What Is the Nature (Ἡ ΟΥ̓ΣΊΑ) of Good?[276]

God is beneficial. But the Good also is beneficial.²⁷⁷ It is consistent then that where the nature of God is, there also the nature of the good should be. What then is the nature of God?²⁷⁸ Flesh? Certainly not. An estate in land? By no means. Fame? No. Is it intelligence, knowledge, right reason? Yes. Herein then simply seek the nature of the good; for I suppose that you do not seek it in a plant. No. Do you seek it in an irrational animal? No. If then you seek it in a rational animal, why do you still seek it any where except in the superiority of rational over irrational animals?²⁷⁹ Now plants have not even the power of using appearances, and for this reason you do not apply the term good to them. The good then requires the use of appearances. Does it require this use only? For if you say that it requires this use only, say that the good, and that happiness and unhappiness are in irrational animals also. But you do not say this, and you do right; for if they possess even in the highest degree the use of appearances, yet they have not the faculty of understanding the use of appearances; and there is good reason for this, for they exist for the purpose of serving others, and they exercise no superiority. For the ass, I suppose, does not exist for any superiority over others. No; but because we had need of a back which is able to bear something; and in truth we had need also of his being able to walk, and for this reason he received also the faculty of making use of appearances, for other wise he would not have been able to walk. And here then the matter stopped. For if he had also received the faculty of comprehending the use of appearances, it is plain that consistently with reason he would not then have beer. subjected to us, nor would he have done us these services, but he would have been equal to us and like to us.²⁷⁶

God is beneficial. But the good is beneficial too.²⁷⁷ So it follows that the nature of the good should be found wherever the nature of God is found. What, then, is the nature of God?²⁷⁸ Flesh? Certainly not. An estate in land? By no means. Fame? No. Is it intelligence, knowledge, and sound reasoning? Yes. So look for the nature of the good there. For I assume you do not look for it in a plant. No. Do you look for it in an irrational animal? No. If you look for it in a rational animal, why look anywhere but in what makes rational animals superior to irrational ones?²⁷⁹ Plants cannot even use appearances, and that is why you do not call them good. So the good requires the use of appearances. But does it require only that? If you say it does, then you must say that irrational animals, too, can possess goodness, happiness, and unhappiness. But you do not say this, and you are right not to. Even if irrational animals use appearances to the highest degree, they cannot understand their own use of appearances. There is a good reason for this. They exist to serve others, and they exercise no superiority. An ass, I suppose, does not exist because it is superior to others. No, it exists because we needed a back strong enough to carry something. In fact, we also needed it to walk. So it was given the ability to use appearances, for otherwise it could not have walked. And that is where the matter stopped. For if the ass had also been given the ability to understand its use of appearances, it clearly would not, according to reason, have been subject to us or served us in these ways. Instead, it would have been our equal and like us.²⁷⁶

Will you not then seek the nature of good in the rational animal? for if it is not there, you will not choose to say that it exists in any other thing (plant or animal). What then? are not plants and animals also the works of God? They are; but they are not superior things, nor yet parts of the Gods. But you are a superior thing; you are a portion separated from the deity; you have in yourself a certain portion of him. Why then are you ignorant of your own noble descent?²⁸⁰ Why do you not know whence you came? will you not remember when you are eating, who you are who eat and whom you feed? When you are in conjunction with a woman, will you not remember who you are who do this thing? When you are in social intercourse, when you are exercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion, know you not that you are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god? Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and you know it not.²⁸¹ Do you think that I mean some God of silver or of gold, and external? You carry him within yourself, and you perceive not that you are polluting him [6] by impure thoughts and dirty deeds. And if an image of God were present, you would not dare to do any of the things which you are doing: but when God himself is present within and sees all and hears all, you are not ashamed of thinking such things and doing such things, ignorant as you are of your own nature and subject to the anger of God. Then why do we fear when we are sending a young man from the school into active life, lest he should do anything improperly, eat improperly, have improper intercourse with women; and lest the rags in which he is wrapped should debase him, lest fine garments should make him proud? This youth (if he acts thus) does not know his own God: he knows not with whom he sets out (into the world). But can we endure when he says 'I wish I had you (God) with me.' Have you not God with you? and do you seek for any other, when you have him? or will God tell you any thing else than this? If you were a statue of Phidias, either Athena or Zeus, you would think both of yourself and of the artist, and if you had any understanding (power of perception) you would try to do nothing unworthy of him who made you or of yourself, and try not to appear in an unbecoming dress (attitude) to those who look on you. But now because Zeus has made you, for this reason do you care not how you shall appear? And yet is the artist (in the one case) like the artist in the other? or the work in the one case like the other? And what work of an artist, for instance, has in itself the faculties, which the artist shows in making it? Is it not marble or bronze, or gold or ivory? and the Athena of Phidias when she has once extended the hand and received in it the figure of Victory²⁸² stands in that [6] attitude for ever. But the works of God have power of motion, they breathe, they have the faculty of using the appearances of things, and the power of examining them. Being the work of such an artist do you dishonour him? And what shall I say, not only that he made you, but also entrusted you to yourself and made you a deposit to yourself? Will you not think of this too, but do you also dishonour your guardianship? But if God had entrusted an orphan to you, would you thus neglect him? He has delivered yourself to your own care, and says, I had no one fitter to intrust him to than yourself: keep him for me such as he is by nature, modest, faithful, erect, unterrified, free from passion and perturbation. And then you do not keep him such.

Will you not look for the nature of good in a rational creature? If it is not there, you would not choose to say that it exists in any other plant or animal. But are plants and animals not also works of God? They are, but they are not superior beings, nor are they parts of the gods. You, however, are a superior being. You are a portion separated from the deity, and you have a part of him within you. Why, then, are you unaware of your noble descent?²⁸⁰ Why do you not know where you came from? When you eat, will you not remember who you are and whom you feed? When you have sex with a woman, will you not remember who you are? When you spend time with others, exercise, or take part in a discussion, do you not know that you are nourishing and exercising a god? Wretch, you carry a god with you and do not know it.²⁸¹ Do you think I mean some external god made of silver or gold? You carry him within yourself, yet you do not see that you are polluting him [6] with impure thoughts and filthy deeds. If an image of God were present, you would not dare do any of these things. But God himself is present within you, seeing and hearing everything. Yet you are not ashamed of such thoughts and deeds. You are ignorant of your own nature and subject to God's anger. Why, then, do we fear for a young man when we send him from school into active life? We fear that he might behave improperly, eat improperly, or have improper relations with women. We fear that the rags he wears might degrade him, or that fine clothes might make him proud. If the young man acts this way, he does not know his own God. He does not know who goes with him into the world. But how can we bear it when he says 'I wish I had you (God) with me.' Do you not have God with you? Why do you look for another when you already have him? Or would God tell you anything other than this? If you were a statue by Phidias, either Athena or Zeus, you would think of yourself and of the artist. If you had any understanding, you would try to do nothing unworthy of your maker or yourself. You would also try not to appear in an unsuitable dress or pose before those who look at you. But now, because Zeus has made you, do you not care how you appear? Is the artist in one case like the artist in the other? Is the work in one case like the work in the other? What work of an artist has within it the powers the artist shows in making it? Is it not marble, bronze, gold, or ivory? Once Phidias's Athena has held out her hand and received the figure of Victory²⁸² in it, she stands in that [6] pose forever. But the works of God can move and breathe. They can use and examine the impressions they receive of things. As the work of such an artist, do you dishonor him? And what shall I say? He not only made you, but also entrusted you to yourself and placed you in your own care. Will you not think of that too? Will you dishonor the responsibility entrusted to you? If God had entrusted an orphan to you, would you neglect him this way? God has placed you in your own care and says, I had no one better than you to entrust him to. Keep him for me as he is by nature: modest, faithful, upright, fearless, and free from passion and disturbance. Yet you do not keep him that way.

But some will say, whence has this fellow got the arrogance which he displays and these supercilious looks?—I have not yet so much gravity as befits a philosopher; for I do not yet feel confidence in what I have learned and in what I have assented to: I still fear my own weakness. Let me get confidence and then you shall see a countenance such as I ought to have and an attitude such as I ought to have: then I will show to you the statue, when it is perfected, when it is polished. What do you expect? a supercilious countenance? Does the Zeus at Olympia²⁸³ lift up his brow? No, his look is fixed as becomes him who is ready to say

But some will say, Where did this fellow get his arrogance and those haughty looks? I am not yet as serious as a philosopher should be. I still lack confidence in what I have learned and accepted. I still fear my own weakness. Let me gain confidence, and then you will see the expression and manner I ought to have. Then I will show you the statue, when it is complete and polished. What do you expect? A haughty expression? Does the Zeus at Olympia²⁸³ raise his eyebrows? No, his expression is steady, as befits one who is ready to say

Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail.—Iliad, i. 526.

My word cannot be taken back and will not fail. Iliad, i. 526.

Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free from perturbation—What, and immortal too, exempt from old age, and from sickness? No, but dying as becomes a god, sickening as becomes a god. This power I possess; this I can do. But the rest I do not possess, nor can I do. I will show the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. What [7] nerves²⁸⁴ are these? A desire never disappointed, an aversion²⁸⁵ which never falls on that which it would avoid, a proper pursuit (ὁρμήν), a diligent purpose, an assent which is not rash. These you shall see.

I will show myself to you as faithful, modest, noble, and free from disturbance. What, immortal too, and free from old age and sickness? No, but I will die as a god should die and fall sick as a god should fall sick. This is within my power. This I can do. But the rest is not within my power, and I cannot do it. I will show you the strength of a philosopher. What [7] strengths²⁸⁴ are these? A desire that is never disappointed, an aversion²⁸⁵ that never encounters what it would avoid, proper pursuit (ὁρμήν), diligent purpose, and assent that is not rash. These you shall see.

Ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ Θεός.

For the mind in each of us is God.