Book 1, Chapter 18

Why We Should Not Be Angry at Others' Mistakes

5 min

If what philosophers say is true, that all men have one principle, as in the case of assent the persuasion that a thing is so, and in the case of dissent the persuasion that a thing is not so, and in the case of a suspense of judgment the persuasion that a thing is uncertain, so also in the case of a movement towards any thing the persuasion that a thing is for a man's advantage, and it is impossible to think that one thing is advantageous and to desire another, and to judge one thing to be proper and to move towards another, why then are we angry with the many? They are thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Ought we then to be angry with them, or to pity them? But show them their error, and you will see how they desist from their errors. If they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their present opinion.

If what philosophers say is true, all people act on one principle. We agree because we believe something is true. We disagree because we believe it is not true. We withhold judgment because we believe it is uncertain. In the same way, we pursue something because we believe it is to our advantage. We cannot believe one thing is advantageous and desire another. Nor can we judge one thing to be right and pursue another. If all this is true, why are we angry with most people? You may say, “They are thieves and robbers.” But what do you mean by thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Should we be angry with them, then, or pity them? Show them their mistake, and you will see them stop making it. If they do not see their mistake, they have nothing better than their present opinion.

τὸ παθεῖν ὅτι, etc.: Schweighaeuser notes the distinction between τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι and τὸ ὁρμᾶν. Compare Epictetus, iii. 2, 1; iii. 3, 2; iii. 22, 43; and i. 4, 11. Schweig. says that ὀρέγεσθαι refers to the ἀγαθόν and συμφέρον, while ὁρμᾶν refers to the καθήκον. He concludes that something is missing from the text and attempts to supply it.

Ought not then this robber and this adulterer to be destroyed? By no means say so, but speak rather in this way: This man who has been mistaken and deceived about the most important things, and blinded, not in the faculty of vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the faculty which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy him? If you speak thus, you will see how inhuman this is which you say, and that it is just as if you would say, Ought we not to destroy this blind and deaf man? But if the greatest harm is the privation of the greatest things, and the greatest thing in every man is the will or choice such as it ought to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are you also angry with him? Man, you ought not to be affected contrary to nature by the bad things of another. Pity him rather: drop this readiness to be offended and to hate, and these words which the many utter: "these accursed and odious fellows." How have you been made so wise at once? and how are you so peevish? Why then are we angry? Is it because we value so much the things of which these men rob us? Do not admire your clothes, and then you will not be angry with the thief. Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer. Learn that a thief and an adulterer have no place in the things which are yours, but in those which belong to others and which are not in your power. If you dismiss these things and consider them as nothing, with whom are you still angry? But so long as you value these things, be angry with yourself rather than with the thief and the adulterer.

Should this robber and this adulterer be destroyed? By no means say that. Instead, put it this way: This man has been mistaken and deceived about the most important things. He has been blinded, not in the sight that distinguishes white from black, but in the judgment that distinguishes good from bad. Should we destroy him? If you put it that way, you will see how inhuman your suggestion is. It is just as if you said, Should we destroy this blind and deaf man? The greatest harm is the loss of the greatest things. In every person, the greatest thing is a will or power of choice that is as it should be. If a man has lost this, why are you angry with him too? My friend, you should not let another person’s misfortunes affect you in a way that goes against nature. Pity him instead. Give up this readiness to take offense and hate, and stop using the words so many people use: "these cursed and hateful fellows." How did you become so wise all at once? And why are you so irritable? Why, then, are we angry? Is it because we value so highly the things these men steal from us? Do not prize your clothes, and you will not be angry with the thief. Do not prize your wife’s beauty, and you will not be angry with the adulterer. Learn that a thief and an adulterer have no place among the things that are yours. They have a place only among things that belong to others and are not in your power. If you dismiss these things and consider them nothing, who will you still be angry with? But as long as you value them, be angry with yourself rather than with the thief and the adulterer.

The text is defective here, in 9, 10, and 11. See Schweighaeuser's note.

[2] Consider the matter thus: you have fine clothes; your neighbour has not you have a window; you wish to air the clothes. The thief does not know wherein man's good consists, but he thinks that it consists in having fine clothes, the very thing which you also think. Must he not then come and take them away? When you show a cake to greedy persons, and swallow it all yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it from you? Do not provoke them do not have a window: do not air your clothes. I also lately had an iron lamp placed by the side of my household gods: hearing a noise at the door, I ran down, and found that the lamp had been carried off. I reflected that he who had taken the lamp had done nothing strange. What then? To-morrow, I said, you will find an earthen lamp: for a man only loses that which he has. I have lost my garment. The reason is that you had a garment. I have pain in my head. Have you any pain in your horns? Why then are you troubled? for we only lose those things, we have only pains about those things which we possess.

[2] Think of it this way: you have fine clothes, but your neighbor does not. You have a window, and you want to air your clothes. The thief does not know what is good for a person. He thinks it is having fine clothes, and you think so too. Won’t he come and take them away, then? When you show a cake to greedy people and eat it all yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it from you? Don’t tempt them. Don’t have a window. Don’t air your clothes. Recently, I had an iron lamp beside my household gods. I heard a noise at the door and ran down. I found that the lamp had been stolen. I thought that whoever took it had done nothing strange. So what next? I said that tomorrow the thief would find a clay lamp. For a person can lose only what they have. I have lost my coat. That is because you had a coat. My head hurts. Do your horns hurt? Why, then, are you troubled? We lose only what we possess, and we feel pain only about what we possess.

The conclusion explains what comes before it. A man cannot have pain in his horns because he has none. A man cannot be upset about losing something he does not possess. Upton says that Epictetus refers to the foolish quibble: "If you have not lost a thing, you have it but you have not lost horns; therefore you have horns" (Seneca, Ep. 45). Epictetus says, "You do not lose a thing when you have it not." See Schweig.'s note.

But the tyrant will chain—what? the leg. He will take away—what? the neck. What then will he not chain and not take away? the will. This is why the antients taught the maxim, Know thyself. Therefore we ought to exercise ourselves in small things, and beginning with them to proceed to the greater. I have pain in the head. Do not say, alas! I have pain in the ear. Do not say, alas! And I do not say, that you are not allowed to groan, but do not groan inwardly; and if your slave is slow in bringing a bandage, do not cry out and torment yourself, and say, Every body hates me" for who would not hate such a man? For the future, relying on these opinions, walk about upright, free; not trusting to the size of your body, as an athlete, for a man ought not to be invincible in the way that an ass is.

But what will the tyrant chain? Your leg. What will he take away? Your head. What, then, can he neither chain nor take away? Your will. This is why the ancients taught the saying, “Know yourself.” So we should practice with small things, starting with them and moving on to greater ones. If you have a headache, do not say, “Alas!” If you have an earache, do not say, “Alas!” I do not say that you must not groan, but do not groan inwardly. And if your slave is slow to bring a bandage, do not cry out and torment yourself, saying, “Everybody hates me.” Who would not hate such a man? From now on, rely on these principles and walk upright and free. Do not rely on the size of your body, as an athlete does. A man should not be invincible in the way a donkey is.

Compare the discussion of the expression Know thyself in Xenophon, Mem. iv. 2; 24.

This should be the method for teaching children."

That is stubborn, as this animal generally is, and sometimes very stubborn. As Schweighaeuser says, the meaning is: "a man should be invincible, not with a kind of stupid obstinacy or laziness and slowness in moving himself like an ass, but he should be invincible through reason, reflection, meditation, study, and diligence."

Who then is the invincible? It is he whom none of the things disturb which are independent of the will. Then examining one circumstance after another I observe, as in the case of an athlete; he has come off victorious in the first contest: well then, as to the second? and what if there should be great heat? and what, if it should be at Olympia? And the same I say in this case: if you should throw money in his way, he will despise it. Well, suppose you put a young girl in his way, what then? and what, if it is in the dark? what if it should be a little reputation, or abuse; and what, if it should be praise; and what if it should be death? He is able to overcome all. What then if it be in heat, and what if it is in the rain, and what if he be in a melancholy (mad) mood, and what if he be asleep? He will still conquer. This is my invincible athlete.

Who, then, is invincible? It is the person who is disturbed by nothing outside his control. I examine him in one situation after another, as I would an athlete. He has won the first contest. But what about the second? What if the heat is intense? What if he competes at Olympia? I ask the same questions here. If you put money in his way, he will scorn it. But what if you put a young girl in his way? What if it is dark? What if he is offered a little reputation, or meets with abuse? What if he receives praise? What if he faces death? He can overcome them all. What if he faces them in the heat or in the rain? What if he is in a melancholy (mad) mood? What if he is asleep? He will still conquer. This is my invincible athlete.

"From the rustics came the old proverb, for when they commend a man's fidelity and goodness they say he is a man with whom you may play the game with the fingers in the dark." Cicero, De Officiis, iii. 19. See Forcellini, Micare.

The manuscripts have ὑομένος or οἰόμενος. Schweighaeuser accepts Upton's emendation of οἰνωμένος, but I do not. The "sleep" refers to dreams. Aristotle, Ethic, i. 13, says: "better are the visions (dreams) of the good (ἐπιεικών) than those of the common sort;" and Zeno taught that "a man might from his dreams judge of the progress that he was making, if he observed that in his sleep he was not pleased with anything bad, nor desired or did anything unreasonable or unjust." Plutarch, περὶ προκοπῆς, ed. Wyttenbach, vol. i. c. 12.