Where Philosophy Begins

The beginning of philosophy to him at least who enters on it in the right way and by the door, is a consciousness of his own weakness and inability about necessary things. For we come into the world with no natural notion of a right angled triangle, or of a diesis (a quarter tone), or of a half tone; but we learn each of these things by a certain transmission according to art; and for this reason those who do not know them, do not think that they know them. But as to good and evil, and beautiful and ugly, and becoming and unbecoming, and happiness and misfortune, and proper and improper, and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do, who ever came into the world without having an innate idea of them? Wherefore we all use these names, and we endeavour to fit the preconceptions³⁰³ to the several cases (things) thus: he has done well, he has not done well; he has done as he ought, not as he ought; he has been unfortunate, he has been fortunate; he is unjust, he is just: who does not use these names? who among us defers the use of them till he has learned them, as he defers the use of the words about lines (geometrical figures) or sounds? And the cause of this is that we come into the world already taught as it were by nature some things on this matter (τόπον), and proceeding from these we have added to them self-conceit (οἴησιν).³⁰⁴ For why, a man says, do I not know the beautiful and the ugly? Have I not the notion of it? You have. Do I not adapt it to particulars? You do. Do I not then adapt it properly? In that lies the whole question; and conceit is added here. For beginning from these things which are admitted men proceed to that which is matter of dispute by means of unsuitable adaptation; for if they possessed this power of adaptation in addition to those things, what would hinder them from being perfect? But now since you think that you properly adapt the preconceptions to the particulars, tell me whence you derive this (assume that you do so). Because I think so. But it does not seem so to another, and he thinks that he also makes a proper adaptation; or does he not think so? He does think so. Is it possible then that both of you can properly apply the preconceptions to things about which you have contrary opinions? It is not possible. Can you then show us anything better towards adapting the preconceptions beyond your thinking that you do? Does the madman do any other things than the things which seem to him right? Is then this criterion sufficient for him also? It is not sufficient. Come then to something which is superior to seeming (τοῦ δοκεῖν). What is this?

For anyone who approaches philosophy rightly, entering by the door, the beginning is recognizing one's own weakness and inability in essential matters. We are not born with an idea of a right triangle, a diesis (a quarter tone), or a half tone. We learn each of these through instruction in a particular art. That is why people who do not know them do not think they do. But who is born without an innate idea of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, or what is fitting and unfitting? Who has no idea of happiness and misfortune, right and wrong, or what we should and should not do? That is why we all use these words. We try to apply our preconceptions³⁰³ to particular cases. We say: he did well, he did badly, he did what he should, he did what he should not. We say: he was unfortunate, he was fortunate, he is unjust, he is just. Who does not use these words? Who waits until he has learned them, as he waits to use words about geometrical figures or sounds? The reason is that we come into the world already taught, as it were, by nature about some of these matters (τόπον). Starting from these ideas, we add self-conceit (οἴησιν).³⁰⁴ A man says, “Why should I not know beauty and ugliness? Do I not have an idea of them?” You do. “Do I not apply it to particular cases?” You do. “Then do I not apply it correctly?” That is the whole question, and it is here that conceit enters. Starting from what everyone accepts, people reach disputed conclusions by applying their ideas incorrectly. If they could apply those ideas correctly as well as possess them, what would prevent them from being perfect? But since you think you apply your preconceptions correctly to particular cases, tell me why you assume that you do. “Because I think so.” But another person disagrees with you, and he thinks he applies them correctly too. Or does he not think so? He does. Can both of you correctly apply your preconceptions to things about which you hold opposite opinions? You cannot. Then can you offer us anything better than your own belief that you apply them correctly? Does a madman do anything other than what seems right to him? Is that standard sufficient for him too? It is not. So come to something better than what merely seems right (τοῦ δοκεῖν). What is it?

Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of the disagreement, and a condemnation and distrust of that which only 'seems,' and a certain investigation of that which 'seems' whether it 'seems' rightly, and a discovery of some rule (κανόνος), as we have discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and a carpenter's rule (or square) in the case of straight and crooked things.—This is the beginning of philosophy. Must we say that all things are right which seem so to all?³⁰⁵ And how is it possible that contradictions can be right?—Not all then, but all which seem to us to be right.—How more to you than those which seem right to the Syrians? why more than what seem right to the Egyptians? why more than what seems right to me or to any other man? Not at all more. What then 'seems' to every man is not sufficient for determining what 'is;' for neither in the case of weights or measures are we satisfied with the bare appearance, but in each case we have discovered a certain rule. In this matter then is there no rule superior to what 'seems'? And how is it possible that the most necessary things among men should have no sign (mark), and be incapable of being discovered? There is then some rule. And why then do we not seek the rule and discover it, and afterwards use it without varying from it, not even stretching out the finger without it?³⁰⁶ For this, I think, is that which when it is discovered cures of their madness those who use mere 'seeming' as a measure, and misuse it; so that for the future proceeding from certain things (principles) known and made clear we may use in the case of particular things the preconceptions which are distinctly fixed.

Notice that this is the beginning of philosophy. We see that people disagree with one another and ask what causes their disagreement. We reject and distrust what merely ‘seems’ right. We investigate whether what ‘seems’ right really is right. And we discover some standard (κανόνος), just as we have discovered a balance for weighing things and a carpenter’s rule (or square) for judging what is straight or crooked. This is the beginning of philosophy. Must we say that everything is right if it seems right to anyone?³⁰⁵ How can contradictory views be right? “Not everything, then, but everything that seems right to us.” Why should what seems right to you count more than what seems right to the Syrians? Why more than what seems right to the Egyptians? Why more than what seems right to me or anyone else? It should not count more at all. So what ‘seems’ right to each person is not enough to determine what ‘is’ right. When judging weights or measures, we are not satisfied with mere appearances. Instead, we have discovered a standard for each. Is there, then, no standard in this matter that is better than what ‘seems’ right? How could the things people need most have no mark by which to judge them and be impossible to discover? There must be some standard. Why, then, do we not seek and discover that standard? Then we could follow it without deviation, not even lifting a finger without it.³⁰⁶ I think that discovering this standard cures people of the madness of using mere ‘seeming’ as a measure and misusing it. Then, starting from principles that are known and clear, we can apply firmly established preconceptions to particular cases.

What is the matter presented to us about which we are inquiring? Pleasure (for example). Subject it to the rule, throw it into the balance. Ought the good to be such a thing that it is fit that we have confidence in it? Yes. And in which we ought to confide? It ought to be. Is it fit to trust to any thing which is insecure? No. Is then pleasure any thing secure? No. Take it then and throw it out of the scale, and drive it far away from the place of good things. But if you are not sharp-sighted, and one balance is not enough for you, bring another. Is it fit to be elated over what is good? Yes. Is it proper then to be elated over present pleasure? See that you do not say that it is proper; but if you do, I shall then not think you worthy even of the balance.³⁰⁷ Thus things are tested and weighed when the rules are ready. And to philosophize is this, to examine and confirm the rules; and then to use them when they are known is the act of a wise and good man.³⁰⁸

What are we examining? Pleasure, for example. Test it against the rule. Put it on the scales. Should we have confidence in what is good? Yes. Should we be able to rely on it? Yes. Should we rely on anything that is unstable? No. Is pleasure stable? No. Then take it off the scales and throw it far away from the place of good things. But if you cannot see clearly and one set of scales is not enough, bring another. Is it right to feel elated about what is good? Yes. Then is it right to feel elated about pleasure you are experiencing now? Take care not to say yes. If you do, I will not think you worthy even of the scales.³⁰⁷ This is how things are tested and weighed when the rules are ready. To philosophize is to examine and confirm the rules. Once the rules are known, using them is the act of a wise and good person.³⁰⁸