man's own and what belongs to another. How then is there left any place for fighting (quarrelling) to a man who has this opinion (which he ought to have)? Is he surprised at any thing which happens, and does it appear new to him? Does he not expect that which comes from the bad to be worse and more grievous than what actually befals him? And does he not reckon as pure gain whatever they (the bad) may do which falls short of extreme wickedness? Such a person has reviled you. Great thanks to him for not having struck you. But he has struck me also. Great thanks that he did not wound you. But he wounded me also. Great thanks that he did not kill you. For when did he learn or in what school that man is a tame animal, that men love one another, that an act of injustice is a great harm to him who does it. Since then he has not learned this and is not convinced of it, why shall he not follow that which seems to be for his own interest? Your neighbour has thrown stones. Have you then done any thing wrong? But the things in the house have been broken. Are you then a utensil? No; but a free power of will. What then is given to you (to do) in answer to this? If you are like a wolf, you must bite in return, and throw more stones. But if you consider what is proper for a man, examine your storehouse, see with what faculties you came into the world. Have you the disposition of a wild beast, have you the disposition of revenge for an injury? When is a horse wretched? When he is deprived of his natural faculties, not when he cannot crow like a cock, but when he cannot run. When is a dog wretched? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot track his game. Is then a man also unhappy in this way, not because he cannot strangle lions or embrace statues, for he did not come into the world in the possession of certain powers from nature for this purpose, but because he has lost his probity and his fidelity? People ought to meet and lament such a man for the misfortunes into which he has fallen; not indeed to lament because a man has been born or has died, but because it has happened to him in his life time to have lost the things which are his own, not that which he received from his father, not his land and house, and his inn, and his slaves; for not one of these things is a man's own, but all belong to others, are servile, and subject to account (ὑπεύθυνα), at different times given to different persons by those who have them in their power: but I mean the things which belong to him as a man, the marks (stamps) in his mind with which he came into the world, such as we seek also on coins, and if we find them, we approve of the coins, and if we do not find the marks, we reject them. What is the stamp on this Sestertius? The stamp of Trajan. Present it. It is the stamp of Nero. Throw it away: it cannot be accepted, it is counterfeit. So also in this case: What is [11] the stamp of his opinions? It is gentleness, a sociable disposition, a tolerant temper, a disposition to mutual affection. Produce these qualities. I accept them: I consider this man a citizen, I accept him as a neighbour, a companion in my voyages. Only see that he has not Nero's stamp. Is he passionate, is he full of resentment, is he fault-finding? If the whim seizes him, does he break the heads of those who come in his way? (If so), why then did you say that he is a man? Is every thing judged (determined) by the bare form? If that is so, say that the form in wax is an apple and has the smell and the taste of an apple. But the external figure is not enough: neither then is the nose enough and the eyes to make the man, but he must have the opinions of a man. Here is a man who does not listen to reason, who does not know when he is refuted: he is an ass: in another man the sense of shame is become dead: he is good for nothing, he is any thing rather than a man. This man seeks whom he may meet and kick or bite, so that he is not even a sheep or an ass, but a kind of wild beast.

The wise and good man neither quarrels with anyone nor lets others quarrel, as far as he can prevent it. Socrates' life offers us an example of this, as it does of everything else. He always avoided quarrels himself, and he would not let others quarrel either. See in Xenophon's Symposium how many quarrels he settled. See, too, how he put up with Thrasymachus, Polus, and Callicles. See how he tolerated his wife and his son, who tried to refute him and find fault with him. He remembered well that no one controls another person's ruling principle. So he wanted only what was his own. What was that? Not for this or that person to act according to nature, because that depends on someone else. Instead, he wanted to remain in a condition that accorded with nature and to live accordingly, while others did as they chose. He wanted to do only what was his own to do, so that others might also live according to nature. This is always the wise and good man's goal. Is his goal to command an army as a praetor? No. But if he is allowed to command one, his goal is to preserve his own ruling principle while doing so. Is his goal to marry? No. But if he is allowed to marry, his goal is to remain in a condition that accords with nature. If he wanted his son or his wife not to do wrong, he would want control over what belongs to another. And to be educated is to learn what is one's own and what belongs to another. How can a man who holds this view, as he should, have any reason to quarrel? Is he surprised by anything that happens? Does it seem new to him? Doesn't he expect worse and more painful things from bad people than what actually happens to him? Doesn't he count anything short of extreme wickedness from them as a clear gain? Someone has insulted you. Thank him for not hitting you. But he hit me too. Thank him for not wounding you. But he wounded me too. Thank him for not killing you. When did he learn, or in what school, that a human being is a gentle animal? Where did he learn that people love one another, and that injustice does great harm to the person who commits it? Since he has not learned this and is not convinced of it, why shouldn't he follow what seems to serve his own interests? Your neighbour has thrown stones. Have you done anything wrong? But things in the house have been broken. Are you a household object? No, you are a free power of will. What, then, can you do in response? If you are like a wolf, you must bite back and throw more stones. But if you consider what is proper for a human being, examine your storehouse. See what abilities you came into the world with. Do you have the nature of a wild beast? Do you have a tendency to take revenge for an injury? When is a horse miserable? When it loses its natural abilities. Not when it cannot crow like a rooster, but when it cannot run. When is a dog miserable? Not when it cannot fly, but when it cannot track its game. Isn't a man unhappy in the same way? It is not because he cannot strangle lions or embrace statues. Nature did not give him special powers for those purposes when he came into the world. Rather, he is unhappy because he has lost his integrity and faithfulness. People ought to gather and mourn such a man for the misfortunes that have befallen him. They should not mourn because a man has been born or has died, but because, during his life, he has lost what is his own. I do not mean what he received from his father, or his land, his house, his inn, and his slaves. None of these things is a man's own. All belong to others. They are subject to another's control and must be accounted for. Those who control them give them to different people at different times. I mean the things that belong to him as a human being, the marks stamped on his mind when he came into the world. We look for marks on coins too. If we find them, we accept the coins. If we do not, we reject them. What is the stamp on this Sestertius? Trajan's stamp. Offer it. It bears Nero's stamp. Throw it away. It cannot be accepted. It is counterfeit. It is the same here. What is [11] the stamp of his opinions? Gentleness, sociability, patience, and mutual affection. Show me these qualities. I accept them. I regard this man as a citizen, and I accept him as a neighbour and a companion on my voyages. Just make sure he does not bear Nero's stamp. Is he quick to anger, full of resentment, and always finding fault? If the whim strikes him, does he break the heads of those who get in his way? If so, why did you call him a man? Is everything judged by its outward shape alone? If so, call a wax model of an apple an apple, and say it smells and tastes like one. But outward shape is not enough. A nose and eyes are not enough to make a man either. He must have the opinions of a man. Here is someone who will not listen to reason and cannot recognize when he has been refuted. He is an ass. Another has lost all sense of shame. He is good for nothing, anything but a man. This one looks for anyone he can kick or bite. He is not even a sheep or an ass, but a kind of wild beast.

See ii. 12. 15.

See Xenophon, Memorabilia, ii. 2.

The word στρατηγῆσαι may be translated either way.

See iv. 1. 77 and the use of θαυμάζειν.

See ii. 10. 14, iv. 1. 120. Similarly, Plato says (Legg. vi.) that a properly educated man is usually the most divine and tamest of animals. Upton. On doing wrong to another, see Plato's Crito, and Epictetus iv. 1. 167.

See iii. 1. 40.

Like Hercules and Diogenes. See iii. 12. 2.

This refers to a fragment from Euripides’ Cresphontes, which Cicero translated into Latin Iambics (Tusc. Disp. i. 48):

The word is πανδοκεῖον, which Schweig. says he does not understand. He thinks the word may be corrupt, unless it means the inn where a man without a home lives. I do not understand the word here.

See Schweig.'s note on the word τετράσσαρον in the text.

He says τὸ κήρινον, which Mrs. Carter translates as 'a piece of wax.' Perhaps it means 'a piece of wax in the form of an apple.'

What then? would you have me to be despised?—By whom? by those who know you? and how shall those who know you despise a man who is gentle and modest? Perhaps you mean by those who do not know you? What is that to you? For no other artisan cares for the opinion of those who know not his art.—But they will be more hostile to me for this reason.—Why do you say 'me'? Can any man injure your will, or prevent you from using in a natural way the appearances which are presented to you? In no way can he. Why then are you still disturbed and why do you choose to show yourself afraid? And why do you not come forth and proclaim that you are at peace with all men whatever they may do, and laugh at those chiefly who think that they can harm you? These slaves, you can say, know not either who I am, nor where lies my good or my evil, because they have no access to the things which are mine.

What then? Would you have me be despised? By whom? By those who know you? How could those who know you despise someone who is gentle and modest? Perhaps you mean those who do not know you. What does their opinion matter to you? No other craftsman cares about the opinion of those who know nothing about his craft. But they will be more hostile to me for this reason. Why do you say 'me'? Can anyone harm your will or prevent you from responding naturally to the impressions you receive? Not at all. Why, then, are you still disturbed? Why do you choose to show fear? Why not come forward and declare that you are at peace with everyone, whatever they do? And why not laugh, above all, at those who think they can harm you? You can say, These slaves know neither who I am nor where my good or evil lies. They have no access to what is mine.

The word is ἐπιφύησονται, which is not a Greek form. Schweig. makes no comment on it and translates it as 'adorientur.' The form should be ἐπιφύσονται. See Stephens' Lexicon on the word ἐπιφύομαι. The word is probably corrupted.

Mrs. Carter translates φοβερόν as 'formidable,' and the Latin translation uses 'formidabilem.' But the word cannot mean that here.

In this way also those who occupy a strong city mock the besiegers, (and say): What trouble these men are now taking for nothing: our wall is secure, we have food for a very long time, and all other resources. These are the things which make a city strong and impregnable: but nothing else than his opinions makes a man's soul impregnable. For what wall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or what possession is so safe, or what honour (rank, character) so free from assault (as a man's opinions)? All (other) things every where are perishable, easily taken by assault, and if any man in any way is attached to them, he must be disturbed, expect what is bad, he must fear, lament, find his desires disappointed, and fall into things which he would avoid. Then do we not choose to make secure the only means of safety which are offered to us, and do we not choose to withdraw ourselves from that which is perishable and servile and to labour at the things which are imperishable and by nature free; and do we not remember that no man either hurts another or does good to another, but that a man's opinion about each thing, is that which hurts him, is that which overturns him; this is fighting, this is civil discord, this is war? That which made Eteocles and Polynices enemies was nothing else than this opinion which they had about royal power, their opinion about exile, that the one is the extreme of evils, the other the greatest good. Now this is the nature of every man to seek the good, to avoid the bad; to consider him who deprives us of the one and involves us in the other an enemy and treacherous, even if he be a brother, or a son or a father. For nothing is more akin to us than the good: therefore if these things (externals) are good and evil, neither is a father a friend to sons, nor a brother to a brother, but all the world is every where full of enemies, treacherous men, and sycophants. But if the will (προαίρεσις, the purpose, the intention) being what it ought to be, is the only good; and if the will being such as it ought not to be, is the only evil, where is there any strife, where is there reviling? about what? about the things which do not concern us? and strife with whom? with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those who are deceived about the chief things?

In the same way, people inside a well-defended city mock those besieging it. They say: What trouble these men are taking for nothing. Our walls are secure, we have food for a very long time, and we have all the other supplies we need. These are the things that make a city strong and impossible to capture. But only a person’s opinions make his soul impossible to conquer. For what wall is as strong, what body as tough, or what possession as secure? What honor, rank, or reputation is as safe from attack? Everything else, everywhere, can perish and is easily attacked. If a person is attached to any of these things, he is bound to be troubled. He must expect the worst, fear and mourn, have his desires frustrated, and encounter what he wishes to avoid. Why, then, do we not secure the only means of safety available to us? Why do we not turn away from what can perish and is servile? Why do we not work at what cannot perish and is free by nature? And why do we not remember that no one either harms or benefits another? It is a person’s opinion about each thing that harms and overthrows him. This is what causes fighting, civil strife, and war. What made Eteocles and Polynices enemies was simply their opinion about royal power and exile. They believed exile to be the worst of evils and royal power the greatest good. Now it is natural for every person to seek good and avoid evil. It is also natural to regard someone who deprives us of good and brings evil upon us as an enemy and a traitor. This is true even if he is a brother, a son, or a father. For nothing is closer to us than what is good. So, if these external things are good and evil, a father is no friend to his sons, nor a brother to his brother. Instead, the whole world is full of enemies, traitors, and flatterers. But suppose that a will (προαίρεσις, meaning purpose or intention) is good only when it is as it should be. And suppose that a will as it should not be is the only evil. Where, then, is there any strife or abuse? What would we fight about? Things that do not concern us? And with whom would we fight? With the ignorant and unhappy, who are mistaken about the most important things?

Eteocles and Polynices were the sons of the unfortunate Oedipus. They fought over the kingship of Thebes and killed each other. Their quarrel is the subject of the Seven against Thebes of Aeschylus and the Phoenissae of Euripides. See ii. 22. note 3.

'Every man in everything he does naturally acts upon the forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good.' Bp. Butler, Analogy, Chap. 2. The bishop's 'naturally' corresponds to Epictetus's φύσις.

Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and endured a very ill tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?) son. For in what did she show her bad temper? In pouring water on his head as much as she liked, and in trampling on the cake (sent to Socrates). And what is this to me, if I think that these things are nothing to me? But this is my business; and neither tyrant shall check my will nor a master; nor shall the many check me who am only one, nor shall the stronger check me who am the weaker; for this power of being free from check (hindrance) is given by God to every man. For these opinions make love in a house (family), concord in a state, among nations peace, and gratitude to God; they make a man in all things cheerful (confident) in externals as about things which belong to others, as about things which are of no value. We indeed are able to write and to read these things, and to praise them when they are read, but we do not even come near to being convinced of them. Therefore what is said of the Lacedaemonians, "Lions at home, but in Ephesus foxes," will fit in our case also, "Lions in the school, but out of it foxes."

Remembering this, Socrates managed his household and put up with a very bad-tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?) son. How did his wife show her bad temper? She poured water on his head whenever she pleased and trampled on the cake sent to him. But what does that matter to me, if I think it is nothing to me? My will is my own concern. Neither a tyrant nor a master can hinder it. The many cannot hinder me, though I am only one. Nor can the stronger hinder me, though I am weaker. For God has given everyone this power to be free from hindrance. These beliefs create love in a family, harmony in a state, peace among nations, and gratitude to God. They make a person cheerful in all circumstances, treating external things as another’s property, as things of no value. We can write and read these ideas, and praise them when they are read. But we are not even close to being convinced of them. So what is said of the Lacedaemonians, "Lions at home, but in Ephesus foxes," applies to us too: "Lions in the school, but out of it foxes."

Socrates' eldest son, Lamprocles, accused his mother, Xanthippe, of being so bad-tempered that no one could endure her (Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 2, 7). In this chapter, Xenophon records Socrates' conversation with his son about her. Diogenes Laertius (ii.) tells how Xanthippe poured water on Socrates' head. Seneca says it was dirty water (De Constantia, c. 18). Aelian (xi. 12) reports that Alcibiades sent Socrates a large, fine cake, which Xanthippe trampled underfoot. Socrates only laughed and said, Well then, you will not have your share of it. The philosopher showed that his philosophy was practical by enduring the torment of a very bad-tempered wife, one of the greatest misfortunes that can happen to a man. He also endured the trouble of a disobedient son.

This is one of Epictetus's wisest and noblest sayings.

See Aristophanes, the Peace, v. 1188:

ἔδει γὰρ ἡμᾶς σύλλογον ποιουμένους τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν εἰς ὅσ᾽ ἔρχεται κάκα. τὸν δ᾽ αὖ θανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαυμένον χαίροντας, εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων.

For we should gather to mourn a newborn child, knowing how many troubles await. But when someone dies and is free from suffering, we should rejoice and send them from the house with words of blessing.

πολλὰ γὰρ δὴ μὲ ἠδίκησαν, ὄντες οἴκοι μὲν λέοντες, ἐν μάχῃ δ' ἀλώπεκες.

For they have done me many wrongs. They are lions at home but foxes in battle.