How to Behave Toward Tyrants

If a man possesses any superiority, or thinks that he does, when he does not, such a man, if he is uninstructed, will of necessity be puffed up through it. For instance, the tyrant says, "I am master of all?" And what can you do for me? Can you give me desire which shall have no hindrance? How can you? Have you the infallible power of avoiding what you would avoid? Have you the power of moving towards an object without error? And how do you possess this power? Come, when you are in a ship, do you trust to yourself or to the helmsman? And when you are in a chariot, to whom do you trust but to the driver? And how is it in all other arts? Just the same. In what then lies your power? All men pay respect¹³⁶ to me. Well, I also pay respect to my platter, and I wash it and wipe it; and for the sake of my oil flask, I drive a peg into the wall. Well then, are these things superior to me? No, but they supply some of my wants, and for this reason I take care of them. Well, do I not attend to my ass? Do I not wash his feet? Do I not clean him? Do you not know that every man has regard to himself, and to you just the same as he has regard to his ass? For who has regard to you as a man? Show me. Who wishes to become like you? Who imitates you, as he imitates Socrates?—But I can cut off your head.—You say right. I had forgotten that I must have regard to you, as I would to a fever¹³⁷ and the bile, and raise an altar to you, as there is at Rome an altar to fever.

If a man has some advantage, or thinks he does when he does not, he will inevitably become conceited if he is uneducated. For example, the tyrant says, "I am master of all?" But what can you do for me? Can you give me desires that nothing can frustrate? How could you? Can you unfailingly avoid what you want to avoid? Can you pursue a goal without making mistakes? How do you have that power? Come now, when you are on a ship, do you trust yourself or the helmsman? And when you are in a chariot, whom do you trust but the driver? What about all the other skills? It is just the same. So where does your power lie? All men show me respect¹³⁶. Well, I also show respect to my platter. I wash it and wipe it, and I drive a peg into the wall for my oil flask. Are these things superior to me? No, but they serve some of my needs, and that is why I take care of them. And do I not look after my donkey? Do I not wash his feet and clean him? Do you not know that every man looks after himself, and looks after you just as he looks after his donkey? Who cares about you as a man? Show me. Who wants to become like you? Who imitates you, as he imitates Socrates? But I can cut off your head. You are right. I had forgotten that I must take care around you, as I would around a fever¹³⁷ or bile. I must raise an altar to you, just as there is an altar to fever at Rome.

What is it then that disturbs and terrifies the multitude? is it the tyrant and his guards? [By no means.] I hope that it is not so. It is not possible that what is by nature free can be disturbed by anything else, or hindered by any other thing than by itself. But it is a man's own opinions which disturb him: for when the tyrant says to a man, "I will chain your leg," he who values his leg says, "Do not; have pity:" but he who values his own will says, "If it appears more advantageous to you, chain it." Do you not care? I do not care. I will show you that I am master. You cannot do that. Zeus has set me free do you think that he intended to allow his own son¹³⁸ to be enslaved? But you are master of my carcase: take it.—So when you approach me, you have no regard to me? No, but I have regard to myself; and if you wish me to say that I have regard to you also, I tell you that I have the same regard to you that I have to my pipkin.

What, then, disturbs and frightens most people? Is it the tyrant and his guards? [Not at all.] I hope not. Nothing that is free by nature can be disturbed or hindered by anything but itself. It is a person's own opinions that disturb him. When the tyrant says, "I will chain your leg," a man who values his leg says, "Please don't. Have pity." But a man who values his own will says, "If you think it better, chain it." "Don't you care?" "I don't care." "I'll show you that I'm your master." "You can't do that. Zeus has set me free. Do you think he meant to let his own son¹³⁸ be enslaved? But you are master of my body. Take it." "So when you approach me, you have no regard for me?" "No, but I have regard for myself. And if you want me to say I have regard for you too, I do. I have the same regard for you as I have for my little pot."

This is not a perverse self-regard,¹³⁹ for the animal is constituted so as to do all things for itself. For even the sun does all things for itself; nay, even Zeus himself. But when he chooses to be the Giver of rain and the Giver of fruits, and the Father of Gods and men, you see that he cannot obtain these functions and these names, if he is not useful to man; and, universally, he has made the nature of the rational animal such that it cannot obtain any one of its own proper interests, if it does not contribute something to the common interest.¹⁴⁰ In this manner and sense it is not unsociable for a man to do every thing for the sake of himself. For what do you expect? that a man should neglect himself and his own interest? And how in that case can there be one and the same principle in all animals, the principle of attachment (regard) to themselves?

This is not a misguided concern for oneself.¹³⁹ Every animal is made to do everything for its own sake. Even the sun does everything for its own sake, and so does Zeus himself. But when Zeus chooses to be the Giver of rain, the Giver of fruits, and the Father of Gods and men, he cannot fulfill those roles or bear those names unless he benefits people. In general, he has made rational animals so that they cannot achieve any of their own proper interests without contributing something to the common interest.¹⁴⁰ In this way, it is not antisocial for a person to do everything for their own sake. What do you expect? Should a person neglect themselves and their own interests? If so, how can the same principle apply to all animals, the principle of concern for themselves?

What then? when absurd notions about things inde pendent of our will, as if they were good and (or) bad, lie at the bottom of our opinions, we must of necessity pay regard to tyrants; for I wish that men would pay regard to tyrants only, and not also to the bedchamber men.¹⁴¹ How is it that the man becomes all at once wise, when Caesar has made him superintendent of the close stool? How is it that we say immediately, "Felicion spoke sensibly to me." I wish he were ejected from the bedchamber, that he might again appear to you to be a fool.

What follows? We base our opinions on absurd ideas about things outside our control, as if those things were good or bad. So we must pay attention to tyrants. If only people paid attention to tyrants alone, and not to their bedroom attendants too.¹⁴¹ How does a man suddenly become wise when Caesar puts him in charge of the toilet? How is it that we immediately say, "Felicion spoke sensibly to me." I wish he would be thrown out of the bedroom, so that he would seem like a fool to you again.

Epaphroditus¹⁴² had a shoemaker whom he sold because he was good for nothing. This fellow by some good luck was bought by one of Caesar's men, and became Caesar's shoemaker. You should have seen what respect Epaphroditus paid to him: "How does the good Felicion do, I pray?" Then if any of us asked, What is master. (Epaphroditus) doing?" the answer was, "He is consulting about something with Felicion." Had he not sold the man as good for nothing? Who then made him wise all at once? This is an instance of valuing something else than the things which depend on the will.

Epaphroditus¹⁴² had a shoemaker whom he sold because he was good for nothing. By good luck, the man was bought by one of Caesar's men and became Caesar's shoemaker. You should have seen how much respect Epaphroditus showed him: "How is the good Felicion, please?" Then, if any of us asked, "What is the master (Epaphroditus) doing?" the answer was, "He is discussing something with Felicion." Hadn't he sold the man as good for nothing? Who made him wise all of a sudden? This is an example of valuing something other than what depends on our will.

Has a man been exalted to the tribuneship? All who meet him offer their congratulations: one kisses his eyes, another the neck, and the slaves kiss his hands.¹⁴³ He goes to his house, he finds torches lighted. He ascends the Capitol: he offers a sacrifice on the occasion. Now who ever sacrificed for having had good desires? for having acted conformably to nature? For in fact we thank the gods for those things in which we place our good.¹⁴⁴

Has a man been appointed tribune? Everyone he meets congratulates him. One kisses his eyes, another his neck, and the slaves kiss his hands.¹⁴³ He goes home and finds torches lit. He goes up to the Capitol and offers a sacrifice for the occasion. But who has ever offered a sacrifice for having good desires or acting according to nature? In fact, we thank the gods for the things we consider good.¹⁴⁴

A person was talking to me to-day about the priesthood of Augustus.¹⁴⁵ I say to him: "Man, let the thing alone: you will spend much for no purpose." But he replies, "Those who draw up agreements will write my name." Do you then stand by those who read them, and say to such persons "It is I whose name is written there"? And if you can now be present on all such occasions, what will you do when you are dead? My name will remain.―Write it on a stone, and it will remain. But come, what remembrance of you will there be beyond Nicopolis?—But I shall wear a crown of gold.—If you desire a crown at all, take a crown of roses and put it on, for it will be more elegant in appearance.

Someone spoke to me today about the priesthood of Augustus.¹⁴⁵ I said to him, "Man, leave it alone. You will spend a lot of money for nothing." But he replied, "Those who draw up agreements will write my name." Will you stand beside the people who read the agreements and tell them, "That is my name there"? Even if you can be there every time, what will you do when you are dead? My name will remain. Write it on a stone, and it will remain. But tell me, who will remember you beyond Nicopolis? But I will wear a gold crown. If you want a crown at all, put on a crown of roses. It will look more elegant.