Book 2, Chapter 9
When We Fail as Men, We Pose as Philosophers
It is no common (easy) thing to do this only, to fulfil the promise of a man's nature. For what is a man? The answer is, a rational and mortal being. Then by the rational faculty from whom are we separated? From wild beasts. And from what others? From sheep and like animals. Take care then to do nothing like a wild beast; but if you do, you have lost the character of a man; you have not fulfilled your promise. See that you do nothing like a sheep; but if you do, in this case also the man is lost. What then do we do as sheep? When we act gluttonously, when we act lewdly, when we act rashly, filthily, inconsiderately, to what have we declined? To sheep. What have we lost? The rational faculty. When we act contentiously and harmfully and passionately, and violently, to what have we declined? To wild beasts. Consequently some of us are great wild beasts, and others little beasts, of a bad disposition and small, whence we may say, Let me be eaten by a lion. But in all these ways the promise of a man acting as a man is destroyed. For when is a conjunctive (complex) proposition maintained? When it fulfils what its nature promises; so that the preservation of a complex proposition is when it is a conjunction of truths. When is a disjunctive maintained? When it fulfils what it promises. When are flutes, a lyre, a horse, a dog, preserved? (when they severally keep their promise). What is the wonder then if man also in like manner is preserved, and in like manner is lost? Each man is improved and preserved by corresponding acts, the carpenter by acts of carpentry, the grammarian by acts of grammar. But if a man accustoms himself to write ungrammatically, of necessity his art will be corrupted and destroyed. Thus modest actions preserve the modest man, and immodest actions destroy him and actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the contrary actions destroy him. And on the other hand contrary actions strengthen contrary characters: shamelessness strengthens the shameless man, faithlessness the faithless man, abusive words the abusive man, anger the man of an angry temper, and unequal receiving and giving make the avaricious man more avaricious.
It is no easy thing simply to fulfill the promise of human nature. For what is a human being? A rational, mortal being. Then what does our capacity for reason set us apart from? Wild beasts. And what else? Sheep and similar animals. So take care to do nothing like a wild beast. If you do, you have lost your human character. You have not fulfilled your promise. Make sure you do nothing like a sheep. If you do, you have lost your human character in that case too. How do we act like sheep? When we act gluttonously, lewdly, rashly, filthily, or thoughtlessly, what have we sunk to? Sheep. What have we lost? Our capacity for reason. When we act quarrelsomely, harmfully, passionately, and violently, what have we sunk to? Wild beasts. As a result, some of us are great wild beasts. Others are small, bad-tempered beasts, so that we may say, Let me be eaten by a lion. But in all these ways, the promise of a human being acting as a human being is destroyed. For when does a conjunctive (complex) proposition hold true? When it fulfills what its nature promises. A complex proposition holds true when it joins truths together. When does a disjunctive proposition hold true? When it fulfills what it promises. When are flutes, a lyre, a horse, or a dog preserved? (When each fulfills its promise.) Why, then, should it be surprising that a human being is preserved or lost in the same way? Each person is improved and preserved by the appropriate actions. The carpenter is improved and preserved by carpentry, and the grammarian by grammar. But if someone gets into the habit of writing ungrammatically, their art will necessarily be corrupted and destroyed. In the same way, modest actions preserve the modest person, and immodest actions destroy that person. Faithful actions preserve the faithful person, and the opposite actions destroy that person. On the other hand, opposite actions strengthen opposite characters. Shamelessness strengthens the shameless person, and faithlessness strengthens the faithless person. Abusive words strengthen the abusive person, and anger strengthens the angry person. Taking more than one gives makes the greedy person greedier.
'The abuse of the faculties, which are proper to man, called rationality and liberty, is the origin of evil. By rationality is meant the faculty of understanding truths and thence falses, and goods and then evils; and by liberty is meant the faculty of thinking, willing and acting freely—and these faculties distinguish man from beasts.' Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 264 and also 240. See Epictetus, ii. c. 8.
This seems to be a proverb: If I am eaten, let it be by the nobler animal.
A conjunctive or complex (συμπεπλεγμένον) axiom or lemma. Gellius (xvi. 8) gives an example: 'P. Scipio, the son of Paulus, was both twice consul and triumphed, and exercised the censorship and was the colleague of L. Mummius in his censorship.' Gellius adds, 'in every conjunctive if there is one falsehood, though the other parts are true, the whole is said to be false,' The whole statement is presented as true. So if one part is false, the whole statement is not true. A disjunctive (διεζευγμένον) statement is of this kind: 'pleasure is either bad or good, or neither good nor bad.'
For this reason philosophers admonish us not to be satisfied with learning only, but also to add study, and then practice. For we have long been accustomed to do contrary things, and we put in practice opinions which are contrary to true opinions. If then we shall not also put in practice right opinions, we shall be nothing more than the expositors of the opinions of others. For now who among us is not able to discourse according to the rules of art about good and evil things (in this fashion)? That of things some are good, and some are bad, and some are indifferent: the good then are virtues, and the things which participate in virtues; and the bad are the contrary; and the indifferent are wealth, health, reputation.—Then, if in the midst of our talk there should happen some greater noise than usual, or some of those who are present should laugh at us, we are disturbed. Philosopher, where are the things which you were talking about? Whence did you produce and utter them. From the lips, and thence only. Why then do you corrupt the aids provided by others? Why do you treat the weightiest matters as if you were playing a game of dice? For it is one thing to lay up bread and wine as in a storehouse, and another thing to eat. That which has been eaten, is digested, distributed, and is become sinews, flesh, bones, blood, healthy colour, healthy breath. Whatever is stored up, when you choose you can readily take and show it; but you have no other advantage from it except so far as to appear to possess it. For what is the difference between explaining these doctrines and those of men who have different opinions? Sit down now and explain according to the rules of art the opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps you will explain his opinions in a more useful manner than Epicurus himself. Why then do you call yourself a [4] [5] Stoic? Why do you deceive the many? Why do you act the part of a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do you not see how (why) each is called a Jew, or a Syrian or an Egyptian? and when we see a man inclining to two sides, we are accustomed to say, This man is not a Jew, but he acts as one. But when he has assumed the affects of one who has been imbued with Jewish doctrine and has adopted that sect, then he is in fact and he is named a Jew. Thus we too being falsely imbued (baptized), are in name Jews, but in fact we are something else. Our affects (feelings) are inconsistent with our words; we are far from practising what we say, and that of which we are proud, as if we knew it. Thus being unable to fulfil even what the character of a man promises, we even add to it the profession of a philosopher, which is as heavy a burden, as if a man who is unable to bear ten pounds should attempt to raise the stone which Ajax lifted.
That is why philosophers warn us not to be satisfied with learning alone. We must also study and then practice. We have long been accustomed to doing the opposite, and we act on opinions contrary to the truth. So if we do not also put right opinions into practice, we will merely explain other people’s views. Who among us cannot now give a polished account of good and evil along these lines? Some things are good, some are bad, and some are indifferent. Good things are virtues and things that share in virtue. Bad things are their opposites. Indifferent things include wealth, health, and reputation. But suppose an unusually loud noise interrupts our talk, or someone present laughs at us. We are disturbed. Philosopher, what happened to the things you were talking about? Where did they come from when you spoke? From your lips, and nowhere else. Why, then, do you corrupt the help others have provided? Why do you treat the most serious matters as though you were playing dice? Storing bread and wine is one thing. Eating them is another. Food that has been eaten is digested and distributed through the body. It becomes sinews, flesh, bones, blood, a healthy complexion, and healthy breath. You can easily take out and display whatever you have stored whenever you choose. But you gain nothing else from it, except the appearance of possessing it. What is the difference between explaining these doctrines and explaining those of men with different opinions? Sit down now and give a polished account of Epicurus’s views. Perhaps you will explain them more usefully than Epicurus himself. Why, then, do you call yourself a [4] [5] Stoic? Why do you deceive the many? Why do you act like a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do you not see why each person is called a Jew, a Syrian, or an Egyptian? When we see a man torn between two sides, we usually say, “This man is not a Jew, but he acts like one.” But when he has adopted the feelings of someone steeped in Jewish doctrine and has joined that sect, he is a Jew in fact and in name. In the same way, we have only been baptized on the surface. We are Jews in name, but in fact we are something else. Our feelings do not match our words. We are far from practicing what we say and what we take pride in, as though we understood it. We cannot even live up to what it means to be a man, yet we also claim to be philosophers. That is a burden as heavy as the stone Ajax lifted, if a man unable to carry ten pounds tried to lift it.
It has been suggested that Epictetus used the name Jews for both Jews and Christians. We know that some Jews became Christians. But see Schweig.'s note 1 and note 7.
As I have said, Epictetus may mean Christians when he says Jews. Some writers clearly confuse Christians and Jews, since the first Christians were of the Jewish nation. In book iv. c. 7, Epictetus calls the Jews Galilaeans. The term Galilaeans refers to the country of the great teacher. Paul says (Romans, ii. 28), 'For he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly—but he is a Jew which is one inwardly,' etc. Paul comments (ii. 17–29) on the man 'who is called a Jew, and rests in the law and makes his boast of God'. His comments may be compared with what Epictetus says about a man called a philosopher who does not practise what he professes.
See ii. 24, 26. Iliad, vii. 264, etc. Juvenal, xv. 65,
Nec hunc lapidem, quales et Turnus et Ajax Vel quo Tydides percussit pondere coxam Aeneae.—Upton.
Nor this stone, like those of Turnus and Ajax, or the one Tydides used to strike Aeneas’s hip. (Upton.)