Book 2, Chapter 12

Debate or Discussion

4 min

What things a man must learn in order to be able to apply the art of disputation, has been accurately shown by our philosophers (the Stoics); but with respect to the proper use of the things, we are entirely without practice. Only give to any of us, whom you please, an illiterate man to discuss with, and he can not discover how to deal with the man. But when he has moved the man a little, if he answers beside the purpose, he does not know how to treat him, but he then either abuses or ridicules him, and says, He is an illiterate man; it is not possible to do any thing with him. Now a guide, when he has found a man out of the road leads him into the right way: he does not ridicule or abuse him and then leave him. Do you also show the illiterate man the truth, and you will see that he follows. But so long as you do not show him the truth, do not ridicule him, but rather feel your own incapacity.

Our philosophers, the Stoics, have explained precisely what a person must learn to argue skillfully. But we have no practice at all in using what we have learned properly. Choose any one of us and give him an uneducated man to argue with. He cannot figure out how to deal with him. He may get the man talking, but if the man answers off the point, he does not know how to respond. Instead, he insults or mocks him and says, “He is an uneducated man. There is nothing to be done with him.” Now, when a guide finds a man who has lost his way, he leads him back to the right path. He does not mock or insult him and then leave him. You too should show the uneducated man the truth, and you will see that he follows. But as long as you do not show him the truth, do not mock him. Instead, recognize your own inability.

How then did Socrates act? He used to compel his adversary in disputation to bear testimony to him, and he wanted no other witness. Therefore he could say, 'I care not for other witnesses, but I am always satisfied with the evidence (testimony) of my adversary, and I do not ask the opinion of others, but only the opinion of him who is disputing with me.' For he used to make the conclusions drawn from natural notions so plain that every man saw the contradiction (if it existed) and withdrew from it (thus): Does the envious man rejoice? By no means, but he is rather pained. Well, Do you think that envy is pain over evils? and what envy is there of evils? Therefore he made his adversary say that envy is pain over good things. Well then, would any man envy those who are nothing to him? By no means. Thus having completed the notion and distinctly fixed it he would go away without saying to his adversary, Define to me envy; and if the adversary had defined envy, he did not say, You have defined it badly, for the terms of the definition do not correspond to the thing defined—These are technical terms, and for this reason disagreeable and hardly intelligible to illiterate men, which terms we (philosophers) cannot lay aside. But that the illiterate man himself, who follows the appearances presented to him, should be able to concede any thing or reject it, we can never by the use of these terms move him to do. Accordingly being conscious of our own inability, we do not attempt the thing; at least such of us as have any caution do not. But the greater part and the rash, when they enter into such disputations, confuse themselves and confuse others; and finally abusing their adversaries and abused by them, they walk away.

How, then, did Socrates act? He would make the person arguing against him bear witness for him. He needed no other witness. So he could say, 'I do not care about other witnesses. I am always satisfied with the testimony of my opponent. I do not ask what others think, but only what the person arguing with me thinks.' He made the conclusions drawn from basic ideas so clear that everyone could see any contradiction and abandon it. He would ask: Does the envious person rejoice? Not at all. Rather, he feels pain. Well, do you think envy is pain at bad things? Who envies bad things? In this way, Socrates made his opponent say that envy is pain at good things. Well then, would anyone envy people who mean nothing to him? Not at all. Having fully developed the idea and made it clear, Socrates would leave without saying to his opponent, Define envy for me. And if his opponent had defined envy, Socrates did not say, Your definition is bad because its terms do not correspond to the thing defined. These are technical terms, and for that reason they are unpleasant and hardly intelligible to uneducated people. Yet we philosophers cannot do without them. We can never use these terms to lead an uneducated person to accept or reject anything for himself. He follows things as they appear to him. Because we are aware of our own inability, we do not attempt this, at least if we have any caution. But most of us are rash. When they enter such arguments, they confuse themselves and others. Finally, after insulting their opponents and being insulted in return, they walk away.

This is stated in Plato's Gorgias, p. 472, 474.

The word is ἔννοιαι, which Cicero says means the same as προλήψεις. Acad. Pr. ii. 10.

Xenophon (Mem. iii. 9, 8) states Socrates' idea of envy: 'it is the pain or vexation which men have at the prosperity of their friends, and that such are the only envious persons.' Bishop Butler gives a better definition, or at least a more complete description. 'Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with or superiority over others, with whom we may compare ourselves. There does not appear to be any other grief in the natural passion, but only that want which is implied in desire. However this may be so strong as to be the occasion of great grief. To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority, by the particular means of others being brought down to our level, or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see, that the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and which the unlawful one, envy, aims at is the same; namely, that equality or superiority: and consequently that to do mischief is not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end.' Sermons upon Human Nature, I.

I have left out the words ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐκίνησε τον πλήσιον. I see no sense in them, and the text is clear without them.

I am not sure I have correctly understood ἐξ ὧν δὲ αὐτός at the beginning of this sentence.

Now this was the first and chief peculiarity of Socrates, never to be irritated in argument, never to utter any thing abusive, any thing insulting, but to bear with abusive persons and to put an end to the quarrel. If you would know what great power he had in this way, read the Symposium of Xenophon, and you will see how many quarrels he put an end to. Hence with good reason in the poets also this power is most highly praised,

The first and most important thing about Socrates was that he never became angry during an argument. He never said anything abusive or insulting. Instead, he put up with abusive people and ended the quarrel. If you want to know how great his power was in this respect, read Xenophon's Symposium. You will see how many quarrels he ended. For this reason, the poets, too, rightly praise this power above all others,

Xenophon's Symposium or Banquet survives. Compare Epictetus, iii. 16, 5, and iv. c. 5, the beginning.

Quickly with skill he settles great disputes. Hesiod, Theogony, v. 87.

He quickly and skillfully settles great disputes. Hesiod, Theogony, verse 87.

Well then; the matter is not now very safe, and particularly at Rome; for he who attempts to do it, must not do it in a corner, you may be sure, but must go to a man of consular rank, if it so happen, or to a rich man, and ask him, Can you tell me, Sir, to whose care you have entrusted your horses? I can tell you. Have you entrusted them to any person indifferently and to one who has no experience of horses?—By no means.—Well then; can you tell me to whom you entrust your gold or silver things or your vestments? I don't entrust even these to any one indifferently. Well; your own body, have you already considered about entrusting the care of it to any person?—Certainly.—To a man of experience, I suppose, and one acquainted with the aliptic, or with the healing art?—Without doubt.—Are these the best things that you have, or do you also possess something else which is better than all these?—What kind of a thing do you mean?—That I mean which makes use of these things, and tests each of them, and deliberates.—Is it the soul that you mean?—You think right, for it is the soul that I mean.—In truth I do think that the soul is a much better thing than all the others which I possess.—Can you then show us in what way you have taken care of the soul? for it is not likely that you, who are so wise a man and have a reputation in the city, inconsiderately and carelessly allow the most valuable thing that you possess to be neglected and to perish.—Certainly not.—But have you taken care of the soul yourself; and have you learned from another to do this, or have you discovered the means yourself?—Here comes the danger that in the first place he may say, What is this to you, my good man, who are you? Next, if you persist in troubling him, there is danger that he may raise his hands and give you blows. I was once myself also an admirer of this mode of instruction until I fell into these dangers.

Well, this is not very safe now, especially in Rome. Anyone who tries it must not do it in a corner, you can be sure. He must approach a man of consular rank, perhaps, or a rich man, and ask him, “Can you tell me, sir, whom you have put in charge of your horses?” “I can.” “Did you entrust them to just anyone, even someone who knew nothing about horses?” “Certainly not.” “Well then, can you tell me whom you entrust with your gold and silver objects or your clothes?” “I don’t entrust even those to just anyone.” “Well, have you also considered whom to entrust with the care of your own body?” “Certainly.” “To an experienced man, I suppose, one skilled in massage and anointing, or in medicine?” “Without a doubt.” “Are these the best things you have, or do you possess something better than all of them?” “What do you mean?” “I mean the thing that uses all these, examines each of them, and thinks things over.” “Do you mean the soul?” “You are right. I mean the soul.” “Indeed, I do think the soul is much better than everything else I possess.” “Can you show us, then, how you have cared for your soul? You are a wise man with a reputation in the city. Surely you would not thoughtlessly and carelessly allow your most valuable possession to be neglected and destroyed.” “Certainly not.” “But have you cared for your soul yourself? And did you learn how from someone else, or discover the means yourself?” Here is the danger. First, he may say, “What is it to you, my good man? Who are you?” Then, if you keep bothering him, he may raise his hands and strike you. I too once admired this way of teaching, until I ran into these dangers myself.

The aliptic art is the practice of anointing and rubbing the body, one of the best ways to keep it healthy. The iatric, or healing, art restores a diseased body to health. The aliptic art is also equivalent to the gymnastic art, or the practice of preparing for physical exercise. Exercise also helps preserve the body's health when it is good and moderate.

Epictetus speaking about himself and his experience in Rome.