Book 1, Chapter 26
What Is the Law of Life?
When a person was reading was reading hypothetical arguments, Epictetus said, This also is an hypothetical law that we must accept what follows from the hypothesis. But much before this law is the law of life, that we must act conformably to nature. For if in every matter and circumstance we wish to observe what is natural, it is plain that in every thing we ought to make it our aim that neither that which is consequent shall escape us, and that we do not admit the contradictory. First then philosophers exercise us in theory (contemplation of things), which is easier; and then next they lead us to the more difficult things; for in theory, there is nothing which draws us away from following what is taught; but in the matters of life, many are the things which distract us. He is ridiculous then who says that he wishes to begin with the matters of real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more difficult things; and we ought to employ this fact as an argument to those parents who are vexed at their children learning philosophy: Am I doing wrong then my father, and do I not know what is suitable to me and becoming? If indeed this can neither be learned nor taught, why do you blame me? but if it can be taught, teach me; and if you can not, allow me to learn from those who say that they know how to teach. For what do you think? do you suppose that I voluntarily fall into evil and miss the good? I hope that it may not be so. What is then the cause of my doing wrong? Ignorance. Do you not choose then that I should get rid of my ignorance? Who was ever taught by anger the art of a pilot or music? Do you think then that by means of your anger I shall learn the art of life? He only is allowed to speak in this way who has shown such an intention. But if a man only intending to make a display at a banquet and to show that he is acquainted with hypothetical arguments reads them and attends the philosophers, what other object has he than that some man of senatorian rank who sits by him may admire? For there (at Rome) are the really great materials (opportunities), and the riches here (at Nicopolis) appear to be trifles there. This is the reason why it is difficult for a man to be master of the appearances, where the things which disturb the judgment are great. I know a certain person who complained, as he embraced the knees of Epaphroditus, that he had only one hundred and fifty times ten thousand denarii remaining. What then did Epaphroditus do? Did he laugh at him, as we slaves of Epaphroditus did? No, but, he cried out with amazement, "Poor man, how then did you keep silence, how did you endure it?"
When someone was reading hypothetical arguments, Epictetus said: There is also a hypothetical law. It says that we must accept what follows from a hypothesis. But before this law comes the law of life: we must act according to nature. If we wish to follow nature in every matter and circumstance, our aim is clear. In everything, we should make sure we do not miss what follows or accept what contradicts it. So philosophers first train us in theory (the contemplation of things), which is easier. Then they lead us to the more difficult things. In theory, nothing distracts us from following what we are taught. But in life, many things distract us. So anyone who says he wants to begin with real life is ridiculous. It is not easy to begin with the harder things. We should use this argument with parents who are annoyed that their children study philosophy: Father, am I doing wrong? Do I not know what is suitable and fitting for me? If these things can neither be learned nor taught, why do you blame me? But if they can be taught, teach me. And if you cannot, let me learn from those who say they know how to teach. What do you think? Do you suppose I willingly fall into evil and miss the good? I hope not. What, then, causes me to do wrong? Ignorance. Would you not choose to have me rid myself of my ignorance? Who ever learned the art of a pilot or music through anger? Do you think your anger will teach me the art of life? Only someone who has shown such an intention is entitled to speak this way. But suppose a man reads hypothetical arguments and attends philosophers only to show off at a banquet. He wants to show that he knows these arguments. What is his aim, except to be admired by some senator sitting beside him? For there, in Rome, are the truly great opportunities. The riches here in Nicopolis seem like trifles there. That is why it is hard to master appearances where the things that disturb judgment are so great. I know a man who embraced the knees of Epaphroditus and complained that he had only fifteen million denarii left. What did Epaphroditus do? Did he laugh at him, as we slaves of Epaphroditus did? No. He cried out in amazement, "Poor man, how did you keep silent? How did you endure it?"
ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας. "Intelligere quid verum rectumque sit, prius est et facilius. Id vero exsequi et observare, posterius et difficilius." Wolf.
This is a profound and useful observation by Epictetus. General principles are easy to understand and accept. The difficulty lies in applying them. For example, what is easier than understanding general principles of law that are true and good? But in practice, we encounter cases that, as Bacon says, are "immersed in matter." This matter makes the principles difficult to apply. Applying them requires the skill and study of an experienced person.
It is easy and right to teach young people general principles for living. But young and old alike too often fail to apply them. So, can virtue be taught? The rules for a virtuous life can be taught, but applying them is difficult. Teachers of religion and morality know this well, if they are fit to teach. If they do not know this, they are not fit to teach the rules. Nor are they fit to lead others to practice them by the only possible method: their own example. They must also be supported by the example of those who direct young people's education and those with whom they live.
"Such an intention" appears to mean "the intention of learning." "The son alone can say this to his father, when the son studies philosophy for the purpose of living a good life, and not for the purpose of display." Wolf.
I have followed Schweighaeuser's explanation of this difficult passage. I have also accepted his correction, ἐκσείοντα, in place of the manuscript reading ἐκεῖ ὄντα.
This was a large sum. He is speaking of drachmae or their Roman equivalents, denarii. In Roman terms, the amount would be expressed briefly as "sexagies centena millia H.S.," or simply "sexagies."
When Epictetus had reproved (called) the person who was reading the hypothetical arguments, and the teacher who had suggested the reading was laughing at the reader, Epictetus said to the teacher, "You are laughing at yourself: you did not prepare the young man nor did you ascertain whether he was able to understand these matters; but perhaps, you are only employing him as a reader." Well then said Epictetus, if a man has not ability enough to understand a complex (syllogism), do we trust him in giving praise, do we trust him in giving blame, do we allow that he is able to form a judgment about good or bad? and if such a man blames any one, does the man care for the blame? and if he praises any one, is the man elated, when in such small matters as an hypothetical syllogism he who praises cannot see what is consequent on the hypothesis?
When Epictetus had rebuked (called) the person reading the hypothetical arguments, the teacher who had suggested the reading laughed at him. Epictetus said to the teacher, "You are laughing at yourself. You did not prepare the young man or find out whether he could understand these matters. But perhaps you are only using him as a reader." Epictetus went on to ask: If a man cannot understand a complex syllogism, do we trust his praise or his blame? Do we accept that he can judge what is good or bad? If such a man blames someone, does that person care about his blame? If he praises someone, is that person delighted? After all, the man giving praise cannot see what follows from a hypothesis, even in a small matter like a hypothetical syllogism.
See Schweighaeuser's note and all his notes on this rather difficult chapter.
This then is the beginning of philosophy, a man's perception of the state of his ruling faculty; for when a man knows that it is weak, then he will not employ it on things of the greatest difficulty. But at present, if men cannot swallow even a morsel, they buy whole volumes and attempt to devour them; and this is the reason why they vomit them up or suffer indigestion: and then come gripings, defluxes, and fevers. Such men ought to consider what their ability is. In theory it is easy to convince an ignorant person; but in the affairs of real life no one offers himself to be convinced, and we hate the man who has convinced us. But Socrates advised us not to live a life which is not subjected to examination.
This, then, is the beginning of philosophy: recognizing the condition of your ruling faculty. Once you know it is weak, you will not use it for the most difficult tasks. But as things stand, people who cannot swallow even a bite buy whole volumes and try to devour them. That is why they vomit them up or suffer indigestion. Then come stomach pains, diarrhea, and fevers. Such people should consider what they are capable of. In theory, it is easy to convince an ignorant person. But in real life, no one is willing to be convinced. And we hate the person who has convinced us. But Socrates advised us not to live an unexamined life.
See ii. c. 11.
Seneca, De Tranquillitate animi, c. 9, says: "What is the use of countless books and libraries, when the owner scarcely reads in his whole life the tables of contents? The number only confuses a learner, does not instruct him. It is much better to give yourself up to a few authors than to wander through many."
See Plato's Apology, c. 28, and Antoninus, iii. 5.