Book 1, Chapter 25
On the Same Subject
If these things are true, and if we are not silly, and are not acting hypocritically when we say that the good of man is in the will, and the evil too, and that every thing else does not concern us, why are we still disturbed, why are we still afraid? The things about which we have been busied are in no man's power: and the things which are in the power of others, we care not for. What kind of trouble have we still?
If these things are true, why are we still troubled and afraid? Are we being foolish or hypocritical when we say that human good and evil lie in the will? Do we mean it when we say that nothing else concerns us? The things we have been occupied with are in no one’s power. And we do not care about the things that are in other people’s power. What trouble do we still have?
But give me directions. Why should I give you directions? has not Zeus given you directions? Has he not given to you what is your own free from hindrance and free from impediment, and what is not your own subject to hindrance and impediment? What directions then, what kind of orders did you bring when you came from him? Keep by every means what is your own; do not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity) is your own, virtuous shame is your own; who then can take these things from you? who else than yourself will hinder you from using them? But how do you act? when you seek what is not your own, you lose that which is your own. Having such promptings and commands from Zeus, what kind do you still ask from me? Am I more powerful than he, am I more worthy of confidence? But if you observe these, do you want any others besides? Well, but he has not given these orders, you will say. Produce your praecognitions (poλnes), produce the proofs of philosophers, produce what you have often heard, and produce what you have said yourself, produce what you have read, produce what you have meditated on; and you will then see that all these things are from God. How long then is [1] it fit to observe these precepts from God, and not to break up the play? As long as the play is continued with propriety. In the Saturnalia a king is chosen by lot, for it has been the custom to play at this game. The king commands: Do you drink, Do you mix the wine, Do you sing, Do you go, Do you come. I obey that the game may not be broken up through me.-But if he says, think that you are in evil plight: I answer, I do not think so; and who will compel me to think so? Further, we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who He who is appointed to play Agamemnon says to me, Go to Achilles and tear from him Briseis. I go. He says, Come, and I come.
But give me directions. Why should I give you directions? Has Zeus not given you directions? Has he not made what is yours free from obstacles and interference? And has he not made what is not yours subject to obstacles and interference? What directions, then, what orders did you bring when you came from him? Keep what is yours by every means. Do not desire what belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity) is yours, and so is virtuous shame. Who, then, can take these from you? Who but yourself can prevent you from exercising them? But how do you act? When you seek what is not yours, you lose what is yours. With such guidance and commands from Zeus, what more do you ask of me? Am I more powerful than he is? Am I more worthy of your trust? But if you follow his commands, do you need any others? Well, you will say, he has not given these orders. Bring forward your preconceptions (poλnes) and the proofs offered by philosophers. Bring forward what you have often heard and what you have said yourself. Bring forward what you have read and thought about. Then you will see that all these things come from God. How long, then, is [1] it right to follow these precepts from God and not break up the game? As long as the game can be played properly. During the Saturnalia, a king is chosen by lot. It has been the custom to play this game. The king gives orders: You drink. You mix the wine. You sing. You go. You come. I obey so that I do not break up the game. But if he says, think that you are in a bad situation, I answer, I do not think so. Who can force me to think so? Again, suppose we have agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. The person appointed to play Agamemnon says to me, Go to Achilles and take Briseis from him. I go. He says, Come, and I come.
See the end of the previous chapter. Upton compares Horace's "Incidere ludum" (Epp. i. 14, 36). See also Epictetus, ii. 16, 37.
A December festival in Rome, marked by merriment and license (Livy, xxii. 1). Compare the passage in Tacitus, Ann. xiii. 15, where Nero is chosen by lot to be king. Also compare Seneca, De Constant. Sapient. c. 12, "Illi (pueri) inter ipsos magistratus gerunt, et praetextam fascesque ac tribunal imitantur."
For as we behave in the matter of hypothetical arguments, so ought we to do in life. Suppose it to be night. I suppose that it is night. Well then; is it day? No, for I admitted the hypothesis that it was night. Suppose that you think that it is night? Suppose that do. But also think that it is night. That is not consistent with the hypothesis. So in this case also: Suppose that you are unfortunate. Well, suppose so. Are you then unhappy? Yes. Well Well then are you troubled with an unfavourable daemon (fortune)? Yes. But think also that you are in misery. This is not consistent with the hypothesis; and another (Zeus) forbids me to think so.
We should approach life as we approach hypothetical arguments. Suppose it is night. I accept that it is night for the sake of the argument. Well then, is it day? No, because I accepted the assumption that it was night. Now suppose you think it is night. I can suppose that. But actually think it is night too. That does not follow from the assumption. The same is true here. Suppose you are unfortunate. All right, I suppose so. Are you then unhappy? Yes. Well then, do you have an unfavorable daemon (fortune)? Yes. But also think that you are miserable. That does not follow from the assumption. And another, Zeus, forbids me to think so.
How long then must we obey such orders? As long as it is profitable; and this means as long as I maintain that which is becoming and consistent. Further, some men are sour and of bad temper, and they say, "I cannot sup with this man to be obliged to hear him telling daily how he fought in Mysia": "I told you, brother, how I ascended the hill: then I began to be besieged again." But another says, "I prefer to get my supper and to hear him talk as much as he likes." And do you compare these estimates (judgments): only do nothing in a depressed mood, nor as one afflicted, nor as thinking that you are in misery, for no man compels you to that.—Has it smoked in the chamber? If the smoke is moderate, I will stay; if it is excessive, I go out: for you must always remember this and hold it fast, that the door is open.—Well, but you say to me, Do not live in Nicopolis. I will not live there.—Nor in Athens.—I will not live in Athens.—Nor in Rome.—I will not live in Rome.—Live in Gyarus.—I will live in Gyarus, but it seems like a great smoke to live in Gyarus; and I depart to the place where no man will hinder me from living, for that dwelling place is open to all; and as to the last garment, that is the poor body, no one has any power over me beyond this. This was the reason why Demetrius said to Nero, "You threaten me with death, but nature threatens you." If I set my admiration on the poor body, I have given myself up to be a slave: if on my little possessions, I also make myself a slave: for I immediately make it plain with what I may be caught; as if the snake draws in his head, I tell you to strike that part of him which he guards; and do you be assured that whatever part you choose to guard, that part your master will attack. Remembering this whom will you still flatter or fear?
How long must we obey such orders? As long as it benefits us. That means as long as I behave properly and consistently. Some men are sour and bad-tempered. They say, "I cannot have dinner with this man and be forced to hear him tell me every day how he fought in Mysia": "I told you, brother, how I climbed the hill. Then I began to be besieged again." But another says, "I would rather get my dinner and listen to him talk as much as he likes." Compare these judgments. But whatever you do, do not act with a heavy heart, or as someone in distress, or as someone who thinks he is miserable. No one forces you to feel that way. Is the room smoky? If the smoke is moderate, I will stay. If it is excessive, I will leave. You must always remember and hold fast to this: the door is open. "Well," you say to me, "do not live in Nicopolis." I will not live there. "Nor in Athens." I will not live in Athens. "Nor in Rome." I will not live in Rome. "Live in Gyarus." I will live in Gyarus, but living there seems like a great deal of smoke. So I leave for the place where no one will stop me from living. That dwelling place is open to all. As for the last garment, the poor body, no one has any power over me beyond it. This was why Demetrius said to Nero, "You threaten me with death, but nature threatens you." If I prize my poor body, I have given myself up to be a slave. If I prize my few possessions, I also make myself a slave. In either case, I immediately reveal how I can be caught. If a snake pulls in its head, I tell you to strike the part it guards. And be sure that whatever part you choose to guard, your master will attack that part. If you remember this, whom will you still flatter or fear?
Gyarus or Gyara, a wretched island in the Aegean Sea where criminals were sent under the Roman Empire. Juvenal, Sat. i. 73.
See Schweighaeuser's note.
Demetrius was a Cynic philosopher. Seneca (De Benef. vii. 1) says of him: "He was in my opinion a great man, even if he is compared with the greatest." One of his sayings was: "You gain more by possessing a few precepts of philosophy, if you have them ready and use them, than by learning many, if you have them not at hand." Seneca often mentions Demetrius. The saying in the text is also attributed to Anaxagoras (Life by Diogenes Laertius). Xenophon attributes it to Socrates (Apologia, 27).
But I should like to sit where the Senators sit.—Do you see that you are putting yourself in straits, you are squeezing yourself.—How then shall I see well in any other way in the amphitheatre? Man, do not be a spectator at all; and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourself trouble? Or wait a little, and when the spectacle is over, seat yourself in the place reserved for the Senators and sun yourself. For remember this general truth, that it is we who squeeze ourselves, who put ourselves in straits; that is our opinions squeeze us and put us in straits. For what is it to be reviled? Stand by a stone and revile it; and what will you gain? If then a man listens like a stone, what profit is there to the reviler? But if the reviler has as a stepping-stone (or ladder) the weakness of him who is reviled, then he accomplishes something.—Strip him.—What do you mean by him?—Lay hold of his garment, strip it off. I have insulted you. Much good may it do you.
But I would like to sit where the Senators sit. Do you see that you are putting yourself in a tight spot, squeezing yourself? How else can I get a good view in the amphitheatre? Man, do not watch the spectacle at all, and you will not be squeezed. Why make trouble for yourself? Or wait a little. When the spectacle is over, sit in the place reserved for the Senators and enjoy the sun. Remember this general truth: we squeeze ourselves and put ourselves in tight spots. Our opinions squeeze us and put us in tight spots. What does it mean to be insulted? Stand beside a stone and insult it. What will you gain? So if a man listens like a stone, what does the person insulting him gain? But if the person insulting him can use his weakness as a stepping-stone (or ladder), he accomplishes something. Strip him. What do you mean by “him”? Take hold of his garment and strip it off. I have insulted you. Much good may it do you.
In Rome, and probably in other towns, seats at public events were reserved for different social classes.
See Schweighaeuser's note.
This was the practice of Socrates: this was the reason why he always had one face. But we choose to practise and study any thing rather than the means by which we shall be unimpeded and free. You say, Philosophers talk paradoxes. But are there no paradoxes in the other arts? and what is more paradoxical than to puncture a man's eye in order that he may see? If any one said this to a man ignorant of the surgical art, would he not ridicule the speaker? Where is the wonder then if in philosophy also many things which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced?
This was Socrates’ practice, and it was why he always wore the same expression. But we choose to practice and study anything rather than how to live unhindered and free. You say that philosophers speak in paradoxes. But aren’t there paradoxes in other fields too? What could be more paradoxical than puncturing a man’s eye so that he can see? If someone said this to a person who knew nothing about surgery, wouldn’t that person laugh at the speaker? So why is it surprising that many truths in philosophy also seem paradoxical to those unfamiliar with it?
Paradoxes (παράδοξα), "things contrary to opinion," are contrasted with paralogies (παράλογα), "things contrary to reason" (iv. 1. 173). Cicero describes paradoxes as "something which cause surprise and contradict common opinion" (Prooemium to his Paradoxes). Elsewhere, he says that the Romans called the Stoic paradoxes "admirabilia". Puncture of the eye is the operation for cataract.