Book 1, Chapter 5

Against the Academics.[49]

2 min

If a man, said Epictetus, opposes evident truths, it is not easy to find arguments by which we shall make him change his opinion. But this does not arise either from the man's strength or the teacher's weakness; for when the man, though he has been confuted, is hardened like a stone, how shall we then be able to deal with him by argument?

If a man opposes obvious truths, Epictetus said, it is not easy to find arguments that will change his mind. But this is not because the man is strong or the teacher is weak. For if the man is hardened like a stone, even after he has been proven wrong, how can we reason with him?

ἀπαχθείς. See the note in Schweig.'s edition.

See Lecture V., The New Academy, Levin's Lectures Introductory to the Phoilsophical Writings of Cicero, Cambridge, 1871.

Now there are two kinds of hardening, one of the understanding, the other of the sense of shame, when a man is resolved not to assent to what is manifest nor to desist from contradictions. Most of us are afraid of mortification of the body, and would contrive all means to avoid such a thing, but we care not about the soul's mortification. And indeed with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state as not to apprehend anything, or understand at all, we think that he is in a bad condition: but if the sense of shame and modesty are deadened, this we call even power (or strength).

There are two kinds of hardening: one of the understanding and the other of the sense of shame. A person becomes hardened when he refuses to accept what is clear or stop contradicting himself. Most of us fear the death of bodily tissue and would do anything to avoid it. But we do not care about the death of the soul. If a person can no longer perceive or understand anything, we think his soul is in a bad state. But if his sense of shame and modesty has died, we even call that power (or strength).

Do you comprehend that you are awake? I do not, the man replies, for I do not even comprehend when in my sleep I imagine that I am awake. Does this appearance then not differ from the other? Not at all, he replies. Shall I still argue with this man? And what fire or what iron shall I apply to him to make him feel that he is deadened? He does perceive, but he pretends that he does not. He is even worse than a dead man. He does not see the contradiction: he is in a bad condition. Another does see it, but he is not moved, and makes no improvement: he is even in a worse condition. His modesty is extirpated, and his sense of shame; and the rational faculty has not been cut off from him, but it is brutalised. Shall I name this strength of mind? Certainly not, unless we also name it such in catamites, through which they do and say in public whatever comes into their head.

Do you know that you are awake? The man replies, I do not. When I dream that I am awake, I do not know it then either. Is being awake no different from that dream? Not at all, he replies. Should I go on arguing with this man? What fire or iron can I use to make him feel how numb he is? He does perceive, but he pretends he does not. He is worse than a dead man. One man does not see the contradiction. He is in a bad state. Another does see it, but he is unmoved and does not improve. He is in an even worse state. His modesty and sense of shame have been destroyed. His ability to reason has not been taken away, but it has been made brutal. Should I call this strength of mind? Certainly not, unless we also call it strength of mind when catamites do and say whatever comes into their heads in public.

Compare Cicero, Academ. Prior. ii. 6.