Book 1, Chapter 17
Why Logic Is Necessary
Since reason is the faculty which analyses and perfects the rest, and it ought itself not to be unanalysed, by what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this should be done either by itself or by another thing. Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else superior to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and have no end. Reason therefore is analysed by itself. Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions) and the like. Will you then hear about those things? Hear. But if you should say, "I know not whether you are arguing truly or falsely," and if I should express myself in any way ambiguously, and you should say to me, "Distinguish," I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, "It is more urgent." This is the reason, I suppose, why they (the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything?
Reason is the faculty that examines and perfects the other faculties, and it should not go unexamined itself. So what should examine it? Clearly, either reason must examine itself, or something else must examine it. That other thing must be either reason or something superior to reason, which is impossible. But if it is reason, what will examine that reason? If that reason examines itself, then our reason can do the same. But if we require something else to examine it, the process will go on forever and never end. So reason examines itself. Yes, but it is more urgent to correct (our opinions) and similar things. Do you want to hear about those things? Then listen. But suppose you say, "I don't know whether your argument is true or false." Or suppose I say something unclear, and you say to me, "Explain the distinction." I will no longer put up with you. I will say to you, "It is more urgent." This, I suppose, is why they (the Stoic teachers) put the art of logic first. When measuring grain, we likewise begin by checking the measure. If we do not first establish what a modius is and what a balance is, how can we measure or weigh anything?
Λόγος ἐστὶν δ διαρθρῶν. Διαρθρούν means "to divide a thing into its parts or members." The closest equivalent seems to be "analyse." See Schweig.'s note on ὑπὸ τίνος διαρθρωθῇ _.
This is unclear. The conclusion, "Reason therefore is analysed by itself" does not appear in Epictetus. But, as Schweighaeuser says, it is implied (p. 197, notes). Similarly, Antoninus, xi. 1, writes: "These are the properties of the rational soul; it sees itself, analyses itself." If our reason requires another reason to analyse it, that other reason will require yet another reason to analyse it. And this would continue to infinity. So if our reason can be analysed, it must be analysed by itself. Interested readers may consult the notes on the first part of this chapter in Schweighaeuser's edition.
"Our opinions." As Wolf notes, there is a defect in the text. "The opponent," he says, "disparages Logic (Dialectic) as a thing which is not necessary to make men good, and he prefers moral teaching to Logic: but Epictetus informs him, that a man who is not a Dialectician will not have a sufficient perception of moral teaching."
He repeats the words of the imagined opponent. He means that the opponent's difficulty shows why Dialectic is necessary.
In this case then if we have not fully learned and accurately examined the criterion of all other things, by which the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accurately and to learn fully any thing else? How is this possible? Yes; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which produces no fruit.—But it is a thing which can measure corn.—Logic also produces no fruit.—As to this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say so? And who is it that has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education? And does not Socrates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination of names, what each name signified? Is this then the great and wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this?—What then is the wondrous thing?—To understand the will of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what more have you need of? For if it is true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right.—But in truth I do not apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is?—They say that it is Chrysippus.—I proceed, and I inquire what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand what he says: I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus.—Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the Roman tongue.—What then is this superciliousness of the interpreter? There is no superciliousness which can justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his own account, but because we think that through him we shall know the future and understand the signs given by the gods; nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake, but because through them signs are given; nor do we look with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs?
If we have not fully learned and carefully examined the standard by which we judge everything else, can we fully learn and carefully examine anything else? How could we? But someone says, “A modius is only a piece of wood, and it produces no fruit.” Yet it can measure grain. “Logic produces no fruit either.” We shall see about that. But even if someone grants this, it is enough that logic can distinguish and examine other things. We might say that it can measure and weigh them. Who says this? Only Chrysippus, Zeno, and Cleanthes? Does not Antisthenes say it too? And who wrote that examining names is the beginning of education? Does not Socrates say so? And whom does Xenophon describe as beginning by examining what each name meant? Is understanding or interpreting Chrysippus, then, the great and wonderful thing? Who says so? What, then, is the wonderful thing? Understanding the will of nature. Can you grasp it yourself, by your own power? If so, what more do you need? For if all people err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, you must necessarily act rightly. “But in fact I do not grasp the will of nature.” Who, then, tells us what it is? “They say Chrysippus does.” So I go on to ask what this interpreter of nature says. I find that I do not understand him, so I look for an interpreter of Chrysippus. “Well, think of what he says as if it were said in the Roman language.” Why, then, should the interpreter be so proud? Even Chrysippus has no reason to be proud if he merely interprets the will of nature without following it himself. His interpreter has even less reason. For we do not need Chrysippus for his own sake, but to understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) for his own sake. We need him because we think that through him we will know the future and understand the signs given by the gods. Nor do we need animal entrails for their own sake, but because signs are given through them. And do we not wonder, not at the crow or raven, but at God, who gives signs through them?
Antisthenes, who followed the Cynic philosophy, rejected Logic and Physic (Schweig. note p. 201).
Xenophon, Mem. iv. 5, 12, and iv. 6, 7. Epictetus knew what education should be. We learn language, and we should learn what it means. When children learn words, they should learn what those words refer to. Children can only partly understand the meaning of some words, but they can understand them to some degree. They must learn what words mean. Otherwise, the words mean nothing to them or, just as badly, they misunderstand them. All of us go through life without knowing the meaning of many words we use. Some of us know less than others, but all of us lack this knowledge to some degree.
The supposed interpreter says this. When Epictetus says "the Roman tongue," perhaps he means that the supposed opponent is a Roman who does not know Greek well.
Encheiridion, c. 49. "When a man gives himself great airs because he can understand and expound Chrysippus, say to yourself, If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing to be proud of." See the rest.
Compare Xenophon, Mem. i. 1, 3.
I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacrificer, and I say, Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give. The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets: Man, he says, you have a will free by nature from hindrance and compulsion; this is written here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded. Well then, in the matter of desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can overcome pursuit except another pursuit? And what can overcome desire and aversion (ἔκκλισιν) except another desire and aversion? But, you object: "If you place before me the fear of death, you do compel me." No, it is not what is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is your opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will. For if God had made that part of himself, [10] which he took from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will charge no one. All will be at the same time according to your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets.
So I go to the diviner who interprets these things and performs sacrifices. I say, Inspect the entrails for me and tell me what signs they give. The man takes the entrails, opens them, and interprets them. Man, he says, you have a will that is naturally free from hindrance and compulsion. This is written here in the entrails. I will show you first how this applies to what you accept as true. Can anyone stop you from accepting the truth? No one can. Can anyone force you to accept what is false? No one can. You see that in this matter your will is free from hindrance, compulsion, and obstruction. Well then, is it any different when you desire and pursue something? What can overcome one pursuit except another pursuit? What can overcome desire and aversion (ἔκκλισιν) except another desire and aversion? But you object: "If you place before me the fear of death, you do compel me." No, it is not the threat before you that compels you. It is your opinion that it is better to do one thing or another than to die. In this case, then, your opinion compelled you. That is, will compelled will. For God took a part of himself [10] and gave it to us. If he had made it so that he or anyone else could hinder or compel it, he would not be God. Nor would he be taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, is what I find in the sacrificed animals. These are the things the signs tell you. If you choose, you are free. If you choose, you will blame no one and accuse no one. Everything will be in accord with both your mind and the mind of God. I go to this diviner and to the philosopher for the sake of this divination. I do not admire him for his interpretation, but I admire the things he interprets.